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PREFACE
Yun Goam (1899-1988), the First Spiritual Leader of
Dae Won Sa Buddhist Temple: A Biography of His
Peacemaking Activities
Chanju Mun
Yun Goam is the master of Daewon Ki, also known as Gi
Daewon, who initiated the International Seminars on Buddhism
and Leadership for Peace, biannually held seven times from 1983
to 1995. He religiously ordained, nurtured and educated his
disciple Daewon Ki. Daewon Ki came to and established Dae Won
Sa Buddhist Temple in Honolulu, Hawaii in 1975. He eventually
made the temple the largest Korean Buddhist temple in North
America. I wrote about him and his peace activities in detail in a
paper entitled “Venerable Daewon Ki and Peacemaking” in my
edited Mediators and Meditators: Buddhism and Peacemaking
(Honolulu: Blue Pine, 2007), pp. v-xxv.
Daewon Ki concentrated his peace activities in two areas. First,
he focused on making peace in the world by holding seven
international seminars and disseminating Buddhist teachings on
peace and justice. Second, as a Korean Buddhist monk, he
dedicated his peace activities to bringing peace between North and
South Korea. He visited North Korea eight times between July
1988 and December 1996. Between these visits, he hosted
numerous meetings with many of the high-ranking administrators
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and politicians of the North Korean government and had thirteen
official meetings with the Federation of North Korean Buddhists.
In 1978, Yun Goam visited the Dae Won Sa Buddhist Temple
and earnestly encouraged his disciple Daewon Ki, founder of the
temple, to propagate Buddhism in the West. In 1980, Yun Goam
visited and became a resident monk at the Dae Won Sa Buddhist
Temple in Honolulu and spiritually and religiously guided his
disciple Daewon Ki. In 1982, Daewon Ki along with his followers
instated his master Yun Goam as the temple’s spiritual leader. Yun
Goam served as the spiritual leader for Dae Won Sa Buddhist
Temple from 1982 until he passes away in 1988.
In 2005, Daewon Ki assigned to me the task of revitalizing the
discussions on Buddhism and peace. Accordingly, I edited and
published four serial books on Buddhism and peace since then and
along with my close colleague Ronald S. Green, am editing and
publishing this current and fifth serial volume on the subject. I
selected papers from the fifth seminar, held in Seoul, South Korea
during November 18-21, 1991 on the theme of “Exploration of
Ways to Put Buddhist Thought into Social Practice for Peace and
Justice” and published them in my co-edited Buddhist Exploration
of Peace and Justice (Honolulu: Blue Pine, 2006). The seminar
was held under the joint sponsorship of Dae Won Sa Buddhist
Temple and the Korean Buddhist Research Institute of Dongguk
University. More than 60 participants came from Canada, China,
Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States.
I selected articles from the seventh seminar, held in Honolulu
during June 3-8, 1995 on the theme of “Buddhism and Peace:
Theory and Practice” and edited and published them in my edited
Buddhism and Peace: Theory and Practice (Honolulu: Blue Pine,
2006). The seminar was held under the joint auspices of the Dae
Won Sa Buddhist Temple and the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Hawaii – Manoa. More than 40 scholars and
religious leaders from Asia, Europe and the United States
participated in the seminar.
I chose articles from the first and second seminars held in
Honolulu during October 22-28, 1983 and in Tokyo Japan during
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December 2-7, 1985 and published them in my edited The World is
One Flower: Buddhist Leadership for Peace (Honolulu: Blue Pine,
2006). The first seminar proceeded under the auspices of the Dae
Won Sa Buddhist Temple and the Department of Political Science,
University of Hawaii – Manoa on the theme of “Buddhism and
Leadership for Peace.” The theme of “Buddhism in the Context of
Various Countries” was examined in the second seminar under the
joint sponsorship of the Dae Won Sa Buddhist Temple and the
Peace Research Institute of Sōka University. Participants came
from China, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Soviet Union, Thailand, and
the United States in the first seminar. Individuals from these six
nations well as from Bali, India and Mongolia participated in the
second seminar.
I selected papers from the third seminar, held in Honolulu
during May 23-28, 1987 on the theme of “Peacemaking in
Buddhist Contexts” and edited and included them in my edited
Mediators and Meditators: Buddhism and Peacemaking (Honolulu:
Blue Pine, 2007). The seminar was cosponsored by the Dae Won
Sa Buddhist Temple and the Peace Institute of the University of
Hawaii – Manoa. Participants included those from China, Japan,
South Korea, Mongolia, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the
United States. I also selected excellent papers among the numerous
submitted to the editorial board of Blue Pine Books in 2006-7,
editing and publishing them.
I was fortunate to have received so many excellent papers in
2007-8 and along with co-editor Ronald S. Green chose among
them to fit the current volume, the fifth serial book on Buddhism
and peace by Blue Pine Books. Because of their lasting importance,
I also included in this volume two articles presented at the sixth
seminar held in Honolulu November 24-28, 1993 on the theme of
“A Buddhist Worldview and Concept of Peace,” those by Y.
Karunadasa and David Putney. The seminar was held under the
joint auspices of the Dae Won Sa Buddhist Temple and the
Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii – Manoa.
Participants included individuals from Korea, Sri Lanka, and the
United States.
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Because of the tremendous debt owed to his master Yun Goam
by Daewon Ki and his peacemaking activities, the following
biography is important. Even though both masters dedicated
themselves to peace building, there are some basic differences in
approach. For example, while Yun Goam tried to create peace at
the individual and spiritual levels, his disciple Daewon Ki
dedicated himself to making peace at the social and international
levels. While Yun Goam prioritized individual and spiritual peace
to social and structural peace, Daewon Ki prioritized social and
structural peace to individual and spiritual peace.
Both shared Korean Buddhism’s ecumenical view, that is, they
inherited the tradition of promoting unity among religious groups.1
They did not exclude other Buddhist doctrines and practices and
did not place any specific philosophy or practice over others. They
harmonized various Buddhist practices such as the meditation of
Seon (Chn., Chan: Jpn., Zen), the chanting of Tantric spells, the
recitations of the names of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, the
recollection of Buddhist images, and other forms of practice, and
did not arrange them hierarchically. They did not treat doctrines
and practices as opposing each other, but as mutually
complementing each other.
Peacemaking Activities: A Biographical Explanation
Yun Goam was born on October 5, 1899 at 425 Sikhyeon
Village, Jeokseong Town, Paju County, Gyeonggi Province. He
was the third son to his father Yun Mun and his mother Jeong
Wonhaeng. His name was Jiho; his ordination name Sangeon; his
honorific Dharma name Goam; and he gave himself the nickname
Hwansan.
Before becoming a monk, he studied Confucian texts at a
village schoolhouse from the age of nine in 1907 to the age of

1

See Chanju Mun, “Wonhyo (617-686): A Critic of Sectarian Doctrinal
Classifications,” in Hsi Lai Journal of Humanistic Buddhism 6 (2005): 290-306.
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twelve in 1910. He also attended Jeokseong Public Elementary
School.2
His short autobiography entitled “Unsu saengae” (A
Wandering Monastic Life) explains his activities from the age of
17 in 1915 until the age of 28 in 1926.3 As the title suggests, he
moved around the nation and from temple to temple. He did not
want to become attached to any place and did not settle down in a
temple. He continuously wandered to learn Buddhism from various
masters and to propagate these teachings constantly to people who
needed to hear them.4
In late summer 1915, he met a wandering monk and followed
him to Mt. Dobong. He stayed at Hoeryong-sa Temple for one
night. He separated from the monk and passed through Hwagye-sa
Temple on Mt. Bukhan in Seoul where he saw several senior
monks chanting Buddhist sūtras while striking a wooden floor with
iron hammers at the temple’s Hwagak Bojeon Pavilion. He was
happy to listen the chanting.
An elderly monk, Jeon Wolhae, then the abbot of Hwagye-sa
Temple and around 70 years old, welcomed him along with the
other resident monks. At their request, he stayed at the temple for
several months. While there, the temple reconstructed the affiliated
hermitage called Samseong-am. He helped them with this project
while studying Buddhism.
When the construction was completed, master Chunsan was
supposed to stay at Samseong-am Hermitage. At the master’s
behest, Goam lived with him for a while at the hermitage.
2

Yun Seonhyo, ed., “Goam seunim haengjang” (Biography of Master Yun
Goam), in his edited Goam keunseunim pyeongjeon: Nege han mulgeon i itteuni
(A Critical Biography of Great Master Yun Goam) (Seoul: Bulgyo yeongsang,
1994), 18.
3
Yun Goam, “Unsu saengae” (A Wandering Monastic Life), in Yun
Seonhyo, ed., Goam daejongsa beobeo-jip: Jabi bosal ui gil (Grand Master Yun
Goam’s Analects: The Ways of a Compassionate Bodhisattva) (Seoul: Bulgyo
yeongsang hoebo-sa, 1990), 370-377. I heavily rely on the autobiography to
introduce this period of his life.
4
Im Hyebong, Geu nuga keun kkum eul kkueotna (Who Awakened from a
Dream?), Jongjeong yeoljeon 1 (The 1st Series of the Biographies of Korean
Buddhism’s Supreme Patriarchs) (Seoul: Garam gihoek, 1999), 209-210.
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However, because he felt heaviness in his chest, he left the
hermitage and wandered without destination. He also visited
several temples in Seoul.
In the fall of 1916, at his age of 18, he happened upon Imje
Seon Propagation Center in Insa-dong, Seoul and occasionally
attended lectures by Baek Yongseong (1864-1940). 5 He thought
that he was a very wonderful master. In the summer of 1917, at the
age of 19, Yun Goam took part in a series of preaching on the
Diamond Sūtra with Baek Yongseong at the center.
One day, Goam asked the master, “According to the Diamond
Sūtra, everything is empty and all forms are like a dream. How can
you explain this sentence?”
After keeping silent for a while, Baek Yongseong responded to
his question, “It exactly explains the Diamond Wisdom.”
He was greatly impressed by the master’s short answer and
decided to consider Baek Yongseong his Dharma master. 6 He
followed him to Mangwol-sa Temple on Mt. Dobong near Seoul
and after a while, he moved down to Haein-sa Monastery where he
met Gim Jesan (1862-1930).7 Gim Jesan practiced Seon at Toeseol
Hall in Haein-sa Monastery and was famous as a vinaya preceptor
and a Seon master.8
Gim Jesan became Yun Goam’s tonsure master and suggested
he become a monk under Baek Yongseong. Yun Goam responded
that he would become a monk under Gim Jesan, keeping in mind
that he would serve Baek Yongseong as his Dharma master. He
studied basic Buddhism at Haein-sa Monastery.
5

I Jeong, ed., Hanguk bulgyo inmyeong sajeon (Dictionary of Korean
Buddhist Names) (Seoul: Bulgyo sidae-sa, 1991), 288-289.
6
Im Hyebong, 371.
7
See the August 8th, 1967 issue of Donga ilbo, HBGJ 1.1.418-419. See
Seonu Doryang, Simmun euro bon Hanguk bulgyo geunhyeondae-sa (The
History of Modern Korean Buddhism through the Newspaper Articles), 4
volumes (Seoul: Seonu Doryang Press, 1995 & 1999). It published the first set
of two volumes in 1995 and the second set of other two volumes in 1999.
Hereafter, I will abbreviate the book title as HBGJ. Here, the first 1 in HBGJ
1.1.418-419 means the first set, the second 1 the first volume, and 418-419 the
page numbers.
8
Yun Seonhyo, ed., Goam keunseunim pyeongjeon, 21-22.
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In 1918, when Gim Jesan moved back to his home temple,
Jikji-sa, in the County of Gimcheon, North Gyeongsang Province,
he wandered here and there. In the winter of 1918, he went to
Hwajang-sa Temple in Gaeseong, Hwanghae Province, and took a
winter intensive retreat at the temple from the 15th day of the tenth
lunar month, 1918 and continued to the 15th day of the first lunar
month, 1919.
When we review his monastic career, we see that he wandered
here and there without stopping until his death.9 For the most part,
he did not stay at any one temple for more than six months. He
thoroughly followed the model of a wandering monk and did not
attach himself to any temple. Whenever people needed him, he
served their needs. He delivered sermons and presided over the
precept offering ceremonies at various temples all over the nation.
Whenever he needed to see teachers in Seon and doctrinal
Buddhism, he did so, visiting the temples and receiving teachings
from them.
In 1919, the nationwide March 1st Movement for independence
from Japan occurred. He also attended the movement for
independence for more than one month along with the temple
members. Because the Japanese police searched for monks who
participated in the movement, he wore patched clothes, put on
straw sandals, took a monastic knapsack on his back, and escaped
to the mountains of Gangwon Province.
He visited and worshipped in the Hall of One Thousand
Buddha Images and the Hall of a Stone Kitigarbha Bodhisattva
Image at Simwon-sa Temple on Mt. Bogae in Cheolwon County,
Gangwon Province. The temple was considered the holy site of the
Kitigarbha Bodhisattva cult.
He visited and drank mineral waters at the Sambang Mineral
Spring in Sambang Village, Sepo County, Gangwon Province. He
went to Seogwang-sa Temple in the County of Anbyeon, South
Hamgyeong Province. Someone guided him to various halls where
he venerated the images enshrined there. The person also led him
to the Hall of Five Arahans and explained its origin. He visited
9

Im Hyebong, 209-210.
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mountain hermitages affiliated with Seogwang-sa Temple for
several months and left the temple for the beautiful beach called
Myeongsa simni in Wonsan City, South Hamgyeong Province.
He walked down to the south along the coastal line of the East
Sea. He finally arrived at the famous Mt. Geumgang (Skt., Vajra;
Diamond). He visited Chongseok Pavilion in Tongcheon County,
Gangwon Province, and arrived and bathed at Onjeong Village
Mineral Hot Springs in Goseong County, Gangwon Province,
located in the outer Geumgang Mountain area. He saw the “Ten
Thousand Spectacular Scenes” on the mountain and entered
Singye-sa Temple.
He visited and greeted the great master Im Seokdu (1882-1954)
at Boun-am Hermitage affiliated with the temple. Im Seokdu10 was
the tonsure master of I Hyobong (1888-1966) 11 who had served
two times as the highest patriarch of the Jogye Order of Korean
Buddhism, from April 1958 until August 13th, 1959 and from April
11th, 1962 until October 24th, 1966. Yun Goam also visited
Bogwang-am Hermitage, affiliated with Singye-sa Temple at
which he observed the lay sculptor Choe Ginam carving stone
Buddha images. We can see at Hwagye-sa Temple in Seoul the one
thousand images that Choe Ginam carved. He then proceeded to
Guryongyeon Falls.
He descended from Mt. Geumgang, passed through Goseong
Town, and arrived at Geonbong-sa Temple. Baljing (d.u.) 12
established the “Society for Chanting Amitābha Buddha for Ten
Thousand Days” at the temple in 758. When they finished the ten
thousand day chanting in 785, 31 monks were said to have been
born in pure lands without changing their physical bodies and 961
lay Buddhist members were said to have been born in Western
Paradise. Here he learned the importance of Pure Land practice. He
ascended to Bori-am Hermitage, affiliated with the temple, where
he stayed for more than one month.

10

I Jeong, ed., 116.
Ibid, 204-205
12
Ibid, 99.
11
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He again left for Yujeom-sa Temple on Mt. Geumgang. At the
time, the great scholar master Gim Dongseon (1856-1936),13 who
became a monk under Byeogam Seoho (1837-1911)14 at Jeongamsa Temple on Mt. Taebaek at the age of 18 in 1873, led the
“Society for Reading the Lotus Sūtra.” Several dozens of monks,
whose ages ranged in their 30’s and 40’s, read and chanted the
sūtra. He taught the sūtra to several dozens of student monks at the
monastic seminary affiliated with the temple. More than 10 monks
also practiced Seon meditation at the Seon Center, affiliated with
the temple’s Banya-am (Skt., prajñā; Wisdom) Hermitage. He also
visited and worshipped the fifty-three Buddha images in the temple
territory.
He went to Mahayeon (Skt., Mahāyāna) Temple in the inner
Diamond Mountain. He observed that 50 to 60 Seon practitioners
attended a series of lectures on the Wisdom Sūtra in 600 sets there.
Two scholar monks Heo Mongcho (d.u.) of Tongdo-sa Monastery
and Gim Gwanheo (d.u.) of Pyohun-sa Temple, one of four major
temples on Mt. Geumgang, taught the sūtra two times a day before
noon and after noon. Each scholar monk was charged with
teaching once each day. While attending the lecture series, the
monks practiced Seon meditation in the morning and in the
evening. He went to Bodeok-gul, a cave near the temple and
recollected the title(s) of Buddha(s) or Bodhisattva(s) for a little
more than one month.
Yun Goam visited Pyohun-sa Temple and studied the four
collections. These are the Shuzhuang (Letters) by Dahui Zonggao
(1088-1163), the Chan Preface by Guifeng Zongmi (780-841), the
Chanyao (Essentials of Chan Buddhism) by Gaofeng Yuanmiao
(1238-1295), and the Beopjip byeolhaengnok jeoryo byeongip sagi
(Excerpts from the Dharma Collection and Special Practice
Record by Guifeng Zongmi with Personal Notes) by Bojo Jinul
(1158-1210).
Generally, Korean Buddhist monastics learn the four
collections in the intermediate class of a traditional monastic
13
14

Ibid, 265.
Ibid, 133-134.
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seminary. They study them at an institutional monastic seminary
affiliated with a big temple or monastery under a scholar monk’s
directorship, not under various scholars here and there. However,
Yun Goam finished the coursework of the four collections under
the personal tutorship of many scholar monks at many temples.15
He studied them at Pyohun-sa Temple, Sinheung-sa Temple,
Goun-sa Temple, Tongdo-sa Monastery, and the Haein-sa
Monastery’s Seoul mission center under various eminent monks.
He studied four texts while meditating at Seon centers. He thus did
not just concentrate on learning the texts.
He left Pyohun-sa Temple on Mt. Geumgang heading south
and arrived in Mt. Seorak. He looked around Mt. Seorak and
entered the Seon Center at Naewon-am Hermitage affiliated with
Sinheung-sa Temple. While staying at the center, he studied the
four collections and practiced Seon meditation for several months.
He departed from Mt. Seorak, moved to the south, and arrived
at Bulyeong-sa Temple in Uljin County, North Gyeongsang
Province. He again moved further to the south and visited Goun-sa
Temple on Mt. Deungun in Uiseong County, North Gyeongsang
Province. He entered the Geumdang Seon Center affiliated with
Goun-sa Temple where he studied the four collections and
practiced Seon meditation for several months, staying through the
winter.
In the spring of 1920 at the age 22, he left Goun-sa Temple and
arrived at Pagye-sa Temple on Mt. Palgong in Daegu. He met at
the temple Jeong Geumo (1896-1968)16 who led the Purification
Buddhist Movement along with Ha Dongsan (1890-1965), 17 I
Hyobong, and I Cheongdam (1902-1971).18 When the great master
Seolsan and the monk Danam came to Pagye-sa Temple, he visited
their rooms and asked for Buddhist teachings from them.
He went to Donghwa-sa Temple on Mt. Palgong in Daegu near
Pagye-sa Temple. He visited Geumdang Seon Center affiliated
with Donghwa-sa Temple and asked for Buddhist teachings from
15

Im Hyebong, 212.
I Jeong, ed., 318.
17
Ibid, 348-349.
18
Ibid, 204-205.
16
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the great master Seoram Uiseong. He left Donghwa-sa Temple for
Eunhae-sa Temple on Mt. Palgong in Yeongcheon County, North
Gyeongsang Province. He went to Gyeongju and visited Bulguk-sa
Temple and its affiliate Seokgul-am Grotto.
He visited Tongdo-sa Monastery on Mt. Yeongchuk in
Yangsan County, South Gyeongsang Province. Korean Buddhists
consider Tongdo-sa Monastery as one of the three jewel temples in
Korean Buddhism along with Songgwang-sa and Haein-sa
Monasteries. Tongdo-sa Monastery represents the Buddha jewel
temple, Haein-sa Monastery is the Dharma jewel and Songgwangsa is the Sagha jewel. Because Jajang (? 590-? 658) took a head
crown relic of the Buddha from China and enshrined it at Tongdosa Monastery, Korean Buddhists regard it as the temple
representing the Buddha jewel in Korea.
He worshipped the stūpa of the Buddha’s relic at Tongdo-sa
Monastery and then moved up to Geurak-am Hermitage affiliated
with the monastery and saw Sin Hyewol (1861-1937),19 the most
famous Chan master in the southern part of the Korean peninsula.
Sin Hyewol was one of the four eminent disciples of Song
Gyeongheo (1849-1912), 20 the revitalizer of Korean Seon
Buddhism in modern times after the persecution of Korean
Buddhism during the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910). Along with Sin
Hyewol (1861-1937), the other three disciples were Jeon Suwol
(1855-1928), 21 Song Mangong (1871-1946), 22 and Bang Hanam
(1876-1951). 23 While living at Geurak-am Hermitage in the
summer, he practiced Seon meditation. He also went to the Seon
center in Bogwang Hall located in the monastery.
He studied the four collections from Haemun, the spiritual
leader of Bogwang Hall Seon Center at Tongdo-sa Monastery. I
Hoegwang (1862-1933),24 then the abbot of Haein-sa Monastery,
established a propagation center in Seoul including a Seon center.
19

I Jeong, ed., 342-343.
Ibid, 144-145.
21
Ibid, 221.
22
Ibid, 210-211.
23
Ibid, 275-276.
24
Ibid, 123-124.
20
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He invited Chan Master Haemun to be the spiritual leader of the
Seon center. When Haemun went to Seoul, Yun Goam also
followed him as an attendant. He studied the four collections from
him and learned meditation from him as well at the Haein-sa
Monastery’s Seoul propagation center.
In 1921, at the age of 23, he entered Mt. Bogae in Gangwon
Province and spent the summer there. He took the monastic
curriculum 25 of the four teachings from the scholar monk
Yongseong (d.u.) on the mountain. The four texts were the
Śūragama Sūtra, the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna, the
Diamond Sūtra, and the Complete Enlightenment Sūtra. Just as he
privately studied the four collections from many teachers at many
different temples, he learned the four teachings from various
instructors at various locations without having a fixed monastic
seminary or teacher.
He heard that Baek Yongseong assembled 50 – 60 Seon
practitioners at Mangwol-sa Temple, located in the vicinity of
Seoul and educated them in Seon Buddhism. He also attended the
teachings on Seon Buddhism. During his free time, he went to
Daegak-sa Temple in downtown Seoul and studied the four
teachings.
In the spring of 1922, at the age of 24, he attended the national
conference for monastics at Gakhwang-sa Temple, then the head
temple of Korean Buddhism, on January 7th of that year. The
participants in the national conference for monastics decided to
abolish the articles and bylaws of the association of 30 abbots of
the parish head temples, which guaranteed the thirty abbots a
monopoly on power in Buddhist society. They agreed to establish
the Central Secretariat Office of the Korean Buddhist Order of
Seon and Doctrine and unite all of the Korean Buddhist
organizations.
The progressive ten parish head temples such as Tongdo-sa,
Beomeo-sa, Haein-sa, Seogwang-sa, Baegyang-sa, Wibong-sa,
25

I Jigwan comprehensively discusses the textbooks used in Korean
Buddhist monastic seminaries in his Hanguk bulgyo soui gyeongjeon yeongu
(Studies in Korean Buddhist Monastic Seminary Textbooks), 2nd edition (1969,
Seoul: Dongguk daehakgyo seongnim-hoe, 1983).
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Bongseon-sa, Songgwang-sa, Girim-sa and Geonbong-sa Temples
withdrew from the association of 30 parish head temples and
established the Central Secretariat Office of Korean Buddhism at
Gakhwang-sa Temple in Seoul. They elected Gwak Beopgyeong
as its acting secretary general. The other pro-Japanese parish head
temples organized the Central Administration of Korean Buddhism
and also located its head office at Gwakhwang-sa Temple. Both
organizations fought against each other to obtain hegemony in the
order.
In 1920, just one year after the March 1st, 1919 Independence
Movement, Gim Namjeon (1868-1936) 26 , Gang Dobong (d.u.),
Gim Seokdu (d.u.) 27 and others resolved to establish a
representative Seon center in Seoul and revive traditional Korean
Seon Buddhism.28 Baek Yongseong, Song Mangong, O Seongwol
(d.u.) 29 and others followed through on the project and began
construction on August 10th, 1921 at Anguk-dong in downtown
Seoul. Construction was completed on November 30th.
On two days, March 30th and April 1st, 1922, 82 monastics,
including O Seongwol, Baek Hakmyeong (1867-1929),30 Hwang
Yonggeum (d.u.), and Song Mangong, established the Seon
Practitioner’s Association as an affiliate organization of the Center
for Seon Studies at the center. They transmitted traditional Korean
Seon and maintained the celibate monastic tradition during the
colonial period. The association accepted only unmarried
monastics as its members.
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The Seon Practitioner’s Association had its headquarters at the
Center for Seon Studies in Seoul. It also had local branches at
nineteen temples such as Mangwol-sa Temple, Jeonghye-sa
Temple, Jikji-sa Temple, Baegyang-sa Temple, Beomeo-sa
Temple, Bulyeong-sa Temple, Geonbong-sa Temple, Mahayeon-sa
Temple, Jangan-sa Temple, Woljeong-sa Temple, Gaesim-sa
Temple, Tongdo-sa Temple, Singye-sa Temple, Namjang-sa
Temple, Seogwang-sa Temple, Seonam-sa Temple, Cheoneun-sa
Temple, Yonghwa-sa Temple and Haein-sa Temple.
The association assigned Yun Goam to establish a branch at
Sangwon-sa Temple on Mt. Odae in Pyeongchang County,
Gangwon Province. Because Ha Dongsan, a more senior monk
than him, practiced Seon meditation at Sangwon-sa Temple at the
time, he carried out Ha Dongsan’s wishes and established a branch
of the association. While practicing Seon meditation at the Seon
center, he used to pray to the Buddha at the Hall of the Buddha’s
Relic, affiliated with Sangwon-sa Temple and continued his
studies of the four teachings.
Around August or September of 1922, he descended from Mt.
Odae. He visited and worshipped the Stūpa of the Buddha’s Relic
at Jeongam-sa Temple on Mt. Taebaek in Jeongseon County,
Gangwon Province. He then headed for Daeseung-sa Temple on
Mt. Sabul in Mungyeong County, North Gyeongsang Province.
The temple hosted a seven-day service. He attended the service
and worshipped the Buddha’s relic, which was revealed to the
participants in the closing ceremony. Next, he visited Gimryong-sa
Temple on Mt. Undal in Mungyeong County, North Gyeongsang
Province, Yongmun-sa Temple on Mt. Sobaek in Yecheon County,
North Gyeongsang Province, and Bongmyeong-sa Temple. He
finally arrived at Jikji-sa Temple on Mt. Hwangak in Gimcheon
County, North Gyeongsang Province. There he served his
ordination master Gim Jesan. He then returned to the Haein-sa
Monastery where he was ordained and continued his studied of the
four teachings there.
He visited Jeonghye-sa Temple, also known as Sudeok-sa
Temple on Mt. Deoksung in Yesan County, South Chungcheong
Province where he served the great Seon master Song Manggong
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and practiced Seon meditation under his guidance at its affiliate,
the Neungin Seon Center. According to the record of the Seon
Center, he attended the summer 1923 intensive retreat with 16
Seon practitioners 31 and he was in charge of the big bell while
practicing Seon meditation at the center. It was also mentioned in
the record that he was a monk of Mangwol-sa Temple on Mt.
Dobong in Yangju County, Gyeonggi Province.
He went back to Daegak-sa Temple in Seoul and read the four
teachings. Hwang Ilgu introduced Unmun-am Hermitage affiliated
with Baegyang-sa Temple to Baek Yongseong and agreed to
establish a Seon center with him at the hermitage. He went to the
hermitage first and prepared to open the Seon center. Around 40 –
50 Seon practitioners participated in the 1923 winter intensive
retreat and practiced Seon meditation under the guidance of Baek
Yongseong. Ha Dongsan also attended the intensive retreat.
In 1924, at the age of 26, he also kept silent and practiced Seon
meditation in the summer intensive retreat at Unmun-am
Hermitage. He then went to Jikji-sa Temple where his vocation
master Gim Jesan resided. He also visited the Toeseol Seon Center
at Haein-sa Monastery and meditated there. Next, he went to Sudoam Hermitage on Mt. Sudo in Gimcheon County, North
Gyeongsang Province and practiced Seon meditation along with
more than 20 Seon practitioners at its affiliate Seon center for the
winter intensive retreat. He also met Jeong Jeongang (18981975)32 and Wolsong, and discussed Seon Buddhism with them.
Then, he spent the winter at the intensive retreat at the center.
In spring 1925, at the age of 27, he went to Jikji-sa Temple and
practiced Seon meditation. He went to the Seon center of Sudo-am
Hermitage where he practiced Seon meditation with the
practitioners Haesan and Wolsong. During that time of practice, he
remained in silence.
Baek Yongseong organized the “Society for Practicing Seon
during the Ten Thousand Days” at Chilbul-am Hermitage on Mt.
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Jiri in 1924. When Yun Goam heard that Baek Yongseong would
continue the society at Mangwol-sa Temple, he went to Seoul to
attend the society’s intensive retreat. Around 50-60 Seon
practitioners assembled and practiced Seon meditation. Seol Seogu
(1875-1958),33 the former highest patriarch of the Jogye Order, and
Jeong Unbong (d.u.) led the society under the direction of its
spiritual leader Baek Yongseong. All members of the society
remained in total silence and did not eat any meals after noon.
Their breakfast consisted of one bowl of rice soup and one other
dish. They then held the chanting service in the main hall from
9:00 am to 11:00 am and later ate lunch with three side dishes,
generally kimchi, miso soup, and a soy sauce.
In 1926, Baek Yongseong moved the society because its
members could not live at Mangwol-sa Temple. He took them to
Naewon-am Hermitage on Mt. Cheonseong, affiliated with
Tongdo-sa Monastery, the County of Yangsan, South Gyeongsang
Province. The government reclassified the forest of Mt. Dobong as
a nature reserve, so the members could not use the forest to make
firewood, without which they could not live through Korea’s long
winters. Yun Goam followed Baek Yongseong and remained in
silent meditation along with 40 to 50 Seon practitioners at
Naewon-am Hermitage.
In 1927, he participated in the summer intensive retreat at the
Toeseol Seon Center of Haein-sa Monastery along with 16 Seon
practitioners. 34 He served as the large bell manager. He also
received an honorific Dharma name, “Hyangdang” as recorded in
the list of Seon practitioners who attended the 1927 summer retreat
at the Seon center. However, there is no record of who presented
him with this name.
In January of 1936, at the age of 38, he presided over a sevenday special service for Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva. He gave a
sermon at the closing ceremony and requested all the participants
to purify the world. 35 In the same year, he graduated from the
33
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highest level of Great Learning at the monastic seminary affiliated
with Woljeong-sa Temple.36
In 1938, at the age of 40, Baek Yongseong recognized Yun
Goam’s enlightenment and gave him an honorific Dharma name
“Goam” with the words: “Who knows the eternal beauty of nature?
When I privately interviewed Goam, the beauty of nature is
eternal.”37 Since then, he was called Goam rather than Sangeon.
He provided Yun Goam the following Dharma-transmission
poem.38
A Buddha and a patriarch do not know each other,
Shaking a head, I do not know.
Yunmen Wenyan’s39 Chinese stuffed pancake40 is round,
A radish of the County of Zhenzhou41 is long.
Except for the second line, the above Dharma-transmission
poem that Yun Goam received from his master Baek Yongseong in
36
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1938 is identical to the following Dharma transmission poem that
Ha Dongsan obtained from the same master in 1935.42
A Buddha and a patriarch do not know each other,
They provisionally say that they transmitted (Dharma)
from mind to mind.
Yunmen Wenyan’s Chinese stuffed pancake is round,
A radish of the County of Zhenzhou is long.
In 1935 and in 1938, Baek Yongseong, who received
transmission from Hwanseong Jian (1664-1729), officially
transmitted the Dharma lineage to his two dharma-successors Ha
Dongsan and Yun Goam. Both of them later served as the highest
patriarch in the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism.
Beginning in 1939, one year after his Dharma transmission
from Baek Yongseong, Goam served as a spiritual leader at
various Seon centers across the nation in temples such as Haein-sa,
Baengnyeon-sa, Pyohun-sa, Jikji-sa, Beomeo-sa Temples, where
he trained Seon practitioners.43
On October 10th, 1945, at the age of 47, he became the director
of the Seon Center at Dabo-sa Temple in Naju County, South
Jeolla Province. Lay Buddhists financially supported the Seon
practitioners and let them concentrate on Seon meditation at the
temple.44 Dabo-sa Temple became one of the famous Seon centers
in the Jeolla Provinces at the time. Later, Seon master Uhwa (d.u.)
succeeded his directorship of the Seon center. When Dabo-sa
Temple became famous, he asked master Uhwa to take over as
abbot for a while to elude the distractions to one’s practice inherent
in running a famous temple.45
Between 1945 and 1954, for ten years, Yun Goam propagated
Buddhism and presided over the precept-offering ceremonies in
various temples and propagation centers across the nation. He
transmitted the Bodhisattva precepts to monastics and lay
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Buddhists and helped them preserve the precepts. He inherited the
vinaya lineage from three vinaya masters, Gim Jesan, Baek
Yongseong, and Bang Hanam.
In his later years, he transmitted to Go Gwangdeok (19271999)46 the vinaya lineage he inherited from Baek Yongseong; to
Gim Tanheo (1913-1983)47 the vinaya lineage he took from Bang
Hanam; and to Jeon Gwaneung (1910-2004)48 the vinaya lineage
transmitted from Gim Jesan. Because Go Gwangdeok was a
disciple of Ha Dongsan, a disciple of Baek Yongseong, he
transmitted the vinaya lineage to him. Because Gim Tanheo was
the most eminent disciple of Bang Hanam, he passed it along to
him. Because Jeon Gwaneung was the disciple of Gim Jesan, he
also gave it to him.49
The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950 and it ended on
July 29, 1953. During the war period, he would visit the Jaun Seon
Center in Gwangju from Dabo-sa Temple in Naju. He allowed
young Seon practitioners to escape the violence by travelling to
other, secular places and lived at Dabo-sa Temple. He conversed
with Jeong Jeongang (1898-1975) 50 who resided at Jaun Seon
Center.
On August 25, 1955, at the age of 57, he was appointed abbot
of Seongju-sa Temple in Masan, South Gyeongsang Province and
he purified the temple of married monastics. Celibate Korean
Buddhist monks officially initiated the Purification Buddhist
Movement with President I Seungman’s first presidential message
issued on May 20, 1954 to cleanse the Japanized elements in
Korean Buddhism and to recover traditional Korean Buddhism’s
celibate monasticism. Even though he was not a central figure in
the movement like Ha Dongsan, I Hyobong, I Cheongdam, Jeong
Geumo, and Son Gyeongsan (1917-1979),51 he also participated in
it.
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On September 30, 1958, at the age of 60, he became the abbot
of Jikji-sa Temple in Gimcheon County, North Gyeongsang
Province. Later, when he normalized the temple’s management, he
handed over the abbotship to another monk. Jikji-sa Temple was
his vocation master Gim Jesan’s home temple. Between 1960 and
1968, he was the spiritual leader of Yongtap Seon Center at Haeinsa Temple at which his Dharma master Baek Yongseong’s
memorial stūpa was elected in July of 1941. The center was closely
connected to his Dharma master Baek Yongseong. His relics and
portrait were enshrined in the center. Baek Yongseong was
ordained at Haein-sa Monastery in 1879. He bought the
neighboring land and expanded the temple territory.
While serving as the spiritual leader at the center, he helped the
director Bogwang, founded the Buddha’s Relic Stūpa and
enshrined three major stone images of Amitābha Buddha,
Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva and Kitigarbha Bodhisattva in a Stone
Grotto. He organized the “Society for Amitābha Buddha and Seon
for Ten Thousand Days.” He had a special ceremony on 15th day of
the ninth lunar month each year and raised fund with which he
protected his master’s memorial gravestone. 52 If other monks
asked him to teach Buddhism and preside over the ceremony of
offering Bodhisattva precepts at the temples, he never declined
their requests. Even though he was the leader at the center, he did
not always stay there. As he had done, if needed, he went out to
help other temples for a while without fixing his residence in a
specific place. He stayed at the center and wanted to preserve it
from decline and protect his Dharma master’s memorial
gravestone.53
When President I Seungman (1875-1965), who strongly
supported the celibate monastic group by issuing six presidential
messages, resigned his presidential position due to a massive
national demonstration on April 19, 1960, the married monastic
group counterattacked the celibate monastic group and tried to
regain hegemony in the temples and the order from celibate monks.
52
53

Ibid, 20.
Ibid, 50-51.

Preface

xxv

Celibate monks organized an emergency committee and reacted
against the attacks from the married monks. Yun Goam was
assigned to take charge of the temples on Jeju Island.54
In 1967, he was installed as the vinaya precept master of the
prestigious Diamond Precept Platform at Beomeo-sa Temple and
until this death on October 25th, 1988, he served as the precept
master. During his term, he transmitted Korean vinaya precepts to
a number of lay Buddhists and monastics and educated them in the
importance of precepts in various temples. He held a myriad of the
precept-offering ceremonies at temples throughout South Korea.
On April 24th, 1965, Ha Dongsan passed away at Beomeo-sa
Temple. In 1943, Ha Dongsan became the vinaya master at
Beomeo-sa Temple and until his death in 1965, he served as the
vinaya leader of the temple. He ordained many monks and also
transmitted Bodhisattva precepts to monastics and lay Buddhists
on the ordination platform. He also presided over many ceremonies
of offering Bodhisattva precepts to lay Buddhists and monastics at
numerous temples across the nation.
After Ha Dongsan’s death, resident monks at the temple
wanted to install a precept master and could not find and establish
an appropriate vinaya master for some time because many Korean
vinaya masters received precepts from a Thai vinaya master of the
Theravāda lineage when he visited Korea. They argued that they
could not install as the ordination master of the prestigious
Beomeo-sa Temple anyone who obtained the Thai vinaya precepts
instead of the traditional Korean vinaya precepts passed from
generation to generation for the long history of Korean Buddhism.
Even though most people knew that Yun Goam did not receive
the Thai precepts, he did not announce that only he did not receive
them in order to be considered by his colleagues as a vinaya master.
When some representative monks from Beomeo-sa Temple went to
Thailand and investigated the list of monks who received the Thai
precepts, they discovered that Yun Goam did not receive the
Theravāda precepts. As a result, they, along with the resident
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monks at Beomeo-sa Temple, recommended Yun Goam for the
position of vinaya master.55
On July 25, 1967, the central assembly hosted its 16th session at
Haein-sa Temple and on July 26th, it accepted the resignations of
the order’s 2nd highest patriarch I Cheongdam and secretary
general Son Gyeongsan. The assembly elected Yun Goam as the
order’s third highest patriarch and Bak Gijong (1907-1987)56 as its
secretary general. Yun Goam was the director of Yongtap Seon
Center, affiliated with Haein-sa Monastery and Bak Gijong was the
abbot of the same monastery.57 It recommended I Cheongdam to
the chair of the Council of Senior Monks and Son Gyeongsan to
the chair of the Committee of Legal Principles. I Cheongdam had
retired to Doseon-sa Temple in the vicinity of Seoul and Son
Gyeongsan to Jeokjo-am Hermitage in Donam-dong, Seoul.
These two highest figures in the order fought one another to
obtain hegemony over the order and disagreed with each other on
the order’s major issues. While I Cheongdam was a radical in the
Purification Buddhist Movement, Son Gyeongsan was a moderate.
They also disagreed with each other on how to revitalize Korean
Buddhism from its degenerate state. Because I Cheongdam
advocated a speedy revitalization of Korean Buddhism, he wanted
to secure funds by selling unused temple properties. However, Son
Gyeongsan opposed his proposal. If they sold the temple properties,
he felt this would set a bad precedent. He suggested the order
invest some money and manage businesses for profit. He invested
the order’s money and lost more than 40 million Korean won. I
Cheongdam asked Son Gyeongsan to resign his position as
secretary general and take responsibility for this failure. Because
Son Gyeongsan refused to do so, both sides fought continuously.
Yun Goam was well known as a very docile, gentle,
compassionate, and forbearing monk among eminent monks. The
public considered him the best choice for the symbolic patriarchate.
Even though he was installed as the order’s highest patriarch on
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July 27th, 1967, he did not give an inauguration speech. As the
highest patriarch, he gave his first, short speech on the closing day
of the summer intensive retreat at the Toeseol Seon Center of
Haein-sa Monastery on the 15th day of the seventh lunar month
(August 20th), 1967.58
When he became the order’s highest patriarch, the mass media
began to spotlight the Yongtap Seon Center of Haein-sa Monastery.
A reporter of the order’s official newspaper Daehan bulgyo visited
the center and reported on it in the September 10th, 1967 issue in
which he mentioned that 18 senior laywomen had been practicing
Seon meditation at the center.59
On September 20th, 1967, the highest patriarch Yun Goam
announced that the order would establish a practice complex at
Haein-sa Monastery where it would educate monks to enhance the
quality of monastic education at the monastery. 60 In the tedious
and long disputes between married and celibate monastic groups,
many unqualified monks were admitted to the order and
furthermore, the order did not educate them well. The public
generally considered monks unqualified and incapable. According
to his proposal, the monks would attend two regular intensive
retreats per year, namely, the summer and winter intensive retreats
with each retreat lasting for three months. In addition to the two
regular retreats, they could attend irregular retreats in various Seon
centers throughout the country. However, because the order did not
systematically manage the practitioners, it did not know where,
when and how long they should practice Seon under what master.
Yun Goam suggested that the order reform the monastic education
system. He argued that the order should strictly execute
compulsory education for newly ordained monks for at least three
years after the establishment of the practice complex. He asserted
that Haein-sa Monastery should be the order’s center even though
its Secretariat Office should of course process the basic
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administrative affairs. He strongly hoped that after constructing a
building, the order would initiate his plan for the practice complex.
On November 26, 1967, the grand master Baisheng (19041989), the president of the national Association of Chinese
Buddhism in Taiwan and the highest patriarch of Linji Chan Sect
visited South Korea. And on December 2nd, he also visited Haeinsa Monastery and took a photo with Yun Goam, then the highest
patriarch of the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism.61
On January 1, 1968, Yun Goam, as the order’s highest
patriarch, issued to Korean Buddhists a speech commemorating the
New Year entitled “If Our Minds are Purified, Our Lands are
Purified.” He often preached this same theme to Buddhists. A
speech with the same title by him was included in the January 1,
1986 issue of the order’s official newspaper Bulgyo sinmun:62
The Buddha says, “If the mind is purified, the Buddha
lands are purified.”63 It means that if our minds are purified,
our nations are purified. When the Buddha was a crown
prince, he observed a world in which people fought against
each other ideologically and ethnically in each nation, were
not in peace, anxiously competed with each other, and were
stuck in a sea suffering birth, living, aging and dying. Even
though I have reconsidered the observation of the Buddha’s,
these problems originate from sentient beings themselves.
However, if we look back to the origin of human beings,
this origin was brighter than the sun and there was a
mysterious creature. This light surrounded the universe and
nurtured all beings. Because the origin is an originally pure
and bright light, we can call it “the awakened mind.” The
mind cannot raise an unwholesome mind at any time. If so,
we can live well in an extensively pure and always bright
nation. Therefore, the Buddha said that if the mind is
purified, the nation is purified. This mind is always a new
61
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day, a new year and a new mind. Because it does not have
the suffering of birth, aging, sickness, dying, anxiety,
sadness, pain, and evil passions and it does not like, dislike,
and envy others, people can live with joy. While
propagating the teaching, the Buddha educated sentient
beings with four methods adopted to attract people to
Buddhism, (1) generosity, (2) lovely speech, (3) benefitting
actions, and (4) a generous mind to allow sentient beings to
see the benefit of practicing the Dharma. Sentient beings
called him the Buddha and paid homage to him.
We should not make only ourselves liked. We should not
make others disliked. Like the crown prince Gautama
Siddhārtha, we should distinguish good from evil and
recover the original light from which we come. We should
transform dark worlds into light ones, suffering into
happiness, and wicked friends into good ones with a new
mind in the New Year. As the Buddha suggested, we
should give rise to a new and always good mind,
implement the four methods and live well in this troubled
society.
Between March 31 and April 4, 1968, for five days, he
presided over a ceremony at Jogye-sa Temple and offered the
Bodhisattva precepts to 1,300 Buddhists. 64 It was the largest
precept offering ceremony since the beginning of the Purification
Buddhist Movement. He also outlined the Bodhisattva precepts in
the ceremony over the course of one hour.
On 8th day of the fourth lunar month (May 5), 1968, as the
order’s supreme patriarch, he issued a message commemorating
the Buddha’s birthday, entitled “Born on the Street and Living on
the Street.” The message was included in the May 5, 1968 issue of
the order’s official weekly newspaper Daehan bulgyo. Yun
Seonhyo, a disciple of Yun Goam, edited and published it in Goam
daejongsa beobeo-jip: Jabi bosal ui gil (Great Master Yun Goam’s
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Analects: The Ways of a Compassionate Bodhisattva) (Seoul:
Bulgyo yeongsang hoebo-sa, 1990), 148-150.
On May 11, the lay leader I Hansang organized at
Jangchungdan Park in Seoul the opening ceremony for the bronze
statue of Master Samyeong Yujeong (1544-1610), 65 a leader of
Korean Buddhist monastic soldiers during the Japanese invasion
period (1592-1598). He was the CEO of Pungjeon Industry
Corporation and financially supported Buddhist organizations. He
also became the president of the order’s official weekly newspaper
Daehan bulgyo. Korean Buddhists have regarded Samyeong
Yujeong as an idol of state protectionism. Yun Goam attended the
ceremony and delivered an address.
On January 1, 1969, he issued, as the order’s supreme patriarch,
the New Year message to Buddhists, entitled “Let Us Purify the
World with a Spirit of Harmony.”66 He listed six harmonies in this
address:67
First, the Buddha taught us to treat own bodies equally with
other people’s bodies. We should not feed only our own
bodies but also other people’s bodies. We should eat meals
and wear clothes equally in our daily lives without
discriminating against others. Second, the Buddha taught us
to harmonize our speech with others and to avoid arguing
with each other. If we see people fighting, we should step
in and help them to resolve the disagreement. We should
not side with one person but should treat both sides equally.
We should use soft and lovely speech towards other people.
Third, the Buddha requested us to think in harmony with
others. We should not adhere to only our opinion but also
listen to others. We should make friends with others.
Fourth, the Buddha asked us to keep the precepts with
others. We should not be proud of ourselves by saying that
we preserve them, but we should equally praise others in
65
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maintaining moral standards. We should practice Buddhist
ethics with others. Fifth, the Buddha taught us to view
things in harmony with others. We should purify our view
and see the positive qualities of others, not the negative
qualities of others. Sixth, the Buddha taught us to maintain
possessions in harmony with others. We should not benefit
only ourselves but we should also benefit others quietly
without letting them know what we have done. If we
remove our own desires and help others, our world would
be naturally harmonious.
On the 8th day of the fourth lunar month (May 23), he gave an
address to celebrate the Buddha’s birthday as the order’s highest
patriarch. He suggested Buddhists to confess their faults, celebrate
the Buddha’s birthday and endeavor to cultivate themselves.
In 1969, he was installed as the spiritual leader of Beomeo-sa
Temple and until his death in 1988, he served that temple as its
spiritual leader, guiding the monks in residence.68 From the time of
the former spiritual leader Ha Dongsan’s death in 1965, the
position was vacant until 1969. I Seongcheol (1912-1993), Ha
Dongsan’s monastic disciple, had served as the spiritual leader of
Haein-sa Monastery since 1967. While his disciple served as the
spiritual leader of presumably the biggest temple in Korea in 1969,
his younger Dharma brother and the order’s supreme patriarch Yun
Goam was installed as Beomeo-sa Temple’s spiritual leader at the
time.
On September 11, 1969, Yun Goam became a director of the
Board of Directors of the Daegak (Great Enlightenment)
Foundation when the disciples and grand disciples of Baek
Yongseong established the foundation at Daegak-sa Temple in
order to inherit and propagate the spirit of Baek Yongseong.
Daegak-sa Temple was the temple that Baek Yongseong himself
established on April 8, 1911. At the time, his Dharma brother I
Dongheon (1896-1983) was elected as the board’s first president.
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Baek Yongseong propagated Buddhism and developed the
independence movement at the temple. He also officially
established and systematized a new religion named Daegak-gyo
(Great Enlightenment Religion) in 1927 and tried to modernize
Korean Buddhism. He also endeavored to preserve Korean
Buddhism’s celibate monasticism from the onslaught of the
married priesthood imported from Japan. Yun Goam inherited his
master Baek Yongseong’s emphasis on monastic precepts and the
recovery of Korean Buddhism’s tradition of celibacy from the
Japanized system of a married priesthood infecting Korean
Buddhism at the time. He presided over innumerable ceremonies
of offering precepts to monastics and lay Buddhists at many
temples all throughout the country.
On January 1, 1970, he gave a speech entitled “Geumgang
bojwa” (Diamond Treasure Seat) as the order’s supreme patriarch
and asked Buddhists to practice the Dharma diligently.69 On the 8th
day of the fourth lunar month (May 12), 1970, the Buddha’s
Birthday, he gave a speech entitled “Let Us Purify the World with
Peace and Mercy.”70
In 1970, he was installed as the second spiritual leader of
Haein-sa Monastery after the first and founding spiritual leader I
Seongcheol. After married monks along with some celibate
monastics established the Taego Order of Korean Buddhism on
May 8th and completely separated themselves from the Jogye
Order, the order hosted a special service for 49 days between
August 23rd and October 10th at Jogye-sa Temple, the order’s head
temple in Seoul. During that time, Yun Goam presided over the
ceremony for offering Bodhisattva precepts to Buddhist
practitioners. In early September, he announced the 3rd session of
the order’s central assembly and on September 23rd, he gave a
speech at the central assembly’s opening ceremony.
On July 22, 1970, I Cheongdam, who had served as the order’s
Supreme Patriarch from November 30th, 1966 to July 26th, 1967,
was appointed the order’s lower-ranked Secretary General. He
69
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served in this position until his death on November 15th, 1971. I
Cheongdam contributed a great deal to the effort to regain the
hegemony of the celibate monks in Korean Buddhism from the
married monks. During his term as the order’s Secretary General,
he actually had handled the order’s administration and Yun Goam
just symbolically served as the order’s patriarch.71
On January 1st, 1971, Yun Goam issued a message to all
members of the Jogye Order. On January 25th, the order revived its
Committee for Planning at a cabinet meeting with the intention that
the committee would advise the supreme patriarch. However, Yun
Goam did not utilize this committee. In March, the order’s
Secretariat Head Office determined that the order would strongly
implement the order’s three major missions of the education for
monks, the propagation of Buddhism to the masses, and the
translation of Buddhist texts in the vernacular Korean language
and convened the Committee for Planning to that end. On May 9th,
the 15th day of the fourth lunar month, the first day of the threemonth summer intensive retreat, he delivered a speech for the Seon
practitioners and strongly advised them to concentrate on their
Seon practice for the next three months.72
On June 26th, the executives of the order’s Secretariat Head
Office determined that they would all resign from their posts if the
order’s central assembly would not pass the revised constitution at
an extraordinary session to be held on July 5th. Because the
Secretariat Head Office wanted to strengthen its role and to
centralize the administration of the order as much as possible, it
submitted the revised constitution. The members of the order’s
central assembly hoped to decentralize the order’s administration
and to give greater autonomy to the parish head temples. Both
sides clashed with each other.
Around that time, Gim Gyeongu, the order’s secretary of
general affairs, arbitrarily sold 60,000 pyeong73 of land belonging
to Yeonju-am Hermitage on Mt. Gwangak near Seoul without
71
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approval from the cabinet or the Secretary General. The order’s
Committee for Inspection investigated the case. The order’s
Inspector General, Secretary General and all cabinet members
submitted their resignations to the order’s central assembly. On
July 27th, the central assembly accepted their resignations except I
Cheongdam, the Secretary General and Song Wolju, the Secretary
of Education at its 26th extraordinary session.
On August 16th, Yun Goam came to Seoul from Haein-sa
Temple to solve the order’s crisis. He discussed how to settle the
current case with I Cheongdam and his secretaries. He also met
some leading monks in Seoul. Over two days, from August 18th to
19th, Yun Goam hosted a meeting of the Council of Elder Monks at
Jogye-sa Temple in which 13 elder monks participated. In the
meeting, they decided to establish an Advisory Committee for the
Order’s Administration under the direct control of the supreme
patriarch. The committee consisted of 22 members. When the
speaker of the central assembly, the secretary general of the
Secretariat Head Office, and the Inspector General recommend
some candidates, the supreme patriarch appoints the members from
among the candidates. The crisis originating from the illegal sale
of the Yeonju-am Hermitage property by Gim Gyeongu allowed
Yun Goam, the order’s supreme patriarch, to officially step into the
order’s administration. He hosted committee meetings three times
in 1971 in order to improve the order’s administration.
On November 15th, 1971, I Cheongdam, the order’s secretary
general, suddenly passed away. When the order hosted a big
memorial service for him at Dongdaemun Stadium on November
19th, Yun Goam attended the service and delivered an address of
condolence. Go Gwangdeok, secretary of general affairs, served as
the acting secretary general. The order’s central assembly elected
Gang Seokju, an independent and neutral monk, as the order’s 7th
secretary general at the order’s 27th regular session. Gang Seokju
did not belong to any particular faction.
On December 2nd , 1971, the 15th day of the tenth lunar month,
the opening day of the winter intensive retreat, he issued an
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address as the order’s highest patriarch in which he asserted that
ignorance and suchness (enlightenment) are non-dual.74
On January 1st, 1972, Yun Goam gave a New Year’s address.75
He asked Buddhists throughout the country to think positively,
open up a new era, and develop the order’s three major missions in
the January 2nd, 1972 issue of the order’s official newspaper
Daehan bulgyo.76 He also announced the principal directions for
purifying the order’s monastics in six points.77 We can understand
his basic ideas on the purification of Buddhism through this article.
The six topics he discussed in the article are (1) the order’s
organizational framework, 78 (2) the participation of religious
practitioners in society, 79 (3) propagation originating from
cultivation,80 (4) the education of monastics,81 (5) the propagation
of Buddhism,82 and (6) the harmony between traditional education
and modern education for monastics.83
On January 2, 1972, he attended the 49th day memorial service
for the late I Cheongdam, former Secretary General, at Jogye-sa
Temple and delivered a memorial speech at the service. Monks
also concurrently hosted a service at Songgwang-sa Monastery in
Suncheon and Bohyeon-sa Temple in Daegu.84
On May 20th, the Buddha’s Birthday, the 8th day of the fourth
lunar month, the order’s Secretary General Gang Seokju read a
message on behalf of Yun Goam. He requested Buddhists to
accumulate all wholesome merit.85 On May 27th, the 15th day of the
fourth lunar month he gave an address celebrating the beginning of
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summer intensive retreat at Seon centers across the nation as the
spiritual leader of Haein-sa Monastery and as the supreme
patriarch of the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism. 86 His speech
was included in Yun Seonhyo, ed., Great Master Yun Goam’s
Analects.87 He emphasized the unity between praxis and theory in
Seon Buddhism in this speech.
The order’s third supreme patriarch Yun Goam’s five-year
term was subject to finish on August 7th, 1972. The order’s central
assembly hosted the 30th extraordinary session for two days from
July 20th to the 21st and unanimously recommended Yun Goam
once more as the order’s 4th supreme patriarch. At the 30th session,
Yun Goam issued an address and urged the central assembly’s
representatives to enrich the order’s and their own inner wisdom
and not to merely strengthen the order’s and their own appearance
with the following words.88
…. Modern society requests Buddhism to effectively
manage its organizations by strengthening its organizations,
enlarge its businesses, and socialize its structure. I well
know that our order accepts and implements these requests
of modern society. In the process, (however), we should
remember to make the internalization of the Buddha’s
teachings a priority. We should understand that if we
superficially extend the order’s external businesses,
strengthen its organizations and propagate Buddhist
teachings without enriching those inner understanding, it
will destroy the order’s future. In order to extend the
order’s influence externally into society, we should enrich
internally and educate ourselves in advance….
On August 23rd, the 15th day of the seventh lunar month, the
closing day of the three-month summer intensive meditation retreat,
Yun Goam delivered a sermon at Beomeo-sa Temple in Busan. He
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taught the Seon practitioners that mind is the center of all things.
He asked them to keep in mind the following four items: (1) Give
rise to the great awakening mind and let it not backslide; (2) make
good friends and let them not to be far away; (3) endure and let
yourselves not indulge in anger; and (4) stay in a proper place and
cultivate yourselves without being distracted until you achieve
enlightenment.89
On August 27th, the order held an inauguration ceremony for
Yun Goam’s second term as the 4th supreme patriarch at Jogye-sa
Temple to which numberless celebrities and 1,500 lay Buddhists
attended to congratulate him. He said in the ceremony that if we
purify our minds, our nations will become purified as well.90
From October 21st through the 22nd, for two days, he hosted a
precept-offering ceremony at Jikji-sa Temple on Mt. Hwangak in
Gimcheon, North Gyeongsang Province and offered the monastic
and Bodhisattva precepts to the monks.91 On November 20th, the
15th day of the tenth lunar month, the first day of the winter
intensive retreat, he also delivered a speech at Jikji-sa Temple.92
On October 17th, 1972, he dictator Bak Jeonghui issued a
special declaration, dissolving the National Assembly, and
declared a nationwide emergency military vigilance. 93 Ten days
later, on October 27th, the government’s emergency cabinet
notified the revised version of constitution called the Reformation
Constitution by the military dictatorial government. The
constitution allowed the president to control all three branches of
administration, legislation, and judicature, changed the president’s
shorter term in office to a longer eight-year term, allowed the
president to run for the presidency without any term limit,
established the national convention for delegates, and let its
members elect the president. On November 21st, the government
passed the revised constitution through a national referendum. On
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December 27th, Bak Jeonghui was inaugurated as the South Korean
Government’s 8th president and promulgated the constitution. He
campaigned to reform society in order to justify his unusual and
improper actions.
During this period, Korean Buddhism was influenced by the
socio-political atmosphere.94 On December 7th, because the order,
as a long-time pro-government institution, felt that it should
support the government’s measures, it convened a conference for
the leading monks, giving them the opportunity to discuss how to
reform Buddhism. Yun Goam assigned them to submit a list of
twenty reforms for the order. They submitted the list to the order’s
central assembly and requested the assembly to enact all twenty
points. They particularly discussed the order’s ordination system
and the reform of monastic robes. The assembly arranged a budget
for implementing this proposal. On the same day, he issued a
message asking them to discuss the order’s issues, actualize the
purification of Korean Buddhism from all Japanese influence and
reveal the holy principles of the Buddha in this modern society.95
On December 9th, he issued a message to the opening of the central
assembly’s regular session in which he suggested them to revise
the order’s constitution and discuss the order’s urgent issues.96
On December 21st, the order initiated the secretariat office for
the highest patriarch and Yun Goam appointed Im Wongwang as
his chief secretary. He was ordained under Yun Goam at Dabo-sa
Temple in Naju, South Jeolla Province in 1942.
On January 1, 1973, Yun Goam published the supreme
patriarch’s message in that day’s issue of the order’s official
weekly newspaper Daehan bulgyo.97 From January 23rd to the 25th,
the order’s central assembly held the 32nd extraordinary session
and reshuffled the major position-holders in the order. Because
Secretary General Gang Seokju resigned in December 1972, the
position was vacant. The assembly passed a resolution that the
order would protect its sovereignty from the government’s
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intervention, an unusual action for a pro-government institution. It
elected Son Gyeongsan as the order’s 9th secretary general, Chae
Byeogam as the speaker of the central assembly, and Gim Jihyo
(1909-1989)98 as its inspector general. On January 27th, Yun Goam
conferred appointment letters to newly elected persons. Son
Gyeongsan returned to the secretary general position after five
years and six months. 99 Due to the power struggle with the
supreme patriarch I Cheongdam, he resigned this position on July
26, 1967 along with I Cheongdam.
On February 17th, the 15th day of the first lunar month, Yun
Goam attended the closing ceremony for the winter intensive
retreat and delivered a speech at Jikji-sa Temple on Mt. Hwangak
in Gimcheon, North Gyeongsang Province in which he suggested
Seon practitioners to practice diligently. On May 17th, the 15th day
of the fourth lunar month, he presided over the opening ceremony
for the summer intensive retreat at Jogye-sa Temple in which more
than 1,000 lay Buddhists and monastics participated. He asked
them to cultivate their minds with endurance and to endeavor to
remove ignorance.100
On May 29, 1973, the secretary general Son Gyeongsan
requested the supreme patriarch Yun Goam to approve his
dismissal of the director of the bureau of social affairs.101 However,
Yun Goam rejected Son Gyeongsan’s request. Even though six
major executives of the Secretariat Head Office, including the
secretary of general affairs, ritualistically submitted their
resignation letters to the patriarch Yun Goam, they did not expect
the patriarch to accept the letters. However, Yun Goam accepted
all six resignations.
Some people questioned whether or not the patriarch had the
authority to do this under the order’s bylaws. The problem in fact
originated from the constitution’s ambiguous rules on the
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relationship between the patriarch and the secretary general. While
the patriarch Yun Goam wanted to extend his authority, the then
secretary general Son Gyeongsan understood that Yun Goam was
just the order’s symbolic spiritual leader and the secretary general
should have full responsibility for administering the order. Since
this case in the 1970’s, because of structural and legal problems
regarding the roles and responsibilities of the patriarch and the
secretary general, the order’s two highest administrators have
competed with one another for control of the order’s
administration.
On April 22nd, 1970, the dictator Bak Jeonghui announced in a
national meeting for provincial ministers the initiation of a new
village-making movement. Since then, the movement patronized
by the government became a nationwide movement. The
government regularly intervened in and guided the movement in
the 1970’s. From 1970 to 1971, the government began to
modernize farming villages through this movement. In 1972, the
government implemented the movement on a national scale and in
1973, it systemized the movement. However, after his close aide
Gim Jaegyu, then the director of the Korean CIA, assassinated
President Bak Jeonghui on October 26th, 1979, the movement lost
momentum and began to decline.
However, the Jogye Order had positively responded to the
government and this government-sponsored movement.102 On June
23rd, 1973, the order held a national conference for Buddhists for
reforming the people’s eating habits at the gigantic Jangchung
Gymnasium in which more than 10,000 people participated. The
supreme patriarch Yun Goam attended the massive conference and
strongly recommended Buddhists to participate in the New
Village-making Movement and to reform dietary habits.
On July 3rd, the order hosted a ceremony to celebrate Bulguksa Temple’s one thousand year anniversary, having restored its
original form after construction over the four years and two
months.103 Because President Bak Jeonghui also was interested in
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the restoration project and provided government funds for the
project, he also attended the ceremony. Because the temple is
located in Gyeongju, the capital for the former kingdom of Silla, it
had been famous for tourism. The government’s high-ranking
officials and the order’s high executives as well as more than five
thousand Gyeongju citizens and Buddhists attended the ceremony.
From August 26th to the 31st, the 2nd international conference
for World Buddhist Youth Leaders was hosted at various locations
including Seoul and other major cities in Korea. 104 With 62
representatives from 12 nations such as South Korea, Thailand, the
United States, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos,
Khmer, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Nepal attending, Yun Goam
delivered his speech as the Jogye Order’s supreme patriarch at the
opening ceremony.105 He requested them to purify the world with
the Buddha’s teachings.
In 1973, Sinheung-sa Temple, in which his disciple Mun
Seongjun served as abbot, installed Yun Goam as its spiritual
leader. Yun Goam then served as its spiritual leader between 1973
and 1976. On October 17th, he attended a ceremony in
commemoration of the temple’s successful remodeling of
Sinheung-sa Temple on Mt. Seorak in Sokcho, Gangwon Province.
He complimented the then abbot Mun Seongjun who had
successfully reconstructed the temple buildings destroyed during
the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and recovered the original
temple’s atmosphere for his lay and monastic supporters.106
On December 5th and 15th, 1973, the supreme patriarch Yun
Goam issued special messages stating that he would temporarily
suspend the order’s central assembly.107 Since 1954, the minority
of celibate monks kicked out the majority of married monks from
the order and temples by relying on non-Buddhist methods, that is,
physical violence and the support of the external government. Thus,
they accomplished the Purification Buddhist Movement through
the government’s backing. During the movement, many
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unqualified monks flooded the order and began to push for their
interests. Because the order could not have educated the newly
ordained monks properly during the movement period, 1954 –
1962, Yun Goam felt that it was time to purify and discipline the
monks.
Secretary General Son Gyeongsan and his cabinet members as
well as some members of the central assembly also supported the
supreme patriarch Yun Goam’s message.108 On December 19th, the
representatives of the order affiliated organizations and the leading
monks held a meeting and passed a resolution that they would
understand and follow the highest patriarch Yun Goam and his
special address.
On the other hand, on December 20th, 1973, some monks
opposed the patriarch Yun Goam’s special address and met at
Silleuk-sa Temple in Yeoju County, Gyeonggi Province. On
December 28th, some leading monks, some abbots of parish head
temples, and some central assembly members held a preparatory
conference for organizing the Society for the Protection of the
Order’s Ecclesiastical Authority at Jogye-sa Temple. On January
3rd, 1974, they convened a meeting at Gwaneum-sa Temple in
Daegu and, arguing the supreme patriarch’s special address was
unconstitutional, they passed five resolutions in the conference,
including a resolution that they would request the central
assembly’s speaker to convene a session by January 15th. They also
organized the Society for the Protection of the Order’s
Ecclesiastical Authority and elected O Nogwon, abbot of Jikji-sa
Temple, one of the 25 parish head temples, as its president. On
January 5th, they submitted the five resolutions to the order’s
Secretariat Head Office. Eight parish head temples formed the
order’s opposition group. The ruling side represented by the
order’s Secretariat Head Office and the opposition side by the
Society fought against each other to obtain control of the order. On
January 17th, 1974, the parish head temples met at Cheongnyongam Hermitage in Seoul, organized the National Association of
Parish Head Temples, and decided to manage their own
108
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administration independently of the order’s Secretariat Head
Office.
On January 27th, the highest patriarch Yun Goam again issued
a special message and asked Buddhists to work in harmony with
one another and to accomplish the purification of Buddhism. From
February 1st to the 6th, the supreme patriarch, the secretary general
and the speaker of the ruling faction conceded to the opposition’s
request and held the central assembly’s 32nd session. The two sides
fought against each other at the session. The opposition party also
informed the ruling group that it had decided not to host a national
conference for monastics. On February 1, 1974, Goam issued a
message at the opening ceremony and recommended the members
of the central assembly to purify monasticism.109 Even though the
opposition side’s representatives asked even the order’s highest
administrator Secretary General Son Gyeongsan to step down from
his position, they did not succeed in removing him from his
position. However, they did succeed in having three cabinet
members of Son Gyeongsan’s administration fired.
In mid April 1974, the highest patriarch Yun Goam presented
eight principles for the order’s monastic purification with the
cosigners Secretary General Son Gyeongsan, Speaker Chae
Byaegam, Inspector General Gim Jihyo and five major secretaries
of the Secretariat Head Office. 110 The eight principles for the
monastic order were (1) cultivation, (2) propagation, (3) translation,
(4) discipline, (5) diligent work, (6) compassion, (7) stateprotectionism, and (8) trust. He argued that the purification of the
monastics could not be possible without increasing the
qualifications of the monastics in the order. He recommended
reflection on the order’s previous steps and the accomplishment of
monastic purification.
On May 24, 1974, the order’s Secretariat Head Office
(Secretary General Son Gyeongsan) appointed Hwang Jingyeong
as the abbot of Bulguk-sa Temple. On June 3rd, the then abbot I
Beomhaeng took the case to court and applied for provisional
109
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disposition to settle the matter. Due to an uncompromising struggle
between Chae Byeogam and Bak Byeogan on the presidency of the
Dongguk University Foundation, the government’s Department of
Education temporarily appointed 13 directors of the foundation on
June 11th and instructed them to manage the foundation for three
months. During that time, Seo Dongak resigned as the university’s
president and the foundation elected I Seongeun to replace him in
that position.
The order convened a meeting for the Advisory Committee for
the Order’s Administration. 111 The committee members
determined in the meeting that the order should settle the case of
Bulguk-sa Temple by July 1st and appoint monks as directors
within three months to solve the issues at Dongguk University. The
committee reported these resolutions to the order’s supreme
Patriarch Yun Goam and requested him and the order’s Secretariat
Head Office to implement them.
Upon the committee’s request, the order’s Secretariat Head
Office accepted Hwang Jingyeong’s resignation and appointed
Choe Wolsan as the temple’s abbot with I Beomhaeng’s
cooperation. He was the elder Dharma brother of I Beomhaeng and
was the director of the Seon Center affiliated with Bulguk-sa
Temple.
On July 16th, a national conference for monks (Convener Yun
Wolha) was convened by Yun Wolha to resolve the chaos
occurring in the order. 112 Fully realizing his responsibility for
finding a solution to the order’s serious disorder, Yun Goam
announced his resignation at the national conference and suggested
the executives of the order’s Secretariat Head Office and Inspector
General Office resign from their positions. From July 18th to the
23rd, the order’s central assembly hosted the 35th extraordinary
session, accepted the resignations of the highest patriarch Yun
Goam and those occupying the four major posts of the order’s
Secretariat Head Office except the Secretary General Son

111
112

Im Hyebong, 233.
Monastic Alumni Association of Dongguk University, ed., 47.

Preface

xlv

Gyeongsan and elected the 5th supreme patriarch I Seoong. His
inauguration took place on August 3rd.
After removing himself from the order’s politics in 1974, Yun
Goam endeavored to propagate Korean Buddhism internationally
and domestically even though he was by then a man of many years.
Internationally speaking, in 1976, at the age of 78, Yun Goam
visited Japan and Guam and hosted ceremonies of offering
Bodhisattva precepts to lay Buddhists at several Korean temples.
In 1978, he became the advisor to the Society for Memorizing the
War Dead Overseas and then, he presided over memorial services
in many places in the Pacific region.113 On January 7, 1978, he
visited Daewon-sa Temple (currently Muryang-sa Temple) in
Honolulu and Gwaneum-sa Temple in Los Angeles where he
presided over ceremonies of offering Bodhisattva precepts to lay
Buddhists. On the way back to Korea, he visited four holy
Buddhist sites in India.114
Domestically speaking, between 1977 and 1988, the year in
which he passed away, he served as the director of the Daegak
Foundation that Baek Yongseong originally founded. On
November 5, 1977, he presided over the ceremony enshrining the
Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva image at Naksan-sa Temple in
Yangyang County, Gangwon Province, belonging to the parish
headquarter temple Sinheung-sa in Sokcho City, Gangwon
Province, abbots of which were his disciples. More than seven
thousand people attended. He delivered a speech at the
ceremony.115
On May 6th, 1978, the order’s central assembly held a meeting
and again elected Yun Goam as the new supreme patriarch, Yun
Wolha as the new secretary general and Gim Seoun as the new
speaker.116 It also revised the constitution and changed the head of
the order’s administration from the supreme patriarch to the
secretary general, defining the supreme patriarch as the order’s
symbolic and spiritual figure. However, on May 10th, the then
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supreme patriarch I Seoong announced that he would continue his
patriarchate.
At the time, the order was divided in two. The ruling group had
its headquarters at Jogye-sa Temple, led by supreme patriarch I
Seoong. This group advocated the then constitution that prescribed
the supreme patriarch as the order’s highest administrator. The
opposition group had its headquarters at Gaeun-sa Temple. On
March 10, 1978, the opposition group elected Chae Byeogam as
their own group’s supreme patriarch Chae Byeogam and Yun
Wolha as secretary general. The group advocated revision of the
constitution to change the head of the order’s administration from
the supreme patriarch to the secretary general.
Upon Chae Byeogam’s resignation from the position of
Supreme Patriarch for the opposition due to illness, the opposition
group recommended Yun Goam as its own acting supreme
patriarch. 117 On July 18th, the Seoul High Court also appointed
Yun Goam to this position. On July 31st, the leader of the ruling
group, Supreme Patriarch I Seoong, handed over power to Yun
Goam. On August 2nd, Yun Goam appointed I Seongsu as the
order’s secretary general as well as other monks to other major
cabinet posts. On August 3rd, he issued a special message in which
he would normalize the order’s management and recover its
authority.118 On August 11th, he agreed with the opposition group
that he would concede his power as the order’s acting patriarch to
the central assembly. On August 12th, the abbots of 25 parish head
temples convened a meeting and determined that they would
support Yun Goam and his administration. With this support, Yun
Goam announced that he would terminate the 4th central
assembly’s term and notified the opposition group that he would
not continue with their agreement anymore.
On September 6th, he issued his 1st emergency order and
organized an emergency central assembly, 119 appointing 65
representatives to this emergency central assembly. As the acting
117
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supreme patriarch, he completely disconnected his relations with
the opposition group and wholeheartedly backed up the ruling
group led by former supreme patriarch I Seoong. He who had
supported the supreme patriarch-centered administrative system
could not get along with the opposition group that advocated the
secretary general-centered administrative system. Even though he
had been the acting supreme patriarch with the support of the
opposition group, he disconnected his relationship with the
opposition and sided with the ruling group.
On September 9th, the emergency central assembly convened
the 1st session and elected Choe Wolsan as the speaker and Gim
Hyejeong and Im Wongwang as co-vice speakers. 120 At the 2nd
session held from September 25th to the 26th, the central assembly
again revised the constitution and changed the highest administer
from the secretary general to the supreme patriarch. On September
26th, the assembly extended the supreme patriarch’s power. For
example, if needed, the supreme patriarch could issue emergency
orders. At the time, the supreme patriarch could appoint the order’s
secretary general, inspector general, and even the abbots of the 25
parish head temples.121 On September 30th, Yun Goam appointed
the major cabinet members and executives in the order’s
Secretariat Head Office.
He led 15 delegates of Korean Buddhism and attended the 12th
WFB (World Fellowship of Buddhists) General Conference held in
Tokyo on October 1st through the 11th. He delivered an address at
the conference and urged world Buddhist leaders to cooperate with
one another and to create peace and prosperity through the
Buddha’s teachings in this struggling society.122
On October 18th, during the 3rd session, the central assembly
elected Yun Goam as the order’s Supreme Patriarch, Choe Wolsan
as the Secretary General and Gim Jihyo as the Inspector General
and nullified the opposition group’s central assembly. He
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successfully returned the secretary general-centered administrative
system to the supreme patriarch-centered administrative system.
On November 12th, the ruling group hosted the inauguration
ceremony for the 6th Supreme Patriarch Yun Goam at Jogye-sa
Temple. More than 3,000 people attended and celebrated his
installment in the inauguration ceremony. He delivered a speech in
which he enlisted three principles for the order’s new direction.123
The first principle was harmony. He requested Buddhists to act in
harmony and to revive Buddhism from its state of decay. The
second principle was religious cultivation and diligence. He
proposed that lay Buddhists practice for themselves and propagate
Buddhism for the masses. To disseminate Buddhism smoothly, he
mentioned that the order should revise the constitution and
centralized the distribution of power to the supreme patriarch. The
third principle was to engage in creative activities. He
recommended the Buddhists plan and implement long-term
projects as he felt that the order should modernize and popularize
Buddhism among the masses.
However, it is difficult to see his inauguration as being
legitimate. Only one faction of the order elected and installed him
as the order’s supreme patriarch. The Jogye Order today also does
not recognize him as the 6th highest patriarch, but considers I
Seongcheol as the 6th supreme patriarch who began his term in
January 10th, 1981.124
On the other hand, on October 23rd, the opposition group
convened the 49th extraordinary session and opened the 5th central
assembly. 125 After all, two central assemblies in one order were
held. The ruling side and the opposition side organized their own
5th central assemblies. At the session, the opposition side’s central
assembly elected Son Gyeongsan as its speaker, did not agree the
authenticity of the emergency central assembly and nullified the
election of the supreme patriarch Yun Goam at the emergency
central assembly’s session.
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On May 6th, 1978, Yun Goam became the president of the
Association of Korean Buddhist Sects. On January 20th, 1979, he
delivered a speech at the New Year’s ceremony. He recommended
all Korean Buddhist sects to cooperate to develop Korean
Buddhism and help the nation.126
From the second half of 1979 to March 20th, 1980, both sides
took several cases to court. The court ruled sometimes for and
sometimes against the ruling side.127 Based on the court’s rulings,
both sides went back and forth between their hopes and fears
during that time. On March 30th, 1980, when monks of both sides
attended the 100th day memorial service for the late Son
Gyeongsan at Jeokjo-am Hermitage in Seoul, both sides agreed to
dissolve the two separate central assemblies and hold a general
election for the representatives of the 6th central assembly in 20
days.
On April 1st, both groups ratified the agreement and decided to
hold a general election for the 6th central assembly’s 69
representatives on August 17th and open the central assembly on
April 26th.128 On April 26th and 27th, 1980, the central assembly
elected Song Wolju as the order’s Secretary General, Hwang
Dogyeon as the speaker and Yu Woltan and Jeong Chou as the
vice-speakers. They could not make a recommendation for the
order’s supreme patriarch because of serious conflicts between the
two factions.
Each side recommended its own supreme patriarch candidate
as a candidate, I Seongcheol (1912-1993) and Choe Wolsan (19121997) respectively.129 I Seongcheol was a disciple of Ha Dongsan
(1890-1965) who was a disciple of Baek Yongseong (1864-1944).
A resident monk of Haein-sa Monastery, I Seongcheol was a
successor to Baek Yongseong’s Dharma lineage. Korean Buddhists
call this lineage the Beomeo-sa Temple Dharma lineage because of
the connection of Baek Yongseong and that temple in Busan. He
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was also a Dharma nephew of Yun Goam, another disciple of Baek
Yongseong. Choe Wolsan, a resident monk of Bulguk-sa Temple,
was a successor to Song Mangong’s Dharma lineage. He was a
disciple of Jeong Geumo (1896-1968),130 a Dharma successor of
Bowol (1884-1924). Bowol was a disciple of Song Mangong
(1871-1946), a representative of Song Mangong’s Dharma lineage.
Korean Buddhists call the lineage the Sudeok-sa Temple Dharma
lineage because of the connection between Song Mangong and the
temple in Yesan County, South Chungcheong Province. The newly
elected secretary general, Song Wolju and the vice speaker, Yu
Woltan were the younger Dharma brothers of Choe Wolsan. All
three monks were disciples of Jeong Geumo. These Dharma
lineages at times both competed and cooperated with one another
and were the two major Dharma lineages of modern Korean
Buddhism. The majority of monks in the Jogye Order belong to
one or the other of the two, although there are some minor Dharma
lineages. Even though each lineage supported the candidate
affiliated with its own lineage, neither of them received a majority
vote.131
On May 13th, Yun Goam handed over power to the newly
elected Secretary General Song Wolju. 132 The ruling faction
became the opposition faction and vice versa with Song Wolju
representing the opposition. Because he became the order’s highest
administrator at the time, his became the ruling faction. The order
officially united, although, at the time, the two groups had their
own administrative head offices. The ruling group had its head
office at Jogye-sa Temple and the opposition group was
headquartered at Gaeun-sa Temple. Each group had its own
supreme patriarch and secretary general as well. They ultimately
united these two head offices into one that was moved to Jogye-sa
Temple.
During his time as acting supreme patriarchate, July 18th, 1978
to May 13th, 1980, Song Wolju engaged in many contradictory
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actions. Even though he had a famous reputation as a
compassionate monk and as a politically neutral and detached
leader, he had behaved as a typical corrupt politician addicted to
power during that difficult period. Even though he definitely had
difficulty bringing the two factions together, he should have taken
responsibility for engaging in such ugly politics. He was
structurally subject to behaving as a monk-politician while serving
as the order’s acting supreme patriarch.
Yun Goam became the order’s third supreme patriarch on July
26, 1967 on which date the supreme patriarch I Cheongdam and
the secretary general Son Gyeongsan came into conflict with one
another. He also became the acting supreme patriarch on July 18th,
1978 and took over as acting supreme patriarchate on July 31st,
1978 from the 5th supreme patriarch I Seoong. The order requested
Yun Goam to intervene in the emergencies that arose and solve
them. When he was installed as the supreme patriarch and as the
acting supreme patriarch, the order was in crisis.133 In this crisis,
they seemed to need a monk who always emphasized harmony.
During the disputes between the ruling group and the
opposition group, Yun Goam became the advisor to the
government’s Department of Unification on February 9, 1980, and
a member of the Advisory Committee for the Government’s
Administration on February 18th. In 1980, he also became the
spiritual leader of the association of Baek Yongseong’s Dharma
descendants,134 as he had inherited the Dharma lineage from Baek
Yongseong.
Because the order could not install its highest patriarch due to
serious conflicts between opposition and ruling factions, on May
21st, 8th day of the fourth lunar month, the Buddha’s Birthday, the
supreme patriarch could not deliver a message. Due to the
unavailability of a message from the supreme patriarch, Bak
Gijong, chair of the Council of Elder Monks, gave the speech for
the Buddha’s Birthday. 135 After that, the central assembly tried
133
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twice to elect the order’s supreme patriarch, but it was
unsuccessful.136
On August 31st, the newly elected Secretary General, Song
Wolju, internally began to discuss how to purify Buddhism from
within the order.137 On October 20th, the order confirmed detailed
directives to purify Buddhism independently of the government’s
intervention. On August 14th, the order also externally organized
the Propulsion Committee for Revising the Government’s
Buddhism-related Laws and commissioned the committee to
devise the revised laws. On September 15th and 16th, the order
hosted the conference for demanding the government to revise the
Buddhism-related government laws at Jogye-sa Temple and
confirmed the order’s revised versions of the laws that the
committee had drafted. Two days later, on September 17th, the
order submitted a tentatively revised version of the laws to the
government’s Department of Education and Information. Thus,
Song Wolju’s administration tried to reform Buddhism internally
and revise the government’s laws discriminating Buddhism
externally. The order’s reform movement originated in some ways
from the social atmosphere after the death of the longtime dictator
Bak Jeonghui.
On October 26, 1979, Gim Jaegyu, then the director of the
Korean CIA, assassinated his superior, President Bak Jeonghui.
After that, by taking advantage of the political situation, the
opposition group demonstrated for democratizing South Korea.
The government and the military suppressed the demand for
democracy. On May 18, 1980, citizens and students in Gwangju
protested against the military’s intervention in politics and asked
the government to democratize South Korea. On May 24th, the
order sent a relief squad and a fact-finding mission to Gwangju.138
On October 27, 1980, the Martial Law Command dispatched
the military to the order’s Secretariat Head Office and major
136
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temples at four o’clock in the early morning under the pretext of
social purification and it arrested 153 monks and lay Buddhists
including the Secretary General, Song Wolju, Yun Wolha, Gim
Seoun, Yu Woltan, I Hyeseong, and others.139 One day later, on
October 28th, the Martial Law Command announced that they were
investigating 46 corrupt monks and lay Buddhists for religious
purification based upon the requests of conscientious Buddhists.
On October 30th, the command dispatched the police and the
military to more than 3,000 temples of 18 sects across the nation
under the pretext of searching for Communist sympathizers and
criminals hiding in temples. On November 13th, the command
announced that it had confined 18 corrupt monks, defrocked 32
monks, and confiscated from dishonest monks 20,060,000,000
won that they obtained improperly and took the amount back to the
order. Korean Buddhists have called the persecution the “October
27th Persecution.”
Yun Seonhyo, a disciple of Yun Goam, recorded in his
Biography of Master Yun Goam that when he came to Daewon-sa
Temple in Honolulu as an international missionary in 1981 after
the persecution of October 27th, 1980, Yun Goam had arrived
earlier than he had in 1980.140 His other disciple Gi Daewon, also
known as Daewon Ki, came to Hawaii in 1975 and established
Daewon-sa Buddhist Temple in a rented office in Honolulu.141 He
bought some empty land and moved the temple to the new
property on a mountainside in Honolulu’s Palolo Valley in 1979.
He began building the first structure in 1980 and finished it in 1982.
Daewon Ki planned a larger complex in 1983 and began
construction in 1984. It is a traditionally structured Korean
Buddhist temple and the largest cluster of Korean traditional
architectural works outside the boundaries of Korea. It consisted of
the Four Heavenly Kings Gate, the World Peace Pagoda, the Bell
Tower, the Memorial Hall to the Departed, Donor’s Tablets, the
139
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Main Hall, a Statue of Maitreya Bodhisattva, the Buddhist Cultural
Center Building, several residential houses and other structures.
When Yun Goam began to live at the temple in 1980, the
temple was not completed and many of the buildings were just
temporary structures. He served as a chef for temple residents at
the time. He preached at Sunday services and at special services at
the temple. He served as the spiritual leader of the temple from
1982 and until his death in 1988. On October 24, 1982, when
Daewon-sa Temple finished the construction for the main
buildings including the Buddha’s Main Hall and Seon Center and
hosted an establishment ceremony, he delivered an address in
which he celebrated the completion of several Korean traditional
architectural buildings along with other monks and lay
Buddhists.142 He emphasized the symbiosis of Korean Buddhism
with other religions and other Buddhist traditions in the multicultural society of Hawaii and argued that we should dedicate the
temple’s main hall to purify and create a peaceful society. He also
contended that we should contribute to Buddhism by engaging in
the Buddhist effort to recover the sublime humanity inherent in all
of us from the materialism and alienation rampant in human
society today.
In March of 1981, when Professor I Jongik, a specialist in Bojo
Jinul and a theorist of the Purification Buddhist Movement, visited
and stayed at Gwaneum-sa Temple in Los Angeles, he met Yun
Goam at the temple143 as Yun Goam was visiting the temple. Gim
Doan, abbot of the temple, was his Dharma nephew because he
was a disciple of Bak Dongam, a disciple of Baek Yongseong.
Over the course of two weeks, he traveled to various tourist sites in
Los Angeles as well as in South California, Arizona and Nevada
with I Jongik. He travelled to Las Vegas, the Grand Canyon, Zion
Canyon, Bryce Canyon, Disneyland, the Huntington Library, Art
Collections, and Botanical Gardens, among other places. A
prominent lay Buddhist scholar, I Jongik also accompanied him.
They discussed Seon Buddhism during their travels.
142
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On the Buddha’s Birthday, 8th day of the fourth lunar month,
May 11th, 1981, he gave a sermon and celebrated the Buddha’s
Birthday at Daewon-sa Buddhist Temple:144 “Despite our scientific
and technological advancement, we are currently living in a
troubled world in which conflicts, hunger and poverty cause
humans to suffer. The suffering mainly originates from the selfcenteredness of humans. The Buddha’s birthday, (however), gives
us a significant alternative. The Buddha’s teachings provide us
(with the means) to uplift our values and relieve human suffering.
The Buddha and his teachings have brought a light onto this
troubled society. The light of wisdom has the power to transform
the world of suffering to a world of happiness and enlightenment.
The Buddha provides the means to spiritual awakening to all
sentient beings all over the world. We should take the
responsibility of propagating the Buddha’s teachings and instilling
the hope that we can transform this struggling world into a Pure
Land.”
In March of 1985, at the age of 87, he visited several nations in
South and Southeast Asia with India, Burma, Thailand, and Sri
Lanka among them. In July of 1985, he visited Australia in which
he presided over a ceremony offering the Bodhisattva precepts at
several temples. He did not stop propagating Buddhism to people
who needed him even though he was old.
When Daewon Ki, abbot of the Daewon-sa Buddhist Temple of
Hawaii, hosted a fundraising party for establishing the Buddhist
Cultural Institute in his temple on November 30th, 1986, he
attended the party as the temple’s spiritual leader and delivered a
speech. He encouraged attendees to support this invaluable project
and spread Korean culture and Buddhism in the local community
as well as within the Korean-American community.145 He asserted
that if Daewon-sa Temple could establish a cultural center in
Hawaii, a cultural bridge between the East and the West, it could
propagate Korean Buddhism and Korean culture among Korean-
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Americans and other Americans, relieve their mental stress and
ease their social problems.146
In September of 1987, at the age of 89, he was installed as the
president of the Daegak Foundation that the Dharma descendants
of Baek Yongseong established on September 11th, 1969. He was
appointed founding director of the Foundation in 1969, serving as
a director from that time, and finally becoming its president in
1987.
In 1988, at the age of 90, he had a car accident in the United
States. Due to the aftereffects, he went back to Korea and returned
to his home hermitage, Yongtap Seon Center of Haein-sa
Monastery on Mt. Gaya. On October 25, 15th day of the ninth lunar
month, he passed away at the hermitage. Before his death, he
called his disciples and gave his farewell poem:147
The red leaves become more reddish on Mt. Gaya,
We know from this that the season is autumn.
When it frosts, leaves fall down and return to the root.
The full moon of September shines in the sky.
On October 29th, the order hosted the funeral service for him at
Haein-sa Monastery.148 After cremating his remains in the Haeinsa Monastery crematorium, his disciples collected 16 serene relics.
One year later, they established a gravestone on the western side of
Haein-sa Monastery and memorialized their master Yun Goam.
I Seongcheol, the order’s supreme patriarch, expressed his
condolences. Because he was a disciple of Ha Dongsan, a Dharma
brother of Yun Goam, he was his Dharma nephew and a grand
disciple of Baek Yongseong. Yun Seonhyo introduced a
condolence poem by I Seongcheol as follows:149
The moon brightly shines on Mt. Gaya,
146
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The water violently runs through Hongnyu Valley.
The valuable birds loudly chirp,
The strange animals walk.
His compassion was limitless,
His edification covered nine continents.
He kept the precepts well.
He was the most respected preceptor on the Korean Peninsula.
He has repeatedly served as the order’s highest patriarch,
All Buddhists respected him.
Because he transmitted precepts his whole life,
All the people took them.
Stars fly and twinkle in the sky,
The light of the stars swallows the whole universe,
Who can follow him in the past or present?
He suddenly came,
He suddenly went,
Mt. Sumeru is high and higher still.
He once frowned,
He once smiled,
The blue ocean is spacious and broad.
He lifted up his two hands,
He moved his two legs,
The sky is high,
The earth is deep.
When he opened his mouth and spoke,
The sound of thunder crashed,
It flashed.
Oh!
Who was he, Yun Goam?
He stood on one foot
on the top of Mt. Kunlun.
An auspicious wind fills the sky
With five-colored clouds.

INTRODUCTION
Chanju Mun
Ronald S. Green
Does Buddhism offer useful ideas and role models for
peacemaking worldwide? If it does, which of its ideas are
specifically applicable to the process and where are the examples
of the individual or groups that have ever applied them? These are
the major questions addressed in this volume.
While these articles offer evidence of the great potential for
peacemaking through Buddhism, a number of recent news articles
may have implied to opposite. Over the past several years, many of
us from the outside have read reports of politically active monks of
Southeast Asia with growing interest. We have seen newspaper
images of protesters in Myanmar, in orchid robes with raised fists,
yelling into megaphones. Monks in Sri Lanka have been shown in
the press firing artillery cannons. These news stories typically
point out that such images contrast greatly with our conceptions of
monks. The general expectation in non-Asian countries is likely to
be that either Buddhists would abstain from political conflicts
entirely due to monastic vows and worldview, meet conflict with
pacifism if forced, or at most use non-violent activist methods
similar to those of Mohandas Gandhi, and then only in face of the
utmost atrocious social injustices. Indeed, a number of articles in
this collection find canonical support for such expectations.
Admittedly, in many respects, the faith and understanding
maintained within the borders immediately affected by Buddhists
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in political conflict is more important than the impressions
outsiders form based on partial information presented in the
foreign press. However, for our purpose, seeking to understand the
potential role of Buddhism in the larger process of peacemaking,
we are apt to look within those borders for outside applications as
well as examples of pitfalls to be avoided. This task is potentially
complicated when the media makes such statements about socially
engaged Buddhists as “Nirvāa is not the first thing their political
activism, past or present, brings to mind.” 1 If we read this as
meaning activist Buddhists give up their religious goal in worldly
pursuit, non-Buddhists around the world may ask why bother
looking to Buddhism for ideas on peacemaking. In fact, Buddhism
may appear to be a throwback to an earlier age from an unrelated
part of the world, with a philosophy anachronistic for dealing with
modern crises.
Activist Buddhists have answered this concern similarly to
Venerable Yun Goam (1899-1999) of Korea: “Despite our
scientific and technological advancement, we are currently living
in a troubled world in which conflicts, hunger and poverty cause
humans to suffer. The suffering mainly originates from the selfcenteredness of humans…. The Buddha’s teachings provide us
(with the means) to uplift our values and relieve human suffering.
The Buddha and his teachings have brought a light onto this
troubled society. The light of wisdom has the power to transform
the world of suffering to a world of happiness and enlightenment.
The Buddha provides the means to spiritual awakening to all
sentient beings all over the world. We should take the
responsibility of propagating the Buddha’s teachings and instilling
the hope that we can transform this struggling world into a Pure
Land.” 2
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Most of the articles in this collection hold to this belief in one
way or another, attempting to flesh out those values from various
angles or provide examples of them. Particularly helpful in this
regard is “Uprooting Sprouts of Violence, Cultivating Seeds of
Peace: Buddhism and the Transformation of Personal Conflict” by
Christiaan Zandt; “Re-imagining Socially Engaged Buddhism” by
James Kenneth Powell II, “Peace through Moral Life: An Analysis
Based on Early Buddhist Discourses” by Y. Karunadasa, and “A
Buddhist Oriented Relational View of Transformation in
Meditation” by Ran Kuttner.
In the preface “Yun Goam, the First Spiritual Leader of Dae
Won Sa Buddhist Temple: A Biography for his Peacemaking
Activities” by Chanju Mun, readers can see the detailed
peacemaking activities of Venerable Yun Goam, religious master
of Venerable Daewon Ki who founded Dae Won Sa Buddhist
Temple, the largest Korean Buddhist Temple in North America.
Based upon Master Yun Goam’s spiritual influences, his disciple
Daewon Ki held seven international conferences on Buddhism and
peace and dedicated himself to forging peace between South and
North Korea.
The publication of the current book as well can be traced to the
original vision of Daewon Ki who assigned Chanju Mun to edit
and publish articles submitted to the conferences in a series of
books on Buddhism and peace. Two of the articles in this volume
were originally presented at the sixth seminar held in Honolulu
November 24-28, 1993, those by Y. Karunadasa and David Putney.
The other articles were selected by the editors from many received
though a general call for academic submissions on our topic.
In the opening article “Buddhism and Peace: An Overview” by
Chanju Mun, readers will find a valuable outline of socially
engaged Buddhism both in theory and practice. He investigates the
Buddha and the Bodhisattva as ideal peacemakers and considers
Huayan Buddhism and the ecumenical tradition as ideal
philosophical and practical models for peacemaking. He also
critically discusses modern Korean Buddhism and state
protectionism in East Asian Buddhist contexts.
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More examples of models for peacemaking are given in several
articles about Japanese Buddhists. These include “How Faith
Inspired the Save The Bell Movement,” an article compiled by the
Shōgyōji Archives Committee, “Reflections on the Ethical
Meaning of Shinran’s True Entrusting” by Victor Forte, and
“Peace in Shin Buddhism and Process Theology” by Steve Odin.
These writings are not only valuable in presenting information on
exemplars of peacemaking. The authors have each uniquely
contributed to our project by analysis and reflection.
Likewise, western philosophical concepts are applied as tools
of reflection in “Paradigms of Buddhist Ethics: Judgment and
Character in the Modern World” by David Putney, “A Dialectical
Analysis of the Conception of “Self Interest Maximization” and
Economic Freedom” by Mathew Varghese, and “Virtue, and
Violence in Theravāda and Sri Lankan Buddhism” by Eric Sean
Nelson. The latter article along with “Buddhist Protest in Myanmar:
Basic Questions” by Ronald S. Green deals with some of the issues
surrounding the abovementioned Buddhist involvement in crises in
Southeast Asia. The volume is rounded out of by two articles that
bring Christianity into our topic: “The Teachings of the Buddha
and Jesus as Resources for a Doctrine of Peace” by J. Bruce Long
and “Christianity and War by Kenneth A. Locke. The editors feel
these articles may be especially informative for readers
approaching our subject from a Christian background.
Bringing Selflessness into Peacemaking
Again, Venerable Yun Goam suggested, “We should contribute
to Buddhism by engaging in an effort to recover the sublime
humanity inherent in all of us from the material greed and
alienation rampant in society.” 3 In this sentence, we see a
circularity that also applies to our task. It is a contribution to
Buddhism to engage in the effort to recover our sublime humanity
but it is through Buddhism that such is possible. In this book, we
ask what appears to be an opposite question, not how we may
3

See Chanju Mun, “Preface,” page liv in this volume.
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contribute to Buddhism but how Buddhism may contribute to the
task of peacemaking. Yet, in some sense, we are also asking how
our effort may contribution to Buddhism. According to a
Mahāyāna idea, we all have the innate wisdom and compassion of
the Buddha, known as “Buddha nature.” It is impossible to
contribute to this. At the same time, we do contribute to Buddhism
by realizing our nature and putting it into practice. Styled in the
seemingly enigmatic form so famous of Buddhists, because it is
impossible to contribute to Buddhism, we are able to contribute to
it.
As mentioned above, many of the contributions to this
collection deal with specific Buddhist teachings that help us as
individuals, groups and perhaps, as some suggest, universally to
uplift our values and to relieve suffering. Perhaps the most
prominently mentioned of these teachings here and elsewhere is
the concept of no-self and the related idea of selflessness in giving
and living. Not only is this understandably puzzling for those
hearing it first time but it can continue to perplex longtime
practitioners and even be denied by them. The first questions likely
to arise include: To what conception of “self” do the Buddha’s
teachings refer? Did he mean there is (1) no “soul” or eternally
abiding spirit; (2) no ego-self; (3) no physical, bodily self? How
well does the English word “self” correspond to the sixth century
BCE Indian notion of “ātman” (Pāli, atta) and, in fact, the other
terms referred to by the Buddha for which we simultaneously use
“self” as a translation? Is the Buddhist concept of “no-self” a
statement about the nature of ultimate reality or about an ideal goal
believed to be attainable by a few or all through meditation and
other practices such as acts of charity and compassion? Where did
the doctrine of no-self originate and has it developed over time in
Buddhism? Perhaps most striking: how can Buddhists believe in
both no-self and reincarnation? After all, if there is no self to
survive death, what is left to be reincarnated? Drawing on the
efforts of our contributors, the following is a simplified
explanation, introducing some of the basic ideas as answers to
these questions.
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Existence, non-existence and “no soul” in Buddhism
Buddhist scriptures (Skt., sūtra; Pāli, sutta) surviving in the
Pāli language are typically considered the earliest accounts of the
Buddha’s words. In these, scholars have searched in vain for a
phrase equivalent to “the doctrine of no-self” often used to
describe the Buddha’s view. Although there may be no early
mention of a specific “doctrine,” a number of interrelated ideas are
expounded by the Buddha in these texts. Early scriptures record
the Buddha critically reevaluating two contrary religious or
philosophical tendencies prevalent in India around the time he
lived.4 Buddhists believe these tendencies are common to people
throughout history and across geographical borders but that their
underlying assumptions are incorrect. The beliefs are in existence
(sassatavāda) and non-existence (ucchedavāda). In the Kaccayana
Gotta Sutta, the Buddha says the following to his learned disciple
Kaccayana.5 “This world, O Kaccayana, generally proceeds on a
duality of the belief in existence and the belief in non-existence….
All exists, Kaccayana, that is one extreme. Naught exists,
Kaccayana, that is the other extreme. Not approaching either
extreme the Tathāgata 6 teaches you a doctrine by the middle
way.”7
Buddhism is called the Middle Way for a variety of reasons. It
rejects extreme asceticism as well as extreme hedonism. It also
refutes beliefs in existence and beliefs in non-existence. Many
Buddhist writings address these issues. While some explicitly
elaborate on the extreme positions, others proceed on the moderate
assumption readers accept the Middle Way. But what exactly the
4

The dating of the life of the Buddha is currently controversial among
scholars. Conventionally his birth is dated around the mid-sixth century BCE.
5
Kaccayana is traditionally considered one of the Ten Great Disciples of
the Buddha.
6
The Tathāgata is a name for the Buddha. While East Asian Buddhists
translated it as “Thus-come,” Tibetan Buddhists translated the same term as
“Thus-gone.” He is the one who has come from and gone to “thus-ness.”
7
Refer to Sayutta Nikāya 12.15, and based on the Pali Text Society
version, Sayutta Nikāya II, 17.
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Buddha meant by existence and non-existence is a matter of
contention. Many Buddhists feel that by “existence” the Buddha
was referring to the Indian equivalent of the western philosophical
idea of substantialism, the doctrine that real matter constitutes
phenomena. In this case, non-existence is interpreted as the
equivalent of nihilism. Interestingly, Buddhism has often been
variously charged with being either a substantialist or nihilist
philosophy by critics, allegations Buddhists soundly deny.
Others find support in early Buddhist writings for saying the
Buddha was referring to various Indian doctrines that attempt to
explain humanity by positing the existence of a permanent soul
that is distinct from the body.8 An example of this we are likely
most familiar with is found in the Upaniads of Hinduism. There
and elsewhere, the true essence of an individual is said to be a
permanent metaphysical self, independent of the physical body.
This metaphysical self (ātman) is often called soul in English
translation, or Self was a capital “s” to distinguish it from a
physical self. It is envisioned as eternal and unchanging. Most if
not all the Indian religions at the time of the Buddha seem to have
incorporated this view, either as a development of Vedic thought
or reaction against it. For this reason, it might be assumed that by
“existence” the Buddha was referring generically to all the beliefs
in an immortal soul. It is quite likely that the Buddha’s rejection of
the belief in existence precludes both substance and soul. In the
first sermon, Dhammacakkappavattana-sūtta (The Sūtra Setting
the Wheel of Dharma in Motion),9 he explains that the individual is
nothing beyond a composite of “five aggregates” or “five heaps”:
form, feelings, perceptions, mental fabrications, and consciousness.
8

Evidence of this position may be found in Dīgha Nikāya I, 157, 188;
Sayutta Nikāya IV, 392; Majjhima Nikāya I, 157; and elsewhere. For further
analysis of this and some of the issue that follow, please see Y. Karunadasa,
“Peace through Moral Life: An Analysis Based on Early Buddhist Discourses”
in this volume.
9
See Sayutta Nikāya 56.11. See T.W. Rhys Davids and Herman
Oldenberg, trans., Vinyaya Texts, in F. Max Mueller, ed., The Sacred Books of
the East, 50 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1879-1910), Vol. 13, pp. 94-97, and 100102.
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So that none of the five aggregates would be seen as eternally
substantial, the Buddha said, “Form is anattā (not soul/Self,)
feelings are anattā, so too are perceptions, mental fabrications, and
consciousness.”10 A famous phrase the Buddha uses in a number of
scriptures to refute notions of existence is “na me so atta,” this is
not my self/Soul.11
Can the refutation of the doctrine of Self be called a doctrine?
Some would argue the Buddha did not create a doctrine of no-self
but simply refuted what he saw as incorrect views of his time.
Among those taking this perspective is perhaps the most famous of
all Buddhist theorists, the Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna (150-250
CE). Claiming he was not an innovator but only a spokesperson for
the Buddha’s original messages, Nāgārjuna set about refuting all
notions of reality, including those that had subsequently developed
within Buddhism. In the end, Nāgārjuna claimed neither he nor
Buddhism had a doctrine of any kind.
In fact, in the Kaccayana Gotta Sutta, and in other scriptures,
the Buddha also opposes non-existence. But again, what does this
mean? It may be, as some suggest, the Buddha is referring to
another widespread belief of his time, one that held the physical
body itself is a kind of soul.12 According to this non-Buddhist view,
the body is an individual’s real essence and is annihilated at death.
From the viewpoint of many modern Buddhists, any form of
“materialism,” past or present, which advocate a theory of the
ultimate reality of a physical self that ends with death, are subject
to the Buddha’s rejection of theories of non-existence. Such a
reading of the Buddha’s message sees beliefs in non-existence and
existence as instances of theories of the soul or Self (Pāli, attavāda;
Skt., ātmavāda). One sees the soul as permanent and transcending.
The other sees it as material, temporary and passing to nothingness.
Concerning the latter the Buddha says, “Both formerly and now, I
have never been a vinayika (believer in nothingness), never been
10

See Sayutta Nikāya 3.196.
For example, Sayutta Nikāya 3.46.
12
See Dīgha Nikāya I, 34, 35; Dīgha Nikāya I, 157, 188; II, 333, 336; and
Sayutta Nikāya IV, 392.
11
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one who teaches the annihilation of a being, rather I taught only
the source of suffering, and its ending.”13
For today’s readers, removed from the ancient Indian context,
we are tempted to use modern descriptions for imagining what the
Buddha meant by any of this. For example, if we interpret anātman
as “no-soul” according to our conception of those words, we might
mistakenly envision the following. Suppose that in the future,
space travelers venture to another planet and find people just like
us in every way except they have no souls. What would the
difference be? Likewise, searching the internet for “people with no
souls” turns up a bizarre variety of historical ideas about “black
people,” “white people,” “redheaded people,” and, of course, nonmusical people.
For many Buddhists, the refutation of the view that there is an
unchanging soul is a denial of any transcendental reality that would
serve as ultimate grounds for existence. Others see it as less a
specific denial of the possibility of such a reality than a part of the
Buddha’s broader ban on speculative philosophy. The Buddha
discouraged talk about things we can never possibly know,
whether about the existence of God or gods, the soul, or a universe
just like ours underneath your fingernail. Spending time musing
about unanswerable questions only distracts practitioners from the
goal of overcoming suffering. This is one reason Buddhists often
see Buddhism not as a religion but a way of practice, as focused on
humanity rather than divinity. The Buddha says the following in
The Shorter Instructions to Mālukya.
“So, Mālukyaputta, remember what is undeclared by me
as undeclared, and what is declared by me as declared. And
what is undeclared by me? ‘The cosmos is eternal,’ is
undeclared by me. ‘The cosmos is not eternal,’ is
undeclared by me. ‘The cosmos is finite’ is undeclared by
me. ‘The cosmos is infinite’ is undeclared by me. ‘The soul
and the body are the same,’ is undeclared by me ‘The soul
13

See Sayutta Nikāya IV, 400.
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is one thing and the body another,’ is undeclared by me.
‘After death a Tathāgata exists,’ is undeclared by me.
‘After death a Tathāgata does not exist,’ is undeclared by
me. ‘After death a Tathāgata both exists and does not
exist,’ is undeclared by me. ‘After death a Tathāgata
neither exists nor does not exist,’ is undeclared by me. And
why are they undeclared by me? Because they are not
connected with the goal….”14
In this way, the Buddha’s idea of anātman is not a doctrine,
stating definitively that there is no soul but a tool to critique
ideologies. Accordingly, the Buddha addressed these issues out of
concern for the “psychological” wellbeing of meditative
practitioners on his path to liberation from suffering. In order to
overcome suffering, the Buddha taught we must eliminate our
desires and attachments. Among the most deep-seated may be the
desire to live forever. Hoping for this so strongly, various
individuals have posited the existence of an immortal soul.
However, cherishing this vision becomes a hindrance to liberation
from suffering because it is a strong attachment. On the other hand,
the belief in non-existence or non-being, if interpreted to mean
nothing survives death, may have arisen from the human desire to
be free from responsibility for living an immoral life or doing
anything that weighs heavily on the conscience. The belief that
nothing survives death or that nothing exists at all, frees an
individual from the fear of moral retribution whether that is
culturally envisioned as a day of reckoning in terms of karma or
otherwise.
In short, the Buddha does not say there is no soul. He says
those who believe there is a soul are mistaken and those who
believe there is nothing after death are equally wrong. The first
major problem with both views is that reality cannot be
conceptualized through such categories. You are justified in asking
now: Since the Buddha rejected views of existence and views of
non-existence, on what do Buddhists rely for dealing with life and
14

See Cula-Mālukya Sutta, Majjhima Nikāya 63.
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the world? The Buddhist idea of understanding phenomenal reality
(or realities) is in fact different from the conceptions of many
theorists. Buddhism rejects the very notion that it is possible to
understand the phenomenal world by means of a theory. In the
Brahmajāla sutta for example, the Buddha criticizes the promotion
of any theoretical viewpoint and concludes that the world cannot
be understood from the limitations set by any theory. Accordingly,
theoretical understanding of the phenomenal world originates from
our expectations and preferences rather than what actually
happens.15 If this seems like a theory, then it too should eventually
be abandoned as a boat that helped you in the difficult crossing of
barriers in the journey toward overcoming suffering.
Dependent Origination and “no self” in Buddhism
You have probably been asked or asked yourself the following
question at some time in your life. If you could be anyone else in
the world, who would you be? This is also a popular question
online where the most common answers are movie stars and
musicians. But what if we add a twist? You can be anyone else in
the world but you will no longer be you. Would you still want to
do it? In some conceptions of reincarnation (or even heaven), the
situation imagined is somewhat analogous: you will be reborn but
you will not remember this life.16 While many Buddhist traditions
vary in their interpretations of what reincarnates since it is not
ātman, typically their answer is karma. That is, only the results of
your actions continue and nothing you might call “you.” 17 For
those suffering from the fear of death who subconsciously hope to
15

See the first of the long discourses of the Buddha. See Maurice Walshe’s
The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya
(Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995).
16
It should be noted that in Indian religions, Hinduism, Buddhism and
Jaina, being reborn is not a good thing. Religious practices in these traditions are
typically aimed at release from the cycles of rebirth.
17
Some Buddhists suggest what we call “reincarnation” actually takes place
in this life. For example, if your actions produce negative results you come to
live in a kind of hell on earth. See Takashi Tsuji’s article at
http://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/reincarnation.htm.
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find consolation in a doctrine of eternal life, the idea that you will
not be you is unlikely to be completely satisfying. Nor is it likely
to match our view of soul connected with personality. Maybe even
less satisfying are the Buddhist suggestions that you are not who
you think you are now and ultimately there is no independent you
at all.
We have seen above that the Buddha rejected ideas of
permanence and annihilation as valid ways of understanding reality,
and we questioned whether this applies to non-Indian conceptions
of soul. In a like manner, we should ask to what extent the sixth
century BCE Indian conception of self corresponds to the 21st
century European, perhaps Judeo-Christian or even Freudian
influenced idea of the self that we cherish today. Even though the
Buddha did not live in our time, we can venture that, regardless of
the differences, he rejected any possible conception that posits the
existence of a real entity such as the independent self. This can be
found specifically in his teachings about dependent origination.
Buddhism does more than simply reject the seemingly
relentless conflict between existence and non-existence. It answers
those concerned with such issues with the principle of dependent
origination or dependent co-arising (paicca-samuppāda). 18 Most
Buddhist traditions hold that this idea is the foundation of all other
Buddhist ideas, that it is the Middle Path itself. The Buddha said,
“Whoever sees dependent co-arising sees the Dhamma; whoever
sees the Dhamma sees dependent co-arising.”19 This means, it is
generally held in Buddhism, that the attainment of awakening is
based on comprehension of the principle of dependent origination.
The principle of dependent origination proposes that individual
existences are composed of interdependent physical and
psychological elements that mutually condition one another. One
element of this principle is the important Buddhist idea of nonsubstantiality. Since all “things” exist only as dependent on other
18

For an account and critical analysis of this idea, see David J. Kalupahana,
Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1975).
19
See Majjhima Nikāya 28,
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.028.than.html#t-4.
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“things,” nothing is independently substantial. Likewise,
everything is changing and exists only in process, including what
you have been calling your “self.” References to “oneself,” “I,”
“me,” etc., are for Buddhists, made merely for the sake of
conventional usages. Through meditative practice and acts of
charity, we are to realize the hollowness of these concepts.
It might seem troubling that there is nothing we can point to as
being an independent and unchanging entity that is the self. The
Buddha well understood the anxiety you are likely to feel at the
suggestion you give up this false notion. While today we tend to
see meditation as a non-stressful activity, the Buddha continually
encouraged followers to persevere in that practice with
“fearlessness.” If we look at it another way, the principle of
dependent origination destroys our ego-centered worldview. When
the Buddha advises us to observe all events from an interrelated
perspective, this sets the guidelines for a symbiotic outlook on life.
It rejects hostility toward an “other”, antagonisms with neighbors,
conflicts with “other” countries, attacks on animals and nature. In
short, Buddhists believe that if otherness is rejected, egocenteredness is destroyed. Modern Buddhists often say that as a
result, peace and environmental responsibility can be realized. 20
According to scriptures, practitioners of meditation who are able to
overcome their fear and finally renounce the belief in the ultimate
reality of the five aggregates and the self, realize a release from
suffering caused by clinging to those ideas. They experience an
unattached bliss and abide in insightful wisdom (prajñā).
Because dependent origination advocates viewing with equal
value what we conventionally call “ourselves” and “others,” it
encourages equal treatment of all. Not only should we live without
being attached to self, we should not even give priority to what we
call our self. When we hear on the news that a certain number of
soldiers from the alleged “other side” were killed in battle, we
should feel the same sympathy for them and their families that we
20

As with adherents of most religious traditions, Buddhists have not always
lived up to these ideas. See, for example, Brian Daizen Victoria, Zen at War, 2nd
edition (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) and Zen War Stories (New York:
Routledge Curzon, 2003).
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feel for those killed from our country. In addition, the Buddhist
notion of non-substantiality paves the road for another of its central
themes: non-violence. By extension, according to the ideas of
dependent origination and non-substantiality, to hurt others means
to hurt ourselves. These ideas reject both the extreme egoist view
focusing on maximizing one’s own benefits and the extreme
altruist view that only concentrates on the benefits of others.
Neither oneself nor others can be prioritized. Seeing other human
beings as the same, we should remove potential bases of
discrimination such as age, gender, race, nationality, class, and so
on. According to this outlook, we should consider all sentient
beings, including the smallest of animals, equal in value.
Again, the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna illustrates
dependent origination by offering a series of examples and
metaphors that bring into question common perceptions of reality
and the self. Nāgārjuna asks about a burning log, where does the
wood end and the flame begin?21 If we consider the changes taking
place on the surface of the log, beneath and above the surface, the
exact range of the fire becomes uncertain at best and in a constant
state of change. Likewise, all “things” including the “self” are
impermanent and in a constant state of flux. Any entity that exists,
only does so in dependence on other entities that condition its
arising and are non-eternal. Therefore, whatever concept one might
have of an abiding self is regarded as a delusion. Conceptualization
of the self is just that and not ontological truth.
This appears to contrast with Judeo-Christian positions in
several respects. First, in distinction from this Buddhist egalitarian
outlook, Judeo-Christianity typically views the world as a creation
with God the creator at the top of a hierarchy, followed by humans,
and animals.22 In addition, if the principle of dependent origination
is accepted, we should not presuppose external forces or any prima
causa to explain the origin of beings. Even God would have come
from dependent co-arising. In this case, to conceive “I” as being in
21

See chapter 10 in Kenneth K. Inada, Nāgārjuna: A Translation of his
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1993).
22
Other entities such as angels are seen as interspersed.
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a process and not within fixed borders, removes boundaries
between creator and created, subject and object, you and me, and
other pairs often conceived of as polar opposites. Nor should we
look for accidental forces to explain the origin of beings or events
in history. When something happens, we should seek to understand
it objectively and neutrally without looking for explanations in
heavenly powers or accidental forces.
Perhaps one reason we hold on firmly to our love of a
supposedly independent self is that we fear losing control of our
lives. The Buddhist notion of “letting go” or “giving up” our
egocentric selves likely seems like a loss of self-control to many. If
that is your fear or objection, you should ask yourself how much
control you have of your life now. Buddhists feel we are ordinarily
led around by desires and hardly ever stop to think about it. What
will I have for lunch, how can I meet a love interest, what car
should I buy? We live with a constant barrage of such desiredriven questions or, more often, unacknowledged impulses. Maybe
the desires are our own as human beings. But advertisers are
betting high stakes that they can decide the direction of them. Did
you really need the SUV you were persuaded to buy two years ago?
Now you are being told to trade it in. Buddhists believe that it is
not your life that you are giving up by letting go of your tendencies
to grasp for things. Instead, those who are unconsciously led
around by such desires are as if dead.23 Only when we give up
desires and false beliefs are we capable of living.
Later Buddhist writers illustrated the holistic worldview of
dependent origination with a famous metaphor known as “The
Jewel Net of Indra,” Indra being a deity of ancient India. Imagine a
large net spreading on and on across the heavenly abode of Indra.
In each knot of the net there is a glittering jewel so that in all
directions there appears to be an infinite number of them. When
you look at one jewel, all of the many other jewels are reflected in
its polished surface. Such is the case for each and every jewel. This
symbolizes the universe as a potentially infinite number of
23

See verse two of The Dhammapada, translated by Glenn Wallis (New
York: The Modern Library, 2007).
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connected relations among all beings with inter-identity and
interdependence.24 Buddhists see this as analogous to our situation.
If we come to understand dependent origination, we awaken to the
fact that each person, element of nature, planet and existent is not a
separate “self” but an interactive and continually changing
reflection of all those we erroneously supposed to be “others.”

24

See Thomas Cleary, trans., The Flower Ornament Scripture: A
Translation of the Avatamsaka Sutra (Boston: Shambhala, 1993).

BUDDHISM AND PEACE: AN OVERVIEW
Chanju Mun
1. Prologue
Even though scholars in the Judeo-Christian tradition interpret
the term history in different ways, that religious tradition generally
understands it with some variations as follows: 1
1. Through a teleological concept on the history of
humanity and the universe, having a beginning and an
end. Because history has a beginning, it is also
supposed to be directed towards an end.
2. Considering history as the embodiment of a divine will
or plan. Human beings cannot comprehend the ultimate
plan, conducted by God, the Creator.
3. Centering only on the history of humans on earth,
considered the center of the universe.
The above general characteristics of the Judeo-Christian
tradition have decisively affected the history and the mentality of
those from many non-Asian countries. The views on history could
be analyzed as placing exclusive significance on human history in
1

See the prologue in Garma C. C. Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of
Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism (University Park & London:
The Penn. State University Press, 1971).
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relation to God, maintaining a human-centered and earth-centered
orientation.
Unlike the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Buddhist tradition,
especially Mahāyāna Buddhism, does not claim a unique
significance for human history. The Buddhist view includes all
beings, regardless of whether they are sentient or non-sentient, and
everything in the universe, seeing Earth as one of the many planets.
Buddhism generally characterizes history with some variations as
follows: 2
1. History has a beginning and an end only on a relative
level, not an absolute one.
2. Human history has significance but this is not an
exclusively human attribute. Buddhism presupposes
numerous histories of other sentient beings on earth and
in the universe and asserts that the histories of those
beings have the same significance as the history of
human beings.
3. Earth is only one tiny spot in the magnificent universe,
i.e., the dharmadhātu (Infinite Dharma Realm).
Buddhism does not postulate the earth as the only
location Buddhists must consider.
4. History is not conducted and intervened into by God
and it is the collective karma (activities) of sentient
beings.
Buddhism views the assumed opposition implicit in the abovementioned terms from a relative perspective, not an absolute one. It
asks its followers to consider that those opposite conceptions are
supplementary. Without the creator, the created cannot exist at all;
without good, evil cannot exist; without the secular, the
transcendental cannot exist; and so forth. In general, Buddhism
advocates what we might call a symbiotic view. Symbiosis means
the close association or mutually beneficial union of two dissimilar
organisms.
2
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Buddhism does not divide the creator and the created.
Buddhists should rely on themselves, not others, and on the
teachings that the Buddha delivered. Generally stated, Buddhists
do not look to God the creator transcendental deity to offer peace
to humans as a gift through His Grace. God is not seen as the
bringer of peace. Only humans can and should make peace. Peace
is not a gift given by the outsider(s) or external force(s). Peace is
not created by accident. Peace is the result of collective actions of
peace activists.
Buddhism does also not dichotomize subject and object. We, as
subject, have an impact on objects such as other humans, nature,
societies and worlds. Objects also have an impact on us. Relations
between subject and object are correlated and co-influential. If
subject influences object, object influences subject. If we promote
other objects, those objects promote us. One side does not bar the
other side completely. Both sides are not exclusive, but
complementary.
Based on its symbiotic view, 3 Buddhism advises its followers
not to be antagonistic against, but to be cooperative and co-existent
with other beings. Buddhism teaches how to cooperate with other
religions, philosophies, ideologies, and so on. Unlike some
individuals of other religions, generally Buddhists do not
concentrate on proselytizing to win over others to their own
religion. While not abandoning their religious teaching, they
should develop cooperative relations with other religious persons.
This ecumenical aspect of the Buddhist stance is strongly needed
in problematic societies in which many religions are involved in
the conflicts both worldwide and nationwide.
In his book Buddhism: A Quest for Unity and Peace, Johan
Galtung, authority in peace studies, discusses Buddhism in terms
of five areas where there are global problems, (1) nature, (2)
human, (3) society, (4) the world, and (5) culture. Each of these
areas is matched to a goal, (1) ecological balance, (2) (human)
enlightenment, (3) (social) development, (4) (world) peace, and (5)
3
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(cultural) adequatio. He states that the five areas and their
respective goals are not operating separately but are very closely
related. For example, if peace is discussed, it should be explained
among nations, within societies, within cultures, among and within
human beings and even within nature, without excluding any of the
aforementioned five dimensions. Buddhists should interrelate the
five dimensions holistically and dynamically and should not
segregate them into separate dimensions.
Each of the above-listed five items should share two common
factors, diversity and symbiosis. 4 Diversity and symbiosis might
lead to ecological balance at the level of nature, to rich and mature
human beings at the level of human beings, to pluralistic and
democratic societies at the social level and finally to active
peaceful coexistence between several systems at the world level.
Galtung clearly explains in the prologue why Buddhism quests
for unity and peace in the following six cases, (1) species, (2)
gender, (3) race, (4) nation, (5) classes, and (6) persons: 5
There is no chosen species, human beings, chosen over and
above animals and the rest of nature, giving rise to cruelty
to animals, to meatism, (and) to destruction of nature. From
the very beginning, the unity with all life was proclaimed.
There is no chosen gender, man, giving rise to cruelty and
repression of all kinds of women, including discrimination.
The Buddha saw women as equally capable of obtaining
enlightenment. There is no chosen race, for instance,
whites, or yellow people, giving rise to racism, slavery and
colonialism. In fact, such practices are explicitly forbidden.
There is no chosen people or nation, for instance, a country
where the Buddha was born or where he worked, giving
rise to nationalism and imperialism. Buddhism is found in
many nations, none of them more chosen than the others.
There are no chosen classes such as kings and rulers,
military or merchants with both power and privilege, giving
4
5
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rise to repression, exploitation, and class discrimination. In
fact, from the beginning, Buddhism cut across the steep
Hindu caste system. There are no chosen persons, such as
the true believers, giving rise to all kinds of cruelty against
the non-believers, inquisition, etc. On the contrary, there is
the potential for Buddhahood in all of us. Nobody is divine,
above the rest, but some may serve as better examples than
others.
As above, any species, gender, race, nationality, classes, and
persons should not be excluded and discriminated and should be
equally treated without having any pyramid-like hierarchical
stratum. Buddhism is a good and maybe ideal model in theory and
praxis for environmentalism (nature’s ecological balance), human
enlightenment, social development, world peace, and cultural
adequacy. It horizontally discusses each of those six subjects, i.e.,
species, gender, race, nationality, classes and persons, without
vertically arranging any of them over others. It does not accept the
superior position of a species, a gender, a race, a nationality and a
class over other classes. It horizontally and equally treats any
species, gender, race, nationality, and class without exception.
By overcoming three types of violence, (1) direct violence, (2)
structural violence, and (3) cultural violence,6 Buddhists can make
a non-violent (peaceful) society in the troubled mundane world. If
the three types of violence were eliminated, peace would be
realized. Because Buddhism does not accept any kind of violence,
it is a good model for removing it and for building peace.
First, counteracting direct violence, Buddhism expounds the
doctrine of non-violence (Skt., ahisā). It commands Buddhists
not to kill any beings as the most important precept. It does not
authorize any kind of violence, individual and social, in its
discipline codes. Whenever Buddhists have disputes, disagreements, wars and other conflicts in society, they should use
dialogues, persuasion, consultation, diplomatic measures and other
peaceful means, not relying on violent actions. The Buddha hoped
6

Ibid, 136-141.

6

Chanju Mun

to create a peaceful community in the monastic society at least and
in the larger Buddhist one at best.
Buddhism has not brought war, violence and conflicts across
the world in its name, even though we can easily find many
examples of serious wars, violence and conflicts in Buddhist
nations. Due to its symbiotic view, I think Buddhism might hold
the greatest potential for constructively contributing to the
peacemaking process in the world, perhaps more than other
religious traditions.
Second, Buddhism suggests we remove structural violence that
kills slowly and indirectly, replacing it with structural justice. The
social structure of dictatorships produces such structural violence
causing people to suffer in terms of human rights, free speech, and
otherwise. Development-oriented governments lead to the
destruction of nature. Stressful societies make people
uncomfortable, distressed and disappointed. Sexist, nationalistic,
racist, undemocratic, non-pluralist and caste societies structurally
create violence. In opposition to these, a democratic society is
strongly required to foster structural justice and eliminate structural
violence.
Third, cultural violence is pervasive especially in religion
and/or ideology, which backs up direct and/or structural violence.
Even though there are many Buddhists who commit direct violence
and support structural violence, there is no textual evidence in
Buddhism that supports the previous two types of violence. If we
live in a culturally peaceful society, we naturally have peaceful
actions. Conversely, if we live in a culturally violent society, we
easily commit violent acts. The society that culturally advocates
competition naturally increases direct and/or structural violence.
The views of the Judeo-Christian tradition and traditional
Western philosophy often involve divided pairs of opposites. For
example, there is the creator and the created, good and evil, the
secular and the transcendental, the nature and the function,
noumenon and phenomena, sentient beings and non-sentient beings,
subject and object, the Buddha and unenlightened beings, nature
and human beings, enemies and friends, and so forth. However,
Buddhism harmonizes each pair of opposites without excluding
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either of each constituent. Once again, due to the symbiotic view,
Buddhism can be a strong theoretical and practical basis for peace.
2. The Buddha: An Ideal Figure of Peace
The Buddha, whose name is Śākyamuni, discovered the
doctrine of dependent origination, the most important and central
teaching in Buddhism. The doctrine of dependent origination
explains that individual existences, composed of physical and
psychological elements, are interdependent and mutually condition
each other. This led to another central teaching, non-substantiality.
Accordingly, all existences are existent based on interdependent
relations and are not independently substantial. It is generally held
in Buddhism that the attainment of enlightenment is based on the
comprehension of the doctrine of dependent origination.
An early form of the doctrine of dependent origination shows
the causal relationship between ignorance and suffering with
twelve links. Each link leads to the next one. The twelve links
begin with (1) ignorance, which produces (2) karmic action.
Action causes (3) consciousness. Consciousness causes (4) name
and form. Name and form cause (5) the six sense organs. The six
sense organs cause (6) contact. Contact causes (7) sensation.
Sensation causes (8) desire. Desire causes (9) attachment.
Attachment causes (10) existence. Existence causes (11) birth; and
birth causes (12) aging and death.
The twelve-linked dependent origination is seen from two
perspectives, i.e., the perspective of transmigration and the
perspective of liberation. If the perspective of transmigration is
employed, (1) ignorance is led via ten links finally to (12) aging
and death in the cycle of delusion and suffering. However, when
the perspective of liberation is adopted, if (1) ignorance is removed,
(2) action is automatically wiped out. Likewise, the case is
consecutively applied to the next step and finally leads to (12)
aging and death. One will be liberated from the cycle of life and
death.
The doctrine of dependent origination destroys the egocentered worldview. The Buddha advised us to observe all events

8

Chanju Mun

with an interrelated perspective. The doctrine sets the guidelines
for Buddhism to be a symbiotic religion of peace, not a nonsymbiotic one of antagonisms. If ego-centeredness is emphasized,
peace can in no way be constructed between oneself and others.
If the doctrine of dependent origination is accepted, we should
not presuppose external forces such as God or other creators, to
explain the origin of things. According to the doctrine, because
everything is interdependently originated, even God should be
originated interdependently. The Buddha negates deductive
reasoning that assumes a primal originator (cause). If the doctrine
is accepted, we should also not assume that accidental forces
explain the origin of things. According to the doctrine, everything
is conditioned by other things and there are no existents without
causes and conditions. If something good or bad happens, we
should understand objectively and neutrally why it happens
without looking for external and/or accidental forces.
The doctrine of dependent origination leads to the doctrine of
impermanence that everything is changing and exists in process.
The doctrine does not eternalize anything and suggests we
comprehend all facts and events as being in process. Even though
this society is full of disputes, wars, violence, struggles and so
forth, those unwholesome situations are not permanent. We can
remove them and bring peace to a troubled society.
The doctrine of dependent origination also naturally leads to
the doctrine of non-substantiality that excludes the possibility of a
permanent soul or self. Unlike a concept of soul or self that is
permanent and substantial, it does not remove something
impermanent and changing. It negates the independent self as
something eternal, unique, permanent and so on. It encourages all
beings to treat others equally without being attached to oneself or
giving priority to yourself. It conceives “I” as being in a process,
not within a fixed border. Thereby, it removes boundaries between
creator and created, subject and object, you and me, and other pairs
often conceived of as polar opposites. We do not need to attach to
ourselves because we are not permanent and eternal but
continuously changing.
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The doctrine equalizes the value of others and ourselves. It
strongly calls for us to see other human beings equally without
fixing borders such as age, gender, race, nationality, class, and so
on, to consider even other sentient beings, including animals, as
equal in value. It extends the quest for unity to everything,
including other humans, sentient beings, and even non-sentient
beings. To the contrary, Christianity explicates that the quest for
unity should be extended upwards from humans to God through
Jesus Christ, a mediator between humans and the creator. It
justifies the hierarchical or vertical structure from bottom to top. It
sees a just the rule of God over the created and of humans over
nature. Because of these factors, Buddhists tend to see their
worldview as being more egalitarian and conducive to
peacemaking than that of Christianity. At its root Christianity
appears to promote disharmony, starting with the creator and the
created and moving to humans and nature.
The Buddhist doctrine of non-substantiality paves the road for
another of its central doctrines, the doctrine of non-violence. If we
extend the non-substantiality doctrine, “to hurt others” means “to
hurt ourselves.” All beings are existent in the continual process
because their own permanent substance(s) are not existent. It also
presupposes neither the egoist view focusing on maximizing one’s
own benefits nor the altruist view that only concentrates on the
benefits of others, because neither of the two, oneself and others,
can be prioritized in value. We should treat others as equal to
ourselves. If we accept as an ethical norm that we should consider
others equal to ourselves, there is no way we can justify violence
against others.
The Buddha taught that the world is full of sufferings and
contradictions. Buddhism can co-exist with other religions and
ideologies. It is not a linear, one-sided religion and philosophy, but
a cyclical, multi-sided religion and philosophy. It comprehends any
facts and truth in the interactive process between action and
reaction. Without excluding other faiths and ideologies, Buddhism
can harmonize them. It naturally accepts diverse ideologies and
religions without fighting and conflicts in a society.
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Buddhists consider Nirvāa to be the final goal. It is not an
extinguished negative mental status, but a vivid positive realization
of the doctrine of dependent origination. It is peaceful mind at the
individual level, conflict-free peace at the social, national and
international level and ecological balance at the level of nature. It
advocates not having a conflict-oriented mind but a harmonyoriented mind at the individual level, not being violence-oriented
but peace-oriented at the social level, not being exploitationoriented but environment-oriented at the level of nature.
The non-violence or non-killing precept is the first precept in
five cardinal precepts, i.e., (1) don’t kill; (2) don’t steal; (3) don’t
engage in sexual misconduct; (4) don’t use false speech; and (5)
don’t use intoxicants. All Buddhists, monastic and laypersons,
should keep the precepts. While the five precepts are composed of
negative sentences, the five activities comprise positive sentences.
The five activities are as follows: (1) Increase compassion towards
all sentient beings; (2) donate belongings and wealth to others; (3)
positively control sexual conduct; (4) tell the truth; and (5) think
wisely and reasonably.
If we combine the first non-killing (non-violence) precept of
five precepts with the first deed of the five activities, we should not
only remove violence but also increase compassion towards all
sentient beings. We should not engage ourselves and others in
violence, wars, conflicts, disputes, and so forth in the negative
context and we should make peace, harmony, and so on in the
positive context as well. Johan Galtung also says, “In the very
center of Buddhism, there is a basis not only for negative peace,
but also for positive peace, not only for absence of war, but also
for positive relations.”7
We should equate social well-being, natural environment,
national security and economic development of other nations with
those of our nation. If we destroy other humans at the individual or
collective level, we also destroy ourselves because we are interconnected with others. We should not see ourselves and others as
being permanent, separate and independent, but as changing,
7
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mutually dependent and interconnected. Buddhism strongly
suggests we investigate our social well-being, natural environment,
natural security and economic development in conjunction with
others, not excluding but including opposite sides. We should not
sacrifice social well-being, the natural environment, national
security and economic development of others to build up those of
things on our own side. In those areas of others, there should be
cooperation with the same areas of our own and vice versa.
The Buddha also rejected caste-centeredness, a part of the
hierarchical structure of society in India. For thousands of years,
the caste system justified the social hierarchy in India, with the
priest caste as the highest position, the warrior as the second
position, the commoner the third and the slave the lowest or fourth
caste. The Buddha declared the equality of all people, regardless of
what social circumstance or family background one is born into,
and negated the social discrimination of his day. Brahmanism, the
Indian hierarchical religion of priests that the Buddha opposed,
authorized racial discrimination and argued that Aryans are
superior to native Indians.
The Buddha emphasized the middle path that avoided extreme
standpoints as follow. 8 Epistemologically, he avoided both
absolute substantialism and absolute skepticism. Ontologically, he
negated both eternalism and annihilationism. He also ethically
renounced both self-indulgence and self-mortification. He did not
accept any extreme view as absolute. To take any particular view
to the extreme naturally leads to conflicts because it refuses other
views. This doctrine of the middle path is strongly needed to bring
peace in this troubled society. It makes people see their own
extreme views from the broader context and the more objective
perspective, freeing them of their own dogmatic views.
The Buddha suggested that we not be extreme. For example,
we should make a balance between prosperity and poverty,
development and preservation, the poor and the rich, materialism
8
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and spiritualism, monism and dualism, theism and atheism,
inequality and equality, diversity and unity, surplus and deficit,
self-torture and self-indulgence, asceticism and hedonism, and so
forth. The doctrine means Buddhists should not to be fanatics
about religion and/or ideology. It means that Buddhists should not
persecute believers in other religions but should take a pluralistic
attitude towards them. It causes Buddhists to relinquish extreme
attitudes that discriminate against other believers in their own
religion and in other religions.
The doctrine of the middle path can be explicated as follows. If
one eats too much, it is not good for one’s health. If one eats too
little, it is also not healthy. If one nation uses natural resources too
much, it is not good for that nation. If one nation uses natural
resources too little, it is also not good for its citizens. If one uses
ones energy too much, it is not good for the body and mind. If one
uses one’s energy too little, it is also not good for one’s body and
mind. If one exercises too much, it hurts ones health. If one
exercises too little, it is also detrimental to one’s health.
Buddhists often refer to the Buddha with ten epithets as follows:
(1) “Thus-Come,” “the one who has Thus-come from
enlightenment”; (2) “Worthy of Respect”; (3) “Correctly
Enlightened”; (4) “Perfected in Wisdom and Action”; (5) “ThusGone,” “the one who has Well-Gone to enlightenment”; (6)
“Knower of the Secular World”; (7) “Unsurpassed”; (8) “The
Tamer”; (9) “Teacher of Gods and Humans”; and (10) “World
Honored One.”
These names for the Buddha show him being seen as an ideal
figure, perfect in theory and practice, capable of cultivating and
educating all beings, those sentient and non-sentient, in order to
bring about enlightenment and liberation without discrimination.
That is, he is a person who actualized peace in himself and guided
others to complete peace.
Buddhists believe the Buddha had the eighteen distinctive
characteristics as follows: (1) Unmistaken action, (2) unmistaken
words, (3) unmistaken intention, (4) meditative stable mind, (5)
equanimous mind, (6) all-embracing mind, (7) determined
aspiration, (8) determined endeavor, (9) determined mindfulness,
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(10) determined wisdom, (11) determined liberation, (12)
determined view to liberation, (13) all physical deeds that are
practiced in accordance with wisdom, (14) all verbal deeds that are
practiced in accordance with wisdom, (15) all mental deeds that
are practiced in accordance with wisdom, (16) view of wisdom
which is not blocked in the past, (17) view of wisdom which is not
blocked in the present and (18) view of wisdom which is not
blocked in the future.
We can see by these eighteen characteristics, the Buddha put
equal emphasis on both sides, i.e., theory and practice, without
neglecting either side to realize peace within him. He is an active
peacemaker because he attained a peaceful state within his mind
and continuously persuaded all beings to build peace.
Buddhists believe that when the Buddha attained
enlightenment, he obtained ten auspicious powers or ten perfect
knowledge(s). These are: (1) Knowledge of right and wrong; (2)
knowledge of the karmas of all sentient beings of the past, present
and future; (3) knowledge of various meditations; (4) knowledge
of the capacities of sentient beings; (5) knowledge of the desires of
all sentient beings; (6) knowledge of the different conditions of
every individual; (7) knowledge of the results of various practices;
(8) knowledge of the transmigratory states of all sentient beings
and their accompanying thoughts; (9) knowledge of the past lives
of all sentient beings and the Nirvāic state of non-defilement; and
(10) knowledge of the destruction of all evil passions.
The 10 perfect knowledge(s) lead the Buddha to engage
actively in saving all sentient beings in this mundane world. The
Buddha’s ten knowledge(s) are always accompanied by the
Buddha’s concrete practical actions with the following four
confidences. Theory and practice are two wings of a bird in
Buddhism.
The Buddha is endowed with four fearlessnesses or
confidences as follows: (1) Confidence in complete supreme
enlightenment, (2) confidence in complete destruction of
defilement, (3) confidence in teaching defilement to hearers
(śrāvakas) and (4) confidence in leading śrāvakas to the
destruction of defilement.
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The Buddha advised Buddhists to observe five precepts as
follows: (1) abstaining from killing, (2) not taking what is not
given, (3) refraining from sexual misconduct, (4) abstaining from
unjust speech and (5) refraining from intoxicants. He prioritized
non-killing (non-violence) as the most important precept in
Buddhist ethics for Buddhists to observe. He also strongly urged
his followers to maintain symbiotic relations with others and not to
hurt them financially or mentally. He did not authorize any kind of
violence in Buddhist ethics.
3. The Bodhisattva: An Ideal Activist for Peace
There are two main types of Buddhism practiced in the world
today, Theravāda Buddhism and Mahāyāna Buddhism. In
Mahāyāna Buddhism, which is the predominate variety practiced
in East Asia, the model practitioner is called a Bodhisattva. The
Bodhisattva is an ideal activist for peace in Mahāyāna Buddhism in
particular and in Buddhism in general. From the Mahāyāna point
of view, while other traditions may seek personal liberation,
Mahāyāna Buddhism tries to attain enlightenment for the sake of
all beings. The Mahāyāna attitude is embodied in the Bodhisattva,
the ideal figure of Mahāyāna Buddhism, actively conducting
altruistic practice. The Bodhisattva even postpones the complete
entry into Nirvāa until all beings attain enlightenment.
The Bodhisattva practices ten perfect virtues: the following six
major ones, (1) generosity, (2) discipline, (3) patience, (4)
endeavor, (5) meditation and (6) wisdom, and the following four
additional ones, (7) right means, (8) vow, (9) manifestation of the
ten knowledge(s), and (10) knowledge of the all existences.
The six major perfect virtues can be explained a little more as
follows. (1) Generosity includes the beneficent activities and the
Bodhisattva dedicates it to saving all beings. (2) Discipline
indicates proper activities conducive to eradicating all passion. (3)
Patience and tolerance arise from insight. (4) Endeavor is resolute
effort, which does not have any diversion and distraction. (5)
Meditation is the way of wiping out illusion and (6) wisdom is the
realization of supreme insight.
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The rules of discipline, designed to ensure personal purity for
monks and nuns and harmony in the religious order, sagha , are
dominant in the monastic community.9 A major alternative to the
monastic model of ethics is the Bodhisattva precepts, which
advocate social activism. Many different texts of Mahāyāna
Buddhism provide various examples of practices and values for the
bodhisattva life.
There are a number of different sets of bodhisattva precepts,10
among which the Fangdeng list of twenty-four vows and the
Fanwang set of fifty-eight vows are representative in East Asian
Buddhism. The Fangdeng precepts are based on an Indian scripture,
but the set of ten major and forty-eight minor vows in the Fanwang
jing (Skt., Brahmajāla-sūtra) may have been compiled in China.
The Fanwang vows became the most famous and the most used.
Monks and nuns in Sino-Korean Buddhist tradition usually receive
these precepts after receiving their monastic vows at their full
ordination.
The ten major Bodhisattva precepts, included in the Fanwang
jing, are as follows: (1) Don’t kill; (2) don’t steal; (3) don’t engage
in sexual misconduct; (4) don’t use false speech; (5) don’t use
intoxicants; (6) don’t gossip; (7) don’t boast about selves and insult
others; (8) don’t be stingy and don’t insult the needy; (9) accept
repentance and avoid ill will; and (10) don’t slander the Buddhist
community.
While around twenty-nine minor precepts of 48 in the
Fanwang jing are dedicated to maintaining the Buddhist teachings
and the religious order, the remaining sixteen minor precepts deal
with social actions beyond the Buddhist community as follows:11
9
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2. Don’t consume intoxicants or deal in intoxicants;
3. Don’t eat meat;
4. Don’t eat the five pungent plants;
9. Care for the sick as the foremost field of blessing;
10. Don’t collect deadly weapons, nor seek revenge;
11. Don’t act as a military envoy;
12. Don’t conduct uncompassionate business dealings (for
example, slavery, being an undertaker, keeping
domestic animals);
13. Don’t deliberately slander others;
14. Don’t ignite destructive fires;
16. Help the needy, even if you have to give your own body,
and then teach them the Dharma;
17. Don’t curry favor with the powerful for the sake of
selfish manipulation and to gain advantage over others;
20. Seek to liberate all beings (physically and spiritually)
based on your kinship with all beings;
21. Don’t seek revenge and kill others;
29. Don’t conduct deviant livelihoods;
30. Don’t conduct other deviant livelihoods but choose
purer activities; and
32. Don’t harm living beings.
While the Bodhisattva precepts are altruistically oriented, the
monastic ones aim primarily at the attainment of personal merits.
While monastic rules center on the formalistic or external aspects,
the Bodhisattva precepts are more concerned with the intentional
or internal ones. The violation of rules in monasticism has a strict
punishment, including even expulsion from the monastic
community. However, the violation of rules in Mahāyāna
Buddhism can be excused if they violate the precepts for the sake
of the welfare of other beings.
4. Huayan Buddhism: A Chinese Totalistic View
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In China, Huayan Buddhism is the most representative
philosophical Buddhist tradition along with Tiantai Buddhism. It
teaches the equality of all beings, sentient and non-sentient, and the
interdependence of all things. Its teaching is called the teaching of
totality. The fundamental teaching of Huayan Buddhism is the
interdependent origination of the dharmadhātu (universal Dharma
realm), in which everything in the universe is inter-related without
obstruction. The realm of principle, the static aspect and the realm
of phenomena, the dynamic aspect, interpenetrate each other
without obstruction.
The view of Huayan Buddhism is explained in the division of
the universe to four realms as follows: (1) the realm of phenomena;
(2) the realm of the principle; (3) the realm in which phenomena
and principle interpenetrate; and (4) the realm in which all
phenomena exist in perfect harmony and do not obstruct each other.
The last realm must be an ideal world in which the status of
complete peace and interpenetration is realized.
Fazang, systemizer of Huayan Buddhism, explains the
interdependent origination of the dharmadhātu with the six
characteristics as follows:12
First, if we list the names [of the interdependent origination
of the six characteristics], they are the characteristics of (1)
universality; (2) particularity; (3) identity; (4) difference; (5)
integration; and (6) disintegration. (1) Universality means
that one includes many virtues. (2) Particularity means that
the many virtues are not identical because the universal is
necessarily made up of many dissimilar particulars. (3)
Identity means that many aspects [which make up the
universal] are not different because they are identical in
forming the one universal. (4) Difference means that each
aspect is different from the standpoint of any other aspect.
(5) Integration means that [the totality of] interdependent
12
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origination is formed as a result of [the collaboration of]
these [elements]. (6) Disintegration means that each aspect
remains what it is [as an individual with its own
characteristics] and is not disturbed [in its own nature].
Second, this teaching [of the six characteristics] can be
explained as follows: this teaching is to show such things as
the interdependent origination of the dharmadhātu, which
is the perfect doctrine of the one vehicle [i.e., Huayan], the
infinite interpenetration [of all things], the unimpeded
identity [of all things], all other matters including the
infinite interrelationship of noumenon and phenomenon,
and so on, shown in the symbol of the net of Indra.13 These
aspects reveal all of the obstacles. When one obstacle is
overcome, all are overcome. One acquires the destruction
of [moral and intellectual faults of] the nine times and ten
times. In practicing the virtues, when one is perfected, all
are perfected, and with regard to the essence, when one
[part] is revealed, everything is revealed. All things are
endowed with universality and particularity, beginning and
end are the same, and when one first arouses the aspiration
for enlightenment, one also becomes perfectly enlightened.
Indeed, the interdependent origination of the dharmadhātu
results from the interfusion of the six characteristics, the
simultaneity of cause and result, perfectly free identity, and
the fact that the goal is inherent in causal practice. The
cause [of enlightenment] is the comprehension and practice,
as well as enlightenment, of Samantabhadra Bodhisattva,
and the result is the infinitude which is revealed in the
realm of the ten Buddhas, all the details of which can be
found in the Huayan Sūtra.

13
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The dharmadhātu does not have a teleological meaning at all.
It has neither a beginning or end, nor a division between the
creator and the created. It cannot be directed by a divine plan and it
should be explained only in terms of its own inner dynamic
functions. All things are interpenetrated and interdependent
without obstruction in the universe. It does not exclude any
elements, but harmonize them in the universe. It is a self-creating,
self-maintaining, and self-developing universe.
While Judeo-Christian tradition adopts an exclusive approach,
Huayan Buddhism adopts an inclusive one. While the theist
religions adopt the exclusive importance of God to which all
beings are subordinate, Buddhism does not have the concept of
exclusiveness and equalize God with all beings. Based on the nonteleological view, Huayan Buddhism does not exclude other
religions, philosophies, races, classes, genders, cultures and others.
The Huayan universe is essentially a universe of inter-identity
and interpenetration. It has no hierarchy. There is no division
between center and circumference and between the creator and the
created. The doctrine of inter-identity is identical with
interdependence. No being can exist independently of other beings.
Existence is empty because it does not have substance or essence
within it. Existence derives from the interdependence.
The inter-identity is the static relationship among things and
the interpenetration the active relationship. Inter-identity and
interpenetration are two sides of the same coin or two wings of the
same bird. The two aspects cannot be separated at all. They are
interrelated. Based on the doctrine of emptiness, Huayan has a
totalistic view of beings. The rafter is a part of the whole building
in its inter-identity and interdependence with the rest of the
building. Without the rafter, the whole building cannot exist.
Without the whole building, the rafter cannot exist.
The totalistic world is a living and organic body in which the
part and the whole interpenetrate and inter-create. It firmly follows
the doctrine of impermanence, delivered by Śākyamuni Buddha in
early Buddhism. Śākyamuni Buddha emphasized the doctrine
along with the doctrine of non-substance. The Huayan universe is
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continuously changing without intervention. All beings are living
under a changing stream of activities.
Huayan scholars explain the totalistic world with a famous
metaphor of the jewel net of the great god Indra. Imagine a
wonderful net in the heavenly abode of Indra in which there is a
glittering jewel in each knot and there are infinite jewels. When we
select and look at one jewel, so many other jewels are reflected in
its polished surface. Likewise, in each jewel’s polished surface, the
other jewels are reflected. There could be an infinite reflecting
process without limit. This symbolizes a Huayan universe in which
there are the non-obstructed relations among all beings in terms of
inter-identity and interdependence.
Huayan Buddhism strongly negates ego-centeredness and
human-centeredness. However, it is generally said Judeo-Christian
tradition has a hierarchical view in which the creator occupies the
highest position, human beings the middle one, while other
animals, plants, rocks and things occupy a lower position. Huayan
Buddhism idealizes the universal peace and harmony among
humans and even between humans and their surrounding
environment.
5. The Ecumenical Tradition in Sino-Korean Buddhism
As in many other religions, sectarian Buddhists accept the
teachings to which they are affiliated and hold theirs to be superior
to other Buddhist teachings in many ways. Likewise, sectarian
antagonistic attitudes against other traditions in Buddhism created
many sectarian conflicts throughout the history of Buddhism
across nations. However, ecumenical Buddhists recommend coexistence and cooperation with other traditions without making
trouble with them.
I think it is natural to extend the ecumenical attitude among
Buddhist sects in Sino-Korean Buddhism in particular and in
Buddhism in general to include the many religious traditions.
Because there are so many religious traditions in the United States,
brought here from the rich traditions of the world, the interreligious ecumenical movement is strongly needed here for the
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construction of a peaceful society. If we exclude other religious
traditions, it automatically leads to conflicts among them.
I published a research book of 498 pages on doctrinal
classifications of Chinese Buddhism 14 in which I categorized
doctrinal classification systems into two groups, i.e., the
ecumenical systems and the sectarian systems and explained the
ecumenical lineage. Sino-Korean Buddhist ecumenists define the
Buddha’s teachings from ecumenical perspectives. They consider
that all of the Buddhist teachings are equal in values without
discriminating among teachings and traditions. They adopt the
expression “one voice teaching” for their own ecumenical
scriptural evidence. Based on an individual’s mental or spiritual
capacity, he or she understands Buddhism in a certain way. Others
understand Buddhism in different ways according to their own
capacities. In contrast to this ecumenical view, sectarians create
systems to show how their doctrines and practices are superior to
those of other Buddhist traditions.
The connotation of the term “sect” in Sino-Korean Buddhism
is entirely different from its usage in Christianity as well as in
Tibetan and Japanese Buddhism. It is impossible to clearly delimit
boundaries among the sects, which are not exclusive. Since the
classification of sects is not based upon differences of doctrine and
practice, the notion of a “sect” is essentially nominal. For instance,
if a monk is living in a monastery founded by a master in the
Huayan School, he is automatically classified to a monk of the
Huayan School, regardless of his mastery or familiarity with some
other doctrine or practice. In this context, sect has a genealogical
meaning in Sino-Korean monasticism.15
In terms of monastic genealogy, eminent monks are generally
supposed to have three lineages, i.e., the tonsure linage, the
ordination linage and the dharma lineage. Thus, a monk might
simultaneously belong to various lineages. Monks living in the
same monastery might belong to different traditions based upon
14

Chanju Mun, The History of Doctrinal Classification in Chinese
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of America, 2006).
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three lineages. For example, if a monk was shaved under a master
in the Tiantai sect, he belongs to the Tiantai sect. If the same monk
was ordained under a Vinaya (discipline) master, he belongs to the
lineage of the preceptor. And if the same monk was trained under a
Linji Chan (Kor., Seon; Jpn., Zen) master, he belongs to the
lineage of the Linji Chan sect. Each monk has multiple interactive
relations among various sects. Thus, a monk might belong to one
of the Chan sects by lineage, but study Huayan doctrines by his
doctrinal preference and recite the name of the Amitāyus Buddha
as his practical method.
In a typical monastery, there are different centers, e.g., a Chan
center, a Vinaya center, a doctrinal seminary, a center for Pure
Land practice and so on. In a Chan center, Chan practitioners focus
on meditation. In a seminary, Buddhist scholars conduct research
and educate monk students in Buddhist theory. In a Vinaya center,
moralists center their practice on their strict observance of various
precepts and teach Buddhist ethics to novice monks. And in a
center for Pure Land practice, practitioners endlessly recite the
name of Amitāyus Buddha as their own practical method. Without
having any contradiction, the residents in the monastery can select
any center or all of them based upon their own preference for their
practice.
Sino-Korean Buddhists generally categorize the sects into three
categories. First is the category of doctrinal sects, represented by
the Tiantai Sect, Huayan Sect and Faxiang Sect. Second is the
category of practical sects, represented by the Chan Sect and Pure
Land Sect. Third is the Vinaya (discipline) Sect. Since all monks
take precepts in the ordination ceremony, they should always keep
them. Historically, we assume that Sino-Korean monks live
without having strong rivalry and exclusiveness toward other sects.
As a hypothesis, we might suggest that it is the third vinaya (rules)
that creates a non-sectarian environment. They do not completely
exclude other doctrinal and practical sects. Rather than kicking out
other sects, they synthesize various sects or tenets in their own
doctrinal and practical systems.
From the time of the introduction of Buddhism in China and
Korea, there have been no institutionalized sects that resemble
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Western religious sects or Japanese Buddhist sects. For example,
the scholars of the Huayan sect do not have strong sectarianism,
compared to Japanese Buddhist sectarianism and western Christian
sectarianism. The “Huayan sect” refers simply to the group of
scholars who are interested in Huayan Buddhism. Therefore, a
scholar who is categorized under the rubric of the Huayan sect can
also be included in another sectarian category. So, when the term
“Huayan sect” is used, it means those who hold Huayan Buddhism
as a central tenet.16
Sino-Korean Buddhist ecumenists, technically speaking, are
the Mahāyāna ecumenists, arguing that the Mahāyāna teaching is
higher than the Hīnayāna. However, because there is no sect
representing Hīnayāna Buddhism in East Asia, their assertion is
nominal. East Asian Buddhists generally use the term “Hīnayāna”
didactically and ethically, to delineate what Buddhists should not
do. It is secure for us to define them as ecumenists, just not
Mahāyāna ecumenists.
They do not hierarchically evaluate various scriptures and they
advocate that the scriptures are basically equal in value. From the
ecumenical perspective, they suggest that various scriptures should
not be understood as lesser than other scriptures because each has
their own unique valuable tenets. To iterate, because they believe
that all the scriptures have their own unique tenet, they do not
evaluate all of the Mahāyāna scriptures.
6. Wonhyo (617-668): An Ecumenist Model of Korean
Buddhism
Wonhyo formed the ecumenical tradition of Korean Buddhism.
His ecumenical interpretation of various Buddhist teachings had a
tremendous impact on the formation of Korean Buddhism. His
ecumenical stance on previous doctrinal disputes was extended to
include conflicts about practices and disputes among religious
traditions. Whatever thoughts and religions Korean Buddhists have
16
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met, they tried to harmonize new ways with Korean Buddhism.
They do not dichotomize their thinking into two camps of friends
and enemies.
Wonhyo is a very complex persona.17 Early in his life, he was a
part of an elite youth corp. After this, he became a Buddhist monk.
Later, he abandoned his monastic robes and returned to secular life.
He also had a love affair with a princess. While he belonged to a
street gang, he continuously propagated the teaching of the Buddha
wherever he went, adopting an easy practical method for
commoners to chant the names of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and
to seek rebirth in the Pure Land. Wonhyo removed a dichotomous
border between secularism and monasticism in his activities.
One of the most famous Chinese Buddhists in history,
Xuanzang (602-664), introduced and translated new a massive
amount of Buddhist texts into Chinese Buddhism. Loyally
following the ecumenical perspective on various Mahāyāna
scriptures from the preceding ecumenical systemizers, Wonhyo
opposed Xuanzang’s sectarian doctrinal interpretation in which
Xuanzang championed the superiority of the Yogācāra Buddhism
over various Buddhist traditions and philosophies.
Wonhyo set the cornerstone for the syncretic and ecumenical
tradition of Korean Buddhism. His ecumenical position is by
called the Korean term “hwajaeng,“ which can be translated as
“Harmonization of All Disputes”. Through the ecumenical position,
Wonhyo endeavored to reconcile all doctrinal debates to unify and
synthesize all sectarian perspectives into a comprehensive
Buddhist teaching.
Korean Buddhism is generally characterized as having a highly
syncretic and conciliatory nature. The Korean Buddhist syncretic
and ecumenical pattern of thinking is owed to Wonhyo and his
works, especially the Shimmun hwajaeng-non (Treatise on the
Harmonization of Ten Disputes). He dedicates the book to
harmonize various Buddhist opposing traditions with ten different
17
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topics. The text comprises two fascicles. However, some fragments
of the text, consisting of eleven woodblock pages, were discovered
in 1937 in Haein-sa Temple where the woodblock version of
Korean Buddhist Tripiaka is preserved.18
Of ten disputes, there are three found in the fragments and
several Korean scholars such as I Jongik, I Manyong, Gim Unhak
and O Beopan reconstructed the remaining seven disputes from
Wonhyo’s texts and other references.19 I will list the ten disputes
based on O Beopan’s reconstructions,20 the first three of which are
included in the extant fragments. Wonhyo harmonizes all disputes
in ten aspects, i.e., (1) harmonization of the disputes between
Being and Emptiness (Non-being); (2) harmonization of the
disputes on whether or not Buddha nature exists; (3) harmonization
of the disputes between subject and object; (4) harmonization of
the disputes on Nirvāa; (5) harmonization of the disputes on
Buddha Body; 21 (6) harmonization of the disputes on Buddha
nature; (7) harmonization of the disputes on (Yogācāra’s) Three
Natures;22 (8) harmonization of the disputes on (Yogācāra’s) Two
Hindrances; 23 (9) harmonization of the disputes on ultimate and
conventional truths; and (10) harmonization of the disputes
between three vehicles24 and one vehicle.
Many later eminent Korean monastic scholars incorporated
Wonhyo’s ecumenical understanding on Mahāyāna Buddhist texts.
Later Korean Buddhists try to harmonize Seon Buddhism and Pure
18

See O Beopan’s Wonhyo ui hwajaeng sasang yeongu (Wonhyo’s Theory
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19
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Transformation).
22
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interdependence, and (3) the nature of ultimate reality.
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Two Hindrances are (1) the hindrance of the object of knowledge and (2)
the hindrance of defilement.
24
Three Vehicles are (1) the vehicle of hearers, (2) the vehicle of solitary
realizers and (3) the vehicle of Bodhisattvas.

26

Chanju Mun

Land Buddhism, Seon Buddhism and doctrinal traditions, Seon
Buddhist groups, doctrinal traditions and furthermore among
different religious traditions, represented by Confucianism and
Daoism.
There are two major traditions of practice in East Asia. One is
Pure Land Buddhism and another is Seon Buddhism. Pure Land
Buddhism recites the title of Amitāyus Buddha through which its
practitioners concentrate their minds. The practitioners use external
object(s) to meditate and visualize. However, Seon practitioners
cultivate their minds without relying on any other external images
and objects.
With the introduction of Chan Buddhism to the Korean
peninsula, some Korean monks, represented by Jinul (1158-1210),
adopted an ecumenicist position to harmonize between doctrinal
traditions and Seon practical ones. Jinul is considered the actual
founder of the current Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism. His
ecumenical books were incorporated into the monastic educational
curriculum in the Korean Buddhist tradition. The Korean
monastics are naturally supposed to be trained under the
ecumenical education atmosphere.
Wonhyo himself tried to harmonize Pure Land Buddhism with
doctrinal traditions. His syncretic attitude between Pure Land
Buddhism and other doctrinal traditions directly and indirectly
influenced later ecumenists to harmonize between Pure Land
Buddhism and its opposing Seon Buddhism.
Based on the strong influence of two ecumenists, Wonhyo and
Jinul, Korean Buddhists are free to choose any kind of practices for
their cultivation. There are several practical methods available for
Korean Buddhists. These include Seon, the recitation of the title of
some Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, chanting mantras, reading texts,
copying texts, participation in ceremonies, social activities, and so
on. They do not accept only one practice exclusively for their
cultivation. If needed, they choose one and/or multiple practices
based on their inclination and/or their capacity.
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7. State Protectionism: East Asian Buddhist Contexts25
Buddhism was first introduced to China during the reign of
Emperor Ming (r. 58-75) of the Later Han Dynasty (25-220). 26
After the Later Han Dynasty fell in 220, a long period of chaotic
disunity continued until to 589 when the Sui Dynasty united China.
Non-Chinese rulers, mostly of Turkic and Tibetan origins,
established their short-lived dynasties and ruled native Chinese in
north China from 316 for less than three hundred years. Chinese
literati, officials, and learned monks left north China to south
China and transplanted their own civilization in uncivilized south
China.
Exiled Chinese (re)established the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317420) in south China, considering itself as the real successor of the
(Western) Jin Dynasty (265-316) in north China. Because of
(relatively) strong influences from Chinese Confucianism and
Daoism, Buddhist monks “emphasized both Buddhist and Chinese
learning, philosophical discussions, literary activities, a mixture of
Taoist and Buddhist ideas, and congenial association between
monks and the cultured elite of Chinese society. Since the imperial
house was generally weak, the monastic community was able to
assert its independence from secular authority.”27
Indian Buddhism pretty well preserved the separation between
religion and state. Monks governed the monastic community based
the vinaya codes, not state rules. The state gave the monastic
community autonomous governing authority. The rulers might
respect a monk of even a lower-class family background. However,
Chinese bureaucrats strongly opposed the Indian concept of the
separation between religion and state based on their traditional
25
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Confucian ideology. Confucianism ideologically authorized only
the ruler to rule the state in all areas, including law, politics,
diplomacy, religion, education, rituals, and so on. Confucians even
referred to the emperor even as the Son of Heaven. Confucians
subordinated religion to politics.
Confucian bureaucrats, Yu Ping and Huan Xuan, could not
accept extraterritorial positions for Buddhism and wanted to locate
Buddhist organizations under the government’s direct control.
Buddhists, Ho Chung, a sincere layman and Huiyuan, a famous
monk, defended the separation status between the monastic
community and the state. Especially in his famous work entitled
Shamen fujing wangze lun (Treatise that Monks Do Not Need to
Pay Respect to the Rulers),28 Huiyuan divided Buddhism into two
groups, i.e., the laity and the monks. He asserted in it that because
the laity follows the Buddhist teachings in society, lay Buddhists
should pay respect to the ruler and because the monks transcend
society and do not have worldly affairs, they do not need to pay
respect to the ruler based on the ordinary social norms.
Unlike in the south where the Buddhist monastic community
pretty much had autonomous and independent status, many nonChinese rulers used Buddhism for political purposes in the north.
Many eminent monks who were active in the north were political
and military counsels. Those such as Fo-tu-cheng and
Dharmakema exercised magical techniques for their rulers and
nations in order to propagate and popularize their religion. It
sometimes served as a state religion. Some non-Chinese rulers
gave strong favors and sympathy to Buddhism of non-Chinese
origin because they also were non-Chinese.29 Non-Chinese were
not happy to follow conservative Confucianism of Chinese origin,
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which identified non-Chinese as barbarians. They embraced
Buddhism in their strong antagonisms against Confucianism.30
Emperor Taizu (r. 386-409), the founder of the Northern Wei
Dynasty (386-534), possibly of Turkic origin, appointed Faguo the
national chief of monks and let him exercise administrative control
over the monastic community. According to the Buddhist doctrines,
he should be prohibited from participating in secular politics as a
government official and from paying respect to the ruler as a monk.
To the contrary, he even stated that because Emperor Taizu was
the Buddha, not the ruler, when he respected him, he respected him
as the Buddha, not the secular ruler.31
Emperor Wencheng (r. 452-465) of the same dynasty
appointed Shixian, presumably died in 460, the national chief of
monks and systematized the monastic bureaucratic system. The
highest governmental office for controlling the monks was the
jianfucao (Office to Observe Merits). His deputy was called duweina. The government established provincial offices called as
sengcao (Office of Monastic Community) in various provinces and
the national head of monks appointed the provincial head of monks,
called zhou shamen-tong and his assistant weina. The government
bureaucratized the monastic community and temples to control
Buddhism very smoothly. Following the bureaucratic model of
Buddhism from Shixuan, Tanyao furthered bureaucratized
Buddhist temples and activities under the centralized government.
The reasons why Buddhism rapidly grew during the period of
disunion are as follows.32 First, Buddhism became popular when a
strongly centralized government that Confucians idealized as its
ideology became dissolved. Many Chinese considered Buddhism
for an alternative of Confucianism, their traditional social ethics,
and political ideology.
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Buddhism and Confucianism are contradictory in many ways
such as the following. (1) The Buddhist monastic celibate system
is opposed to Confucian familism. (2) While Buddhism backs up
the separation between the state and religion, Confucianism thinks
religion is subordinated to the state. (3) Buddhism that
theoretically advocates an egalitarian society is contrasted with
Confucianism that theorizes a hierarchically structured unequal
society. (4) The Buddhist view that the world as full of suffering is
opposed to the Confucian view that the world is filled with
harmonious happiness.
Second, Buddhist monks with sophisticated rituals that
included chanting spells and charms and predicting the future,
helped popularized the tradition for the public and ruling group
especially in north China. Using the aforementioned ability, they
also supported the state and in return, they received strong support
from the state.
Third, many persons who wanted to escape from the military
and labor services during the continuous warring period became
Buddhist monastics. When they joined the monkhood, they were
also free from the secular regulations and taxations that their
governments imposed.
Fourth, many literati and scholars who could not find
opportunities to exercise their knowledge and talents in the state
politics relied on Buddhism. They withdrew from the
contemporary problematic society and found mental tranquility
and happiness by means of theory (knowledge and study) and
praxis (meditation) in Buddhism. The upper class, especially in
south China, also enjoyed conversations with Buddhists on
metaphysical and mysterious issues.
Fifth, Buddhism was very adaptable during the troubled period.
(1) Confucianism did not satisfy the religious demands of the
people in the uncertain and instable society. (2) The doctrine of
karma helped the oppressed and the hopeless have hope, at least
for the future. According to this idea, if people are involved in
wholesome activities, they are guaranteed to be reborn in a better
position. (3) The doctrine of Buddha nature also provided the
possibility for all beings to obtain Buddhahood and salvation. (4)
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Pure Land Buddhism that provided easy practical techniques and
salvation to the commoners popularized Buddhism.
Emperor Wen (r. 581-604), the founder of the Sui Dynasty
(581-618), a general of the Northern Zhou (556-581), superseded
the nation in the north and by conquering the Chen Dynasty (557589) in the south, finally united all of China after the long disunion
of more than three hundred years. He issued edits for the
promotion of Buddhism several times during his reign. He helped
Buddhists construct the forty-five national temples in the
prefectures. He also issued a decree for the establishment of
Buddhist temples at the five holy mountains33 and donated land to
support and maintain the temples.
After uniting south and north China, he used Buddhism as a
unifying ideology in his nation. He endeavored to locate himself as
a universal emperor in the Buddhist tradition. “The emperor’s
motive was very clear. He hoped that all classes of society would
share in the merits of worshiping the sacred relics. The stūpas were
the symbols of the imperial support of Buddhism, and were erected
in places where the scenery was especially excellent. By the
ceremony of simultaneous enshrinement of the relics, with the
official and clerical community participating, he sought to convey
the idea that the entire empire was united in its support of
Buddhism.”34
Emperor Yang (r. 604-617) killed his father and ascended the
throne. Like his father, he was also a sincere Buddhist and
supported Buddhism in many ways. He carried out a gigantic
construction project, linking by canal Chang’an and Loyang, the
two capitals, one in the north, the other in the Yangzi Valley of the
south. He imposed taxes on the citizens and their properties to
support the two capitals and to construct palaces in each. He
unsuccessfully exercised three military campaigns against
Goguryeo (37 BCE – 668 CE). Because of the afore-mentioned
33
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problems, the Sui Dynasty ended in 618. After that, Buddhism lost
its position as the state’s official ideology.
The Tang Dynasty (618-907) succeeded the united nation that
the previous Sui Dynasty established. Its founder claimed that the
royal family clan was the direct descent of Laozi, the legendary
founder of Daoism. The dynasty naturally favored Daoism and
also treated other religions pretty well, newly imported religions
such as Nestorian Christianity, Islam, and Manichaeism, and
established religions, Buddhism and Confucianism.
Buddhism was tremendously influential among all classes of
people from the imperial family to the commoners. Chinese
Buddhists incorporated into their traditions the massively
translated texts that previous and current translators had introduced
and they sinicized Buddhism on their own soil. They created their
own Buddhist traditions, doctrinal and praxis, for instance, Chan,
Tiantai, Huayan, Pure Land, and others. The government strongly
supervised and controlled Buddhism in the Tang Dynasty. It
arranged monastic officials under the control of state officials.
“Under previous dynasties, monks accused of major crimes, such
as murder, were tried by the state, but those guilty of minor
infractions were judged by monastic law. Now, under the Tang, all
crimes committed by monks were judged by civil laws.”35
East Asian Buddhists exercised state-protection ideology under
the name of their own religion, even creating an apocryphal text
entitled the Renwang huguo banruo jing (Wisdom Sūtra on How
Benevolent Rulers Can Protect Their Own Nations) (the Renwang
jing for abbreviation). 36 They used to recite the scripture along
with the Lotus Sūtra and the Jinguang-ming jing (Skt., Suvaraprabhāsa-sūtra; Eng., Sūtra of Golden Light) 37 in special
ceremonies in order to protect their own nations.38 The three texts
are considered the three major texts for protecting nations in East
Asian Buddhism.
35
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It is told that if rulers and commoners recite “the chapter for
state protection” in the Renwang jing and “the chapter for state
protection by four heavenly kings” in the Jinguang-ming jing, they
can remove seven disasters39 and are able to comfort and protect
their own nations. Chinese Buddhists popularly recited and gave
lectures on the two texts from early history of Chinese Buddhism
during Southern and Northern Dynasties (386-589). The chaotic
and endless warring between southern and northern dynasties
made the two texts popularized and let Buddhists, the rulers and
the ruled, rely on them to protect their own nations. Many eminent
monks commented on the texts and implemented ritual manuals for
protecting nations.
During the Sui and Tang Dynasties (581-907), the rulers
established temples at the central government and provincial
government levels where Buddhists particularly prayed for the
nation’s prosperity and comfort. For example, Emperor Taizong (r.
626-649) 40 issued decrees that monks should hold consolation
services for the dead heroes, should pray for a rich harvest and by
39
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reciting the Renwang jing and the Dayun jing (Skt., Mahāmeghasūtra; Eng., Sūtra of the Great Cloud) 41 , should pray for the
prosperity and protection of the empire. He also patronized some
important temples on holy mountains for the spiritual welfare of
the empire.
Emperor Gaozong (r. 649-683) established state-sponsored
temples called Guofen-si Temples in each prefecture in order for
the monks residing in the temples to pray for the protection and
prosperity of the empire and to spread and propagate the good
aspects of the emperor to the masses.42
Empress Wu (r. 684-705) very strongly supported Buddhism
and sponsored the carving of various images in the grottoes of
Longmen even before taking over the government administration.
She justified her control of the state not from Confucianism, which
discriminates against women obtaining political power, but from
Buddhism. She used the Dayun jing for her political purposes.
There are two translation versions for the text, one by Zhu Fonian
and another by Dharmakema, consisting of thirty-seven chapters.
Some scholars claimed that a monk or monks concocted the sūtra
by Empress Wu’s edict to solidify her power ideologically.43 In the
text, the Buddha answers questions posed by the Bodhisattva
Dayun and manifests his teachings.
Especially, in the 4th fascicle of the Dharmakema translation,
the Buddha said “that as a result of her having heard the
Mahāparinirvāa sūtra from a previous Buddha, she was now
reborn as a female deity (named Ching-kuang), but that having
encountering his super-mundane profound teaching, she would
transform her female deity form to a universal monarch ruling over
nation.”44 In the 6th fascicle of the same text, the Buddha told that
seven hundred years after he entered the death (Nirvāa) by the
skillful means, a princess named Zengzhang, of a small kingdom
in South India succeeded the kingship after her father passed away
41
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and extended her rule over all of the world. While she ruled the
nation, she propagated Buddhism in her nation and educated her
citizens with it. The Buddha even predicted that she would become
a Buddha named Zengzhang.45 The female ruler used the Dayun
jing to cultivate the mind of her citizens and with the merits of
reading and copying the text for twenty years, she was able to be
transformed to the female body.46
Empress Wu distributed the Dayun jing at the national level
and established a Dayun-si Temple in each province across the
nation to justify her unjust accession to the throne and her
establishment of a new dynasty called Zhou as a female ruler. In
order to get the support from people ideologically, Huaiyi and
others used the popular Maitreya cult during the time and even
claimed that Empress Wu was the reincarnation of the future
Buddha Maitreya on this mundane world. She prioritized
Buddhism over Daoism in her imperial edit of 691 and changed the
basic policy on religion, implemented during the reigns of the
previous rulers of the Tang Dynasty, which gave favor Daoism
over Buddhism.
Emperor Zhongzong (r. 683-710) took back the throne from
Empress Wu and restored the Tang Dynasty in 705. He tried to
treat Buddhism and Daoism equally and by changing the titles of
existing temples, established in every prefecture Zhongxing-si
Temple in 705, renamed Longxing-si Temple in 707.
Emperor Ruizong (r. 710-712) issued a decree in 711 for the
equal treatment of Buddhism and Daoism in all royal ceremonies.
Emperor Xuanzong (r. 712-756) gave priority to Daoism over
Buddhism and recommended the public read the Daoist texts. Even
so, he did not discriminate against Buddhism and in addition to
existing public temple Longxing-si Temples, he established
Kaiyuan-si Temple in all prefectures across the nation. He let
Buddhists pray for the nation’s protection and defense at the two
official temples. They performed various nation-protecting
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ceremonies and rituals. Even so, he attempted to control Buddhism
under the governmental administration.
The very famous persecution against Buddhism by Emperor
Wuzong (r. 840-846) in 845, called the Huichang Suppression,47
can be explained by the following reasons. First, ideologically,
Daoists developed their long-time antagonisms against Buddhists.
Second, Confucian officials, one of two major political groups,
sided with the emperor’s persecution measure while the eunuchs
the other of the two, allied with Buddhism to defend it. Third,
economically, the emperor wanted to appropriate huge tax-free
temple lands and wealth and to tax numerous tax-free monastics.
He ordered the government administration to investigate the
number of monastics and temples in the fourth month of 845.
According the census, the number of temples was around 4,600,
the number of monastics more than 265,000. He issued an edict in
the fifth month of the same year that except four temples in each of
the two capitals and only one temple in each county and prefecture,
all temples should be destroyed. Only 30 monks were able to live
in each capital temple and of the county and prefecture temples, 20
monks were allowed to live in the large-sized temples, 10 monks
in the middle-sized temples, and 5 monks in the small-sized
temples. Except the above-allowed monks and nuns, all should be
defrocked. He also ordered that the bronze images and bells be
made into coins, iron images be changed into agricultural tools,
golden, silver and jade images be turned over to the government.
He issued an edict in the eighth month of 845 and revealed his
determined intention for persecution against Buddhism.
Emperor Wuzong died of an illness in the third month of 846.
Two months later, Emperor Xuanzong (r. 846-859) arrested and
executed 12 Daoist priests, including three key figures, i.e., Zhao
Gueizhen, Liu Xuanjing, and Deng Yuanchao, who cooperated to
persecute Buddhism. He cancelled the suppressive measures
against Buddhism that previous Emperor Wuzong implemented
and issued favorable measures on Buddhism. In the third month of

47

Ch’en, 226-233; and Foguang dacidian, 5473.

Buddhism and Peace: An Overview

37

847, he issued an edict to revitalize Buddhism from the 845
persecution.
The persecution was tremendously influential in the history of
Buddhism in China. It was the most extensive suppression of
Buddhism in China. The previous suppressions by the Northern
Wei Dynasty in 446 and by the Northern Zhou Dynasty between
574 and 577 were limited to the northern part of China. After the
persecution, the connection between Buddhism and the state
became weaker throughout the history in China. The intellectual
and academic atmosphere of Buddhism drastically decreased and
only two practical forms of Buddhism, Chan and Pure Land
Buddhism, continued to be preserved and to be prosperous into
modern times.
Buddhists, particularly in Korea, have also been proud of
fighting against invading nations and of protecting their own
nations from them. Even monks voluntarily became soldiers and
bravely fought against the invading nations. Buddhists, including
monastics and laypersons, in medieval Japan, had continuously
used violence and wars for their sectarian and political purposes.
Buddhists, especially in modern Japan, justified Japan’s attacks on
neighboring nations and participated in the invading wars. They
described defensively the fact that Buddhism has served as a
nation-protecting ideology and boasted of Buddhism as a religion
of protecting the nation and the people.48
By violating the rule of separation between religion and state,
many monks even joined government officialdom and carried out
activities to rule the state. Regardless of whether or not their
actions were just, the monks prayed for the well-being, prosperity
and longevity of the rulers. They did not question their unjust
activities. In East Asia, some rulers made bureaucratic systems for
monastics at the government level, appointed national advisors,
royal advisors and even the lower monastic bureaucratic posts and
let them control Buddhism under their directions. Buddhists
48
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supported the government to gain and maintain positions and
power without listening to voices from the oppressed masses. They
cooperated to nullify the just voices of the people for democracy
and for free speech.
In modern times, when Japan invaded neighboring nations,
while a few of Buddhists voiced up to oppose the unjust war, the
majority of Japanese Buddhists kept silent or supported it
reluctantly or actively.49 During Japan’s occupation period, while a
few Buddhists demonstrated against the unjust war, the majority of
Korean Buddhists kept silent about the war or supported it
reluctantly and strongly.50
We should question the unquestioned bureaucratism,
nationalism, and patriotism that East Asian Buddhists have
generally accepted. Can we justify the use of violence and wars for
defensive fighting in Buddhism? Does Buddhism allow
nationalism and patriotism? How should we judge many of the
monks and laypersons who proudly employed violence and killing
for protecting their own nations? Even East Asian Buddhists, at
least in Korea and in Japan, respect them and consider them as
national heroes.51 Can we say that their arguments are proper and
appropriate according to original and fundamental Buddhist
teachings?
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8. Peacemaking: A Case of Modern Korean Buddhism
In 1910, Japan annexed Korea and in 1911, the Japanese
Governor-General Office established regulations for Korean
Buddhist Temples, effectively colonizing Korean Buddhism. 52
The regulations heavily influenced modern Korean Buddhism
during the occupation period (1910-45) and continue to do so to
the present. In complete acquiescence to these regulations, the
Korean government passed the Law of the Management of
Buddhist Properties in 1962 to control all Korean Buddhist
Temples under the hands of the dictator, Bak Jeonghui. Because
progressive Buddhist activists protested against the undemocratic
law under the name of the Minjung (Liberation) Buddhist
movement,53 the government substituted it with the Law of the
Preservation of Traditional Temples in 1987. Even though the
scope of the government’s control was reduced from all
Buddhist temples to the traditional temples, the current Korean
government is still imposing undemocratic laws to manipulate
Korean Buddhism by continuously revising it to appease Korean
Buddhist opposition.
Based on the regulations, the Japanese colonial government
organized all Korean Buddhist temples under its bureaucratic
hierarchy and established a system of thirty parish headquarter
temples in which the vertical relations between the headquarter
temple and its respective branch temples are strictly regulated. In
52
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order to easily rule Korean Buddhism, the Japanese GovernorGeneral Office approved the abbots, in contrast to the Korean
Buddhist tradition in which abbots are appointed in accordance
with the unanimous recommendations of monastic members. The
articles and bylaws of the thirty parish headquarter temples also
had to be approved by the government. The regulations
stipulated that all Korean temples must report their temple affairs
in detail to the government.
While or after pursuing education in Buddhist Studies at
universities in Japan, many Korean monastics got married, due
to the influence of married monasticism of Japanese Buddhism.
The Japanese colonial government encouraged the thirty parish
headquarter temples to change their articles and bylaws so that
married, pro-Japanese monastics could become abbots through
whom Japan could smoothly control Korean Buddhism. Because
their abbotships were approved by the government, it was
economically and politically prudent to be loyal to its will. The
married monastics also privatized temple properties to support
their families. In short, the Japanese-derived system destroyed
traditional Korean celibate monasticism and brought about the
loss of monastic properties.
On one hand, Korean progressive activists reacted against
Japanese control of Korean Buddhist temples and properties and
began to demand that Japan’s Governor-General Office abolish
the regulations and the parish system in the early 1920s, that is,
just since the massive March 1, 1919 movement for
independence from Japan. However, they were unsuccessful in
nullifying the regulations because pro-Japanese abbots and
Japan’s colonial government crushed the movement. On the
other hand, Korean Seon practitioners initiated the Center for
Seon Studies in 1920, just after the March 1 movement, and tried
to recover Korean Buddhism’s celibate tradition and other
conventions of Korean Seon Buddhism.
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There have been two major movements in the Buddhist
history of South Korea since the liberation of that country from
Japan on August 15, 1945. Chronologically, the first to appear
was the “Purification Buddhist Movement” (Jeonghwa Bulgyo
Undong), 54 the more recent being the Minjung Buddhist
Movement.
The Purification Buddhist Movement began in 1954 and was
largely concluded by 1962. This movement focused on the
cleansing of the influence of Japanese Buddhism from Korea and
the purification of the monastic order. The movement was initiated
by the executive order of the first South Korean president, I
Seungman, to expel married Buddhist priests from traditional
monasteries. Essentially, the Korean monastic order had kept the
precept of non-marriage until the Japanization of it by the Japanese
government. This occurred during the colonial period from 1910
to 1945. During that time, the Japanese Governor-General in Korea
forcibly caused Korean Buddhist monks to marry in order to
facilitate control over the Korean Buddhist order.
The unmarried monks obtained the leadership in the order after
the national monastic conference on August 12 – 13, 1955. The
married monks, who lost the leadership, strongly reacted against
the unmarried monks’ leadership. The confrontations between two
groups continued until to the establishment of the united order in
April 1962. The married monastic group broke away from the
united order because of the discriminating measures from the
unmarried monastic group in September 1962.
The Supreme Court finished the long and tedious legal
procedure between the married monastic group and the unmarried
monastic group and authorized Purification Buddhism over
married Japanized Buddhism in 1969. The married monks
established the independent new order called the Taego Order and
the government approved the registration of the new order based
on the Law of the Management of Buddhist Properties in 1970.
54
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Purification Buddhism had two major missions. First, it was to
recover the celibate monastic tradition of Korean Buddhism from
the married priesthood of Japanese Buddhism. The married monks
privatized temple properties to support their families financially.
To obtain and keep their higher positions in Buddhism, they were
loyal to their appointers, Japanese officials.
The second mission of Purification Buddhism was to revitalize
the Seon practice tradition of Korean Buddhism. Seon practitioners
lost the temples in which to practice because married abbots and
higher order administrators controlled almost all Korean temples at
the time. The movement closely mirrored the spirit of the Center
for Seon Studies. The Seon practitioners actively participated in
the Purification Buddhist Movement in this context.
The characteristics of the Purification Buddhist Movement can
be summarized as follows. First, the movement heavily resorted to
the state for support. Two rulers supported the movement,
President I Seungman and President Bak Jeonghui. President I
Seungman issued six messages between May 21, 1954 and August
5, 1955 and President Bak Jeonghui issued official statements
several times to support the Purification Buddhist Movement.
Second, the movement violated the separation policy between
religion and state, which is described in the constitution. President
I Seungman initiated the Purification Buddhist Movement by
issuing his first presidential message on May 21, 1954. Prior to the
message, Korean Buddhists tried to purify Korean Buddhism and
obtained almost none of their goals. After the first message by
President I Seungman, the government administrative units
became actively involved in the religious affairs.
Third, both groups, married monks and celibate monks,
defined the monastic order in different ways based on their
interests. The celibate monks conservatively defined the monastic
order based on the monastic codes which the traditional Buddhist
orders had kept. The married monks suggested that the monastic
order could be a combination of celibate monks who might
concentrate on cultivation and enlightenment without being
distracted by secular lives and married monks who could focus on
propagating Buddhism through mundane lives.
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Fourth, the process of the Purification Buddhist Movement
was heavily dependent on the court and the state’s intervention.
The two groups took their cases to court and to the state to back
up their own behaviors. The court and the state generally favored
the celibate monastic side. Korean Buddhism wasted its
properties and money in legal fees. In the process, Korean
Buddhism became a pro-Government religion and automatically
voiced government support. It ignored the social injustices of the
undemocratic regimes. Meanwhile, the government manipulated
the conflict between the two Buddhist groups for their purposes.
Fifth, the behaviors of both sides were non-Buddhist.
Violence was used, some disemboweled themselves and intruded
into the court, and the harmony of the Buddhist community was
generally broken. Gangsters were even employed to attack the
opposite side and to take temples. Even though the goals of
Purification Buddhism could be justified, the methods they
adopted could not be authorized under the name of Buddhism.
Buddhism strictly prohibits Buddhists from using violence.
Because the aim of the Purification Buddhist Movement was to
recover this aspect of the monastic order from the Japanese
influence, the movement was basically for reformation of Korean
Buddhism inside the religious area. In contrast, the Minjung
Buddhist Movement is fundamentally an attempt to construct a
type of Pure Land in the society by introducing such universal
issues as human rights, justice, peace, labor, democracy,
reunification, and so on.
Below, I discuss Minjung Buddhist Movement in terms of its
history, development and meaning within the larger context of
Korean Buddhism and society. I also indicate when and how the
two movements came into conflict with each other. While Minjung
Buddhism was a socially engaged movement, Purification
Buddhism was a religious one. While Minjung Buddhism was
active to work for social justice, Purification Buddhism was
indifferent to the social issues. Purification Buddhism was
successful based on the government’s backing so that it was
automatically institutionalized under the government’s control.
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The term “Minjung” means “masses,” “people,” “populace”
and so on, strongly associated with the oppressed class. Minjung
Buddhism became a movement in its collective and continuous
activities aimed at the accomplishment of particular social,
political and religious ends. As the representative movements in
contemporary Korean Buddhism, the above-mentioned have
greatly affected the formation of current Korean Buddhism.
Minjung Buddhism continues to be a vital force in that respect.
Minjung Buddhism experienced its greatest period of influence
as a progressive religious movement in the 1980’s. There are two
major reasons why the Minjung Movement has been declining
since the early 1990’s. One stems from international conditions,
namely, the economical and political collapse of the Eastern
European Communist bloc and the Soviet Union. Minjung
Buddhism is indebted for its theories and practice to Marxism and
socialism. As the Eastern European Communist bloc collapsed,
Minjung Buddhism lost one of its most important models.
The second reason for its decline is related to domestic
conditions. In 1992, a longtime opposition party leader, Gim
Yeongsam, was elected president, even though this involved
collaboration with the conservative ruling camp. Although many
Korean intellectuals considered his victory in the presidential
election incomplete in terms of overthrowing the dictatorship, it
definitely decreased the need to push for democratization through
extra-parliamentary means. After assuming power, Kim recruited
radical and progressive opposition leaders to fill some important
positions in his cabinet and ruling party. His measures brought
democratization to many areas of administration and served to
nullify the power base of the long time ruling conservative group,
even though he was elected by the support of that group. His aim
was to diminish the influence of conservative politicians and their
supporters, including businessmen, bureaucrats, bankers, and so
forth, in order to establish a strong democratic hegemony in the
ruling circle.
The characteristics of Minjung Buddhism can be outlined as
follows. First, it maintains an acutely critical stance towards
traditional or established Buddhism. Their criticisms in this respect
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are aimed primarily at practice as opposed to theory or doctrine
itself. If the oppressed masses are not liberated, Minjung Buddhists
assert, the true ideal of Buddhism cannot be realized. They charge
the traditional Buddhists with standing in opposition to this by
maintaining the status quo.
Second, Minjung Buddhists believe that they can alleviate the
real suffering of the masses by the transformation of contradictory
structures in politics, economy, and society. In order to do so, they
adopted the idea of class struggle as one of their major principles.
For this reason, the Minjung Buddhist method of salvation is quite
different from that of traditional Buddhism, which tries to destroy
the suffering of sentient beings by purely “spiritual” means.
Third, Minjung Buddhist activists do not interpret doctrine
with the traditional panjiao (doctrinal classification) system but by
reference to the modern social sciences. For example, Minjung
Buddhism does not see suffering as originating from human
internal desire or ignorance but from the external social structure.
For this reason, their solution to suffering focuses upon structural
contradiction rather than individual ignorance.
Forth, Minjung Buddhist activists exercise a cliquish
exclusionism, considering that they are endowed with an advanced
consciousness. They believe they are justified, simply based on
this assumption, in strongly criticizing those who do not follow
their line.
Fifth, traditional Buddhists and other scholars disagree with
Minjung Buddhism in terms of its doctrines as well as its practices.
They ask whether Minjung Buddhism is Buddhism and consider it
instead a new Buddhism or heretical Buddhism. They strongly ask
Minjung Buddhism to not rely on the non-Buddhist method of
violence to propagate its agendas.
9. Closing Remarks
Buddhism has two forms, the ideal and the actual. As discussed
above, Buddhism strongly advocates peace in principle. It is the
ideal form of Buddhism. Many Buddhists might represent a
contradiction between real Buddhism and ideal Buddhism.
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Buddhist scholars and leaders should inform the two different
types of Buddhism to promote peace in this problematic world.
If we look at the actual history of Buddhism across the world,
we can easily find so many cases that Buddhists have been very
tolerant of undemocratic social structure, such as dictatorship,
militarism, imperialism, and so on and have very seriously ignored
social justice, human rights, unjust economic policies, inequality,
racism, sexism, nationalism, and others problems.55
Buddhists easily accept unjust political leadership if the leaders
give special favors to them. According to Johan Galtung,56 we can
easily find cases of nations where dictators give favor to Buddhism,
possibly, in Thailand, Sri Lanka, Burma, Korea, and elsewhere.
For instance, when the atrocious dictator Bak Jeonghui, a South
Korean Buddhist, supported unmarried monks in favor of the
Purification Buddhist Movement, the celibate monks did not
protest against his undemocratic actions and further authorized his
dictatorship.57
In many cases, we can easily see the negative sides, i.e.,
isolationism, escapism, retreatism and ritualism, in the history of
Buddhism across the world. There are many instances of Buddhist
monks having privatized their own ideal teachings on peace and
social justice in their own monastic communities at the micro level
and having not activated the teaching in terms of social,
governmental and world affairs at the macro level. Buddhists made
a very peaceful and egalitarian model in monastic communities.
They did not endeavor to extend their monastic model to the
broader contexts, such as village, government, world and even
nature. They have kept silent in social issues, for instances,
political equality, democracy, environmentalism, human rights,
social justice, world peace and so on.58
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The Buddhist view of cyclical processes, not linear ones, easily
results in a high possibility of fatalism in some way, not always,
making Buddhists accept failure too easily. The cyclical view of
history assumes failure. If we meet failure, we easily accommodate
ourselves to it without strongly trying to overcome it. If we have
failure, we also anticipate success. If we have success, we also
expect failure. When peoples encounter failure, they might have
two opposite responses. Some might respond to it very positively
and anticipating success, others would try to overcome it. Some
may react to it very pessimistically, others might accept it as a
natural phenomenon.59
There is the doctrine of Buddha nature or Tathāgatagarbha in
later Mahāyāna Buddhism. The doctrine explains that all sentient
beings have Buddha nature or Tathāgatagarbha without exception.
Some can interpret it substantially in terms of ontological
context.60 Others can interpret it as a provisionally needed logical
apparatus for a soteriological purpose.61 Some scholars argue that
Buddha nature served as an ideological background for social
discrimination, Japanism, nationalism, and ethno-centralism.62 One
can find many historical cases of rulers and the ruling class
59
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utilizing the doctrine for a social discrimination. One also can see
opposite historical cases that the oppressed masses appropriated it
for their own political purpose such as egalitarian social well-being,
rebellions and others, particularly in the Three Stages Sect.63
Buddhists should overcome the negative aspects of actual
Buddhism prevalent in the history of Buddhism across the world
and should actualize the positive aspects of ideal Buddhism in
concrete historical and social contexts. Buddhists need to explore
seriously how to remove direct, structural and cultural violence
and as a result how to build peace in Buddhist institutions and
societies in particular and throughout the world in general.
They can see some practical models from the peace activities
of Buddhist leaders,64 for example, U Thant, a Burmese and the
late UN Secretary-General; Sulak Sivaraksa, a Thai and the leader
for democracy; H. H. the 14th Dalai Lama, the political and
religious leader of exiled Tibetan government in India; A. T.
Ariyaratne, a Sri Lankan and the leader of Sarvodaya Shramadana
Sangamaya; Thich Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese and the leader of the
Plum Village community in France; Aung San Suu Kyi, a Burmese
and the leader for democracy; and others.
Buddhists can also get invaluable teachings on peace from nonBuddhist leaders, for instance, Mohandas K. Gandhi, an Indian
Hindu and the leader for independence from Britain; Martin Luther
King, Jr., an American Christian and the leader of civil rights
movement; Petra Kelly, a German and the founder of Green Party;
Ham Seokheon, a South Korean Quaker and the leader for
democracy; Desmond Tutu, a South African Catholic and the
leader for democracy; N. Radhakrishnan, an Indian Hindu and the
founder of the Shanti Sena (Peace Corps) and the G.
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Ramachandran School of Non-violence; Leo Tolstoy, a Russian
Christian and the world-renowned novelist and peace activist; and
others.
We can find good examples of peacemaking from many
religious institutions that promote peace across the world, e.g., the
Jains of India, Quakers of England and America, the Universal
Peace and Brotherhood Association of Japan, the Buddhist Plum
Village community in France, the Simon Kimbangu Church in
Africa, the Boukhobor (Spirit Wrestler) pacifists of Russia and
Canada, the Jewish Peace Fellowship in the United States, and so
on.65
Every day we see many articles in newspapers dealing with
violence, both individual and institutional. Of course, all religions,
including the three Abrahamic religions, i.e., Judaism, Christianity
and Islam, might give their own answers and solutions. However,
as this author argued continuously, while the Abrahamic religions
and traditional Western philosophies polarize all things into
opposites, for instance, the black and the white, the good and the
bad, the truth and the false, the center and the circumference, the
creator and the created, humans and nature, and so forth, Buddhist
doctrine says we should harmonizes them. Buddhism has this to
offer other religions and philosophies as an outlook with great
potential for peacemaking.
Buddhist doctrines, such as non-substantialism, impermanence,
the middle path, interdependent origination, and so forth, negate
human-centeredness, ego-centeredness, class-centeredness, racecenteredness, religion-centeredness, and so on. I firmly believe the
Buddhist symbiotic view is a strong theoretical means for bringing
about peaceful coexistence in the world. Based on this view, we
can make peace, unity, cooperation and harmonization between
different groups in terms of race, religion, class, and so forth.
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UPROOTING SPROUTS OF VIOLENCE,
CULTIVATING SEEDS OF PEACE:
BUDDHISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PERSONAL CONFLICT
Christiaan Zandt1
Introduction
There is suffering. The body hurts, a dear one dies, or a
marriage breaks up. One type of distress that most, if not all,
human beings experience on a daily basis, is personal conflict.
When dealt with effectively, small-scale personal conflicts can
bring a sense of progress and development that fills an immediate
need for relief or happiness. There seems to be a promise in
Buddhist sources from the Buddha’s discourses (suttas) to the
writings of modern-day Buddhist authors, that Buddhism gives
clear and practical aid in dealing with these conflicts. In the
Madhupiika Sutta 2 for instance, the Buddha summed up his
1 This article is a summary of a dissertation written under the guidance of
Professor Peter Harvey (University of Sunderland in UK). Many people
contributed by sharing ideas, reviewing drafts or just by being present. I feel
grateful for their feedback and support.
2
See Majjhima Nikāya (I.109-114), translated by BhikkhuÑāamoli and
Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (Boston: Wisdom
Publications, 1995). Reference is to the volume and page number of the Pāli
Text Society edition of the Majjhima Nikāya. ‘I.109-114’ refers to volume I,
pages 109-114. These can be found as i.109-114 at the top of the pages
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teaching as ‘enabling a person to live without entering into conflict
with anyone.’ In the Upāsaka-śīla-sūtra, a Mahāyāna sūtra on the
moral code for lay followers of Buddhism, there is a vow to bring
people together in harmony when he or she sees them ‘separate
due to discord.’ 3 Despite practical aid and insights, there are
numerous and quite recent examples of Buddhists engaging in
violence and even war. Richard Gombrich has even wondered how
anyone ever came by the idea that Buddhism predisposes its
believers and practitioners to being less violent in public affairs
than other people.4 It is not my intention to present or defend the
worth of a spiritual philosophy. It is my intention to contribute to
discussion and applications of Buddhist philosophy. I tend to agree
with Mahinda Deegalle, who states that Buddhists, as practising
religious people, have a need to express their condemnation of
violence both in their reflections as well as in their behaviour.5 For
many people, a state of conflict provides the greatest challenge to
refrain from harmful conduct. Therefore, the goal of this article is
to present an introduction to Buddhist analysis of conflict and to
point out some elements of Buddhist philosophy which can be
useful in the transformation of conflict on a personal scale.6
Sprouts of violence: Buddhist analysis of conflict
1.1 Towards a definition
Anton Chekhov once wrote down in his notebook:
inÑāamoli and Bodhi’s translation.
3
See Heng-ching Shih’s translation, Upāsaka-śīla Sūtra: The Sūtra on
Upāsaka Precepts (Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and
Research, Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai, 1994), 36. This is a translation from the
Chinese of T.24.1488.1034a-1075b).
4
Richard Gombrich, “Is the Sri Lankan War a Buddhist Fundamentalism?”
in Mahinda Deegalle, ed., Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri
Lanka (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 22-38.
5
Deegalle, ed., 4-5.
6
I have chosen to generally refer to persons with ‘he’ or ‘him.’ This is done
for the benefit of readability. The reader is cordially invited to read ‘she’ or
‘hers’ in its place.
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If you cry “Forward,” you must without fail explain in
which direction one must go. Do you not see that, if
without explaining the direction, you fire off this word
simultaneously at a monk and at a revolutionary, they will
proceed in precisely opposite directions?7
In a similar fashion, when one wants to resolve or transform
conflict, some clarity on how conflict is perceived is beneficial.
Organizers of a workshop on conflict management held by the
Sinhalese and Buddhist Sarvodaya Shramadana organization made
sure the first step taken was in the direction of a definition of
conflict. One team came up with over fifty responses, which were
then narrowed down by consensus to a list which included notions
ranging from competition, opposition and hatred, to fear, division,
injustice, and social discord.8 What definition of conflict is being
used here? And can it be shared by Buddhists?
The Latin verb confligere means ‘to hit against each other’ or
to collide. ‘Conflict’ basically means that there is a perceived
collision. But if I accidentally bump into a street-lamp, we would
not call this conflict. So there seems to be more to conflict than
two (or more) things colliding. A satisfactory definition of conflict
has to take into account some sort of perceived incompatibility of
the impulses, needs, tendencies, people, or parties involved. I
propose to use the following working definition of conflict:
Conflict is an antagonistic state or action of incompatible,
divergent phenomena. These internal or external phenomena
can be mental or physical needs, drives, ideas, wishes, interests
or demands.
7

A. P. Chekhov, Note-Book of Anton Chekhov, trans. S. S. Koteliansky and
Leonard Woolf, 2004, online at The Project Gutenberg eBook,
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12494/12494-8.txt.
8
Robert Burr, “Buddhist Conflict Management,” in Chanju Mun, ed.,
Buddhism and Peace: Theory and Practice (Honolulu: Blue Pine, 2006), 179180.
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When two things or persons do not accord, and seem
irreconcilable, we use an intransitive verb to say that they conflict.
I will refer to this first type of conflict as either inner conflict, for
friction within oneself, or implicit conflict, for friction which
involves others. When the disagreement leads to some overt action,
things or people are ‘in conflict,’ they struggle, fight, battle or even
wage war. This second type of conflict will be referred to as overt
or open conflict. Of course, when handled too rigidly, this
distinction between inner, implicit and overt conflict becomes
inadequate: even when inner or implicit conflict does not lead to
overt action, it might (and probably will) influence the people
around the person who feels torn. And during overt conflict, one
will be assessing whether it is worth continuing the struggle,
weighing the immediacy of different needs.
1.2 A state of mind
Though most Buddhists would agree with the definition just
presented, they would add that conflict starts in the mind (even
when the triggers for conflicts seem to lie outside oneself). An
‘antagonistic state’ or an ‘incompatibility of phenomena’ clarifies
first of all a certain state of mind. Because of this, it is not the
existence of conflict itself which we need to focus on, but an
understanding of its causes and the way it is dealt with, to prevent
it from leading to open conflict. Ignorance, hatred and greed are
seen as the roots of all unskilful behaviour of sentient beings. The
Theravādin Dhammapada9 holds that ignorance is ‘the worst stain
of all.’ 10 When the 14th Dalai Lama, the temporal and spiritual
leader of the Tibetans, attended a meeting of trainees at the Tibetan
Center for Conflict Resolution in Dharamsala, he said: ‘According
to the Buddhist philosophy, the main source of conflict is hatred
and attachment, and the root cause of these conflicting emotions is
9

The Dhammapada is a part of the Pāli canon and can be found in the
Khuddaka-nikāya section of the Sutta Piaka.
10
Dhammapada, v. 243.

Uprooting Sprouts of Violence

55

ignorance.’ 11 It is safe to say that this is the general Buddhist
position. As long as ignorance reigns, there will be conflict,
collisions of delusions, a continuation of misunderstanding.
When Buddhists talk about ignorance (Pāli, avijjā; Skt., avidyā)
or delusion as the root of conflict, they are not referring to
stupidity in an ordinary sense. First and foremost is meant a lack of
experiential knowledge of the four Noble Truths (Nidāna-sayutta,
S.II.4). Secondly, there is ignorance or a lack of insight into the
real nature of phenomena. Let us have a closer look of these
interrelated appearances of ignorance and their bearing on conflict.
The four Noble Truths – In the first discourse the Buddha
gave after his awakening, he spoke of four Noble Truths. These
can be found in the canons of various Buddhist schools:
1. There is suffering.
2. There is a cause to suffering, namely craving.
3. There is an end to suffering, namely the complete
fading away of craving.
4. There is a path leading to the end to suffering,
consisting of eight parts.
What the Noble Truths imply is that dealing with the deep
causes of suffering (and conflict) will lead to its extinction. The
first Noble Truth acknowledges that there is hardly a reason to be
surprised when conflict arises: Conflict is part and parcel of the
world that we live in. Nor is there reason to become angry, at
ourselves or others, because of the thought that there should not be
conflict. Not understanding that suffering is an inherent part of the
conditioned existence, sentient beings try to avoid or get rid of
things perceived as the causes of particular pains. They tend to be
content with temporary solutions which are subject to change.
When this change happens, suffering and pain arise anew. While
people are in pain and experience inner conflict, they tend to hurt
11

T. Dhondup, “Buddhism and Conflict Resolution”, The Times of Tibet,
the Jan 20, 2005 online at http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=
8,667,0,0,1,0 and The Buddhist Channel, May 31st, 2007,
http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/ > Opinion > Conflict and Buddhism.
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others through overt conflict.12 Not knowing the way to appease
inner conflict and to arrive at a state of peace, people thus keep
creating the conditions which contribute to open conflict.
Another insight that the Noble Truths offer is that conflict, as a
form of suffering, might have some sort of craving as its cause.
Several discourses explain how craving and conflict are tied up. In
a discourse on quarrels and disputes, the Kalaha-vivāda Sutta,13
the cause of conflicts is traced back to the tendency of the mind to
label, evaluate and then elaborate on every perception with
lightning speed. 14 People, upon evaluating what they perceive,
long for or grasp at something, so as to affect the nature of their
mind and body. This situation is one of the elements that influence
contact, which is the coming together of a sense-organ (including
the mind-organ which is crucial for mental contact), a senseconsciousness and an object. As soon as this contact has appeared,
there is ‘appealing’ and ‘unappealing.’ What is appealing, one
desires to have close. This desire makes a thing become dear to a
person. And from what is dear arise, says the sutta, ‘quarrels,
disputes, lamentation, sorrows, along with selfishness, conceit and
pride, along with divisiveness.’15 In the Araavibhanga Sutta16, the
Buddha explores conditions of a state of non-conflict. Not pursuing
sensual desires which are ‘low, vulgar, coarse, ignoble and
connected with harm’ is first in the list. Pursuing sensual pleasures
or sense desire can cause all kinds of suffering, ranging from
internal conflicts to fights or even wars. Similar analysis can be
found in the Mahādukkhakkhanda sutta 17 and the Mahānidāna
Sutta, where the Buddha provides us with an example of how
conflict over possessions is directly caused by craving: Craving is
12

Thich Nhat Hanh, Creating True Peace: Ending Violence in Yourself,
Your Family, Your Community and the World (New York: Free Press, 2003), 14.
13
Sutta-nipāta, translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu,
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp. 4.11 (Reference is to verse
number).
14
Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and
Nirvāa in Early Buddhism (London and New York: Courzon, 1995), 139.
15
Sutta-nipāta, 4.11.
16
Majjhima Nikāya, III.230-237.
17
Majjhima Nikāya, I.86-88.
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the cause of pursuit, and pursuit will lead to seeking gain. Gain
leads to decisions, which lead to desire and passion. Out of desire
and passion arises tenacity, which leads to possessiveness. When
one possesses something, this will cause avarice. Avarice will lead
one to guard property, which will have quarrelling and fighting as
a result.18
The nature of reality – People have a mistaken view of the
nature of reality. Firstly, people fail to see that phenomena in
Sasāra, or the endless cycle of rebirth, are ‘interconnected.’
Actions (karma) and the intention behind them bring forth results,
which will affect the actor. Thus, the cycle of rebirth is perpetuated
because certain conditions bring about certain results. This is
paicca-samuppāda (Skt., pratītya-samutpāda), which has been
translated in various ways, from Conditioned Arising and
Dependent Origination to Interdependence and Interbeing. Most
people, Buddhist or not, have a gut-feeling that their own
behaviour contributes to the way, a relationship, a family, or even
society at large functions. When it comes to conflict, it is difficult
to grasp or pinpoint the exact nature of this relationship between a
lack of inner peace and outer turbulence. This fundamental lack of
really seeing or understanding the principle of Conditioned Arising
is an important aspect of ignorance.
Secondly, there is a lack of awareness of something that some
Buddhists call ‘Buddha nature’ (Tathāgatagarbha). Although the
idea of a Buddha nature has its precursors in the Pāli Canon,19 it
has been developed and discussed mainly in the Northern (i.e.,
Tibetan) and especially East Asian traditions of Buddhism. It
might be described as an inner purity or the potential that all
sentient beings have to attain enlightenment, to free ourselves from
the endless cycle of rebirth. It is a fundamental quality that all
sentient beings are said to share equally. To some it was the innate
18

Dīgha Nikāya translated by Maurice Walshe, The Long Discourses of the
Buddha (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995). Reference is to the volume and
page number of the Pāli Text Society edition of the Dīgha Nikāya. ‘II.58-60’
refers to volume II, pages 58-60. These can be found as ii.58-60 at the top of the
pages inWalshe’s translation.
19
e.g., AN.I.7-11.
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bright purity of the mind, to others it was a corollary of the lack of
acceptance of a fixed nature, and therefore the potential of every
sentient being to awaken into a Buddha. Modern Buddhist authors
talk mostly about a basic goodness, or a shared humanity. The
famous Vietnamese Buddhist monk, scholar and poet Thich Nhat
Hanh translates Buddha nature into an inherent goodness in every
human being that may be covered up by ignorance.20 Because we
do not see this inherent goodness, we are tempted to think that
some beings are fundamentally ‘bad’ or ‘evil.’ And because we are
not aware of Conditioned Arising, we tend to hold onto fixed
images, especially during conflict, of what a person ‘is’. This
brings us to a third aspect of a deluded perspective on reality.
Because of delusion, people conceive reality in a way that is
full of conceit. One of the most convincing conceits is that there is
something that one could an ‘I’ or ‘me,’ or ‘you.’ We experience a
‘conventional’ self, an identity based on the thoughts we have, the
body we experience or the name we carry. We mistake these,
Buddhism holds, for an Absolute Self. We even cherish this
identity, this self, and want to protect it or satisfy its needs and
greed. Especially, this notion of there being a Self, according to
Buddhists, fuels inner, implicit and overt conflict.21
1.3 From the mind into the world
In 2006, members of the Buddhist Peace Fellowship (BPF)
were offered a chance to join a retreat that was announced under
the title: ‘Peace in Our Hearts, Peace in the World: Wholehearted
Practice in Difficult Times.’ Earlier that year, a World Buddhism
Forum convened in Zhejiang (China) to discuss the theme ‘A
harmonious world begins in the heart.’ Awareness of how inner
and overt conflict, or inner peace and outer peace, relate is a
20

Thich Nhat Hanh, Creating True Peace, 182-183.
Bhikkhu Bodhi, an American Buddhist monk and translator of many
important texts, sees a view of self not as ignorance but as an aspect of clinging.
He is supported by AN.V.116 (16-21). Clinging is conditioned by craving,
which in its turn is conditioned by ignorance (The Connected Discourses of the
Buddha, p. 728, n. 8).
21
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crucial feature of the Buddhist approach to conflict. How does
Buddhism enhance the understanding that peace of mind
conditions peace in the world?
First of all, many clarifications of the workings of Conditioned
Arising can be found. Well known from the Pāli canon are the 12
links that tie up physical and mental processes to all sorts of
discomfort we experience. To me, the following explanation
indicates, among other things, that the better we understand the
ways that our body and mind interact, the better we understand the
prolonging of Sasāra:
Spiritual ignorance  constructing activities 
(discriminative) consciousness  mind-and-body  the
six sense-bases  sensory stimulation  feeling 
craving  grasping  existence  birth  ‘ageing, death,
sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and distress.’22
We have seen above what is meant by spiritual ignorance.
‘Constructing activities’ are states of mind or tendencies that
influence ones character and determine action. They can be
intention or ‘volition,’ but also determination, joy or anger. These
constructing activities direct ones consciousness. ‘Mind-and-body’
refers to the coming together of mental and physical processes,
most commonly the sentient organism with its sense-bases. Only
with the sense-bases and consciousness present can there be
sensory stimulation and pleasant, unpleasant or neutral feelings.
Feelings lead to craving, either to get rid of something or to get
close to it. And this craving leads to a more active pursuit, called
grasping, which in turn prolongs existence. This existence can be
considered to be the effect of one’s actions in this life, or in a next
life, after a new birth.23
The sequence of 12 links shows how, because of ignorance,
22

Mahāpadāna Sutta, Dīgha Nikāya, II.32-33. Because of its clarity, I have
made use of Harvey’s translation of this passage instead of Walshe’s. Peter
Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 55.
23
Harvey, 59.
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tendencies arise which might fuel inner conflict. Since these states
of mind condition consciousness, they influence how one perceives
the world and the distinction between pleasant, unpleasant and
neutral phenomena. By sustaining violence in ourselves, we
cultivate the roots and conditions for violence to occur in our
community and society. Conversely, by investigating what
violence we hold in our bodies and minds, and by transforming
these, a change in perception and perspective is possible. The
extent of craving that arises based upon certain feelings can be
modified,24 which in turn might dampen down the transition from
implicit conflict to overt conflict. This explanation provides insight
and inspiration: insight how Conditioned Arising works, and trust
that there are links in the chain which offer a chance for change.
Insight and inspiration can also be found with many
contemporary Buddhist peace-makers: Daisaku Ikeda, a Nichiren
Buddhist and leader of Soka Gakkai International25 has written a
book in which he outlines several paths that can lead to global
harmony.26 Throughout the book, Ikeda illuminates the connection
between the mind and outer peace. His ‘first path’ is taken alone,
consisting of self-restraint and introspection, leading to selfmastery.27 Ikeda’s ‘second path’ is one of dialogue; being an open,
respectful connection that leads to the deinstitutionalization of war.
The same perspective can be found with Sulak Sivaraksa, a Thai
Buddhist and activist for democracy and human rights. He holds as
follows:
A personal understanding of violence in ourselves and
meditating, praying, contemplating – in order to lessen the
violence inside us – obviously cannot by itself be a singular

24

Ibid; my emphasis.
Soka Gakkai International is a Buddhist school that is based on Japanese
Nichiren Buddhism, which promotes international education exchange and the
establishment of world peace (www.sgi.org).
26
Daisaku Ikeda, For the Sake of Peace, Seven Paths to Global Harmony, A
Buddhist Perspective (Santa Monica: Middleway Press, 2001).
27
Ikeda, 12.
25
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force for social change. What it can do is to give clear
vision, not clouded by hatred.28
This is done by looking at our inner conflict, our own violence,
by becoming knowledgeable and dissolving little parts of our
delusion or ignorance about it. Sivaraksa continues:
It can help us link our head and heart and also to draw
strength from Mother Earth, as did the Buddha. When we
identify the seeds of violence, perhaps we may not uproot
them, but we plant seeds of peace in their place. All of this
is necessary in order to cultivate the inner strength to
persist in non-violent struggle.29
Although the quality of our inner and overt conflict
management is conditioned by the mind, it sometimes takes more
than the mind to end conflict. There are several reasons to be
cautious with the assumption that because conflict starts in the
mind, it also ends in the mind. First of all, it seems sensible not to
rely solely on the development of our minds to transform violence
around us. It takes a highly developed mind to be able to apply
enlightened insights in daily conduct. These highly developed
minds are quite rare. Sometimes there are other means to resolve
conflict, even though they might not last as long as peace of mind.
Secondly, there are other conditions than our mind that determines
outer conflict. One’s individual inner peace (or lack of it) is only
one part of the outer conflict at hand.30 This insight might help one
refrain from becoming frustrated or disillusioned when outer
conflict persists, despite one’s inner peace or effort to dissolve it.
A third and final reason for caution is that individualistic spiritual
practice, driven by determination to better the world, might
reinforce the ‘I am’-conceit, a sense of a separate Self. It was noted
28

David Chappell, ed., Buddhist Peacework: Creating Cultures of Peace
(Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999), 44.
29
Ibid.
30
Nico Tydeman, a Dutch Zen teacher, pointed this out during a personal
interview in January 2007.
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in the Mahāyāna Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra (third century CE) that
meditators should not spend too long sitting in the meditation hall,
but that they should go out and apply the benefits of meditation.31
We now turn to some qualities that support transforming conflict
on a personal scale.
Seeds of peace: Ingredients for the transformation of conflict
Just like a cook uses several ingredients to make a meal, there
are several factors that can contribute to dealing with suffering in
the form of conflict. We will have a look at ingredients that
support constructive transformation of inner, implicit and overt
conflict. Since greed, hatred, and delusion are at the basis of the
Buddhist analysis of conflict, their antidotes (wisdom/insight,
loving-kindness/compassion and generosity) form a good place to
start. Buddhists have worked for millennia to strengthen these
antidotes by practicing insight or wisdom (Pāli, paññā; Skt.,
prajñā), practicing ethical conduct (Pāli, sīla; Skt., śīla), and
practicing meditation or concentration (Pāli/Skt., samādhi).
According to the fourth Noble Truth, this practice consists of eight
aspects, which became known as the Noble eightfold path:
Wisdom
Ethical conduct

Concentration

31

1.

Right view or understanding

2.

Right intention or thought

3.

Right speech

4.

Right action

5.

Right livelihood

6.

Right effort

7.

Right mindfulness

8.

Right concentration

W. H. Grosnick, “The Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra,” in Donald S. Lopez, ed.,
Buddhism in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 92-106.
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The terms ‘noble’ and ‘right’ require some explanation. It is
said that, during the process of awakening, one passes through
several stages. During these stages, ones wisdom, conduct or
concentration might be in accord with the Dharma. These are then
called ‘mundane’ or ordinary right view, intention, speech, etc.
The thoughts and actions of an enlightened one, whose mind is
noble and taintless, are called ‘Noble’ or supramundane.32 ‘Right’
or ‘noble’ in this context points to the spiritually ennobling effect
of following this path, as well as to a supramundane way of
understanding, intention, etc.
The richness of the Noble Eightfold path and its implications
fill many books. Here, I introduce eight ingredients of conflict
transformation, cast in the Buddhist mould and distilled both from
the factors of the Noble Eightfold path, as well as from what has
been presented so far:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The power of truth: Developing wisdom (cf. path factor 1)
Compassion and cherishing others (cf. path factors 2-5)
Deep listening, right speech (cf. path factor 3)
Mindfulness or awareness (cf. path factor 7)
Inner transformation through meditation (cf. path factors 68)
6. Equanimity (cf. path factor 8)
7. Non-violence (cf. path factor 4)
8. Skill in means (cf. path factors 1-2)
To me, these ingredients mutually enhance one another, as do
the factors of the eightfold path. For instance, equanimity supports
the awareness needed to listen deeply. And cherishing others
provides skill in means with human warmth. Here, I shortly give
32

The Mahācattārīsaka Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya, 117) offers a clear
explanation of the differences between the ‘mundane’ and the ‘supramundane’
view, intention, speech, action, etc. There are many books which explain the
many facets of the eightfold path. Concise introductions can be found in
Piyadassi Thera’s The Buddha’s Ancient Path (Kandy: Buddhist Publication
Society, 1974) and Rupert Gethin’s The Buddhist Path to Awakening (Oxford:
Oneworld, 2001), 190-226.
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some background information from Buddhist sources as well as a
few remarks on their possible application during personal conflict.
2

The power of truth: Developing wisdom

In early Buddhist suttas, outer conflict was traced back to the
tendency of the mind to immediately evaluate (and thereby in a
way ‘complicate’) perceptions. 33 When we do not see how our
mind shapes our experiences world, we start to think that there
exists such a thing as an ‘enemy’ outside of our own mind:
The processes that compound the picture of the enemy
occur within the mind of the perceiver. Phassa might give
us accurate data, causing feelings to arise (vedanā), the raw
material of emotion, but the process of concocting a picture
of the other person then takes place within us. The enemy
is an extension of our own self-picture and is intimately
related with it.34
This does not mean that there is no such thing as a world that
can be known outside of the mind. Buddhists have been discussing
this for a long time. The Theravādins for instance consider reality
as consisting of dhammas that make up all phenomena (including
people). Although the Theravādins they do not deny that a physical
reality can lead up to mental ones, 35 the authors of the
Dhammapada explicitly state that all that people are, is the result
of, founded on and made up of what they have thought.36 In the
Mahāyāna Yogācāra tradition, the role of the mind in constructing
33

Sutta-nipāta, 4.11.
J. McConnell, Mindful Mediation: A Handbook for Buddhist
Peacemakers (Bangkok: Buddhist Research Institute, 1995), Part 1 chapter 3.
35
Peter Harvey, “The Mind-Body Relationship in Pāli Buddhism: A
Philosophical Investigation,” in Asian Philosophy 3.1 (1995): 39; T.A.
Kochumutton, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and
Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu, the Yogācārin (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1982), 1-3; and Griffiths, On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation
and the Mind-Body Problem (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986), 37.
36
Dhammapada, vv. 1-2.
34
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the world is emphasized up to the point that the perceived world is
‘thought-only’ (citta-mātra), or representation-only (vijñaptimātra). The objectivity of things and subjectivity of oneself only
exist in the mind. Whereas modern science tends to view the
empiric side of experience as related to the physical senses, and the
mind to be ungraspable, the Yogācārins took it the other way
around. For them, the psychic complex which makes up an
individual is empiric, while everything else simply cannot be
known by ordinary human beings. 37 As ordinary human beings,
they hold, we have no direct experience of this Absolute Truth,
although we can (and do) experience a relative, everyday truth.
Developing wisdom can contribute to the transformation of
conflict in two ways. On a ‘deep’ level (the Right Understanding
which is the first step of the Eightfold Path), it is a knowing and
understanding of the Dharma. By becoming more aware, one’s
understanding of reality deepens. This understanding helps
dissolve the ignorance that lies at the root of our conflicts. A
growing understanding of the way things are will strengthen inner
peace and conduct that is in harmony with the way things are. It
can help resolve inner conflict by penetrating the different thoughts
and mindsets that make up the conflict, and see that there is a
choice how to deal with these conflicting inner elements.
Secondly, developing wisdom on a conventional level is about
‘getting the facts right.’ It is important to assess the situation and
investigate what is true for the people involved in outer conflict.
The power of truth can be applied in many ways. One way to
practice with it during conflict is trying to distinguish between
observation and evaluation or interpretation.
2.1 Compassion and cherishing others
Many people acknowledge that compassion, a concern for the
problems of others who wish for peace and happiness and wish to
overcome suffering, is crucial in any important relationship.
‘Compassion,’ says Daisaku Ikeda, ‘signifies the sublime
37

Kochumuttom, 219.
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endeavour to share the suffering of another from the stance of our
common humanity.’38 This common humanity can be understood
as a universal application of the concept of ‘Buddha nature’ that
some Buddhist traditions share. At the same time, it is the Right
Intention of the Noble Eightfold Path. If we are concerned for the
welfare of other sentient beings, we change the attitude or illusion
which holds our self (or even our alleged Self) as most important.
It is an experiential way to increase an understanding of reality.
The implicit conflict fuelled by the cherishing of a self is put on
hold, but the ability to cherish is used to the benefit of others.39
Training oneself to be so filled with compassion, with concern,
with love, has the practical benefit of being able to deal with all
kinds of outer conflict. But for the untrained it might need
tremendous effort to have compassion, for oneself or others, during
conflict. When you find it difficult to have compassion during
conflict, you might want to try and be compassionate –
acknowledge and mourn that a gap remains between your ideal and
the current situation. Smile and celebrate that you are aware of this!
2.2 Deep listening, right speech
Compassion, mindfulness and equanimity provide a motivation
and an atmosphere that can strengthen our ability to listen and
speak at the right time. According to Thich Nhat Hanh, deep
listening and loving speech can stop new anger and fear from
arising. 40 In the case of inner conflict, listening well to what is
actually going on that causes inner turmoil, often helps to lighten
the burden. Often this provides the space needed to create calm or
even a solution. The same can hold true for overt conflict: deep
listening and right speech can allow the parties to get things off
38
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their chest and provide clarity in the turmoil of emotions. Deep
listening helps us connect mindfully to what is alive in ourselves
and others. It goes beyond the words that are being spoken. At the
same time, these same words might be given back to the other
party to establish a connection that aids conflict resolution. We
have to develop the flexibility to understand words and definitions
that are used by the other party and be able to use them freely.
In the Araavibhanga Sutta, a few hints are given as to what is
this right way of speaking.41 First of all, one should not utter covert
speech which is untrue, incorrect and unbeneficial. ‘Unbeneficial’
in the case of conflict could mean: not aiding the transformation or
resolution of conflict. If we think we know something about the
other person, but we are not sure whether it is true, and we want to
utter it just to confront or even hurt the other, this is best left
unsaid. Covert speech which is true, correct and unbeneficial is
also best avoided whenever that is possible. Even when we know
something as a fact, it might still be better to leave it unsaid, in
order to solve the conflict. When covert speech is true, correct and
beneficial, one has to know the right time to utter it. Secondly, the
same approach is advocated for the use of overt sharp speech.
Speaking sharply is not avoided per se, if it is true, correct and
beneficial, but one should know the right time. Hearing the truth
might be hurtful. Yes, there is suffering (this is the first Noble
Truth), but one has to allow time for healing as well. Thirdly, one
should speak without haste. Speaking hurriedly costs a lot of
energy and wears the body down. Moreover, it is quite hard to hear
and understand what one is saying. Finally, we should not rely on
specific local vocabularies and meaning alone, but be able to freely
use language as an instrument. In addition to this, we find an
explanation by the Buddha in the Abhayarājakumāra Sutta42 where
he explains that, based on his compassion for sentient beings, he
only utters speech which he knows to be true, correct, and
beneficial, whether or not others find it agreeable to hear.
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When you are involved in a conflict, check our intention just
before you open your mouth to speak. What need are you trying to
meet? When you listen to others, try to be with them with all your
being, like when you are reading an exhilarating book.
2.3 Mindfulness or Awareness
We saw earlier how ignorance, the root cause of conflict
according to most Buddhists, can be interpreted in different ways.
Insight as an antidote is supported by mindfulness or awareness
(sati). Sati refers to a bare attention for what is (or was) happening,
without egocentric judgement or other forms of attachment. It is a
great aid in experiencing more clearly the real nature of
phenomena (people included).
The act of being mindful as well as the right understanding that
can be its result serve conflict transformation in at least two ways.
First of all, being mindful is being aware of the changes that occur
in body and mind, moment by moment. If one observes carefully,
one sees that inner conflict changes. It is intense at one moment,
and weakens the next. It is fuelled by different thoughts and
mindsets that come into being and fade away. These lessons from
mindfulness can be extended and applied to outer conflict, to social
situations: things will and do change. There will be new sides to
this story, to this outer conflict. Mindfulness thus helps in being
attentive, rising to the occasion when the tide changes. Secondly,
the right understanding that grows upon mindfulness helps see that
there is always something like a ‘different perspective,’ as long as
we are dealing with conventional everyday truth. When we
understand that life is made up of physical and mental processes,
and not of solid, permanent elements, we are opening up to the
possibility of change. We tend to look less for conventional truths
based on conventional facts, and look more at the processes and
needs that arise in the moment because of certain conditions.
Bernie Glassman Roshi, cofounder of the Zen Peacemaker
order, explains that for him an important ingredient of making
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peace is ‘bearing witness’ or ‘unknowing.’ 43 These terms are
sometimes used, I believe, as Zen Buddhist synonyms for
mindfulness. By ‘unknowing,’ I understand Glassman to mean
letting go of conditioned responses and treasuring the creativity
that arises from being open to the moment, instead of being stuck
to what we think we know:
When we penetrate the unknown we don’t see the meal, we
see the ingredients. (…) In the present moment, there are
no thoughts, no concepts, just – THIS!44
By staying open, the chance is that there is a greater awareness
of the elements which make up the situation, instead of our usual
(deluded) perception of it. So mindfulness becomes a very
practical tool that supports outer conflict transformation aimed at
present needs, not at alleged ‘truths.’ This openness or
receptiveness, however, does not mean that one trims ones sail to
every wind. It is being ‘response-able’: able to confidently deal
with conflict’s capriciousness. We can find a clear illustration of
this position in the Pāli Canon: When prince Abhaya came to the
Buddha questioning whether the Buddha would ever say
unwelcome or disagreeable things to others, the Buddha gives him
a detailed answer (see below, ‘right speech’). Prince Abhaya then
posed a second question: Does the Buddha think beforehand about
how he is going to respond to a certain situation, or do the answers
occur on the spot? The Buddha responded with an analogy:
Somebody who is an expert on the different parts of a chariot can
promptly and spontaneously answer any questions that arise about
a chariot. Since the omniscient Buddha has fully penetrated the
way things are, the answers to questions occur when they are
posed.45
There are many ways to apply mindfulness in case of conflict.
The breath is always with us as an instrument of awareness.
43
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Becoming aware of the in-breath and the out-breath can quickly
bring us back to the present moment. Like in walking meditation,
slowing down the conversation, either within oneself or between
people, can bring a new sense of awareness as well. Thich Nhat
Hanh urges us to practice mindful breathing, mindful walking and
gives a specific meditation that can help transform anger and
irritation into openness and the ability to listen with love and
compassion.46
2.4 Inner transformation through meditation
Mindfulness is a key ingredient of most forms of Buddhist
meditation. One of the most important expositions of Buddhist
meditation in the Pāli Canon and in the Theravāda school is the
Satipahāna Sutta, 47 a discourse on the foundations (or
applications) of mindfulness. Meditation is a tool. It can help
develop insight, compassion, awareness and patience. By watching
the breath, for instance, or thoughts or any bodily sensations that
arise when one sits for an extended amount of time, we learn to see
our actions and habits for what they are: conditioned phenomena,
processes that arise and fade away. For Senauke meditation
practice is the essence of what he calls ‘inner disarmament.’48 It is
becoming intimate with the pain we experience as well as how we
react to it.
The ability to sit and watch comes in handy during outer
conflict: we become more skilful in observation, distinguishing
between egocentric evaluation of our observations and evaluation
based on wisdom or insight. One develops patience to see what
happens. We thus create the choice not to act out of habits that got
one in the mess in the first place. Meditation then becomes a tool
46
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to learn to abstain from unethical conduct with body, speech, and
mind, and strengthen the ability to act ethically.
2.5 Equanimity
The Kakacūpama sutta49 tells of the monk Phagunna, who is
associated over much with the community of monks around him.
Whenever somebody makes an unkind remark about the
community, Phagunna becomes upset. The Buddha admonishes
him to be mindful of ‘urges and thoughts which are worldly’ when
he is reproached to his face or even hit by hand or some other
means. He should train himself to the effect of being gentle and
calm even under dire circumstances out of respect for the teachings.
Even if bandits were to sever a monk limb by limb with a saw, the
training of monks should be not to utter harsh words, but remain
calm and try to encompass their own minds as well as the bandits
and the whole world with a mind imbued with loving-kindness.50
This is equanimity (Pāli, upekkhā; Skt., upekā). Equanimity
clearly is not indifference or desperation. It is the experience of
spaciousness based on a growing absence of hostility and ill will.
Even though suttas like the Kakacūpama sutta were directed at
monks with their high and exacting standards, it is sound advice
for all involved in conflict not to build upon fickle reputations and
to work on patience, loving-kindness and compassion. The danger
of emotional involvement in outer conflict is first of all the effect
that these emotions have on our minds. A reaction of anger is an
act on the part of the doer ‘and by it you co-operate with your
assailant’s wish to bring harm to you.’51 Providing a stronghold for
conflict through anger, the conditions for karmic traces or imprints
are made. Furthermore, patience and equanimity help to keep a
focus on deeds and processes, instead of what something or
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someone allegedly is.52
Equanimity helps in remaining impartial and even-minded,
aiding the skilful transformation of inner and outer conflict. In fact,
being able to remain impartial during inner conflict can help
acknowledge emotions or thoughts that one would rather not have.
We can use and strengthen this equanimity during outer conflict by
investigating the different sides to a story, hearing all parties
involved, and desiring to look for alternatives. In the Vinaya, texts
on Buddhist discipline, at many instances where there is conflict
among the monks, the first thing that is done is to hear the
parties.53 This helps get clear what are the different versions of the
truth.
2.6 Non-violence
Although Indian philosophical and religious traditions have
been a strong advocate of the non-violent way of solving conflict,
there has also been awareness that in certain situations, the use of
force or even violence was justified. In the Bhagavad Gītā, direct
violence is justified when there is no way left open to restore
righteousness.54 Early Buddhism took a radical different position
52
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from the contemporary dominant view and influential Indian works
like the Gītā.55 All forms of abuse, be it mental, verbal or physical,
directed towards oneself or others, are defined in early Buddhist
scriptures as possible examples of ‘violence.’56 Some regard the
abstention of violence as a lofty ideal, as something for saints, an
absolute standard impossible to adhere to and not a practical
approach to conflict. 57 Deegalle reminds us that the original
context for the often quoted Dhammapada verses on non-violence
was very concrete indeed, being a dispute between monks over the
construction and possession of material property. 58 But is it
possible to always deal with conflict without causing harm? Isn’t it
impossible not to resort to the use of force in certain circumstances
or positions which require ‘peace-keeping’? There is an account of
the Buddha thinking over the possibility of reigning without killing,
conquering or grief.59 Before he could come up with an answer,
however, the ‘tempter’ Māra stopped by to persuade him into
becoming a king himself. Because the Buddha was interrupted in
his train of thought, it remains unclear whether he thought it was
possible to rule without killing or grief. Some authors 60 indeed
hold that early Buddhism considers a ‘peace-loving defender’ as
moderately good. To these authors, the gap between early
Buddhism and contemporary religious traditions was not that big
on the stance of violence. Khantipalo Bhikkhu, a Theravādin monk,
acknowledges that some people think that sometimes force or
punishment is needed to have fools not do acts of violence.61 In
cases like these, forceful action is seen as an act of compassion.
Khantipalo is sure that nowhere in ‘the original collection of the
Buddha’s discourses’ is such a doctrine included. According to
55
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Khantipalo, Dharma-practice does not recognize means that use
violence from a compassionate motivation as Dharma-means:
‘Means are important if ends are to be attained, but only Dhammameans will lead to a Dhamma-end.’ Perhaps Khantipalo is
referring to the suttas of the Tripiaka only, and does not take other
Buddhist scriptures into account. Since, in the Mahāyāna traditions,
the liberation of all sentient beings is the Dharma-end, intervening
forcefully or even violently to protect beings from greater suffering
or a prolonged stay in Sasāra, might well be called a dharmameans. A version of the Mahāyāna Parinirvāa sūtra, that was
composed before the 5th century CE, even urges lay followers to
protect ‘true Buddhist teachings’ with weapons if necessary.62
For early Buddhism, the motivation to avoid violence and to
protect the lives of other beings derives from a fundamental
conviction that all beings share a similar position with respect to
their own lives. 63 All beings, to paraphrase the Dhammapada,
tremble at violence and fear death.64 Non-harmful conduct can be
considered to be a necessary element on the way to liberation, both
as three of the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path, as well as part
of the (right) resolve to practise harmlessness.65 Although space is
lacking here to go into a definition of violence, I think that the
ability to distinguish between conflict and violence supports a nonviolent transformation of conflict. Unable to make that distinction,
anyone striving for harmlessness is lured into thinking that conflict
itself is harmful and violent. Thinking that it should be stopped
immediately, we might lose any valuable information that aids the
structural relief of conflict. Conflict is not violent per se. The way
we deal with it might be. So, one application of non-violence
during personal conflict is: try to slow down and let the conflict be.
Ask others and yourself whether there is anything more that needs
to be said or done. This way, you create the conditions for
transformation, instead of solutions which support some apparent
62
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needs, but violate other, less obvious ones.
2.7 Skill in means
Bearing witness, acting compassionately, being mindful,
listening or speaking rightly, aiming for non-violence all are
suitable approaches that contribute to the recipe of peace. Without
wisdom, applying (Buddhist) principles might lead to serious
problems. Without wisdom, equanimity might lead one to condone
domestic violence, or non-violence to destruction. So how do
Buddhists determine when to use which tool? And what to do
when circumstances require means that seem to oppose rules of
conduct that Buddhists hold as important?
In the history of Buddhism, this discussion often centred
around the topic of skilful means (Skt., Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra).
‘Skilful means’ or ‘skill in means’ came to the fore in exegesis and
Buddhology. It was not a term or an issue that was prominent in
early Buddhism, 66 although the logic behind the skill in means
stories that we encounter in the Mahāyāna tradition, can be found
in Theravāda-texts as well. In the first century CE, the idea that
everybody could attain Buddhahood and the availability to all of
the spiritual career of a bodhisattva started to evolve.67 This greatly
influenced the values that were considered central for Buddhists.
Compassion (Pāli/Skt., karuā) became central from this time on.
And so, with a compassionate motivation, a bodhisattva could
choose means which in early Buddhism would certainly entail a
breach of precepts. There was a shift in dominance from the
principle of non-violence to that of compassion. Buddhists in the
Mahāyāna traditions generally accept that certain beings can
commit transgressions of certain modes of conduct that they
consider ethical or skilful, because their intention is to benefit
other sentient beings. Stewart MacFarlane sees the Buddha making
promises which he has no intention of delivering, for the spiritual
66
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benefit of the persons involved.68 He connects with the concerns at
hand, and uses them as a spiritual springboard to a higher
understanding and insight into the causes of suffering. An example
of this is the case of a woman named Kisagotami, as narrated in a
commentary to the Pāli Therigāthā.69 She asks the Buddha for a
medicine that will cure her son, who has recently died. The
Buddha seems to agree to provide the medicine as he asks
Kisagotami to bring him a handful of mustard-seed. When the girl
is about to leave, the Buddha adds that the mustard-seed must be
taken from a house where no one has lost a child, husband, parent,
or friend. Kisagotami goes from house to house, only to find out
that everywhere she goes, some beloved one had died. Tired and
hopeless, Kisagotami sits down, watches the lights of the city
which slowly extinguish during the night. It is likewise with the
lives of all men, she discovers: they flicker up and are extinguished,
death is common to all. Kisagotami eventually had the body of her
dead son buried and took refuge in the Buddha and the Dharma. So
here we see how the Buddha’s approach is both practical
(addressing the concerns of the person or parties who are engaged
in conflict) and spiritual (opening up new insights).
The concept of ‘skill in means’ was also used to explain certain
puzzling events in the Buddha’s life, seeing them as means by
which the Buddha taught. The Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra, of the early
Mahāyāna school and probably dating from the first century BC,
was composed to offer explanation for instances which were hard
to understand.70 How should one, for example, understand the fact
that the one time Buddha had a thorn in his foot? People
surrounding him wondered whether this was bad karma ripening,
being some residue of unskilful past deeds? The Buddha then used
the observation to make the point that there is no place where one
can go to escape the effects of his deed. He tells his audience of a
previous life, when he was captain of a ship.71 This captain, who
68
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some sources refer to as Captain Great Compassionate72 and others
as Captain Courage, 73 steers a ship manned by five hundred
merchants. One of them, however, has planned to kill the
merchants as soon as they have collected their possessions. The
Captain is warned by the ocean’s deities, who tell him in his dream
of the plans of the man. The deities also paint the karmic
consequences of such a deed for this person and they urge the
captain to come up with skilful means to prevent the person from
killing and thus perpetuating his own suffering from karmic
consequences. The captain reflects upon this for seven days.
Eventually he concludes that the only way to prevent a tremendous
amount of suffering is by killing the man himself. He will bear the
consequential pain from the hellish rebirths that killing a man may
lead to. Twenty people in the city of Śrāvastī, upon hearing this
story, abandoned plans of killing their enemies.74 So the Buddha
used skill in means to teach persons and inspired them not to kill.
Another important sūtra in the discussion on the use of violent
means is the Sarvāstivāda Mahāparinirvāa sūtra.75 The issue of
skilful means is addressed at several points, to bridge the gap
between early Buddhist principles and their seeming contradiction
with ideas presented in this sūtra. In short, the Buddha uses skilful
means to teach different people in different circumstances. The
sūtra has been used repeatedly as a scriptural source for supporting
the use of force in certain circumstances. The sūtra describes an
episode in a previous life of the Buddha, where he killed several
Brahmins who were about to slander Buddhism. By doing this, he
saved them from the karmic consequences of such an act. The sūtra
goes on to state that followers of the Mahāyāna should bear
72
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weapons and ignore their moral code if this is necessary to defend
the Dharma.76
Skill in means enables Buddhas and bodhisattvas of a high
stage (mahāsattvas) to act with compassionate motivation in a way
that aids the permanent liberation of other sentient beings, even
when it seems to go against the temporal relief of suffering. From
stories like the one about Captain Courage, it seems evident that
skill in means can even serve as a validation for violent actions to
prevent wider violence. I want to point to two important caveats
which greatly reduce the strength of an argument in favour of
skilful use of violence. First of all, Mahāyāna texts which touch
upon the subject of skilful means often describe cases and crises
where drastic measures and extremely skilful means have to be
employed. In these stories, there is almost always a real or
potential conflict. 77 What becomes clear is that these are
uncommon situations, and are ones which require measures which
can only be judged correctly by one with great insight and a pure
motivation. Stories about the Buddha in previous lifetimes often
describe him as a bodhisattva. It is the bodhisattva’s extensive
knowledge which provides for the assurance that what is done is
actually best in a certain situation. 78 One needs ‘fundamental
assumptions about the operation of karma, the acceptance of
responsibility for actions, as well as the need for insight,
understanding and compassion for those involved.’ 79 Without
sufficient wisdom and compassion, we try to provide help and later
on regret that our ‘help’ turned out to be harmful.80
Besides a compassionate motivation, complete insight is a
requisite for the skilful use of violence. Note, that in the story of
captain Courage, it is not the captain who can read the intentions of
the villain. The ocean’s deities inform him. And even then, it is not
immediately clear to the captain what he should do. He ponders
over the issue for days. So penetrative insight, help and time are
76
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relevant factors in skilfully determining the appropriate means in a
situation. Before one uses violence and inwardly or outwardly
validates it by saying it is the skilful use of means, we have to look
deeply inside and outside ourselves. We have to have penetrating
insight in the causes and effects of those processes which surround
us. Or we should have the ability to be guided by people with these
qualities. Most people simply do not qualify. It is exactly for this
reason that the Buddha cautions his audience in the end of the
Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra, that the given explanation of skill in means
is to be kept secret: Only a bodhisattva of a high level is ‘a fit
vessel’ for this teaching. Common people have too little merit to be
able to benefit from it. 81 For one who looks for ethics that are
prescriptive and universal, not situational and dependent on the
actor, this hierarchy in a moral or spiritual sense might be quite
hard to deal with.
How is the discussion on the issue of skilful means related to
attempts to resolve or transform conflict? First of all, skill in means
can help understand, manage or even transform outer conflict
constructively. Anyone who finds himself in a conflict, or is asked
to help resolve it, benefits from investigating thoroughly. Only
then can he try and translate his principles to this specific situation.
Secondly, the ability to adapt to circumstances and to the character
and capacity of the people involved, requires an absence of
prejudice. 82 It takes great insight and the compassion of a
bodhisattva to judge with certainty what means to happiness and
salvation for those involved would fit a situation best. Thirdly, this
implies that there is no ultimate or ‘best’ way to solve conflict.
Skill in means enable one to adapt and creatively use the means at
hand to benefit a constructive solution of conflict. And fourthly,
forceful means to prevent or resolve outer conflict might be opted
for, according to many Buddhists, in extreme situations. Until one
is a bodhisattva of great capacities, however, it seems wise not to
opt for it.
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3. Conclusion
From the Buddhist perspective, as long as ignorance reigns, it
will cause greed and hatred, and these three will misguide people’s
intentions. Collisions of delusions and a continuation of
misunderstanding will persist, leading to suffering on a daily basis.
For Buddhists, inner conflict has its origin in a mind that is
deluded. Some Buddhists would even state that outer conflict is
nothing more than mind: the reality that we perceive as verbal
disagreement or struggle between two persons, is not something
that is ‘out there.’ The Noble Truths make clear that dealing with
suffering in general, and conflict in particular, requires a multipronged approach. Buddhism, moreover, stresses the importance of
transforming wisdom and experience into everyday conduct. A
Buddhist approach to conflict therefore is both practical and
spiritual. It addresses the needs involved, and also opens up new
insights through self discipline, inner calm and cultivation of
mindfulness and wisdom. I have suggested that these might be
broken down into eight aspects: (1) a search for what is the truth
that supports conflicting needs or parties; (2) the ability to have
compassion, for (the needs of) oneself and others; (3) mindfulness
of what is actually going on during conflict; (4) equanimity which
supports even-mindedness and impartiality amidst the turbulence
of conflicting needs and emotions; (5) the ability to communicate
constructively by listening deeply and speaking constructively; (6)
concentration and the ability to transform experiences into wisdom
through meditation; (7) the intention not to harm others; and finally,
(8) flexibility and creativity to adapt one’s methods according to
circumstances.
Spirituality can be a practical resource in handling problems.
Most if not all of the skills just mentioned can be found in the
methods of other religious and spiritual traditions, as well as in
communication processes that have been developed recently.
Someone who experiences conflict as a one-time event (even when
it occurs repeatedly) might choose to focus on any of the presented
tools. He might take the admonition to be flexible and creative in
solving outer conflict, based upon his own abilities, without really
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caring for the happiness of others involved. Some Buddhists have
facilitated this by translating the assumptions underlying these
tools into concepts that seem to be universal and supported by
modern science. For a Buddhist, this fits well into the bodhisattvaideal of helping people become or remain free of suffering.
‘Buddha nature,’ a complex concept which most Mahāyāna
Buddhists hold to be the potential of every being to become a
Buddha, has been watered down to inherent goodness or a
‘humanity’ which we all share. Conditioned Arising is presented
without its corollary that all phenomena lack inherent substance.
There is a danger, however, that the coherence and motivation that
underlie these tools are lost.
To me the power of ancient Asian thought, and in particular of
the Buddhist traditions, lies in the fact that it points to our
individual peace as the fundamental source for dealing skilfully
with conflict. Neither this individual peace, nor the elements that
make up the inner transformation that Buddhism professes as a
requisite for peace, are ‘Buddhist.’ The Buddhist twist, I believe, is
both in the way these skills are presented as a coherent whole, as
well as in the assumptions or motivation underlying this coherence.
Like a medicine that has a certain composition and a certain way of
usage. The ingredients that make up a medicine to alleviate pain
might be used in a different composition with a different effect.
And the medicine itself, used with a different motivation, might
even be an instrument to harm. Together, tools and motivation
form a ‘Buddhist’ whole that can be truly called a way or a method:
Without wisdom, a compassionate attitude might lead to
condoning behaviour that is harmful. Equanimity without
compassion might actually be indifference. The flexibility of a skill
in choosing and using means without insight and compassion tends
to trickery. For a Buddhist, understanding of and belief in the
Buddhist teachings will likely help him see the coherence between
the several tools of conflict transformation. It will help him gain a
personal and experiential understanding of the Buddhist teachings,
which goes beyond the ideas and insights that have been presented
in this dissertation. A practice confined to meditation and retreat is
bound to hamper the sense of connection needed to skilfully
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resolve conflict. Ending conflict is a road travelled with the body,
our speech and our mind.
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HOW FAITH INSPIRED THE SAVE THE BELL
MOVEMENT:
An historic chapter in the life of the Venerable Dharma
master Daigyōin, demonstrating his philosophy of
peace and his efforts to try to bring about peace in this
world.
Compiled by the Shōgyōji Archives Committee1
Introduction
When a person stands on the verge of a spiritual
breakthrough, there is no need for them to answer to anyone as to
who one is or what one knows. All that matters is how to break
free from this state of suffering in which one has long been
imprisoned. It is only when one arrives at this critical impasse
wherein one turns at last to take refuge in the Three Treasures
that a true resolution comes about. In more familiar terms the
1

The present text was originally compiled by Reverends Shinohara Kōjun
and Senō Eshū, of the Shōgyōji Archives, Shōgyōji Temple, Fukuoka, Japan,
under the editorial supervision of the Venerable Reverend Takehara Chimyō;
English translation and annotation were carried out by W. S. Yokoyama, of
Kyoto, in collaboration with Reverend Satō Kemmyō Taira, of the London
Shōgyōji branch. The text has greatly benefited from the extensive critical
editing by Mrs. Dilly Suzuma of London.
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Three Treasures of Buddha, Dharma, and Sagha are,
respectively, (1) the excellent person of ideal qualities who is
awakened to the truth, (2) the teaching of the truth that veritably
speaks to us, and (3) the community of seekers who have
awakened to that truth. Thus, those who have turned to take
refuge in the Three Treasures are the ones who have crossed the
threshold of salvation and realized what it truly means to be
saved. Today, as wars continue to rage, there is little sign that the
forces of world conflict threatening to destroy such Treasures
will ever abate.
During World War II, the Buddhist community in Japan was
forced to stand helplessly by as many of their irreplaceable
temple treasures, which should be regarded as items belonging to
the Three Treasures estate, were put in jeopardy and in fact ran
the risk of being lost forever. Although our own temple was
ordered by the military government to hand over our historic
temple bell to the drive to assemble scrap metal, one lone monk
had the courage to step forward and engage in a long and bitter
struggle to protect that precious bell through a faith-inspired
campaign that claimed it as the heritage of our Sagha. Nor was
the scope of his monk’s campaign restricted to preserving this
treasured bell for our postwar Sagha alone. His struggle, rather,
was a continuation of his lifelong efforts to create a living
Sagha community that was culturally rich in such items of
Three Treasures estate. The name of that Dharma master was the
Venerable Daigyōin, also known as Reverend Takehara Reion.
The Venerable Daigyōin was born at Shōgyōji in Fukuoka
prefecture on December 24, 1876 and lived to the advanced age
of seventy-five, his long career coming full circle with his death
at the same temple on November 12, 1951. Daigyōin was a priest
of the Jōdo Shinshū School, a form of lay Buddhism established
some eight hundred years ago by Shinran Shōnin (1173–1262).
Known as Jōdo shinshū, or Shin Buddhism, it is now the largest
school of Japanese Buddhism, comprising some twenty-thousand
traditional branch temples and a combined congregation
estimated modestly to be upward of one million members. The
Venerable Daigyōin Reion was the thirteenth head priest of
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Shōgyōji, a temple established over four hundred years ago on
the outskirts of Hakata, in northern Kyushu.
Our temple, Shōgyōji, built in the medieval period during a
time of civil war, was founded by the sixteenth century Dharma
master Ryōen, originally hailing from the bushi, or warrior class,
attached to the powerful Asō clan that in those days ruled the
Asō district of Kyushu.2 Ryōen was forced to stand by and watch
as the Shimazu clan, the rulers of southern Kyushu, attacked the
Asō clan and brought them to ruin. As a liege of the defeated
Asō clan, Ryōen fled northwards, at which time he must have
acutely felt the impermanence of this world. By chance he met
the twelfth Honganji leader, Kyōnyo Shōnin (1558–1614), who
happened to be touring the area, delivering sermons. Ryōen
pledged allegiance to the Honganji and was ordained into its
priesthood.
With the support of a devoted follower, who was a lord of
the Ōga family, 3 Ryōen built a hermitage, or small temple, in
Chikushino on the site of modern day Shōgyōji. Ten years after
he became a monk, Ryōen’s hermitage came into its own as a
full-fledged temple when the main Honganji temple bestowed
upon it an official temple name and furnished it with the
requisite Buddha statue carved of wood.4 Just the previous year,
in 1592, Hideyoshi Toyotomi dispatched his first wave of troops
to Joseon Korea (the so-called Bunroku no eki, Imjin Waeran)
and then five years later, in 1597, a second wave that invaded the
whole peninsula (Keicho no eki, Jeong’yu Waeran). Thus, when
we look at the background to our founding master Ryōen, it is
2

Next to the Imperial lineage and the Izumo Sen family, the Asō family of
Kyushu is one of the oldest traditional clans in Japan. Since the Sengoku period,
they have served as the head of the Shinto shrines in Asō, the present day head
being the ninety-first descendant of the line.
3
The Ōga family continues to be supporters of Shōgyōji, with the oldest
member currently serving as one of the most responsible trustees of the temple
today.
4
Shōgyōji was at one time affiliated with the Shinshū Ōtani-ha (Higashi
Honganji) denomination. Nowadays it has independent status but still enjoys
cordial relations with the Tokyo Honganji, successors to Shinran Shōnin’s blood
line.
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evident that such continuous war-related affairs must have
swayed his decision to enter the Buddhist order. Nor can we
deny the impact that such events in the modern era must have
had on the Venerable Daigyōin as he set out to formulate his own
philosophy of peace.
In the modern age, along with the tremendous progress in
scientific technology, we have witnessed a quantum leap in the
massive killing power of weapons and an unrelenting rise in the
overall scale of warfare. The First and Second World Wars
resulted in the deaths of ten million and thirty million people,
respectively. In imperial Japan, the only country to suffer atomic
bombing, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki some one hundred and
twenty thousand lives were incinerated in the blink of an eye.
After her defeat, Japan was obliged to declare in her
Constitution a wish for everlasting peace with the words, “We
desire to occupy an honored place in an international society,
striving for the preservation of peace and the banishment of
tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from
the earth.” Recognizing the equal rights of all peoples to live in
peace, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution further states that
“We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live
in peace, free from fear and want.” These points are reiterated in
further articles of the Japanese Constitution expressing the noble
ideals that Japan shall forever abandon war, shall not maintain
armed forces, and shall reject the right to wage war.
Awakening of Faith
The inspiration for the Buddhist path of peace that the
Venerable Daigyōin walked during his long life of seventy-five
years came from his own personal awakening of Faith that took
place a full century ago in April 1907. As he relates in his
Record of My Awakening of Faith (Nyūshinroku), once he
noticed a young nobleman, who was a priest ordained to the
traditional Higashi Honganji order, standing on the brink of
moral ruin. During this period, he did his best to go to that young
man’s aid, and apart from that, even helped spur a religious
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revival amongst the general populace. Nevertheless, in the midst
of striving to resolve these problems, he came to suddenly realize
the futility of such altruist efforts on his part, or what Shin
Buddhists call jiriki, literally, “self power.” At length he found
himself impelled to renounce forever the idea he could change
anyone by applying any such external means.
Hard upon the heels of that realization, the Venerable
Daigyōin had to confront what was for him the vexing problem
of taking a wife. He reckoned that anyone who married him,
given his role as Buddhist priest and spokesman, would have to
go through hell and high water at his side, and so for his own
purposes he wanted someone well able to endure whatever
hardships they might encounter together. Yet how utterly false
this line of reasoning was, was revealed to him by the light of the
Tathāgata, which purged him of his self-centeredness and
showed him how caught up he was with thinking only in terms of
himself alone. The religious convictions he had held up to then
were completely overturned and he found himself swept up and
emptied of this false way of being. It was as if the voice of the
Tathāgata spoke to him, saying, “Come what may, I will take
upon myself all your burdens and shoulder them on your behalf.”
Interestingly, a similar episode is known to have occurred with
Shinran Shōnin, the Shin Buddhist founder, who, when faced
with the decision whether to marry or not, was overjoyed to hear
a voice in a dream vision assure him that it was the right thing
for him to do. Thus, in the same year as his religious awakening,
the Venerable Daigyōin was also able to cross the threshold of
married life.
In Record of My Awakening of Faith (Nyūshinroku), the
Venerable Daigyōin expresses the deep joy he felt upon reading
a passage from the Buddha’s sermon in the Larger Sūtra of
Eternal Life that goes, “There are sentient beings who, having
encountered this Light, find that their three defilements have
simply vanished and their bodies and minds have now become
soft and supple. They dance for joy as they discover to their
intense surprise that a warm heart has been awakened within
them. When those caught up in the suffering of the three mires
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behold this radiant Light, they will all of them recover from their
misery and never have to endure such anguish again. After their
lives come to an end, all of them will don the cloak of liberation”
(Larger Sūtra of Eternal Life, Scroll One). For the Venerable
Daigyōin this passage perfectly expressed the brilliant expanse of
living faith that now cradled him, body and soul, in her oceanlike embrace.
While still on the subject of peace, it should be noted that
Buddhism, in order to spread its message, has never once
resorted to arms. Let us now look at some of the several ways in
which peace has been defined: “the state of no war,” “the state of
non-aggression towards neighboring countries,” “the absence of
civil war,” “the state of no conflict between a State and its
citizens.” In each case, peace is defined negatively as “a state of
no war.” It is rare indeed to come across a positive definition of
peace as comprising a specific kind of state. Such nostalgia for a
war-free state or for the construction of a war-free world should
remind us in what high esteem humanity holds these ideals and
how universal they actually are. Ever since the beginning of
recorded history, however, an errant mankind has demonstrated
time and again it has learned nothing from its deplorable
tendency to engage in war. Buddhist teachings point out that as
long as we let our self-view, self-delusion, self-conceit, and selflove persist, our personal interests are bound to come into
conflict with those of others, compelling us to engage in endless
conflict.
Thus, it is not until each and every one of us achieves Inner
Peace or tranquility of being, known in Buddhism as Nirvāa,
that can we hope to be released from the vexing forms of karmic
suffering that torment us at every turn. When every individual
attains for themselves, a state of Inner Peace, it will be reflected
in the peace of the State, the peace of the people, and ultimately,
the peace of the world; other than that there can be no real way to
achieve World Peace. This is why His Holiness the Dalai Lama
has constantly been referring to Inner Peace as the wellspring of
World Peace. Such a state of inner tranquility has been clearly
exemplified by numerous Buddhist figures, as well as by
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countless leading individuals and their likeminded followers.
What we ourselves should be thinking about today is finding the
way for each of us to achieve that state of peace within, or Inner
Peace, that leads to World Peace.
With this in mind, let us take a brief look at the way devised
and tested by the Venerable Daigyōin, retracing the steps he took
at various points in his career.
Petition to save the temple bell
The most potent symbol of how our Master, the Venerable
Daigyōin, set about putting into practice his prayer for World
Peace was the Save the Bell movement initiated by him in 1943,
when the world was in the throes of World War II. By 1943, the
situation of the Japanese Army on the battlefield was rapidly
deteriorating and it was abundantly clear that Japan itself was on
the road to defeat. On February 1st, the Japanese Army began its
retreat from Guadalcanal; on April 18th, Admiral Yamamoto
Isoroku, Commander in Chief of the Japanese fleet, was killed;
and on May 30th, the Japanese garrison on Attu Island, in the
Aleutians, was completely destroyed. It was against this somber
background that the Venerable Daigyōin, in his mission to
restore peace in our hearts, implemented the Save the Bell
movement. In the following, we will attempt to give an outline of
the key Buddhist activities undertaken by him in his campaign to
bring about peace.
In May 1942, with the rapid depletion of strategic materials
and arms, the country found itself so lacking in scrap metal that
the Government was at last forced to turn to the public sector for
further supplies, issuing what came to be known as the Metal
Collection Directive. All over the country temples were forced to
hand over any Buddhist items that were made out of metal such
as statues and bells. The Administrative Headquarters of the
Shinshū Ōtaniha (Higashi Honganji) denomination, to which
Shōgyōji was at that time affiliated, sent word that July to all its
temple branches that it would be conducting a special drive to
collect all such metal, and in September again initiated a further
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campaign to step-up scrap metal donation. By September 1943,
the Higashi Honganji Headquarters had managed to accumulate
ten and a half tons of so-called scrap metal, including amongst
these other treasures its own bells and the bronze base of the
lotus fountain from in front of its very gates.
As one of the Honganji branch temples, our Shōgyōji, too,
received a directive regarding scrap metal collection from the
local administrative office of the main temple in June 1942.
Given the situation, there appeared to be no alternative but to
hand over the temple bell and other Buddhist artifacts, since
turning one’s back on a government edict would have been
tantamount to refusing to obey the Emperor’s orders, and, in
religious circles at least, to be labeled unpatriotic traitors would
have amounted to the temple faithful digging their own graves.
The Venerable Daigyōin, however, spurning the abuse of
those around him, urged people instead to assume the standpoint
of monpō, or Dharma listening, and “to nurture the Buddhadharma in their hearts.” In time he was able to gather together a
loyal circle of likeminded followers, with whom he solemnly
initiated a movement to petition the government to please not
requisition their bell.
It should be particularly noted that the fundamental purpose
of this movement was not to absolutely oppose the drive to
collect scrap metal, but rather to submit with all deference a
petition for our bell to be exempted. There was never any
intention of opposing the militarists in control of the government;
rather, as was firmly proclaimed to one and all, this was a
religiously inspired movement on behalf of the Shōgyōji Sagha,
that sought to obtain exemption from the round up of scrap metal
for the temple’s beloved bell and other Buddhist treasures, which
were originally intended for the peaceful alleviation of suffering.
Japan at that time was engaged in what had by now escalated
into a war against other nations on a worldwide scale. At the
very heart of that conflict, and with no signs of stopping or
abating, was Japan’s own voracious self-infatuation, that is her
adoration of self as a centre of power. This is what Shin
Buddhists term jiriki, or “self-power.” The essential core of the
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Venerable Daigyōin’s Dharma movement was the desire to
overcome our destructive attachment to such “self-power.”
In the course of the eleven-year period between 1938 and
1948, the Venerable Daigyōin wrote out Dharma messages one
by one on hundreds of sheets of plain Japanese paper,
distributing them to all his loyal followers. These essays were
later compiled into his One-page Dharma Message (Ichimai
hōgo). In one of these, he writes: “For the past three hundred and
fifty years, this bell has been tolling, filling the temple precincts
with its resonance: you must listen to the voice of that bell! The
Bell is saying: From ancient times right down to the present day
not one single person has ever really listened to me. I might as
well go off with the army, let them drag me away! These are the
words I hear the bell saying and they are perfectly justified. Even
if we are doomed to let the bell go, if we hand her over first
without listening to her voice, no matter whether we are
traditional temple members (benefactors) or the head priest (the
petitioner) in person, no words of apology can ever suffice. I am
left speechless to think there is nothing I can do to save that bell
from the scrap heap; that is indeed a bitter cup to drain. Never
did I dream it would come to this.” (Shōgyōji Archives, ed.,
Ichimai hōgo: Daigyōin goroku (One-page Dharma Message: A
Record of the Words of the Venerable Daigyōin), § 158; official
edition; to be published).
From this Dharma message, we can see the basic stance
taken on religious grounds by the Venerable Daigyōin towards
the scrap metal drive: a Buddhist temple bell and other such
treasures are precious tools for peace, meant to rid the nation’s
people of their blind passions and to treat the delusions
enshrouding their hearts. Never should such tools of peace be
allowed to be melted down and transformed into weapons of war
and mass destruction.
Being forced to hand over the Shōgyōji temple bell on
government orders was a situation that left him speechless. As
head priest of Shōgyōji, his being asked to part with that bell was
as painful to him as having to cut off his own arm. Nor was there
anything he could say to his followers by way of apology,
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especially not to the temple’s chief benefactor, a descendant of
the Ōga clan that had helped to establish the original Shōgyōji.
In another essay (One-page Dharma Message (Ichimai hōgo),
§ 24; adapted), the Venerable Daigyōin writes, in effect, “If the
temple bell were the private property of the temple complex, then
handing her over to the authorities would be less of a problem.
But everything, from the temple precincts themselves with their
buildings and equipment right down to the Buddhist artifacts and
temple bell, belong to the Buddha. As devotees on the path of the
nembutsu, we must realize that nothing of what we are being
asked to hand over to the government is originally ours. Now at
long last we are getting down to the fundamental practice of the
Buddha-dharma. At this point let us hand over to the Buddha the
very possessions we treasure most: our body, our life, our
property.” The fact that Daigyōin had dedicated his entire being
to Buddha, Dharma, and Sagha enabled him to become now a
spokesman for the great Dharma of the Tathāgata, summoning
one and all to action. Thus the senseless demand of the
government scrap metal collection directive was reinterpreted by
the Venerable Daigyōin as the great command of the Tathāgata
for him, Daigyōin Reion, to muster his courage and take a stand.
In the course of the three hundred and fifty years since
Shōgyōji was first established, there had been many a follower
who had heard the sound of the bell pealing out in every
direction, but there had been none who had listened to the bell’s
voice speaking to them from her basic source: the soundless
sound from which her voice drew being. The source of the bell’s
voice was the voice of Amida Tathāgata’s Great Compassion,
calling to us from the Pure Land. But nobody up till then had
listened to her voice in quite that way, and so, until such time as
people should hear the bell and come forth to encounter the Great
Compassion, the Venerable Daigyōin could not resign himself to
letting her simply be tossed on the scrap heap.5
5

Regarding the voice of the bell, in another entry the Venerable Daigyōin
writes, “The reason I had hoped to keep the bell around was because our
followers are sometimes like people without eyes or ears who can neither see
nor hear religious faith. All I was plotting to do was to get them to encounter
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The result was that a core group of Shōgyōji members who
supported the Venerable Daigyōin’s spiritual convictions
gathered round him. Though they were well aware of the risk
they were running by taking what appeared to be a stand against
government policy, they succeeded in initiating a petition to save
the bell. One representative of the traditional temple members
actually took the petition to his hometown of Futsukaichi where,
by circulating it among the citizens, he was able to rally support
and gain considerable sympathy for the Venerable Daigyōin’s
views. Had everyone who was involved, from the contributors, to
the government authorities and collectors, all shared a consistent
understanding of the Buddhist teachings, there would have been
little need to oppose the scrap metal collection so vigorously, but
unfortunately this was not the case. As it gained momentum, the
petition movement had members scurrying in every direction in
search of support. A record of what the petition movement
entailed can be gleaned from the following items that appeared in
the Shōgyōji in-house publication All That Has Been Done For
Us (Go-On).
1. The work of producing the Save the Bell petition (Bonsho
kyoshutsu horyū tangan shō [A request to exempt the temple bell
from the scrap metal collection], dated December 21st, 1942) in
the Shōgyōji magazine All That Has Been Done For Us (Go-On),
No. 163 (1968)). In those days, famous antique bells of aesthetic
or artistic value fell into the category of cultural assets worthy of
preservation, hence it was standard government policy at the
time to exclude such temple bells from being requisitioned as
scrap metal. Knowing this, Daigyōin arranged to have an
enlightened woman disciple of his, named Nonaka Ekaini (1899–
1998), draw up the Save the Bell petition with the help of a
number of other followers, subsequent to which the work of
circulating the petition began in earnest. 6 Part of that petition
religious faith [through the voice of the Bell]” (One-page Dharma Message
(Ichimai hōgo) 68).
6
Ekaini, the first disciple of the Venerable Daigyōin, had her spiritual
awakening in 1925. During the Venerable Daigyōin’s lifetime, she was a
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reads: “More than National Treasures sequestered for their
meritorious value in days gone by, more than bells that have long
fallen silent, set aside from ancient times on account of their
craftsmanship, the Temple Bell of Shōgyōji plays a role in the
veneration of the spirits of our ancestors and in continuously
opening up the spiritual hearts of those of us who are their
children. Along with our honored head priest (the Venerable
Daigyōin), who has appeared to us in the present global
confusion as a universal savior, that Bell is our Living National
Treasure, one that we cannot live without at this desperate point
in time” (Bonsho kyoshutsu horyū tangan shō, extract).
2. In October 1942, Ekaini called upon the Manager of
Shrines & Temples and the Manager of the Conscription Section
at Fukuoka Prefectural Government headquarters to plead against
the compulsory handing over of the temple bell.
3. Around the same time, to ascertain whether it might be
possible to refuse to surrender the temple bell, Ekaini took the
petition to Hikata Ryūshō (1892–1991), professor of Kyushu
University, who was one of the editors of the Taishō Buddhist
Tripiaka as well as a member of the Fukuoka Prefecture Cultural
Assets Survey Committee.
4. In April 1943, Ekaini went up to Kyoto to plead her case
before the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Yamazaki
Tatsunosuke, who also came from Kyushu.
Immediately after that, Ekaini all on her own went to visit the
nationalist activist Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944), a man who
wielded great power in the world of Japanese politics.
capable Dharma worker to whom he entrusted many of his projects. In the
postwar era, after his death, it was to her that the task of editing his published
works befell. She also played an important role as Dharma mother, nurturing
new members of the Sagha. Further information on her life and work can be
gleaned from The Wheel of Light Knows No Limits (Kōrin kiwanaku) that
contains her writings as well as a chronology of her life, compiled by Shōgyōji,
and published in 2007.
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Journeying all the way to Nagano prefecture, she related to him
the spiritual understanding of the matter she had received from
the Venerable Daigyōin, taking several hours of his time to
explain their quest to preserve the temple bell. Tōyama was
moved by her single-minded devotion and there and then
approved a stay of execution that was sent to Fukuoka
Prefectural Government headquarters and Fukuoka City Hall.
In addition, Ekaini called upon the Administrative Chief of
the Shinshū Ōtani-ha (Higashi Honganji) Headquarters, a large
number of notable Shin Buddhist scholars, the manager in charge
of scrap metal collection at Fukuoka Prefectural Government
Headquarters, members of the Diet, the chief secretary of one of
the political parties, members of the prefectural assembly and the
mayor of Futsukaichi-chō, as well as various other individuals.
Nor did Ekaini merely plead her case. Instead she presented each
one of them with her vivid understanding of the Venerable
Daigyōin’s religious convictions in such a way that every visit
became an occasion for serious discussion of the problem.
On the occasion of her meeting with the Administrative
Chief of the Higashi Honganji Headquarters, Ekaini leveled a
sharp criticism, declaring, “The Honzan Headquarters should be
the gathering place of our school’s most prominent intellectuals.
For them to be among the first to contribute the metal items in
their Buddhist repository to the drive for scrap metal is not in
accord with the spiritual faith of our founder, Shinran Shōnin.
Especially at times like these, we need to strive to live up to our
ideals, to guide our community beyond the demands of State, and
to bring to fruition our religious teaching. Is this not the mission
sent down to us from the great citadel of Dharma?”7

7

Ekaini was sharply critical in her remarks on more than one occasion
during the war years; see All That Has Been Done For Us (Go-On), no. 163
(1968): 9, and The Wheel of Light Knows No Limits (Kōrin kiwanaku) Vol. 3, §
46. On one occasion leading Shin Buddhist scholar Kaneko Daiei (1881-1976)
was present (see The Wheel of Light Knows No Limits (Kōrin kiwanaku) Vol. 2,
§ 41). Though he felt obliged to cooperate with the military government during
wartime, Professor Kaneko was also a man of deep faith and was no doubt
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But on May 18, 1943, despite all the desperate efforts of the
followers to promote the movement, an altogether unexpected
event befell Shōgyōji, as related in A Short Biography of the
Venerable Daigyōin (Daigyōin shōden).
Stirred up by state-sponsored wartime fervor, a band of some
thirty vigilantes from Futsukaichi, led by former servicemen,
suddenly stormed into Shōgyōji and began to forcibly make off
with the temple bell.8 Even though the people inside the temple
pleaded with them, saying, “We have filed a petition with the
prefectural office to allow us to keep the bell, please give us
more time,” it was to no avail. The leaders of the young patriots
argued, “After all, if one temple were allowed to keep its bell,
then other temples might follow suit, and this could undermine
the whole war effort. Shōgyōji would be branded a community
of unpatriotic citizens who had refused to cooperate.” There was
no knowing what that hot-blooded group of vigilantes might
have got up to next, rather like those terrible bands of armed
monks from Mount Hiei in the olden days who violently attacked
the temples of other sects.
The sounds of a scuffle filled the temple precincts, and as
urgent word reached Daigyōin’s disciple Ekaini, she rushed out
without thought for her own safety and placed herself squarely in
the path of the departing bell. Barefoot, having had no time to
put on her shoes, there she stood, hands raised to block the
group’s progress, saying,” You menfolk, have you never heard
the teaching of the Buddhist prince Shōtoku Taishi? He says that
a premium should be placed on harmony, and that it is absolutely
crucial you revere the Three Treasures!”
Struck by Ekaini’s compelling words, the vigilante band
stopped in their tracks and set down the bell. The Venerable
Daigyōin then calmly spoke with the leaders of the band,
moved when he heard her declare that cooperating with the government in this
way was not in the spirit of Shinran Shōnin’s teaching.
8
The young patriots who came to remove the bell by force were members
of the Auxiliary Youth Movement (Yokusan sonen dan), an organization
initiated by former war veterans that formed part of a nationwide network and
permeated every town and village throughout Japan.
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explaining to them how inappropriate it was to fashion weapons
of war out of Buddhist instruments of peace. At length, with the
fight gone out of them, the men reluctantly withdrew from the
scene, flustered and angry.
Seeing how selflessly Ekaini had acted, the Venerable
Daigyōin shed tears of joy, praising her with the words, “To
respond as you did, with all your heart, that is something that
happens only when a person puts all other practices aside and
turns solely to the nembutsu in which they entrust themselves
absolutely to Amida (Skt., Amitāyus or Amitābha) Buddha. You
are like our temple bell come alive!” By calling her the living
embodiment of their temple bell, the Venerable Daigyōin was in
effect saying that, as a person who truly lived Buddhism, Ekaini
was just as important as the bell itself. Indeed in the postwar era
she went on to become one of the great spiritual pillars of the
Shōgyōji Sagha community.
Nevertheless, the whole event was a matter of great concern
to Daigyōin, for he recalled how in the Kamakura period, during
the Jōgen Dharma persecution of 1207, a number of Pure Land
monks had been executed for no reason. It occurred to him that
Ekaini, by her actions, might have crossed that same line and
thus put her life in jeopardy. Knowing how in history things are
all karmically linked, he now noticed how a single thread of
karmic coincidence connected the government authorities, the
metal collectors, and Shōgyōji itself, and realized that the time
had now come to hand over the bell.
One day, about six months later, in the wake of a solemn
ceremony of sūtra chanting that took place in front of the temple
bell placed in the main hall, the Venerable Daigyōin delivered a
sermon that touched even the hearts of that band of vigilantes.
Then, as members of the community repeated the nembutsu with
palms together in gasshō, it was time to bid a fond and tearful
farewell to the Bell as she quietly disappeared through the temple
gates forever.
The central committee could see how much losing the bell
grieved the Venerable Daigyōin and so, rather than give up hope
entirely, they set out some time later to try and track the bell
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down. They finally managed to catch up with her at the Japan
Mining Industry Saganoseki Smelter and Refinery. Informing the
manager of their deep concerns on religious grounds, they
discovered that he too was a Shin Buddhist follower who hailed
from Echigo (present day Niigata prefecture). Ekaini and the
others found the manager extremely sympathetic to their cause
and the night before the temple bell was to be melted down he
secretly arranged for the dragon-head crown (where the life of
the bell is said to reside) to be cut off and delivered back to
Shōgyōji. To this day in the sūtra repository of Shōgyōji the
dragon-head crown remains safely preserved, a temple treasure
testifying to the peace movement first set in motion by the
Venerable Daigyōin.
Reverence for the Buddhist prince Shōtoku Taishi
The Venerable Daigyōin sought to establish a source of peace
for the entire world. In the midst of World War II, he deeply
lamented the global situation and is reported as saying, “The last
thing we should be doing is waging war against those very
countries to whom we are most indebted, particularly China and
Korea with whom we have a long history of cultural exchange,
including the transmission of the kanji writing system and the
whole Confucian tradition. It is the height of arrogance on our
part.” Pointing out Japan’s responsibility for her actions, he also
stated, “The Second World War is one that Japan started, and as
such, it must be one that she has to settle by herself” (One-page
Dharma Message (Ichimai hōgo), 920; paraphrase). In the same
entry he writes, “The means to bring an end to this world war is
to be found in the battle of the holy inner war”; that is, it lies in
the struggle for the Buddha-dharma or, more precisely, the inner
struggle to establish the Three Treasures. In the case of Shōgyōji
Temple, this struggle can be traced back to the establishment of
the temple some four hundred years ago, and in the case of the
Japanese state, to the era of the Buddhist prince Shōtoku Taishi,
who drew up the first Japanese Constitution, about one thousand
four hundred years ago.
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We shall recall how Prince Shōtoku, at a time when the
Japanese state had yet to achieve stability, laid down his
Seventeen Article Constitution as the bedrock of the Yamato
Imperial Court. The first article of the Constitution reads, “We
shall value harmony above all else,” and the pathway to realizing
that ideal is indicated by him in the second article, “We shall
hold the Three Treasures in the highest respect.” Nor was Prince
Shōtoku content with merely making such a declaration to his
people. In 596, he himself engaged as his own personal teachers
the Buddhist high priests Hyeja and Hyechong, from Goguryeo
and Baekje, who had come over to Japan and, while learning
from them the finer points of Buddhist doctrine, he also wrote a
work that was later celebrated even in China called the Three
Sūtra Commentary (Sangyō gisho), a set of three studies in praise
of the Vimalakīrti (Yuimakyō), Lotus (Hokkekyō), and
Śrīmālādevī (Shōmangyō) Sūtras.
The Venerable Daigyōin’s reverence for Prince Shōtoku was
above all inspired by the way that, in the midst of a life-anddeath struggle for imperial power, Prince Shōtoku had sat in
meditation in the Yumedono, internalizing the conflict as his
own problem and seeking a resolution through inner religious
struggle. Realizing that there was a connection between
experiencing this terrible world war and being born in the present
age of the Last Dharma (mappō), the Venerable Daigyōin felt
that it was up to him to bring this war to a close by taking up the
spiritual legacy of Prince Shōtoku Taishi. He paid reverence to
the statue of Prince Shōtoku Taishi morning and evening and,
taking Prince Shōtoku Taishi’s own thoughts as a starting point,
came to the conclusion that to achieve peace in the outside world,
one first needed to realize a state of Inner Peace.
Inner Peace can only be found in the world of Awakening,
the Buddha world. Recognizing this, the Venerable Daigyōin
tells us that the source of Inner Peace is “what we build within
ourselves and what we build within ourselves is an eternal,
unchanging, and everlasting temple where peace can at last
prevail” (One-page Dharma Message (Ichimai hōgo), § 37;
paraphrase). This state of inner calm is created by the interplay
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of our inner and outer religious striving for peace.
On August 15th, 1945, when the Venerable Daigyōin heard
the Emperor’s voice on the radio announcing Japan’s
unconditional surrender and the end of the war, he is reported to
have said, “Thank goodness for that. It was a senseless war for
Japan to have got herself into in the first place . . . what was she
thinking of, fighting against those very countries (America,
China, and Korea) to whom she owed so much? 9“
To the Venerable Daigyōin’s mind, the world of material
goods offered no solution: the more you have, the more you want,
and there is simply no way out. In the world of great spiritual
awakening, by contrast, even though on first reflection we may
see ourselves as inextricably bound for hell, the moment our
hearts become oriented along the axis of religious awakening,
that dark and doom-laden state suddenly transforms itself into
the bright and welcoming world of true reality. Thus, for those
living on the plane of great spiritual awakening, the Buddhadharma emerges ever stronger through confrontation with
adversity. Truth arises when we least expect it and, as the heart
undergoes spiritual conversion, we realize we are no longer
continuously drowning in the endless sea of suffering that is birth
and death, but feel ourselves instead coming back to life.
The Venerable Daigyōin denounced the war, saying, “Now,
as to the present great conflict, this is all the result of our jealous
heart” (as cited from the uncompiled items to One-page Dharma
Message (Ichimai hōgo)). All those terribly evil worlds brought
about by the wars in which Japan was involved, such as the SinoJapanese War that Japan herself instigated and the First and the
Second World Wars, originally sprang from the Three Poisons
9

See Ekaini’s recollection of the Venerable Daigyōin’s words in The Wheel
of Light Knows No Limits (Kōrin kiwanaku), Volume 3, § 37, where she tells of
hearing the Venerable Daigyōin utter these words after the Emperor’s radio
announcement of Japan’s unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945. When an
overwrought Ekaini cried out, “Why, if I didn’t have religious faith I might go
out and kill myself,” she recalls that the Venerable Daigyōin strode up to her
with a glowering expression and, standing over her, slapped her on both cheeks,
left and right, military style.
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and Five Desires of the blind passions that rule the heart of
Ignorance. Regarding the hell unleashed by atomic bombs, he
writes: “Alas, that holocaust is what has been caused by my own
state of Ignorance” (cited from the uncompiled items to Onepage Dharma Message (Ichimai hōgo)). In so saying, the
Venerable Daigyōin takes upon himself full responsibility for the
war in all its terrifying aspects as being the product of his own
human karma. His confession is utterly uncompromising,
reminding us that, even if our country has been seared by the
blast of atomic bombs, unless we realize the terrifying nature of
our own inborn karma that caused such a war and arrive at a
penetrating insight into the frightful impact that human karma
exercises on a global scale, then sad to say we can never arrive at
a thoroughly penetrating religious self-realization conducive to
Inner Peace.
Resisting the 1929 Religious Organizations Bill
The defining moment of Daigyōin’s path to religious
conviction came about as he sought to deal with several major
problems that came his way. One problem was the Religious
Organizations Bill. In January 1929, the Japanese Government of
the time, having decided some kind of regulation of religious
organizations was called for, formed a select committee in the
House of Peers to draw up a bill especially for this purpose. The
essence of the bill proposed by the government was that
“Religious sects (kyōha) and denominations (shūha), as well as
religious orders (kyōdan), would be placed under the jurisdiction
of local government administrators (prefectural governors) and
supervised by the Ministry of Education (Mombushō).” But
subjecting religious organizations to state control in this way, of
course, would seriously undermine the freedom of religion.
The religious world, the media and public opinion all
demonstrated strong opposition to what would amount to
ideological control by the State. The Venerable Daigyōin himself
joined the Association Opposed to the Religious Organizations
Bill, founded by his close friend Reverend Chikazumi Jōkan

104

Shōgyōji

(1870–1941), 10 and together the two men and their colleagues
built the movement into a nationwide crusade. The Venerable
Daigyōin portrayed the guiding principle of the movement as
“one that is beyond the dichotomy of ‘I agree’ or ‘I oppose’;
what is called for is an opposition so absolute that it utterly
annihilates such a bill, an opposition grounded in the absolute
religious conviction of Other Power faith” (The Solution to the
Problems of Society (Shakai mondai no kaiketsu), 1929).
The crux of the problem of Religion versus State and the
grounds for opposition to the bill are summed up by the
Venerable Daigyōin in the following four statements: (1) The
government errs when it seeks to establish its goal of public
safety and state-appointed social order by using its jurisdiction
over religion to its own advantage. (2) The government errs
when it guarantees the impartial treatment of Buddhism,
Shintōism and Christianity but seeks to use its own discretion to
decide whether other religions are good or bad. (3) The
government errs when, rather than leaving religious problems to
the religious world to solve, it sees the political as superior to the
religious sphere and seeks instead to discuss such problems as
part of its own remit. (4) Unless politicians themselves attain
peace of mind on a religious plane and transcend their dualistic
views on right and wrong, good and bad, friend and foe to arrive
at a state of unwavering respect for others, they can never truly
be in a position to discuss the problems of the religious
congregation.
10

Reverend Chikazumi Jōkan was a leading Buddhist activist who, like the
Venerable Daigyōin, came from the Shinshū Ōtani-ha denomination. Close in
age, the two became close Dharma friends. In 1910 it was Reverend Chikazumi
who confirmed the Venerable Daigyōin’s awakening of faith, something that the
Venerable Daigyōin had arrived at of his own accord without any actual teacher
(see Record of My Awakening of Faith (Nyūshinroku), compiled in My
Encounter with That Light (Gushikō), Vol. 1, p. 27). In the ensuing years, the
Venerable Daigyōin often made the journey to Tokyo to see and work with
Reverend Chikazumi. Reverend Chikazumi had numerous books and articles on
Shin Buddhist themes, many of them based on talks he gave at his striking
architectural landmark, the Kyūdō Kaikan, or Seekers Hall, established near the
main gateway of Tokyo University.
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In March 1929, just before the bill was to be enacted, the
Venerable Daigyōin published a book entitled The Solution to
the Problems of Society (Shakai mondai no kaiketsu), expressing
his opposition to the Religious Organizations Bill on religious
grounds, and sent out thirteen thousand copies to religious
communities, the media and members of the intellectual classes.
He also initiated a campaign amongst his compatriots to get
people to sign a petition. In the end, on March 19th, the bill was
thrown out. The movement Daigyōin initiated was thus never
just another run-of-the-mill opposition movement, but evolved
instead out of a sense of deep religious conviction. It represented
what he himself confessed to being his “ferocious inner struggle
against a host of demons in my mind”.11
Establishing the Taya house system for the Shōgyōji Sagha
The Venerable Daigyōin made a lasting contribution to
promoting the Three Treasures in the public consciousness by
establishing the Taya house system. The actual concept of the
Taya house made its first appearance in the history of the
Shinshū community in the olden days when the Honzan, or Main
Temple, as well as branch temples, began providing
accommodations, called kyūdō shukuhaku sho, to visiting
Dharma friends for their convenience.
The origins of the Taya house system can be traced back to
the time when Rennyo Shōnin (1415–1499) sought to circumvent
the persecution of the Shin Buddhist community by the powerful
Enryakuji temple on Mount Hiei, and took shelter in the distant
province of Echizen in the Hokuriku district (present day Fukui
prefecture) where he constructed a dōjō, or temple, on a hillside
known as Yoshizaki, facing the Sea of Japan. Once there,
accommodations soon had to be provided for his followers on the
order of several hundred such dwellings.
11

In his Introduction to Record of My Encounter with That Light (Gushikō
roku); in the compilation of this work in My Encounter with That Light
(Gushikō), volume two, 1953, this statement regarding his “ferocious inner
struggle with a host of demons in my mind,” appears on p. 142.
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With the establishment of the Yoshizawa religious center,
fellow Dharma seekers came to listen to the teachings of Rennyo
Shōnin from as far away as Tōhoku, or northeastern Honshu, as
well as from the provinces of Ōshū, Dewa and Shinano and from
all over Hokuriku, with priests and laymen, men and women,
arriving in droves. It is recorded that within the main dōjō area
there were permanent houses for Rennyo Shōnin’s immediate
disciples, who protected the temple, but, as more and more
fellow visitors began to arrive to pay their respects to Rennyo
Shōnin and receive his teaching, more and more
accommodations had to be built and soon Taya houses began
suddenly springing up as if out of nowhere.
The visiting Dharma friends who came from many provinces
were able to commute from the Taya houses to the Main Hall on
the hill, where they could hear the sermons of the Master,
Rennyo Shōnin, and also listen to the Dharma talks of the priests
who were his disciples. In addition, whilst living in a Taya house,
any Dharma friend suffering from one or other of life’s problems,
as symbolized by “birth, ageing, disease, and death,” could listen
and benefit from the advice from those who were more advanced.
This would lead them to an awakening of religious faith and
thereby enable them to arrive at a solution to their problems.
The Venerable Daigyōin had a clear understanding of how
the dynamics of the Taya house system had played a crucial role
in the development of the Shin Buddhist community from the
time of Rennyo Shōnin onwards and wanted to incorporate this
feature into Shōgyōji on a permanent basis for the benefit of the
Shōgyōji Sagha. With the Taya house system, as both priest and
layperson alike engage in the Jōdo Shinshū practice of listening
to the Buddha-dharma, the basic distinction between priest and
layperson vanishes and the concept of the Mahāyāna as a great
path leading to Universal Awakening takes on an even deeper
meaning. As far as religious faith is concerned, the Taya house is
an ideal setting where priest and layperson alike mutually seek
religious awakening by listening and learning from one another.
In his One-page Dharma Message (Ichimai hōgo), the
following three guidelines are given for the Taya house. (1) The
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Taya house shall be a dōjō, or place of religious practice, where
all attachment to self, career or possessions are set aside, and
each person entrusts themselves to the Buddha-dharma in order
to attain birth in the Pure Land. (2) The Taya house shall be a
place where priest and layperson alike illumine one another so
that each may come to experience the awakening of faith. (3)
The Taya house shall be a place where those awakened to faith,
as a result of their faith-experience, have decided to embark upon
their spiritual journey unto the very end of their lives. Also it
shall be the religious crucible wherein they communicate through
faith with other family members living outside the temple.
In Buddhism, the Sanskrit word “Sagha” refers to the
community of those that receive the teachings of the Buddha and
of their good friends or spiritual guides, known as kalyāamitra.
The particular process whereby members of the Sagha pass on
to other members the teachings of the Buddha, represents the
notion of precept-holding in Buddhism in general (One-page
Dharma Message (Ichimai hōgo), §§ 45, 81, 434). Even though
Shin Buddhism is a form of lay Buddhism, the Taya house
system can nevertheless be seen as incorporating the formal
precept-holding aspect of regular Buddhist monastic life as the
cornerstone of Sagha practice.
After the Shinshū restoration initiated by Rennyo Shōnin in
the fifteenth century the Taya house system admittedly fell into
virtual disuse. Although there were already a few Taya-style
houses in Shōgyōji during the 1920s and 1930s, the first Taya
house built in 1932 by Ekaini, based on Daigyōin’s idea of
providing Taya houses for the Shōgyōji Sagha, was called quite
simply Taya house Number One. Taya house Number Two,
erected at the request of Ekaini, was built by her sister-in-law.
These two buildings, which they used as Taya houses, were
known as the Enokidera Taya, and were also the living quarters
of Ekaini and of Ekaini’s sister-in-law and family. Nowadays, in
the vicinity of Shōgyōji main temple, there are seven Taya
houses and a number of other ordinary households, in which
upward of one hundred and eighty people, young and old, male
and female, live and practice. In addition, there are another
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fourteen Taya houses in Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, London and other
places with a further seventy people in residence.
In recent years, Reverend Seongwon (Chanju Mun) of the
University of Hawai’i - Manoa, on the introduction of his teacher,
the Venerable Jeongwoo, head priest of Guryongsa12 in Seoul,
has visited Shōgyōji on several occasions, attending morning and
evening service and taking part in the Eza, or Sagha assembly.
Sensing the peace and harmony of the Taya house system at
Shōgyōji, he wrote, “Shōgyōji is a place where equality is finely
balanced between the sexes; it is an environment free of
discrimination, where social plurality is duly recognized. What I
witnessed was a melding together of priest and layperson in a
process of mutual growth. Herein may lie the key to resolving
the problems of religion in the future.” These words encouraged
us considerably, as the number of other Shin Buddhist temples in
Japan that promote the Taya house system is virtually nil, and as
a result, as far as the lay population goes, the power of Buddhism
to infuse the lives of the ordinary people has been greatly
curtailed. In our Taya house Sagha, on the other hand, we are
constantly being forced to ask ourselves whether what we are
doing is truly leading us to the realization of Inner Peace. To
achieve this goal requires that we diligently explore the question
together and view the problems of daily life as an invitation to
engage personally in Buddhist practice.
Retreating into oneself to open up the flow of Buddhadharma
12

The Japanese Shin Buddhist priest, Reverend Kamada Kōmei (1914–
1998) of Kyōganji temple, Toyama prefecture, at the end of his life, sought the
help of Shōgyōji in carrying on his pioneering work of improving relations
between Korea and Japan and introduced a Korean Buddhist Venerable
Jeongwoo, abbot of Tongdo-sa Monastery, one of the biggest monasteries in
Korea, to Shōgyōji. Venerable Jeongwoo in turn introduced his sincere disciple
Reverend Seongwon (Chanju Mun), the chief editor of Blue Pine Books to
Shōgyōji. cf. Reverend Kamada’s book A Bell Tolls in Baekje (Kudara ni kane
wa naru). It is through this karmic connection that the present essay came to be
contributed to the book that Reverend Seongwon is currently editing and
publishing.
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During the war, while the Venerable Daigyōin was engaged
in developing the Taya house system, a subtle development came
about in his way of thinking. This had to do with the concept of
Shokai, a word the Venerable Daigyōin coined to mean “to
retreat into oneself to open up the floodwaters of spiritual
awakening,” and which he himself frequently made use of when
instructing his followers (cf. One-page Dharma Message
(Ichimai hōgo), § 287). Shokai is, in fact, a subtle play on words
on the very similar-sounding Japanese term for evacuation or
dispersal, sokai, which came into everyday use towards the end
of the Second World War. At that time, Japan was being
regularly firebombed, and people were being told to get women
and children of the cities out of harm’s way by evacuating them
to a safe place in the countryside. The Venerable Daigyōin took
this word that was on everyone’s lips and fashioned a new word
with a Buddhist twist: Shokai, “to retreat into oneself.” While the
wartime word for evacuation simply meant to disperse from the
busy city centers, the Venerable Daigyōin’s own coinage had the
deeper implication to “retreat into oneself away from the
maddening Sahā world in order to practice in an environment
conducive to the pursuit of religion.” Indeed, Shokai retreats,
inspired by the Venerable Daigyōin’s idea, may one day become
an important item on the Shōgyōji Sagha agenda.
In his philosophy, the Venerable Daigyōin felt it incumbent
on the Sagha to demonstrate its own unique form of activity,
inherent in its identity as a place of religious practice, and from
his new vantage point, the Venerable Daigyōin strongly
recommended that we flee the Sahā world, a world consumed by
fighting and the flames of war, and escape to Buddhist territory,
such as the Taya houses of Shōgyōji, where the power of the
Buddha will most surely protect us. In the ideal environment of
this newly discovered land perfectly suited to Mahāyāna
Buddhism, the pursuit of religious practice will cause the
floodgates of Awakening to burst asunder, allowing its freeflowing waters to irrigate the thirsty soil of our long-parched
land, in both the real as well as in the spiritual sense. It is through
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the release of these waters that our world within and our world
without will at last be brought into equilibrium.
This reminds us of an episode that took place during the
Second World War, when American citizens of Japanese
ancestry were rounded up and incarcerated in so-called
relocation camps. Amongst those confined within the walls of
these concentration camps were a number of devout Shin
Buddhists who worked together to raise the level of religious
awareness of their fellow inmates. By sublating the feelings of
confusion that the war had stirred up in them, this small handful
of brave individuals managed to encourage others to live lives
brimming with the joy of religious awakening. As a result, once
the war ended, many of the incarcerated were able to return to
ordinary life in a more positive frame of mind. Like the
Venerable Daigyōin, they strove to create a more perfect
environment for the pursuit of religion in a less-than-ideal world.
Sermon to his disciple, Sudō Kaneomi, at his government
office
In another wartime episode, the Venerable Daigyōin’s
admonitions to one of his disciples make patently clear his own
religious convictions, convictions that can be seen as exactly
resembling those of Amida Buddha, for whom a warm and
healthy respect for other religions, other peoples, and other
cultures is paramount for building a peaceful world.
In a career in which he served as governor of several
prefectures, Sudō Kaneomi (1896–1994) was appointed by the
Ministry of Home Affairs to become Chief of the Fukuoka
Prefectural Police, and it was through his connection to this
office that he first met the Venerable Daigyōin and had the
opportunity to receive from him instruction in the Buddhadharma. At that time, Mr. Sudō was under considerable pressure
to try and keep the left-wing elements under control. Troubled by
the ideological contradictions that lay in carrying out his official
duties, he was finally able to resolve his dilemma through
experiencing a deep personal understanding of Other Power faith.
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Subsequently, on more than one occasion, he related the
following account, that, “In 1942, just before I was assigned to
the post of Military Governor of the Japanese-occupied territory
of Celebes, my revered teacher (the Venerable Daigyōin) came
to explain some Buddhist guidelines to me at my government
headquarters. This sermon was such a magnificent gesture and
one for which I was so immensely grateful that even now words
still fail to express how I felt then.” Below is a similar entry by
Mr. Sudō from The Wheel of Light Knows No Limits (Kōrin
kiwanaku), vol. 5.
“In 1942, just before I was appointed to the post of Military
Governor (attached to the Japanese Navy) of the former Dutch
colony of Celebes (present day Sulawesi, Indonesia), my teacher
(the Venerable Daigyōin) made the long journey to the capital
(Tokyo), to set out for me in straightforward terms, A, B, and C,
just exactly how one should conduct oneself as governor of an
occupied territory when one is a person who is committed heart
and soul to the nembutsu. He told me in the most unequivocal
terms that, in occupied territory, one should not build Japanese
shrines or force people to worship there. One must respect the
religions native to that territory. And one must never recklessly
impose Japanese customs or Japanese ways on native people.”
The instructions he received from the Venerable Daigyōin, in
short, ran diametrically counter to the ideology of the Japanese
military regime presiding over Japan at that time. Mr. Sudō goes
on to write, “Thanks to his instruction, I was able to conduct my
military governorship of the Celebes in a relatively uneventful
manner, working harmoniously with the native peoples, and did
not end up accused of being a war criminal.” In October 1951, in
accordance with the last will and testament of the Venerable
Daigyōin, Mr. Sudō entered the Shōgyōji Sagha, living in a
Taya house and devoting the rest of his long life to the practice
of the Buddha Way.

112

Shōgyōji

Taking delivery of our Gagaku instruments during wartime
During the closing years of the Second World War, the
American armed forces stepped up their aerial bombardment,
leaving the country strewn with rubble and ashes. In the long
history of the Venerable Daigyōin’s efforts to realize peace, there
is yet one more episode occurring around that time that deserves
special mention, and that is in connection with the set of
traditional Gagaku musical instruments that he purchased and
bequeathed to Shōgyōji which are still carefully preserved here
to this day.
In June 1944, American bombers attacked northern Kyushu;
in July, Saipan fell, followed by the loss of Guam and Tinian;
and in October wave upon wave of American troops landed in
Okinawa. As the American armed forces’ saturation bombing
threatened to reduce one region after another into so much
scorched earth, the Venerable Daigyōin lamented the fact that he
might be forced to die without leaving behind him any Gagaku
music by means of which people could offer up praise from this
world to the land of the Buddha. Earlier, when the Venerable
Daigyōin was around age fifty, his keen appreciation of Buddhist
chanting had led him to make the acquaintance of leading
Buddhist musicologist Hatsuka Kenshi (1893–1975), later Chief
of the Music Section of Higashi Honganji. It was through
Hatsuka’s introduction that in 1944 the Venerable Daigyōin was
able to place an order for a full set of Gagaku musical
instruments, dispatching Ekaini and others to Nagoya to take
delivery of them. They transported these instruments via the
wartime train service which was in a state of confusion such as
the little party had never before experienced. Nevertheless the
party and their shipment arrived safely at Shōgyōji on December
26, thanks in no small part to the timely intervention of an
influential member of the temple. The Venerable Daigyōin’s
cherished wish for Gagaku music to be performed as a means of
offering praise to the Buddha land continues to be honored to
this day in the form of the Shōgyōji Gagaku music group.
Gagaku music boasts a fourteen-hundred-year history in
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Japan and is the oldest form of music to be handed down
continuously right until the present day. It was originally an
ancient art form brought to Japan as part of the East Asian
cultural interchange, and was transmitted via the countries along
the Silk Road, from distant India, to China, along the Korean
peninsula, to Japan. There it fused with an ancient form of music
and dance, especially in vogue during the Heian period, to
become the traditional Gagaku music we know today.
The Venerable Daigyōin’s deep and undying respect for the
Buddhist prince Shōtoku Taishi is intimately tied in to the fact
that the prince is known to have issued an imperial edict to
conduct a Pūja ceremony for the Three Treasures to be
celebrated by a varied program of continental music. This event,
dated Suiko 20, or 612, is reported in the Short Biography of
Prince Shōtoku (Shōtoku Taishi denryaku). A similar event also
took place during the Nara Period, in 752, at the Rakkyō-e, the
inauguration of the Tōdaiji Great Buddha. On that occasion, over
five hundred musicians took part in a grand Gagaku performance
staged as part of the Buddhist Pūja ceremony.
While Gagaku is traditionally regarded as “the Pūja of Music
offered up to the Three Treasures” and “the performance of
music dedicated to the gods and buddhas,” its essence is best
captured in the observation that, “when it comes to transporting
us beyond the realm of human emotions, that ranges from
happiness and anger to sorrow and joy, it is Gagaku music that
best conveys to the heart the song of Peace and Harmony of the
Pure Land.” Throughout its history, Gagaku has thus long been
appreciated as a special form of religious music. Its sound has a
unique resonance that conveys the highest aspiration of
humankind to realize Peace and Harmony in this world. Thus, a
Pūja of Music offered to the Buddha is an important form of
religious music.
In the closing years of the Second World War, the Venerable
Daigyōin’s preoccupation with his extraordinary desire to
promote and safeguard the performance of Gakaku music may
have made him appear to many as somewhat obsessed. To the
Venerable Daigyōin, however, Gagaku music had the potential to
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convey the absolute importance of Inner Peace. During the final
phase of bitter fighting against British and American troops,
when the barest necessities of life were in short supply and
dreaming of the heavenly strains of Pure Land music was the last
thing on people’s minds, the Venerable Daigyōin set out to
purchase a complete set of Gagaku musical instruments,
declaring it absolutely vital that Gakaku music be performed at
Buddhist services. The musical instruments obtained at that time
are still carefully preserved by the Shōgyōji Gagaku group, now
known as the Chikushi Gagaku Music Ensemble. Today the
membership of the Chikushi Gagaku Music Ensemble has
swelled to over seventy participants and their hall is still the only
place in Japan devoted exclusively to Gagaku music where the
music performed is offered up to the Buddha.
The Venerable Daigyōin is said to have remarked, “Even if
our country loses this war, the one thing that she absolutely must
not lose is this Gagaku music that transcends the power of words.”
The Pūja of Music offered up to the gods and Buddhas should
thus remind us that music is not simply for one’s own personal
enjoyment. Before a symphony of sound can be performed, one
must first tune in to the soundless sound of Peace beyond the din
of conflict and listen to the Harmony that resounds therein.
Borne along on the symphony of sound that such deep listening
brings, there comes to us an Inner Peace that we can share with
others, an Inner Peace that could yet make possible a state of
peaceful coexistence in this world.
In the oppressive atmosphere of wartime, the Venerable
Daigyōin alone let his thoughts dwell exclusively on the idea of
preserving Gagaku music for the world, nor did he ever
relinquish his efforts until his wish was finally realized. The
Venerable Daigyōin’s earnest desire to perform the Pūja of
Music well expresses the spirit of peace and harmony that we
should seek to realize in the world today. Though his prayer that
peace and harmony should be brought about by Gagaku music
may go far beyond our ordinary ways of thinking, the Venerable
Daigyōin well understood that the performance of Gagaku music
constitutes a concrete way for the inconceivable and mysterious
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workings of such a spirit to manifest itself right before our eyes
in an actual, tangible event in the real world. The Venerable
Daigyōin’s wish for harmony has thus been perpetuated in the
form of the Shōgyōji music tradition that continues to flourish
down to this very day.
Gagaku music itself is part of a centuries-long transmission
of Buddhist continental culture from China and Korea. Thus,
when the Chikushi Gagaku Music Ensemble was invited to
perform its Pūja of Music abroad, the members found themselves
presented with a unique opportunity to express thanks for all the
kindness these two countries have historically shown to our
country, Japan. In July 2000, the Ensemble was invited to
Yeoraesa temple in Korea to perform a ceremony of goodwill,
and in May 2007, they were likewise invited to the International
Festival of Modern Music in Beijing. These performances in the
homeland of Gagaku music were given on behalf of all Japanese
people as an expression of our deepest gratitude for everything
Japan has received from these two countries over the centuries.
After the Beijing performance, many music lovers from China
came forward to offer their compliments to the Ensemble, saying
how pleased they were to find the music of ancient China was
still preserved intact to the present day. In addition, through the
performance of its Pūja of Music before the statue of Confucius
at the Institute of Confucian Studies at Renmin University of
China, Beijing, the Ensemble was able to give sympathetic
expression to the music of religious rites inspired by the
teachings of Confucius that still flows deep within the hearts and
minds of the Chinese people.
In September 1993, the Chikushi Gagaku Music Ensemble
was invited by Sir Derek Roberts, Provost of University College
London, and Professor John White, Pro-Provost of the same
college, to perform at the unveiling ceremony of a stone
monument dedicated to the memory of the first foreign students
from Japan who came to study at the university at the end of the
Tokugawa Period. This opportunity to perform their Pūja of
Music in London also led indirectly to the creation of an annual
ceremony to pray for world peace and reconciliation between
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British and Japanese war veterans who fought in Burma, with
memorial services held at Westminster Abbey, Coventry
Cathedral, Canterbury Cathedral and the London branch of
Shōgyōji Temple, known as the Shin Buddhist Centre of Three
Wheels. Fifty-six years have passed since the death of the
Venerable Daigyōin, and, thanks in part to the international
performances of Gagaku music by the Chikushi Gagaku Music
Ensemble, we can say that his deepest wish for the realization of
peace and harmony in the world is now starting to be fulfilled.
Conclusion
Of the writings on Buddhism and peace compiled in Chanju
Mun, ed., The World is One Flower: Buddhist Leadership for
World Peace (Honolulu: Blue Pine, 2006), the Venerable
Daewon Ki’s essay, “Why I dedicate the temple to world peace,”
is a moving piece that should open the eyes of many people to
what Buddhism intends. The Venerable Daewon Ki writes that
“The Buddhist temple does not exist to glorify the Buddha, but
comes into the world in order to be returned, with Buddha’s light
inside, to humankind and to the world…. Buddha did not ask that
a temple be dedicated to him or anyone else. He simply asked
that it be returned to all humanity” (The World is One Flower, p.
xxxviii). This powerful assertion brings an important point to our
attention. The Venerable Daewon Ki is telling us in frank terms
that we, as Buddhists, have to rethink our basic attitude toward
our own tradition, otherwise we will never be able to
demonstrate the Inner Peace that is the essential quality of
Buddhism. In the following, we will briefly introduce three
elements of Shin Buddhist teaching: 1. Awareness of one’s past
karma as “good”; 2. Responding gratefully to the kindness
shown us by the Buddha-dharma; and 3. Realizing the state of
selflessness in real terms. These points well complement what
the Venerable Daewon Ki teaches and in future may serve as
guidelines to realizing Inner Peace as a cornerstone of World
Peace.
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1. Awareness of one’s past karma as “good.” In Buddhist
literature, there is an episode where Śākyamuni Buddha, who has
yet to become a Buddha, first aspires to Enlightenment. At that
time, he is said to have met a primeval Tathāgata through whose
encounter he somehow learned to affirm the totality of his past
karma as “good”; it was only then that he was at last able to
become a Tathāgata himself. In this episode, the Buddha, after
long years of reflection on the many untold hardships he had
undergone, is said to have remarked nostalgically, “All these
years have passed but, though coat upon coat of dust and dirt
have covered my body like moss, never once has it ever occurred
to me to rub off the dust and grime.” 13 This statement well
illustrates the Buddha’s awakening to the totality of his past
karma as “good” (shukuzen), ushering in a deep and lasting sense
of inner peace when we own up to and embrace everything about
our lives up to now, whether good or bad, or clean or dirty;
13

This passage is quoted from the writings of Nakamura Hajime (1912–
1999), Gotama Budda: Shakuson no shōgai (Gotama Buddha: The Life of
Śākyamuni) (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1958), a work that was well received, reprinted
numerous times and even translated twice into English (Hajime Nakamura,
Gotama Buddha (Los Angeles: Buddhist Books International, 1977); and
Hajime Nakamura, Gotama Buddha: A Biography Based on the Most Reliable
Text, trans. G. Sekimori (Tokyo: Kōsei Publishing, 2000). The title is compiled
as volume 11 of the Nakamura’s selected works, with this particular quote
appearing on p. 335. The exact source of the quotation is not indicated by
Nakamura, but Professor Shimoda Masahiro of Tokyo University has directed
us to the Mahasihanada Sutta (The Greater Discourse on the Lion’s Roar), the
twelfth item of the Majjhima Nikāya, or Middle Length Sayings. The I. B.
Horner translation (The First Fifty Discourses (Mulapannasa) (London: Pāli
Text Society, 1954), 105) reads: “In that Sariputta, there was this for me through
loathliness: on my body there accumulated dust and dirt of years, so that it fell
of in shreds. Just as the stump of the tinduka-tree comes to accumulate the dust
and dirt of years, so that it falls off in shreds, even so, Sariputta, on my body
there accumulated the dust and dirt of years, so that it fell off in shreds. But it
did not occur to me, Sariputta, to think: ‘Indeed now, I could rub off this dust
and dirt with my hand, or others could rub off this dust and dirt for me with their
hands.’ It did not occur to me thus, Sariputta. This then was for me, Sariputta,
through loathliness.” While the latter interpretation may appear to vary from that
of Nakamura, this is due possibly to historical accretions that we are loath to
dismiss, its literary source would seem to be the same.
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indeed, in this awareness we are loath to part with any bit of it,
so dear have they become to us. Thanks to our past karma, the
significance of which we once were not fully aware, we have
now arrived at the solid bedrock of understanding our total life
experience commensurate to its scale, for which development we
are most grateful. This shows that, in the long and arduous
process leading to the inner peace of Buddhahood, as one’s
spirituality deepens and matures, one at last comes to realize the
“good” or fortuitousness of everything that comprises one’s life,
wherein everything is conserved and embraced in its totality, and
not the least bit of it is ever wasted or abandoned as meaningless.
In Shin Buddhism, the agency taking our often painful past
karma and rendering into “good” is known as the light of Other
Power, its working enfolding us just as we are, with all our joys
and sufferings intact, bringing us to reach a new peak of selfunderstanding characterized by wholeness of being infused with
spiritual insight.
The medieval Shin Buddhist leader Rennyo Shōnin, whom
the Venerable Daigyōin deeply revered, also placed a premium
on the notion of “past karma as good” (shukuzen) and understood
it to mean not merely good karma carried forward from the past,
but the affirmation, in the present, of our total life experience as
“good.” Such an affirmation takes place as a process of selfemptying, fulfilling a prime condition for spiritual rebirth known
in Shin Buddhism as shinjin.14 Once we awaken to such Other
Power faith, in that state of selflessness we realize that
everything in our life up to now is as it should be, that there is no
14

The Shin Buddhist term shinjin, which can sometimes understood simply
as “faith,” refers specifically to Other Power faith. (1) In Shin Buddhism the
essence of such faith lies in awakening: (a) an awakening to oneself or the
reality of one’s karmic existence, and (b) an awakening to the Buddha or the
unconditional love of the Buddha’s Original Vow; this is called nishu jinshin, or
the “two kinds of deep faith.” (2) The concept of faith in Shin Buddhism also
connotes the seeker’s “entrusting oneself to the Buddha,” or tanomu, that is,
giving up our altruistic self-power to at last receive Other Power faith. (3) The
Shin Buddhist faith has the element of instantaneous leap, or ōchō, the so-called
leap of faith. (4) As a result one arrives at the Shin faith of “purified heart” or
the “purification of mind,” known as jōshin (Skt., prasāda).
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part of it that is meaningless, and that in fact there is nothing in
our past that was not meant to be; our life up to now is thus seen
as “good,” a life worth living. Once the awareness of our past
karma as “good” deepens and a change takes place in us via
Other Power, the sense of gratitude we have for the Buddhadharma serves to further refine and purify our Other Power faith.
In other words, it is not that we must have good karma in our
past nor is it necessary for us to reinforce our life with good
karma in the present; rather, when at last we become aware of all
of our karma as “good,” we can affirmatively embrace our total
past karma and are grateful to the role that all of our karmic
conditions have played in making us what we are. Herein, our
affirming the totality of our life experience and finding it to be
“good” comes about through our involvement in the Buddhadharma.
2. Responding gratefully to the kindness shown us by the
Buddha-dharma. Our school of Buddhism places a premium on
gratitude. This sense of gratitude may be said to derive from
Rennyo Shōnin, who had a unique interpretation of gratitude to
the Buddha-dharma. Rennyo Shōnin particularly explained that
such gratitude meant our responding gratefully (hō-on) to the
kindness shown us by the Buddha, and that the defining act takes
place when the seeker says the Name of the Buddha, or nembutsu,
in effortless response. In its very effortlessness, we can see that
our saying of the Name of the Buddha is neither moral deed nor
ethical act; that is, it is not what we strive to do out of our own
purported good; it flows forth rather of itself from the depths of
the heart in grateful response to the kindness the Buddha has
shown us in our hour of need.
Indeed, the Buddha has made a deep prayer for humanity’s
sake out of compassion for the many people who are helplessly
caught in the depths of suffering. This compassionate prayer,
known as the working of the Original Vow, appears to us in the
midst of ordinary life, when we are desperate and have nowhere
to turn. When, in the depths of suffering, we at last hear the call
and awaken to this prayer, we respond effortlessly to the Buddha

120

Shōgyōji

with a grateful heart, the nembutsu flowing effortlessly from our
lips in Other Power faith. In that moment when we awaken to the
great compassion, we realize that this Vow of Amida Buddha is
one that has constantly manifested itself throughout history
through countless individual cases like our own. As the urge to
say the Name of the Buddha emerges from within, we realize the
truth that others too have discovered: that a deep prayer has been
made on our behalf by the world of Awakening, though we have
done nothing to deserve it. This most wonderful gift is being
given us without our asking, and as it flows from our lips, it
marks the beginning of a new phase of our life as its humble
recipient. In Shin Buddhism, our responding gratefully to the
Buddha-dharma thus finds perfect expression in the practice of
nembutsu, effortlessly voiced in response to the kindness that has
been shown us throughout our lives, but that we have come to
appreciate only now.
3. Realizing the state of selflessness in real terms. The true
treasure of the Sagha turns on the realization of the state of
selflessness (muga), that is, acting unselfishly. In the Shōgyōji
Sagha, perpetuated in memory of the Venerable Daigyōin, fifty
to one hundred people gather every morning from nearby Taya
houses or ordinary households to take part in the morning service
and Eza, or Sagha assembly. These services and assemblies are
held all year round without break. At the Eza, or Sagha
assembly, where people listen to and learn from priests and lay
people talking about their experience of the Buddha-dharma, the
nembutsu followers, priests and lay people alike, give full
expression to all that lies in their hearts, and come to resolve
their problems through open and mutual discussion. Whether it is
trouble at home or difficulties in society, everyone strives to look
into oneself in critical self-reflection and to engage one another
in dialogue to reach the root of the problem. This allows an
atmosphere of selflessness to flourish quite naturally in the
Sagha, bringing a fresh infusion of energy that enables us to be
the master of our lives wherever we may go. It is through this
active life of selflessness that we strive to set in place the
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cornerstone of Inner Peace and harmony essential to World
Peace.
As far as Buddhism goes, the awakening to our true self takes
place in this state of selflessness. When history reveals to us its
true face, in this spiritual state of selflessness we see ourselves
reflected in it and recognize ourselves for what we truly are.
When we learn to accept ourselves as we are, it enables us to
open ourselves fully to others and share with them unselfishly as
never before. It is through this state of selflessness that the world
of Inner Peace and harmony we seek to attain reveals itself for
the first time as a viable choice on the road to World Peace. Hōon, our responding in gratitude to the Buddha-dharma, and
shukuzen, the awareness of our past karma as “good,” may differ
as far as words go, but in fact they point to one and the same
reality: the awareness of the absolute present that arises in us in
the here and now putting our hearts at ease via our Other Power
faith.
The Venerable Daigyōin leaves us with these final words.
“Once we recognize that the cause of that terrible war lies
squarely within ourselves, our mission, then, as we go out to
celebrate the end of the war, is to make sure that we never have
to engage in such struggle again. Our temple, the Shōgyōji,
recognizes the cause of the holocaust wreaked by the atomic
bombing [of Hiroshima and Nagasaki] as being deeply
embedded in our own human karma, and our great mission in life
is one and the same: to never let another such a holocaust happen
ever again, and to produce, instead, a world of ultimate bliss on
this earthly plane” (One-page Dharma Message (Ichimai hōgo))
§ 1040; adapted). This sentiment of the Venerable Daigyōin
issues from his especially being kindly led by Other Power to see
the totality of his past karma as “good” (shukuzen). Its
experience was one that naturally led him to take up the life of
nembutsu, effortlessly responding in gratitude for the kindness
thus shown him. This subtle flow of Buddha-dharma from the
world of Awakening to the world of man and back again is well
symbolized by the eternal strains of Gagaku music performed
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from ancient times to the present. Such is the aspiration that the
Venerable Daigyōin sets forth that informs the Shōgyōji
Sagha’s constant search for Inner Peace. In our daily life
inspired by the eternal truth of Other Power faith, what Shin
Buddhism calls shinjin emerges in an uninterrupted and constant
stream on the plane of history in real time and in real terms.
In closing, we would like to express our sincerest thanks
to all of our Dharma teachers and friends who have devoted
themselves to the cause of World Peace. Today, more than ever,
our thoughts dwell on World Peace and it is important that those
who are independently working to achieve such a goal join
forces in fellowship and shared humanity to dedicate their lives
to this noble cause more effectively. As we recite the nembutsu
in humble gratitude, we offer up these thoughts to the Buddha
from the depths of our heart.
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The entire magazine is reproduced in My Encounter with That Light
(Gushikō), Vol. 2, 137–206.
Record of the Words of the Venerable Daigyōin (Daigyōin goroku). Shōgyōji
Archives ed., Daigyōin goroku, or “A Record of the Words of the
Venerable Daigyōin”; official edition; to be published.
Short Biography of Prince Shōtoku (Shōtoku Taishi denryaku). Compiled
from early biographies of Shōtoku Taishi, it was published in two
volumes in 1672 during the Tokugawa period.
Short Biography of the Venerable Daigyōin (Daigyōin shōden). A text
appended to One-page Dharma Message (Ichimai hōgo); pp. 497–595 in
the 1975 edition.
Solution to the Problems of Society (Shakai mondai no kaiketsu), 1929.
Compiled in Ekaini, ed., My Encounter with That Light (Gushikō), Vol.
2, Kyoto: 1963, pp. 75–130.
Wheel of Light Knows No Limits (Kōrin kiwanaku): Ekai hōbo bunshū (The
writings of Dharma mother Ekaini), a series of Shōgyōji monographs
containing the writings of Ekaini, published between 1990 and 1992.

PEACE IN SHIN BUDDHISM AND PROCESS
THEOLOGY1
Steve Odin
Introduction
This essay takes up the notion of transpersonal PEACE as a
theme for East-West comparative philosophy and BuddhistChristian interfaith dialogue, with a special focus on the ideal of
Peace in Jōdo Shinshū, or True Pure Land Buddhism, based on the
teachings of Shinran Shōnin (1173-1263), in relation to the
organismic process theology and process cosmology of Alfred
North Whitehead. Here I attempt to clarify that while Amida
Buddha and the God of traditional Christian theology are very
different, Amida and the God of Whitehead’s process theology are
strikingly similar notions. To begin with, it will be demonstrated
that like Amida Buddha in Shin Buddhism, the God of process
theology is not an omnipotent creator of the universe. Like Amida
Buddha, the God of Whitehead’s process theology is to be
envisioned through the image of “care,” so that for both traditions
reality is compassionate or caring in nature. Fundamental to
Whitehead’s process theology is that God is “dipolar” and
therefore has two natures: (1) the Primordial Nature which acts as
a persuasive lure for all events to realize God’s divine aims for
them; and (2) the Consequent Nature, a repository which acts as
the divine memory that saves all events everlastingly in the
kingdom of heaven. Whereas the Primordial Nature of God has
been compared to the Primal Vow of Amida by process theologian
John B. Cobb, Jr., the Consequent Nature has been compared to
the understanding of Dharmākara/Amida as a personification of the
“Storehouse Consciousness” by John Yokota. Cobb even identifies
the Name of Amida Buddha with Christ as the divine Logos or
1

This paper was presented at the Ninth European Block Conference at
Lausanne in September 2002. It was included and published in The Pure Land,
n.s., 21 (December 2004): 57-87.
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Word that incarnates into each occasion of experience through the
grace of deity. After clarifying this Buddhist-Christian interfaith
dialogue between Shin Buddhism and process theology, I argue
that transpersonal Peace is the ultimate spiritual value derived from
God in process theology as well as Amida in Shin Buddhism.
Peace in Whitehead’s process theology is similar to Buddhist
nirvāa, insofar as it is not only a goal of civilization, but also an
expanded awareness transcending the ego self whereby one
achieves deliverance from the suffering and tragedy inherent in the
perpetually perishing nature of impermanent events in the flux of
interrelational existence. Finally, it is shown that for Whitehead’s
process theology, transpersonal Peace is not achieved through
personal effort, but comes only as a “gift” of divine grace through
the divine immanence of a caring God, just as for the Shin
Buddhist teachings of Shinran, rebirth into the Pure Land of Peace
is not achieved by “self-power” (jiriki), but only through a “gift”
(ekō) received from the transformative grace of Amida Buddha’s
compassionate “Other Power” (tariki).
‘Amida’ in Shin Buddhism & the ‘Dipolar God’ of Process
Theology
Various scholars have noted how out of all Buddhist schools it
is Japanese Shin Buddhism which most nearly approximates
Christian theism, just as Amida Buddha as the compassionate
Savior of all sentient beings comes nearest to the Christian
monotheistic idea of God. In response to the question, “Is Amida
Buddha a Buddhist ‘God’?” Kenneth Tanaka has given the
following response:
You could say that Amida is “God,” but only if you define
God as the dynamic activity of understanding (wisdom) and
caring (compassion). But clearly, Amida is not a personal
God who is 1) the creator of the universe, 2) a divine,
transcendent being, 3) an omniscient (all knowing) being
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who knows my daily activities, and/or 4) a judge who
decides my final destiny.2
As indicated by Tanaka, Amida Buddha is not “God” in the
sense of traditional Christian theology, wherein God is described
as: (1) creator of the universe, (2) absolutely transcendent, (3)
omniscient, and/or (4) a moralistic judge. However, none of the
divine attributes enumerated by Tanaka is applicable to
Whitehead’s revolutionary concept of God. To begin with, against
the traditional Christian theological conceptions of God,
Whitehead argues that “the nature of God is dipolar. He has a
primordial nature and a consequent nature.” 3 While the dipolar
God is absolute, transcendent, impassible (unfeeling), eternal, and
unchanging in his Primordial Nature, God is also relative,
immanent, sympathetic, temporal and changing in his Consequent
Nature. (1) The most radical aspect of Whitehead’s process
theology is that God is not to be understood as divine Creator of
the world, but rather, as a caring deity that aims to save all
occasions in world-process: “He does not create the world, he
saves it.”4 According to Whitehead’s process theology, “God” is
not the omnipotent creator of the universe, since the ultimate
metaphysical category is “creativity,” 5 according to which all
events in nature are self-creative, in that they arise through a
process of creative synthesis, a dynamic activity of unifying the
dynamic web of interrelationships into a novel event or occasion
with beauty and value. (2) In his critique of the Judeo-Christian
and Islamic traditions, Whitehead argues that dogmatic notions of
God as an absolutely transcendent, omnipotent deity who creates
the world ex nihilo by divine fiat, has long been a basic theological
fallacy: “The notion of God as ... transcendent creator, at whose
fiat the world came into being, and whose imposed will it obeys, is
2

Kenneth K. Tanaka, Ocean: An Introduction to Jōdo-Shinshū Buddhism in
America (Berkeley: Wisdom Ocean Publications. 1997), 153.
3
A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, eds. David Ray Griffin & Donald
W. Sherburne (1929; New York: The Free Press, 1978), 345.
4
Ibid, 346.
5
Ibid, 21.
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the fallacy which has infused tragedy into the histories of
Christianity and of Mahometanism.”6 (3) For Whitehead, as well
as for Charles Hartshorne, John Cobb, and other leading process
theologians, insofar as all events arise through a process of creative
synthesis, they are spontaneous, emergent, and unpredictable, so
that God cannot be “omniscient” in the sense of an infinite,
unqualified knowledge that sees the outcome of all decisions made
by occasions emerging in the present, or of future occasions that
have not yet arisen into actuality. (4) Finally, Whitehead clearly
rejects the image of God as a legalistic judge, lawgiver, or
“ruthless moralist.”7 Instead, God is to be envisioned through the
image of “care.”8 Hence, while traditional notions of the Christian
God might be very different from Amida Buddha, Whiteheadian
process theology provides a description of God that resonates
deeply with the Shin Buddhist vision of Amida as a peaceful,
gentle and caring deity that operates to forever lure all events
toward realizing its divine aims toward value, beauty, goodness,
truth, harmony, peace, and salvation. It might be said that the
dipolar God of Whitehead’s process theology functions like Amida
as the Cosmic Buddha defined as a dynamic activity of wisdom
and compassion.
(a) The ‘Primordial Nature’ of God and the ‘Primal Vow’ of
Amida
The Buddhist-Christian interfaith dialogue between Shin
Buddhism and Whitehead’s process theology was initiated by John
B. Cobb, Jr. in his groundbreaking work Beyond Dialogue:
Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism. In
this work Cobb endeavors to show various parallels between the
“Primal Vow” as the working of the compassion of Amida
Buddha’s Other Power and the “Primordial Nature” of God in
process theology: “Whitehead’s account of the Primordial Nature
6
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8
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of God addresses the same feature of reality as that spoken of by
Shinran as the primal vow of Amida. Both of these are remarkably
analogous to ... accounts of the Word of God or Logos or Truth
which is Christ.”9 He then goes on to make the bold declaration:
“The conclusion from the above is that Amida is Christ. That is,
the feature of the totality of reality to which Pure Land Buddhists
refer when they speak of Amida is the same as that to which
Christians refer when we speak of Christ”10 (italics added). Here, it
should be pointed out Cobb in agreement with the view of Nishida
Kitarō (1870-1945), founder of the Kyoto school of modem
Japanese philosophy, who likewise argues that the Name of Amida
Buddha in the Shin Buddhist teachings of Shinran is to be
identified with Christ as the divine Logos or Word of God in
Christian theology.11 The profound insight of Cobb is that Christ as
the divine Logos or Word is itself the Primordial Nature of God,
which incarnates into each and every occasion as the “initial aim”
toward realizing maximum harmony and value, while moreover
identifying the Logos or Primordial Nature with the Primal Vow of
Amida. Whitehead describes the Primordial Nature of God as a
“lure” 12 to realize value. For Cobb, the lure of God in his
Primordial Nature is a theological equivalent to the Primal Vow of
Amida, or as it were, the “call of Amida.” 13 Elsewhere, Cobb
refers to Whitehead’s idea of Primordial Nature of God or Logos
in its working as a divine lure prescribing initial aims, as “the call
forward,” and therefore describes God as “the One Who Calls.”14
For Cobb, the lure of God in his Primordial Nature as Logos or
Word is therefore a Christian theological equivalent to the Primal
9
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Vow of Amida Buddha, or what he otherwise describes as the “call
of Amida.”15
Finally, Cobb argues for another similarity between Amida and
the dipolar God, holding that the ultimate metaphysical category of
creativity as an indeterminate formless activity of creative
synthesis, is itself conditioned by the determinate forms of
harmony provided by the Primordial Nature of God, just as the
formless emptiness of Dharmakāya Buddha is conditioned by the
Primal Vows of Amida (the Sabhogakāya Buddha) in Shin
Buddhism: “It is the Primordial Nature which qualifies creativity
in a way so strikingly similar to the qualification of the
Dharmakāya by the primal vow. Just as the Primordial Nature of
God is the primordial decision for the sake of all creatures, even
more clearly the primal vow is made for the sake of all sentient
beings. “16
The depth of Cobb’s penetrating interpretation of the Primal
Vow in Shin Buddhism as the “call of Amida,” can further be
established by reference to the writings of Taitetsu Unno, a leading
academic scholar and ordained minister of Shin Buddhism. In his
introductory book about the Pure Land teachings of Shin
Buddhism, Unno develops his understanding of the nembutsu, or
vocal recitation of the Name of Amida Buddha of NAMUAMIDA-BUTSU, as the “Name-that-Calls.”17 In his hermeneutics
of Shin Buddhism, Unno asserts that nembutsu, the vocal practice
of reciting the divine Name of Buddha, is to be interpretively
translated into English as “the Name-that-Calls.”18 Unno states that
the nembutsu is the Name that calls one to go beyond the ego-self
and achieve their full possibility for enlightenment as an awakened
human being. 19 Even though one calls to Amida through the
nembutsu, at the same time, since the nembutsu is recited only
15
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through a gift of Amida’s compassion, the nembutsu is ultimately
to be conceived as the Name-that-Calls, that is, it is the beckoning
call of Amida to transcend the ego-self through reliance on the
compassionate Other Power grace of Amida Buddha. As Unno
elsewhere asserts, “If I were to translate nembutsu into English, it
would be the name-that-calls, for it calls us to awaken to our fullest
potential to become true, real and sincere human beings.”20 Unno
clarifies that the name-that-calls is an “Interpretative translation for
nembutsu, NAMU-AMIDA-BUTSU, which is the beckoning call
to human beings from the side of Amida Buddha to take leave of
delusion and awaken to reality-as-it-is.” 21 He further explains how
according to the Shin Buddhist teachings of Shinran, “the saying of
nembutsu is experienced as a call from Amida, but simultaneously
it is our response to that call.”22 Again, “In Shin Buddhism, the
ultimate goal of transformation occurs in the saying of nembutsu,
NAMU-AMIDA-BUTSU ... the nembutsu is the flowing call of the
Buddha of Immeasurable Light and Life, coming from the
fathomless center of life itself, as well as our response to that call
without any hesitation or calculation.” 23 Since the nembutsu of
NAMU-AMIDA-BUTSU is the name-that-calls, accordingly, the
central practice of Shin Buddhism is that of “deep hearing”
(monpō), or as it were, “deep hearing of the call of Amida.” 24
Unno states, “Religiously speaking, deep hearing means that we
have no choice but to hear and respond to the call of boundless
compassion. It is through the name-that-calls that Amida Buddha
gives us the ultimate gift of true and real life …. Thus, the
invocation of the Name, NAMU-AMIDA-BUTSU, is ... a voicing
of the call that comes from the bottomless source of life itself, the
Buddha of Immeasurable Light and Life.” 25
From Unno’s understanding of the nembutsu or vocal recitation
of the Name of Amida Buddha of NAMU-AMIDA-BUTSU, as the
20
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“Name-that-Calls,” 26 one can thereby come to appreciate the
profound significance of Cobb’s interfaith dialogue between
Whiteheadian process theology and Shin Buddhism. For it is
Cobb’s landmark contribution to have reformulated Whitehead’s
notion of the initial aim or lure toward perfection for selfactualizing occasions derived from the Primordial Nature of God
or Logos as “the call forward” from the power of deity as the “One
who Calls,” while at the same time identifying this with the Primal
Vow of Amida Buddha, understood as the “call of Amida.”
(b) The ‘Consequent Nature’ of God and Amida Buddha as the
‘Storehouse Consciousness’
(1) Although Cobb analyzes parallels between the Primordial
Nature of God and the Primal Vow of Amida Buddha to save all
sentient beings through the working of compassionate Other Power,
he does not find any parallels between the Consequent Nature of
God and Amida. Cobb argues that whereas the value-qualities
realized by momentary events arising and perishing in the world of
creative process function to influence and enrich the Consequent
Nature of God, he sees no sense among Buddhists that dharmas
contribute anything to Amida: “There is, in other words, nothing
[in Shin Buddhism] comparable to what Whitehead calls the
Consequent Nature of God.” 27
However, the significant contribution of John Yokota, a scholar
of both Shin Buddhism and process theology, is to have
demonstrated the profound relation between the Consequent
Nature of God and Amida Buddha. More specifically, Yokota
argues for a parallel between the Consequent Nature of God as the
repository functioning to save all perishing events, and the nature
of Dharmākara Bodhisattva/Amida Buddha as the “Storehouse
Consciousness.” Yokota rightly asserts, “The tradition [of process
theology] is unanimous in its understanding of God as this final
26
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and unifying repository of all events. God is the keeper of the past.”
In Whitehead’s process theology, when an event perishes, it then
becomes a cause influencing all future events, thereby to acquire
what he terms an “objective immortality.” Yet with the passing of
time, the causal influence of each passing event in its objective
immortality would become dimmer and dimmer, gradually fading
away into oblivion, if not for the functioning of the Consequent
Nature of God. For according to Whitehead’s process theology, the
values realized by all events in fact do not fade away with the
passage of time, because they are retained, stored and saved
everlastingly in their full intensity and vividness as imperishable
data in the divine memory: namely, the Consequent Nature of God
as the collective repository of the past. Explicating the relevance of
the Consequent Nature of God in process theology to Amida
Buddha in Shin Buddhism, Yokota states, “As the [Buddhist]
tradition develops, one encounters the notion of ālayavijñāna or
the storehouse consciousness that is comparable to the collective
unconscious. It is the storehouse of all karma…. It is interesting to
note that the Shin Buddhist scholar Soga Ryōjin equated Amida
with this storehouse consciousness.” 29 Yokota here makes
reference to the insights of the Shin Buddhist scholar Soga Ryōjin
(1875-1971), a former president of Otani University, who
endeavors to locate Pure Land Buddhism within the mainstream of
the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition by showing how Dharmākara
Bodhisattva/Amida Buddha is the personification of the
Storehouse Consciousness, the repository of all dharmas or karmic
events.30 Because of his compassionate Primal Vow that aims to
save all sentient beings, Dharmākara Bodhisattva was to become
Amida Buddha presiding over the Pure Land of Peace and Bliss. In

28
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his analysis of the name Dharmākara, Soga clarifies how the
meaning of the Sanskrit word ākara (Jpn., zō) is “storage,” so that
Dharmākara (Jpn., Hōzō) is the “Dharma storehouse.”31 According
to Soga, “Dharmākara Bodhisattva of Pure Land doctrine is
synonymous with the Storehouse Consciousness, the ālayavijñāna
of traditional Mahāyāna Buddhism.”32 He further asserts, “Many
years ago I called the ālayavijñāna, this supraconsciousness in
which all dharmas are stored, this ‘storehouse consciousness,’
Dharmākara consciousness.”33 Furthermore, Soga emphasizes not
only that Dharmākara / Amida is the personification of the
Storehouse Consciousness, but that the Storehouse Consciousness
is itself the “Buddha Nature.”34
I myself have developed parallels between Whitehead’s
Consequent Nature of God with both the Collective Unconscious
of Jungian depth psychology as well as the Storehouse
Consciousness of Buddhism, in my book about the microcosmmacrocosm conception of reality as a dynamic network of
interrelatedness, interdependence, and interpenetration formulated
both in Whiteheadian process metaphysics and Huayan (Jpn.,
Kegon) Buddhism. 35 However, from the perspective of Shin
Buddhism, Yokota specifically clarifies how the Consequent
Nature of God in process theology relates to Dharmākara
Bodhisattva and his fully realized state as Amida Buddha, in his
function as the Storehouse Consciousness. Yokota states, “As the
discussion of objective immortality noted, it is in the incorporation
into God of the entirety of an occasion in all its vividness and
completeness that the evil of perpetual perishing is resolved.
Amida too is seen as taking in the entire person in that the karma
of that person is taken on by Amida in its entirety.”36 Yokota’s
point is that just as for Whitehead’s process theology all events in
31
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their objective immortality functioning as causes which condition
all future events would gradually fade away if not for being fully
retained, stored and saved in the Consequent Nature of God,
likewise, the karmic influence of all dharmas on future events
would also gradually fade away into insignificance if it were not
for the working of Dharmākara Bodhisattva / Amida Buddha, who
as the personification of the Storehouse Consciousness functions as
the collective repository of the past which saves all dharmas in
their full vividness and intensity.
(2) There is yet a further dimension to the parallel between the
Consequent Nature of God in Whiteheadian process theology and
Dharmākara / Amida in Shin Buddhism which needs to be
explored. In Shin Buddhism, persons are saved through the
compassionate Other Power of Amida Buddha upon rebirth in the
Pure Land. Likewise, in process theology, all perishing events are
“saved” 37 as they enter into the everlasting divine life of the
Consequent Nature of God, explicitly identified by Whitehead as
the Kingdom of Heaven. At the conclusion of his final chapter
titled “God and the World” from Process and Reality, Whitehead
propounds, “Thus the consequent nature of God is composed of a
multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization .... This is
God in his function of the kingdom of heaven” (italics added).38 He
continues, “The kingdom of heaven is with us today. The action of
[this] phase is the love of God for the world.... What is done in the
world is transformed into a reality in heaven and the reality in
heaven passes back into the world ... the love in the world passes
into the love in heaven and floods back again into the world.”39
Thus, here we find yet another convergence between Shin
Buddhism and process theology: namely, the idea of salvation
through rebirth in Amida’s heavenly paradise as the Pure Land of
Peace and Bliss, and Whitehead’s soteriological notion whereby
events are saved by passing into the everlasting life of the
Consequent Nature of God as the Kingdom of Heaven.
37
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(3) Although he does not discuss either Whitehead’s process
theology or the idea of Amida Buddha as the Storehouse
Consciousness, nevertheless, Taitetsu Unno clarifies the deep
spiritual meaning of this consequent function of the divine nature
from the perspective of the Japanese Buddhist poetics of
impermanence. Unno explains how the Buddhist teaching of
“impermanence” (Jpn., mujō) was depicted in Japanese poetry of
the Heian Period (794-1185) through the image of fleeting
dewdrops. This Heian poetics of impermanence came to be known
as mono no aware, the “tragic beauty” of perishing events in the
flux of becoming. Unno goes on to say, “In this early period, the
notion of impermanence had a negative tone, carrying a tone of
sadness, regret, and pathos. But with the passing of time, it took on
a more positive tone an encouragement to discover an enduring,
unchanging reality beyond the phenomenal world.” 40 Unno then
illustrates this with a poem by the priest-poet Ryōkan (1756-1831),
a Zen monk filled with the spirit of the Pure Land who wrote
poems on Amida:
If not for Amida’s inconceivable vow,
what then would remain to me
as a keepsake of this world?41
Ryōkan encouraged people to follow the path of nembutsu to
find salvation from the suffering of impermanence where all
transitory events disappear like falling dewdrops by taking refuge
in the everlasting Pure Land of Amida the Buddha of infinite Light
and Life:
Return to Amida
Return to Amida
So even dewdrops fall.42
40
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Unno goes on to interpret the above poems from the standpoint
of Shin Buddhism as follows: “Everything in our evanescent world
constantly reminds us not to rely on passing, unreliable things, but
to entrust ourselves to that which is timeless Immeasurable Light
and Life that is Amida.” 43
The closest Western parallel to the Buddhist teaching of
“impermanence” (Jpn., mujō) and the Japanese poetic ideal of
mono no aware or the tragic beauty of impermanence is to be
found in the process theology of A. N. Whitehead. At the
conclusion of his chapter titled “Peace” from Adventures of Ideas,
Whitehead holds that due to the immanence of God, which
provides divine aims to be actualized by events, each occasion
realizes some degree of beauty, or aesthetic value-quality. Yet the
beauty realized by events is always a “tragic Beauty”44 in that the
aesthetic value-quality of each occasion perishes immediately upon
becoming in the incessant flux of process as the creative advance
to novelty. For Whitehead, the problem of tragic beauty arising
from the ultimate evil of the perpetual perishing of events in the
ever-changing flux of becoming is thus to be resolved through the
concept of deity formulated in his process theism, according to
which all perishing events are retained, stored, and saved
everlastingly in all their vividness and intensity in the Consequent
Nature of God. Likewise, the Japanese poetic ideal of the tragic
beauty of transitory dharmas in the ceaseless impermanence of
universal flux is overcome in the Shin Buddhist tradition through
salvation by rebirth into the Pure Land of Amida Buddha. Hence,
just as for Whitehead, the tragic beauty of perpetually perishing
occasions in the stream of process is overcome through retention in
the Consequent Nature of God as the Kingdom of Heaven, so for
Shin Buddhism, the tragic beauty of impermanence is overcome
through salvation by rebirth into the heavenly paradise of the Pure
Land of Amida Buddha as the Storehouse Consciousness which
saves all dharmas forevermore.
43
44
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‘Compassion’ in Shin Buddhism and ‘Care’ in Process
Theology
One of the most significant points of contact between the
frameworks of Whiteheadian process theology and Shin Buddhism
is that both envision the divine nature of God / Amida as a caring
or compassionate deity, just as both underscore how care, concern
or compassion is rooted in the metaphysical structure of ultimate
reality itself, insofar as it is not constituted by separate,
independent, and unrelated substances, but rather, by dependently
arisen dharmas or events co-originated from out of an
interdependent matrix as a dynamic web of relationships in the flux
of becoming. For Shin Buddhism, the nature of Amida Buddha is
that of unconditional “compassion” (jihi) working through the call
of Amida’s tariki or “Other Power” as expressed by the “Primal
Vow” (hongan) with its aim, or compassionate intent, to save all
sentient beings. Describing the divine nature of Amida Buddha’s
salvific Other Power as boundless compassion, Taitetsu Unno
therefore asserts, “The working of the Primal Vow, the compassion
of the Buddha of Immeasurable Light and Life, is called Other
Power.” 45 Yokota explains both the compassionate nature of
Amida Buddha’s Primal Vow to save all sentient beings through
the grace of Other Power as a call to compassion as well as the
centrality of compassionate moral conduct based on a wisdom
seeing the emptiness / openness of reality as interdependence:
The whole point of the Buddhist analysis of reality with its
emphasis on impermanence, becoming, openness /
emptiness, and dependent arising is that it tells us that
reality is like this so that we can act accordingly ... in short,
we should act compassionately. We act compassionately
because a world of openness and dependent arising is a
compassionate world…. If compassion is the primordial
45
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character of existence, then a personal center to existence is
undeniable. Compassionate intent (the primal vow) is
present and undeniable as well.46
Like the Shin Buddhist tradition, Whitehead’s organic process
metaphysics articulates a doctrine of concern, care, or compassion
based on a metaphysics of interconnected, dependently arisen
events that emerge from out of a relational web or network of
causal interconnections in the dynamic, creative, undivided
aesthetic continuum of nature. Although Whitehead does not use
the language of emptiness per se, he does formulate the most
comprehensive Western theory of interrelated events arising
through prehensions, or sympathetic feelings of relations to all
other events, which at once calls to mind the Buddhist doctrine of
pratītya-samutpāda: dependent co-origination, interconnectedness,
or relational existence. For Unno, this awareness of as a “vast
network of interdependence” is itself the core of Shin Buddhism,47
further emphasizing that, “Interdependence is an elemental truth.
When one awakens to this fact, compassion that sustains us strikes
us with full force, and we are made to respond to the world with
the same compassion.” 48 Whitehead’s metaphysical principle of
“universal relativity” functions as a generalized category
expressing
the
interrelatedness,
interdependence
and
interpenetration of all events. The principle of relativity states that
“every item of the universe including all the other actual entities is
constituents in the constitution of any one actual entity.”49 Again,
the principle of relativity asserts that “every item in the universe is
involved in each concrescence.” 50 Indeed, Whitehead’s principle
of relativity is at once reminiscent of the Buddhist doctrine of
śūnyatā (Jpn., kū) or “emptiness,” which has been alternatively
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translated as “relativity” and “universal relativity” by the Soviet
Buddhologist Th. Stcherbatsky.51
In Whitehead’s organismic process metaphysics, the Buddhist
theme concerning the “indivisibility of emptiness and compassion”
is articulated in terms of what the former calls the “concern”
structure of causal process and universal relativity, wherein each
act of prehension, or “feeling of feeling,” is itself comprehended as
an act of “sympathetic concernedness.” In the technical vocabulary
of Whitehead’s process cosmology, each dependently co-arising
occasion or event is a unified subject arising through prehension,
sympathetic feeling, or “concern” for all multiple objects of the
past: “The occasion as subject has a ‘concern’ for the object. And
the ‘concern’ at once places the object as a component in the
experience of the subject with an affective tone drawn from this
object and directed towards it.”52 Whitehead further states, “It must
be directly understood that no prehension ... can be divested of its
affective tone, that is to say, of its character of a ‘concern’....
Concernedness is of the essence of perception.” 53 This concern
structure of causal process whereby events arise through their
concern for every other event, is further clarified by his notion of
“sympathy,” or feeling of feeling, whereby each occasion arises
through sympathetic feelings of its relationships to all other
events. 54 Hence, for Whitehead, “concern” is a functional
equivalent to compassion (deriving from the Latin verbal root
compassio meaning “to feel with”), understood as sympathy or
feeling of feeling. Like Buddhist compassion. Whitehead’s
concernedness involves sympathy with all phenomena arising out
of the dynamic network of interrelationships.
Here, it should be further clarified how the dipolar God of
Whitehead’s process theology relates to the image of Amida
Buddha. In Whitehead’s process theology, God is not the
51
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omnipotent creator of the universe, just as in Shin Buddhism,
Amida Buddha is not understood as a divine creator, since all
dharma events naturally emerge from out of the dynamic web of
interrelationships through the causal process of dependent coarising, the coalescence of a field of causal relationships.
According to Whitehead’s process theology, in its Primordial
Nature, the dipolar God is a “lure for feeling”55 not an authoritarian
deity who rules by forceful coercion but a caring deity who lures
events to achieve maximum depth of aesthetic value, beauty,
harmony and peace through gentle persuasion. Whitehead rejects
the images of God as an unmoved mover, an imperial ruler, or a
ruthless moralist, and instead envisions a patient, tender and caring
God who lures events to realize divine aims. He writes that in
contrast to these other images, the origins of Christianity in Jesus
suggest a new image of a caring God that “dwells upon the tender
elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by
love.”56 Whitehead describes the divine care operating through the
Primordial Nature of God in terms of the image of tenderness:
“His tenderness is directed towards each actual occasion, as it
arises.”57 Again, in his description of the Primordial Nature of God
in its function as a lure toward value, Whitehead asserts that God is
“the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision
of truth, beauty, and goodness.” 58 In its Consequent Nature, the
dipolar God is a caring deity who saves all beauty achieved by
creative events as everlasting value-qualities in the divine memory.
Describing the cosmological function of God’s Consequent Nature,
Whitehead thus writes, “The image ... under which this operative
growth of God’s nature is best conceived, is that of a tender care
that nothing be lost” (italics added).59 Just as in his organic process
cosmology Whitehead describes the “concern” 60 structure of
interrelated events arising through the causal process of sympathy,
55
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or feeling of feeling, whereby an occasion emerges into actuality
by sympathetically feeling its relations to all past occasions, so in
his process theology he emphasizes that God’s ultimate divine
nature is that of “care.” In his Primordial Nature, the care of God
lures all events to actualize his divine aims for them to realize
harmony, beauty and value, just as the Primal Vow of Amida’s
compassionate Other Power grace calls out to all sentient beings to
achieve enlightenment, nirvāa, and rebirth into the Pure Land.
The Consequent Nature of God as the Kingdom of Heaven is a
caring deity that operates like the compassionate nature of
Dharmākara / Amida as the Storehouse Consciousness which
functions to save all sentient beings through rebirth in his heavenly
paradise as the Pure Land of Peace and Bliss. Hence, both
Whiteheadian process theology and Shin Buddhism envision the
divine nature of God / Amida through the image of care or
compassion, just as they view the metaphysical character of
ultimate reality itself as caring or compassionate, due to the
concern structure of existence itself as composed of dependently
co-arisen events or dharmas emerging from out of their sympathy,
or dynamic process of feeling the feelings of all past events, which
have arisen out of the dynamic interconnected matrix of
relationships in the flowing continuum of nature.
Divine ‘Suffering’ in Process Theology and Shin Buddhism
In the classical tradition of Christian theology, God is an
unchanging absolute, characterized by attributes of transcendence,
immutability, and impassibility, thus to be completely unaffected
by events in process. By contrast, the Consequent Nature of God in
Whitehead’s process theology is a caring God who feels the
feelings of all becoming and perishing events, and is thus forever
changing, growing and evolving with the world-process as the
creative advance into novelty. Above it was shown how
Whitehead’s dipolar God is to be conceived through the image of
“care,” 61 just as the structure of ultimate reality itself is to be
61
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described as the “concern” structure of causal feelings,62 whereby
events emerge by their “sympathy,” or feeling of relationships with
all other events.63 In opposition to traditional Christian theology,
wherein one of the fundamental attributes of God in His absolute
transcendence is that of “impassibility,” or total absence of feeling
as an unmoved mover, Whitehead clarifies how the Consequent
Nature of God is a caring deity who by concern, prehension, or
sympathy, comes to feel the feelings of all other events, and
therefore also feels both the suffering and joy of all becoming and
perishing events in the creative process. Whitehead therefore
asserts, “God is the great companion the fellow sufferer who
understands” (italics added).64
Thus far, the interfaith dialogue between Whiteheadian process
theology and Shin Buddhism has not yet addressed the importance
of this notion of “divine suffering” in both traditions. However,
Professor Takeda Ryusei of Ryukoku University, an eminent
Japanese scholar of both Jōdo Shinshū and Whiteheadian process
theology, has clearly explained the Shin Buddhist notion of dukha
(Jpn., ku) or “suffering” in his article titled “Pure Land Buddhist
View of Dukha.”65 In this essay, Takeda explicates what he calls
“the bodhisattva’s compassionate practice of vicarious dukha” in
Shin Buddhism.
This dynamism of the bodhisattva’s ceaseless ‘desubstantializing’ [self-emptying] is embodied as the
universal creativity of Dharmākara Bodhisattva’s Primal
Vow, whose fulfillment is Amida Buddha’s untiring
dynamism of saving all sentient beings. The uniqueness of
Amida’s compassion ... is the ultimate form of
bodhisattva’s vicarious dukha.66
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Like Whitehead’s God of care who acts as a “fellow sufferer”
who understands, Dharmākara Bodhisattva / Amida Buddha is a
compassionate deity who saves all sentient beings by feeling their
suffering as its own through vicarious dukha. Although he does
not explicitly refer to Whitehead in this essay, Takeda nevertheless
shows the unmistakable influence of process theology by his use of
Whitehead’s distinctive technical term “ingression” when
discussing the influx or incarnation of divine grace as a gift of faith
from the Primal Vow of Amida Buddha’s compassionate Other
Power, thereby implying a parallel between the ingression, descent,
or incarnation of grace from the divine immanence of the
Primordial Nature of God, such as when he writes: “For Shinran,
Buddha nature is faith. Faith is given by Amida to each being, and
through this gift of faith the Buddha nature ingresses itself into
each being” (italics added). 67 Again, he states, “Apart from the
bodhisattva’s actualization as ingressing his will into the actual
existence of each being, the ‘desubstantializing’ [self-emptying]
reality turns out to be so abstract that any sort of reference to it
falls into delusive attachment to that reality itself, which is none
other than its dogmatic substantialization.”68
PEACE in Shin Buddhism and Process Theology
Imamura Yemyo (1867-1932), one of the earliest pioneer
missionaries who transmitted Shin Buddhism to America, and the
Bishop of Honpa Hongwanji Mission of Hawaii the first Buddhist
temple in America, proclaimed a Gospel of Peace grounded in the
Primal Vow of Amida to bestow the gifts of peace, happiness and
salvation to all beings. In his essay “Democracy According to the
Buddhist Standpoint,” he writes:
“Peace! Peace!” is the universal cry; for this is the only
condition in which we can realize our ideals of truth,
goodness, and beauty. But we cannot have a permanent
67
68

Ibid, 21.
Ibid, 15.

Peace in Shin Buddhism and Process Philosophy

145

peace unless we have a thorough understanding as to the
true signification of peace.69
Imamura concludes, “We cannot stop short of propagating the
gospel of true peace based upon the Will-to-Save [Primal Vow] of
the Buddha.”70
The process theology of Whitehead similarly holds to a vision
of God as having a Primordial Nature that out of concern aims to
lure all events toward realization of peace, happiness, and salvation.
For Whitehead, Peace is the ultimate spiritual value which comes
as a gift of God’s divine grace. As will be seen, the God of process
theology is a poet of the world luring it toward his vision of beauty,
goodness and truth, along with their unity in the supreme Harmony
of Peace. Whitehead holds that the divine nature of God as well as
the generic metaphysical structure of reality are revealed in an
epiphany of the person, life, and teachings of Jesus Christ through
his gospel of peace, love, and sympathetic care for all creatures.
For Whitehead, as for Shin Buddhism, the realization of Peace as
cosmic Harmony is both an ultimate goal of civilization, as well as
an expanded transpersonal state of consciousness beyond the egoself analogous to resolution of suffering through overcoming
attachment to an ego-self in the Peace of nirvāa. Hence, in this
final section, I want to clarify how both Whiteheadian process
theology and Shin Buddhism culminate in a Gospel of Peace,
including both the social ideal of Peace as the goal of civilization
and the soteriological goal of an expanded consciousness
transcending the ego-self in a cosmic Harmony of harmonies.
(1) PEACE in Shin Buddhism: The imaginative picture of
Amida Buddha depicted in the three great maala images
representing the three Pure Land scriptures, as magnificently
reproduced in The Three Pure Land Sūtras by Inagaki Hisao,
illustrate the serene countenance of Amida Buddha in his Pure
Land of Peace and Bliss. This same tranquil and quiescent visage
69

Moriya Tomoe, Yemyo Imamura: Pioneer American Buddhist, translated
by Tsuneichi Takeshita, edited by Alfred Bloom and Ruth Tabrah (Honolulu:
Buddhist Study Center Press, 2000), 87.
70
Ibid, 108.

146

Steve Odin

of Amida Buddha’s sublimely calm expression is shown through
such great religious art as the famous Daibutsu, or Great Buddha,
located in Kamakura. Throughout the Pure Land scriptures, along
with the writings of Hōnen, Shinran and other Japanese masters of
Shin Buddhism, it is constantly repeated that the Pure Land of
Amida Buddha is the realm of Peace, as imparted by a variety of
technical Japanese terms in the lexicon of Jōdo shinshū, including
annyō (Land of Peace), annyō jōdo (Pure Land of Peace), annyō
jōsetsu (Pure Land of Peace), annyō kai (Land of Peace), anraku
bukkoku (Buddha Country of Peace and Bliss), anraku butsudo
(Buddha Land of Peace and Bliss), anraku jōdo (Pure Land of
Peace and Bliss), anraku koku (Land of Peace and Bliss), anraku
kokudo (Land of Peace and Bliss), and anraku sekai (World of
Peace and Bliss) to list just a few representative examples.71
As noted by James Frederiks, for Shinran, Rennyo and the
whole Jōdo shinshū tradition, “the true sign of saving faith came to
be ‘peace of mind’ (anjin).”72 Shinran’s notion of anjin, or “peace
of mind,” is itself the criterion of true shinjin, or the state of
openness and receptivity to the transformative grace of Amida
Buddha’s compassionate Other Power. Hence, in the writings of
Shinran the faith-consciousness of shinjin is called the “peacebestowing pure mind.”73
In the Kyōgyōshinshō and other writings from his Collected
Works, Shinran often quotes from the Pure Land scriptures about
the Buddha’s teachings on Peace. Thus, in The Sūtra of the
Tathāgata of Immeasurable Life, Amida Buddha declares, “I will
benefit the world, bringing peace and happiness.” 74 Again, “Such
people as these, hearing the Buddha’s Name, will be full of peace
71
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and obtain the supreme benefit.” 75 For Shinran, these kind of
scriptural passages declare Amida Buddha’s Primal Vows (Jpn.,
hongan) to compassionately bestow infinite Peace on all who call
out Buddha’s Name while at the same time guaranteeing the
effectiveness of reciting the Buddha’s Name through the nembutsu
of NAMU AMIDA BUTSU for rebirth into the Pure Land of Peace
and Bliss. For Shinran, “practicing the saying of the Name alone”
leads one to “birth in the Pure Land of peace.”76 Shinran further
quotes the authority of Master Ciyun, “Only the nembutsu is quick
and true as the pure act that brings one to the land of peace;
therefore, practice it.” 77 Moreover, Shinran underscores how
rebirth into the “Pure Land of Peace” (annyō jōdo) through
recitation of nembutsu itself spontaneously, effortlessly, and
naturally springs forth as the expression of shinjin, faith. It is
therefore asserted, “Swift entrance into the city of tranquility ... is
necessarily brought about by shinjin.”78 Shinran remarks, “We see,
therefore, that the realization described above is all the great
benefit we receive in the Pure Land of peace, the inconceivable,
perfect virtue of the Buddha’s [Primal] Vow.”79
The Primal Vow of Dharmākara Bodhisattva / Amida Buddha
that aims to compassionately bestow Peace on all who recite his
Name is cited by Shinran in such passages as follows: “When I
attain Buddhahood, the sentient beings throughout the countless,
immeasurable, inconceivable, numberless worlds throughout the
ten quarters who receive the Buddha’s majestic light and are
touched and illuminated by it shall attain peace.”80 For Shinran, the
realization of the pure mind of “enlightenment” is characterized by
the overcoming of “suffering” (ku) and the experience of divine
Peace as the “gift” (ekō) of the saving grace of Amida’s
compassionate Other Power (tariki) received in the openness and
receptivity of shinjin, faith. Shinran cites The Sūtra of
75
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Immeasurable Life: “The peace-bestowing pure mind (so termed)
because (the bodhisattvas) eliminate all sentient beings’ pain.”81
Again, “[T]hey follow the gate of compassion. They eliminate all
sentient beings’ pain and become free of thoughts that do not bring
peace.”82 Shinran remarks, “The undefiled pure mind is in accord
with the gate to enlightenment.” 83 Also, “Enlightenment is the
realm of purity that brings peace to all sentient beings.”84 In his
commentary on these scriptural passages, Shinran further
emphasizes that Amida Buddha’s Primal Vows arise from the heart
of “compassion” (jihi) and promise to eliminate the problem of
suffering due to impermanence by bestowing Peace on all who
recite his Name in the state of faith: “[Concerning compassion
(jihi)], to eliminate pain is termed ji; and to give happiness is
termed hi. Through ji one eliminates the pain of all sentient beings,
and through hi one becomes free of thoughts that do not bring them
peace.”85 The Pure Land is continually referred to as “the land of
peace.” 86 Shinran continues, “Thus we clearly know from the
Tathāgata’s true teaching and the commentaries of the masters that
the Pure Land of peace is the true fulfilled land.”87
(2) One of the most neglected categories in Whitehead’s
scientific process cosmology and Christian process theology is his
notion of transpersonal Peace. Yet his idea of transpersonal Peace
is not only the crown of his process cosmology and process
theology; it is also the nearest parallel to the ultimate Buddhist
goal of nirvāa, or Peace. The notion of Peace is therefore a
central point of intersection between Whiteheadian process
theology and the Shin Buddhist idea of rebirth in Amida’s Pure
Land of Peace and Bliss, as well as its idea of the Peace of nirvāa
as a gift of the divine grace of Amida Buddha. It might be said that
both Amida Buddha in Shin Buddhism and the dipolar God of
81
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Whitehead’s process theology represent the Peace-bestowing
Buddha / Christ whereby there comes to be the ingression, influx,
or descent of transpersonal Peace, as the divine aim toward cosmic
Harmony in each dharma event through the grace or persuasive
agency of divine immanence as the Primordial Nature of God, the
Primal Vow of Amida. For Whitehead, Christian theology explains
Christ as a revelation of God’s persuasive agency in the world as a
lure toward the divine aims of peace, love and sympathy: “The
essence of Christianity is to appeal to the life of Christ as a
revelation of the nature of God and the world.”88 Whitehead then
describes the revelation of the life, person and teachings of Jesus
Christ as occurring through “his message of peace, love, and
sympathy.” 89 In Process Theology, co-authors Cobb and Griffin
write, “Christian Peace is an expansion of care for self to care for
others. “ 90 This statement underscores how in process theology
there is a deep relation between God’s function as bestowing Peace
and the divine nature as care, concern, compassion, love, and
sympathy.
Whitehead’s most visionary book, Adventures of Ideas,
concludes with a remarkable chapter entitled “Peace.”91 According
to Whitehead, transpersonal Peace is not only the ultimate aim of
civilization; it is also an expanded state of consciousness wherein
the self is transcended in a cosmic Harmony. In Whitehead’s
process metaphysics of becoming and perishing events, suffering,
pain, and tragedy are intrinsic to the dynamic evolutionary
temporal process of creative advance into novelty: “Decay,
Transition, Loss, (and) Displacement belong to the essence of
Creative Advance.”92 And just as for Buddhism, deliverance from
the “suffering” of impermanence is realized only in the Peace of
nirvāa, so for Whitehead, salvation from the tragedy, pain, and
suffering of existence as the perpetual perishing of momentary
88
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events in the flux of becoming, comes only with the immediate
experience of transpersonal Peace, the Harmony of Harmonies:
“The Adventure of the Universe starts with the dream and reaps
tragic Beauty. This is the secret of the union of Zest with Peace:
That the suffering attains its end in a Harmony of Harmonies. The
immediate experience of this Final Fact ... is the sense of Peace.”93
Whitehead further describes his concept of Peace in a manner
consonant with Buddhism when he writes: “Peace is the
understanding of tragedy.” 94 Again, “The inner feeling (that)
belongs to this grasp of the service of tragedy is Peace, the
purification of the emotions.” 95 The salvific transpersonal
dimension of Peace is then indicated by Whitehead in a manner
reminiscent of Buddhist muga (Skt., anātman), or no-self: “Peace
is ... the width where the ‘self’ has been lost, and interest has been
transferred to co-ordinations wider than personality.” 96 Again,
“Peace carries with it a surpassing of personality.” 97 Moreover,
“Peace ... is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some
deep metaphysical insight.” 98 Whitehead even identifies the
immediate experience of transpersonal Peace as the “attainment of
truth”99 and with “extreme ecstasy.”100
In Process Theology by John Cobb and David Griffin, the
coauthors state, “To whatever extent our lives become aligned to
God’s ever-changing aims for us, we can have ‘that Peace, which
is the harmony of the soul’s activities with ideal aims that lie
beyond any personal satisfaction.’”101 They further clarify that, “it
is the immanence of deity as a whole, with its Primordial and
Consequent Natures, its creative and responsive love, which is the
source of Peace: ‘It is the immanence of the Great Fact including
93

Ibid.
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid, 285.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 292.
100
Ibid, 289.
101
Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 124.
94

Peace in Shin Buddhism and Process Philosophy

151

this initial Eros and this final Beauty which constitutes the zest of
self-forgetful transcendence belonging to Civilization at its
height .... The immediate experience of this Final Fact is the sense
of Peace.’” 102 Through the caring persuasive agency of God’s
Primordial Nature as the divine lure, there is implanted in each
dependently co-arising event an initial aim toward realizing the
harmonic value qualities of beauty, art, adventure, and truth, as
well as their unity in the supreme aim of Peace, the cosmic
Harmony of harmonies: “The presence of God in us is divine
grace.103 It gives rise to adventure, and to art. To it we owe the
beauty.... It works at all times in all people. The supreme gift is
Peace, which is an alignment of ourselves with God’s grace.”104 As
again emphasized here, this aim toward Peace in each occasion
derived from God’s Primordial Nature as the divine lure is the
functioning of grace, and the realization of Peace in each occasion
as a result of this grace is itself the gift of God through Christ as
the divine Logos which incarnates into each occasion. Cobb and
Griffin therefore conclude, “Peace is the gift of Christ.”105
Whitehead himself writes that, “The experience of Peace is
largely beyond the control of purpose. It comes as a gift” (italics
added). 106 Again, “Peace carries with it a surpassing of
personality .... It is primarily a trust in the efficacy of Beauty....
The trust in the self-justification of Beauty introduces faith, where
reason fails to reveal the details” (italics added).107 For Whitehead,
transpersonal Peace comes as a “gift” of grace ingressing as the
divine immanence of God received through entrustment, or faith in
the divine efficacy of God’s ideal aims for each occasion. Thus, we
arrive at a most remarkable convergence upon the idea of salvation
from the suffering and tragic beauty of impermanent dharma
events through a bestowal of transpersonal Peace by God / Amida
in the framework of Whitehead’s process theology and that of Shin
102
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Buddhism. For just as in Whitehead’s process theology the
realization of Peace is not attained by self-effort, but is only
received as a “gift” of divine grace through faith by means of the
divine immanence of God, so in Shin Buddhism based on the
teachings of Shinran Shōnin, one attains salvation, enlightenment,
nirvāa, and rebirth in the heavenly paradise of the Pure Land of
Peace and Bliss, not through the efforts of “self power” (jiriki), but
only as a “gift” (ekō) of the transformative grace of Amida
Buddha’s compassionate “Other Power” (tariki) realized in
tranquil inwardness of shinjin, faith. It is in such a manner, then,
that we have arrived at this vision of Amida in Shin Buddhism, and
the dipolar God in Whitehead’s process theology, as the caring and
compassionate Peace-bestowing Buddha / Christ that forever
guides and saves all events co-arising from the dynamic network of
interrelationships in the ceaseless flux of becoming.
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REFLECTIONS ON THE ETHICAL MEANING OF
SHINRAN’S TRUE ENTRUSTING
Victor Forte
The purpose here in examining Shinran’s notion of shinjin or
“true entrusting” is to consider first, how this teaching supports his
assertions about attainment and second, the possible ethical
implications given these assertions. My main philosophical
interests are in examining the ethical meaning that results from the
varying claims and descriptions of attainment that one encounters
in Buddhist traditions. This would include not only what may
result out of the contents of attainment, but also the ethical
implications that might result from the assumed possibilities of
attainment. In the case of Shinran (1173-1262 CE), both content
and possibility are given such a unique and radical meaning that
there may be no single figure in Buddhism who compares in his
courage and vision to take the Dharma in a fundamentally new
direction. Yet, as is often recognized in contemporary studies of
his work, he has attracted little interest from Western scholars.1
1

The most devoted Western scholar in the field has been Alfred Bloom. His
classic early text on Pure Land Buddhism, Shinran’s Gospel of Pure Grace
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965) remains a highly regarded study.
He continues to be the most recognized Western voice, recently editing two
collections on Shinran - The Essential Shinran: A Buddhist Path of True
Entrusting (Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 2007) brings together
excerpts from a number of important primary Shin Buddhist texts, arranged
according to different themes in Shinran’s life and thought. Living in Amida’s
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This may be due to a number of factors – the mythic foundations
of Shin Buddhism, the assumed similarities with Christianity, the
apparent simplicity of the doctrine, the lack of consideration given
to the teaching of emptiness. Regardless of the accuracy of these
assumptions, Shin Buddhism does present a number of challenges
in terms of the ethical meaning of its doctrine, and may warrant
greater attention for this reason. For now, I would like to focus on
a single paradoxical question concerned with Shinran’s
understanding of true entrusting and attainment: How might the
ethical hopelessness of true entrusting make the ethical life
possible?
One of the most striking features of Shinran’s explanation of
true entrusting is that he claims it is functionally operative only
when there is a thorough and complete recognition of the
impossibility of ethical action. He supports this claim with the
assertion that the deep burden of karma we carry into the present
existence provides the very ground for each and every action that
arises out of our lives. For example, in the following verses from
Gutoku’s Hymns of Lament and Reflection, Shinran asserts the
impossibility of good action:
Each of us, in outward bearing,
Makes a show of being wise, good and dedicated;
But so great are our greed, anger, perversity, and deceit,
That we are filled with all forms of malice and cunning.
Extremely difficult is it to put an end to our evil nature;
The mind is like a venomous snake or scorpion.
Our performance of good acts is also poisoned;

Universal Vow (Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 2004) is a collection of
essays from leading scholars and practitioners of Shin Buddhism. One cannot
help but to notice that in this collection the great majority of contributors are
Japanese, with only four Western writers besides Bloom contributing five essays
among twenty-one total. Only one of the four is a scholar in Japanese studies,
Galen Amstutz.
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Hence, it is called false and empty practice.2
Making distinctions between good and evil actions are of no
consequence since even what might be categorized as a good
action arises out of karmic conditionality – so there is no agency
associated with ethical choice, and no measurable progressive
benefit that can come from action of any kind. These assertions
would seem at first glance to be at odds with traditional Buddhist
practice, given that it is commonly assumed that ethical practices
are necessary in order to progress towards liberation. But if we
look closely at the relationship between ethics and liberation in the
foundational teachings of Indian Buddhism, we might find some
precedence for Shinran’s assertions, specifically in terms of the
meaning of puñña and kusala, the two main categories of ethical
activity found in the Indian canons. The way they are often
distinguished is that puñña pertains to actions that accumulate
karmic merit and lead to more auspicious rebirths, while kusala
refers to actions that lead to liberation. This commonly held
understanding of their meaning has brought about a fair amount of
critical debate among Western Buddhologists concerning the
relation between the two3 – Do they represent two paths, puñña
for laypersons and kusala for monks? Does the practice of puñña
eventually lead to kusala, or does puñña possibly interfere on some
level with kusala, or are they really just two ways of speaking
about the same process?
Perhaps, one could argue that essentially puñña and kusala are
both employed by Buddhist practitioners in order to lead to the
formation of interior and exterior environments conducive to the
2

See Dennis Hirota, trans., The Collected Works of Shinran (CWS) (Kyoto:
Jōdō Shinshū Hongwanji-ha, 1997), Gutoku’s Hymns of Lament and Reflection,
I, 421, # 95-96.
3
There has been an on-going discussion about this topic among contributors
to the online Journal of Buddhist Ethics. An editor and co-founder of the
journal, Damien Keown, initiated much of the interest in these teachings in his
The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992). A number
of scholars writing in the Journal of Buddhist Ethics have contributed essays
responding to Keown and adding their own interpretations of puñña and kusala,
including L. S. Cousins, Abraham Velez de Cea, and Martin T. Adam.
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achievement of liberation. 4 This would indicate then that the
primary reason for engaging in ethical practices is to create the
proper psychic conditions for attainment, whether that is the
attainment of arhatship or Buddhahood. 5 To assert, as Shinran
asserts, that all actions regardless of their apparent moral attributes
are inherently evil is to essentially negate the practice of both
puñña and kusala. True entrusting is nothing more than the
forfeiting of these practices. This would seem to indicate a
dramatic break from tradition, forming the basis for Shinran’s
distinction between self power and other power, or the path of the
sages and the path of true entrusting. However, one could also say
that it was never the case that puñña and kusala were understood
as actually leading to liberation, even according to the Indian
foundational teachings. The ethical practices always remain within
4

This is my main position concerning the practices of puñña and kusala.
Namely, ethical practices do not lead causally to liberation, but only provide the
kinds of environments, internally and externally, which are conducive to
liberation. By practicing the precepts and other ethical systems in the
Buddhadharma, we reduce the amount of discord in our relationships and in our
consciousness. In order to achieve the highest levels of concentration, our
internal and external environments must allow for the possibility of reaching
these states, however there is little evidence to conclude that such environments
actually cause liberation. Nor do the canonical records of Indian Buddhism
indicate that attainment occurs as a result of the removal of past karma – that is
the way of the Jains. The way of the Buddha is to recognize the functional laws
of causation and use them to one’s benefit. Ethical behavior results mainly from
a wise recognition of causation. Even in terms of merit, we achieve higher
realms of existence that are less chaotic and violent, providing environments
more conducive to the practices of meditation – this is the main benefit of
puñña, not the pleasurable karmic rewards of merit making. The Buddha resided
in Tuita heaven in his lifetime immediately before being born as Siddhārtha
Gautama, the result of innumerable lifetimes of puñña cultivation, but the
danger of rebirth in a heavenly realm is that the pleasures of such a life can
impede spiritual progress as well. This distinction is illuminated in the story of
the Buddha’s religious journey when he rejects the attainment of the formless
jhānas as liberation.
5
One could argue that the main difference between the path of the arhat and
the path of the bodhisattva is that the former limits the practice of puñña in
emphasizing kusala, while the latter expands the practice of puñña to such a
degree that the accumulation of merit leads beyond arhatship to Buddhahood.
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karmic conditionality, and their main purpose is to lead to
beneficial environments supportive of efficacious meditational
states.6
By insisting that all action is bound to karmic conditionality
and so always resulting ultimately in evil, Shinran was mainly
attacking a common misrepresentation of the Dharma, namely that
liberation is a direct result of human agency. 7 This is further
emphasized in his argument that even shinjin originates from
Amida’s vow and not from the practitioner, so that attainment as
true entrusting does not result from human agency either. Rather, it
occurs as an awakening to one’s full renunciation of progressive
cultivation, a realization of the utter surrender of self power (Jpn.,
jiriki). This surrender, however, does not result in an eradication of
one’s karmic debt, but in the moment of a surrender of such depth
and completeness, the karmic weight holding us in samsaric
bondage is transformed into the good that makes the attainment of
the Pure Land a possibility. According to Shinran:
…without the practitioner’s calculating in any way
whatsoever, all his past, present and future karmic evil is
transformed into good. “To be transformed” means that
karmic evil, without being nullified or eradicated, is made
6

See the Ambalahikārāhulovāda Sutta from the Middle Length Discourses
of the Buddha (Majjhima Nikāya). When the Buddha teaches his son Rāhula
about the benefits of reflecting on one’s actions, he concludes by stating, “But
when you reflect, if you know: ‘This action that I have done with the body does
not lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of
both; it was a wholesome bodily action with pleasant consequences, pleasant
results,’ you can abide happy and glad, training day and night in wholesome
states.” See The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of
the Majjhima Nikāya, trans. Bhikkhu Ñāamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston:
Wisdom Publications, 1995), 525.
7
Nāgārjuna takes up this question in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, on the
“Examination of Bondage,” stating, “‘I, without grasping, will pass beyond
sorrow, and I will attain nirvāa,’ one says. Whoever grasps like this has a great
grasping. When you can’t bring about nirvāa, nor the purification of cyclic
existence, what is cyclic existence, and what is the nirvāa you examine?” See
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Jay L. Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 42.
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into good, just as all waters, upon entering the great ocean,
immediately become ocean water.8
If the ocean water represents the mind of Amida, then in
surrendering one’s agency of progressive ethical development, one
participates in, or comes in contact with, the pure mind of wisdom
and compassion personified in the identity of Amida Buddha. It is
not as though karmic evil is somehow transformed into a karmic or
meritorious good through true entrusting; instead, karmic evil is
transformed into good through the realization of its utter
intractability. The paradoxical result of Shinran’s interpretation of
Amida-inscribed Dharma is the assertion that the ethical life is
made possible through the hopelessness of ethical action. In the
recognition of the hopelessness of self-determined agency, one
may experience a freedom grounded in humility and the shared
human condition – the wisdom and compassion associated with
Buddhahood is made known in the moment of true entrusting, in
the defiled life of an ordinary human being through a receptive self
surrender. So, it is in the sacrifice of puñña and kusala, in the
sacrifice of ethics as meritorious, efficacious practice, that one’s
actions are purified as true compassion.
Attainment of the Pure Land as Non-Retrogression
Therefore, shinjin, according to Shinran, is attainment – not the
promise of attainment in the next life, but the attainment of the
Pure Land in the very moment of true entrusting. But what exactly
is the meaning of this attainment? The writings of Shinran are
quite clear that shinjin is the attainment of non-retrogression
(irreversibility), 9 a traditional notion related to the path of the
bodhisattva as it was described in the Indian Prajñāpāramitā
8

Notes on “Essentials of Faith Alone,” CWS I, 453.
For example, in Lamp for the Latter Ages, Letter 7, “You should
understand that the moment of settling of those who entrust themselves to
Tathāgata’s Vow is none other than settling into the stage of non-retrogression,
because they receive the benefit of being grasped, never to be abandoned.” CWS
I, 532.
9
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Sūtras.10 What these texts describe mainly is the attainment of nonretrogression, not the ultimate attainment of Buddhahood.
Buddhahood, the apparent goal of the Mahāyāna vehicle, is to a
certain degree, subverted in the foundational literature by placing
greater emphasis on the intermediate goal of bodhisattvic nonretrogression. There is evidence of this emphasis in other
Mahāyāna literature as well. Even Gautama Buddha plays a mere
cameo role in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra. In the Heart Sūtra, the
Buddha instructs Śāriputra to turn his attention to Avalokiteśvara
Bodhisattva’s practice of the Perfection of Wisdom, and in the
Larger Pure Land Sūtra (Skt., Sukhāvatī-vyūha; Jpn.,
Daimuryōjukyō), it is the vows of Dharmākara Bodhisattva that
provide the possibility for true entrusting. In this sense, nonretrogression is an attainment without attainment, an assured
being-on-the-way towards an attainment that is coming, but not yet.
In non-retrogression, the bodhisattva courses freely in sasāra,
unfettered by preferences or views, employing skillful means, and
continuing to accumulate the karmic merit required for
Buddhahood.
From the Indian sources, non-retrogression is achieved in the
th
8 stage (bhūmi) of the ten stage progression to Buddhahood.11 At
this stage of development, achieved through innumerable lifetimes
of dedication to the practice of the pāramitās, the bodhisattva has
10

In the Aasāharasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, it states, “Now those
Bodhisattvas who have stood on the irreversible Bodhisattva-stage, …they
expound the perfection of wisdom for sons and daughters of a good family who
are earnestly intent, who train themselves, and strive in the perfection of
wisdom.… There are, on the other hand, countless beings who raise their
thoughts to enlightenment, who strengthen that thought of enlightenment, who
course towards enlightenment, and perhaps just one or two of them can abide on
the irreversible Bodhisattva-stage! For full enlightenment is hard to come up to
if one has inferior vigor, is slothful, an inferior being, has inferior thoughts,
notions, intentions and wisdom.” See The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight
Thousand Lines and its Verse Summary, trans. Edward Conze (San Francisco:
Four Seasons Foundation, 1973), 107.
11
A systematic elaboration on the ten stages of the bodhisattva path is
presented by Candrakīrti in his Madhyamakāvatāra or The Entry into the Middle
Way.
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attained such a high level of wisdom (prajñā), (perfected in the 6th
stage), and skillful means (upāya) (perfected in the 7th stage) that
achievement of liberation is understood as so close at hand, that
final liberation must be resisted in order to eventually achieve
Buddhahood. 12 Having attained non-retrogression, the attainment
of Buddhahood may actually be several lifetimes removed from
the present lifetime, but Buddhahood is nevertheless guaranteed.
However, the attainment is only the attainment of the guarantee
and so it is an attainment that is at the same time, a nonattainment. 13 Having attained the guarantee, this stage is
recognized as the “perfection of the vow.” It is in this space
between the attainment of non-retrogression and the attainment of
final liberation that the vow is achieved, and great compassion is
made possible, since the guarantee of non-retrogression releases
the bodhisattva from any possible remnant of self-concern, while
still allowing for continued response to the needs of suffering
beings.
But what is the non-retrogression that is achieved through trueentrusting? Rather than the result of innumerable lifetimes of
progress, moving through the successive stages of the bodhisattva
path, non-retrogression is achieved according to Shinran by
12

According to Huntington, for example, “At this juncture in his practice,
he would seem most susceptible to the temptation to withdraw completely from
the net of relationships (were such an act possible) and to enter into
unconditional peace and liberation from suffering for himself alone. Yet just
when he might be prepared to turn away from the everyday, pain-filled world,
there appears to him a vision of all the Buddhas who have traveled along this
same path, and relying on their example, he is inspired to reaffirm his original
vow to rescue all sentient beings from the suffering caused by spiritual
ignorance and clinging.” See C. W. Huntington, Jr., with Geshe Namgyal
Wangchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian
Mādhyamika (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 101.
13
Candrakīrti describes the 8th stage named “The Immovable” (Acalā) in
the Madhyamakāvatāra by stating, “The wisdom of nonclinging does not abide
in the company of any faults, and therefore at the eighth stage these impurities
along with their roots are thoroughly eradicated. The afflictions have been
extinguished, yet even though [the bodhisattva] is preeminent in the triple world,
still he is unable to obtain the treasure of the [qualities] of the buddhas, which is
limitless as the heavens.” See Huntington, 186.
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sacrificing the path, by fully accepting its impossibility. In a single
moment of shinjin, one finds oneself in the 8th stage of the
bodhisattva path, having never passed through the previous seven
stages. But in both cases, the 8th stage is achieved through the
perfection of the vow. In the case of the Shin Buddhist, the vow
originates not from some previous lifetime of the practitioner,
however distant the origins of taking up the path may have been,
but from a primordial vow of Other-power (tariki), originating
from an immeasurable mythic past, and preceding any and all
volitional vows that could be traced to a personal karmic history. It
is a vow of perfect purity because it functions independently of the
conditioned necessities of all other forms of religious practice.
There is no need here, for example, to somehow unbind oneself
from the karmic traps of merit making by engaging in practices of
merit transference, since the attainment of the vow in this case is
completely unmerited! It occurs independently of any and all
personal conditionality, and so is, according to Shinran,
inconceivable.
…with regard to Other Power, since it is inconceivable
Buddha-wisdom, the attainment of supreme enlightenment
by foolish beings possessed of blind passions comes about
through the working shared only by Buddhas; (and) it is not
in any way the design of the practitioner.14
Non-retrogression originating from Amida’s vow also
functions as a guarantee in the sense that it releases the practitioner
of true entrusting from self-concern in the present life. Birth is
attained in that moment, yet there remains the space left open
between attainment of the vow and final attainment of
Buddhahood, allowing for the possibility of the compassion of
Amida to manifest itself within the earthly domain of a
degenerated Dharma (mappō). But unlike the bodhisattva path of
traditional Mahāyāna, the guarantee of Amida’s vow promises
Buddhahood in the very next life, so there is even less temporal
14

A Collection of Letters, CWS I, 571, #10.
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uncertainty than in the traditional bodhisattva path. One lives in the
recognition that Buddhahood will be manifested in the proximity
of one’s next life, while still leaving open a space for
compassionate activity within the present life. The narrowing of
the space between non-retrogression and final attainment as
promised by Amida concentrates the power of his compassion in
the immediacy of a single human lifetime. In addition, unlike the
path of the bodhisattva in the 8th stage of non-retrogression,
compassion for the truly entrusting has no merit-making capacity
whatsoever. In the case of the bodhisattva in the 8th stage there
remains the necessity to build up huge stores of merit in order to
eventually achieve Buddhahood. Compassion is practice. But
those who have achieved non-retrogression through true entrusting
are brought to compassion through the recognition of their own
shared defilement and their gratitude towards the vow. Merit
making has been completely forfeited. Even the continued
recitation of the nembutsu is for Shinran an expression of gratitude,
not an activity of merit making.
Shinran’s Promise
The possibility and meaning of attainment in Shin Buddhism is
dependent in large part on the radical interpretation of the original
Pure Land texts offered by Shinran. The vow is not only Amida’s
promise, but it also is Shinran’s promise as well. But how are we
to measure Shinran’s interpretation in terms of his actual
understanding of the canon? Contemporary scholars seem divided
on how far they are willing to take the mythic literalism of Shin
Buddhist doctrine. The debate is centered on two related concerns,
the literalism of the Pure Land and the particular form of Buddhabody attributed to Amida. 15 Based on the face value of the
15

The two questions are interrelated. According to Shinran, is the Pure
Land a literal destination for the truly entrusting, or can we simply equate the
Pure Land with emptiness and Shinran’s system as an example of skillful means,
making the truth of emptiness accessible to everyone through a compelling
mythical construction? If we accept the former, we might emphasize Shinran’s
recognition of Amida as a Sabhogakāya Buddha (Bliss-body) who resides in a
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canonical sūtras, one could argue that the texts simply trace the
story of a particular Sabhogakāya (Bliss-body) Buddha,
Amitābha, who had established a Buddha Realm, one of many
such realms in the cosmology of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism.
Japanese Shin Buddhism resulted ultimately from an imported
Chinese cult that centered its practices on the canonical authority
of the Pure Land sūtras. But how literal is Shinran’s interpretation
of the Pure Land? If we assume it is purely literal, then we must
conclude that attainment through true entrusting and rebirth in a
Western paradise was for Shinran, the necessary result for all Shin
Buddhists in their recitation of the nembutsu. If not, then Shinran’s
Pure Land may be interpreted simply as a representation of
traditional Dharmic doctrine (i.e., emptiness), customized to make
accessible to the many what had been only available for the few.
According to Amstutz, for example, “Shinran’s interpretation
of the Pure Land mythos…short-circuited the mediating feature of
conventional Buddhist religiosity….changing the Amida from a
more or less physical, concretely visualized deity to a relatively
abstract representation of perfected pratītya-samutpāda.” 16 In
Keel’s Understanding Shinran: A Dialogical Approach, he, in a
similar vein, states, “From the enlightened perspective, … the story
is nothing more than an expedient or temporary means (hōben) to
lead ignorant and sinful beings to an enlightenment that, once
realized, has no use for the expedient. The Pure Land story is for
the enlightened of the Pure Land an ‘unreal’ means for realizing

Western Paradise. If we argue the latter, the identity of Amida can be more
accurately equated with the Dharmakāya (Law Body) – reality itself, or
suchness. This would mean that Amida is not a particular Buddha, but a
representation of realization – the Buddhahood of all Buddhas. This is further
complicated by the fact that the Dharmakāya, as interpreted by the early
Chinese Pure Land practitioner, Danluan (476-542 CE) is based on a two-body
theory, arguing that the Dharmakāya is expressed as both the “Dharma Body of
suchness” and the “Dharma Body as compassionate Means.” Shinran was also
influenced by Danluan in his own interpretation of Amida’s identity.
16
Galen Amstutz, “Shinran and Authority in Buddhism,” in Living in
Amida’s Vow: Essays in Shin Buddhism, ed. Alfred Bloom (Bloomington:
World Wisdom, 2004), 146.
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‘reality.’”17 In response to Keel, Gregory Gibbs states, “I would
challenge Professor Keel to find any language in Shinran’s
writings compatible with the reductionistic view he takes of the
Pure Land via concepts of “emptiness” and “skillful means.” 18
Although Gibbs recognizes “these concepts are important and do
occur in Shinran’s texts,” he also finds, “a tendency to assess
Buddhist thinkers in terms of highly edited and homogenized
versions of medieval scholastic Buddhist thought.”19 John Keenan
observes a “neglect of emptiness” in Shinran’s writings, arguing
that the founder of Shin Buddhism placed the Mādhyamika in the
path of the sages and “avoided it [the teaching of emptiness] like
the plague.”20 He concludes that:
Shinran will not allow the language of emptiness to swallow up
the reality of Amida Buddha. He will not admit that the
teaching of emptiness constitutes a meta-language in which all
other teachings may be expressed and to which they may be
reduced….Shinran was…emptying all theories indeed, even
that of emptiness – a very traditional Mādhyamika move
indeed!21
One problem with these attempts to somehow determine an
accurate interpretation of Shinran’s true sense of the meaning of
the Pure Land, is that in order to take such a position, Shinran
would have to recognize himself as authoritative, which it seems to
me he takes great pains to deny throughout his writings. 22
17

Hee-sung Keel, Understanding Shinran: A Dialogical Approach
(Freemont, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 2000), 161.
18
Gregory G. Gibbs, “Understanding Shinran and the Burden of Traditional
Dogmatics,” in The Eastern Buddhist 30. 2 (Summer 1998): 283.
19
Ibid.
20
John P. Keenan, “Shinran’s Neglect of Emptiness,” in The Eastern
Buddhist 33.1 (Spring 2001): 10.
21
Ibid, 13-14.
22
For example, “Through hearing the shinjin of the wise, the heart of
myself, Gutoku (“foolish/stubble-haired”) becomes manifest. The shinjin of the
wise is such that they are inwardly wise outwardly foolish. The heart of Gutoku
is such that I am inwardly foolish.” See Gutoku’s Notes, CWS I, 587.
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Although Shinran is engaged in interpretive and even polemical
assertions throughout his works, these are grounded in recognition
that he is only capable of receiving shinjin – his interpretations are
primarily structured to refute his own authority, and prove his
complete dependence on the vow. If he claims for example, that he
does not have a single disciple, then the practice of skillful means
would be both presumptuous and contradictory. Or in stating (as
recorded in A Record in Lament of Divergences, Jpn., Tannishō)
that he is not sure whether the nembutsu will send him to the Pure
Land or to hell,23 he certainly claims no textual authority. So his
arguments are not designed necessarily to support a particular
interpretive position, but to always follow the path of true
entrusting. Following this path may have often been conscious and
strategic, but his practice of shinjin was limited to the particulars of
his own karmic predicament, and so he could not claim to be
designing a path for others. From his point of reference the
compassionate vow of Amida was established for him alone. 24
However, in openly recognizing his own complete dependence on
the vow, it allowed him to share with his contemporaries an
authentic awakening to human vulnerability and need.

23
24

A Record in Lament of Divergences, CWS I, 622, #2.
Ibid, 679, in “Postscript.”

RE-IMAGINING SOCIALLY ENGAGED
BUDDHISM
James Kenneth Powell II
This term “socially engaged” Buddhism makes reference to a
false dichotomy: “socially engaged” and “Buddhism.” One has
only to think of the Buddha’s own life to realize this. Universal
education and health care were the principle of his community,
powered by a democratic institution and strict rules to avoid
corruption. Tolerance, restraint and mental stabilization along with
abstinence from intoxicants and sex preserve and stabilize the lay
and clerical communities alike.
The western meaning serves for the definition of idea “socially
engaged.” The western monotheisms focus as part of their nature
on the community, society at large, while Buddhism engages the
individual. For the Semitic monotheisms, the idea of the “Chosen
People” is central. The surprising fact is that the society is
comprised of individuals, and so for Buddhist political theory,
engaging the individual in terms of education, ethics and altruism,
through meditation and restraint, entails the larger interest in
“social” ethics of the greater masses.
Specifically it is the Protestant idea of social action, mass
revolt to oppose political oppression “by order of God” that is new
to Buddhism. “God” is styled as a shepherd, thus leading sheep –
the congregation. I suggest that the new context of this idea
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“socially engaged” Buddhism is the meeting of principally
Calvinist social traditions with principally Zen Buddhism. It is then
the task to decipher the social engagement of Buddhism via Asian
evolutes from the influence of Protestant values through contact
with the West. This task is the focus of this paper.
Each of the major Eurasian “families” of religions has a
vertical and horizontal tradition with regard to not only social
ethics, but arguably, in all spheres. In China, the hierarchical
contrast of Confucianism with Daoism is clear. Hierarchically
structured Confucianism provides social security, stability and
order. Daoism suggests freedom for the individual, integration
with unspeakable, “chaotic” nature and a mistrust of social
hierarchies.
Again, the contrast of Hindu varnasrama the “color code”
which the Portuguese first called the casta or “rank” social order
contrasted with the “vertical” and egalitarian structure of the
Buddhist Sagha is equally well-known. In the West, what is not
so well-known are the pre-Christian Greco-Roman hierarchical
social traditions modeling Zeus at the top with relative rankings in
importance on down. The impact of these ancient traditions
remains only subliminally upon our awareness of the Greek and
Roman nature of the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic
churches. The hierarchy of these traditions is arguably a betrayal of
the socially egalitarian ethics of Jesus and followers, but more on
that to come. Both the Hindu and Greco-Roman traditions share
origins in the ancient pre-historic Aryan perspective. The classic
pantheon first appears in written form in Hittite literature, thence
through Sanskrit, Greek and Latin among others, the multitude of
Aryan light deities traverses the entire range of cultures from Iran
(Aryan) and North India to Ireland (Aryaland).
To begin, let us note the fact of climate and culture as informed
by Tetsuro Watsuji, who emphasized the priority of space with
relationship to consciousness. To understand protestant ethics, one
must travel back in time to the desert climates that produced the
fearsome warrior deities of Babylon and related Middle Eastern
cultures. The most ancient civilization and source of the world’s
alphabets, zodiac, legal codes is indeed Iraq. Without top-down
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command authority, irrigation and agriculture along the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers are unsustainable. Those at the top take the
majority of water leaving none for the ancient cities of the delta.
The edin as it is put in the Semitic Akkadian language, or “Eden”
as it is known to the Bible, is that relatively small patch of green
along the rivers. Beyond lay death and “un-God,” soon to evolve
into Satan, the Devil.
Students of the Bible know both that the founder of the
Abrahamic traditions, the legendary Abraham, is said to have
originated from Ur of ancient Iraq circa 1800 BCE at the time of
the promulgation of the first known human legal decree from
Hammurabi, King of Babylon. Some five centuries later,
Abraham’s people have allegedly become slaves in Egypt and we
have with Moses, the egalitarian Ten Commandments circa the
13th century BCE. Unlike the law Code of Hammurabi, Mosaic
Law applies to all alike, without a “fine for murder of a little man,
public torture execution for the murder of a big man” as
Hammurabi’s Code puts it.
As again geography plays a role in the development of
subsequent Israelite religion culminating in Judaism, the constant
invasions heaped upon the inhabitants of Israel / Palestine evolve
an awareness not only of freedom from slavery, but castigation of
the great empires as abominations to Jehovah, the God of Moses.
First the Babylonians, then the Assyrians, the Greeks and
Macedonians, finally the Romans destroy the Temple and send the
Jews into exile in Egypt.
With them travels the early messianic Jewish sect today known
as Christianity. This perspective found its way among the slaves of
the Roman Empire as it promised that “in Christ, there is neither
slave nor free.” The communist lifestyle of the early Christians is
renowned. Their refusal to acknowledge the divinity of the Roman
Emperor won them agonizing and tortured executions. In the end,
the “slave perspective” prevailed and Roman Empire became
Catholic through Roman and Eastern or Greek Orthodox traditions.
As the Roman Catholic Church in the remnants of a Western
Roman Empire devastated by Hun and German invasions, served
as the only glue left to hold society together through the so-called
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“Dark Ages” of Europe. To corral the Germans, the hierarchy
evolved within the church was employed in at first beneficent, then
exploitative ways. In the beginning, a bishop or episcopus in the
Greek was an “overseer” rather like the janitor and secretary of the
early and slave church. At the end of the day, the bishop of Rome
is ruler of all Western Europe. It is into this situation that the
Protestant principle emerges.
I will say a great role model for the first successful Reformer of
the Catholic church, Martin Luther, was Muhammad. By Martin
Luther’s day, Muslims had ruled Spain for some seven hundred
years. The Arab Empire expanded so rapidly due to the fact of its
explicit anti-slavery message as mercenary and slave armies of
Byzantium and Persia deserted to the Muslims. Muhammad treated
women as equals and harmed neither Christian nor Jew in his own
life or for the most part, did his followers. Precipitating the
Protestant Reformation, Turkish Muslim troops were “banging on
the doors of Vienna” and the Pope and his military advisors also
often serving as bishops – were scared. The Pope of Rome
depended upon taxes from Western European peasants to “defend”
Europe from the “infidel” Muslims.
Luther’s insistence on translating the Bible into the vernacular
German so all Germans could know it directly along with his
opposition to the hierarchy of the Catholic church appealed to
peasants to such a great degree, Luther’s writings incited a massive
peasant rebellion. Just as Muhammad is said to have “created” the
Arabic language through his Qur’an, likewise is Luther considered
to have “created” the German language through his translation of
the Bible. His principle? The relative equality of all believers. This
is the inspiration for the “protest” of Protestants. The protest is
lodged at the hierarchy and like the anti-temple prophets of Israel
and the anti-temple features of the life of Jesus, to rebel against
“false priests”, the unfair treatment of all and bowing to that “whor,
Babylon” is an affront to God’s intention for humans, created
equally in the image of God.
Tragically, the wars that ensued as Europe was engulfed in
civil war, Protestant versus Catholic war, resulted in the loss of
many millions of lives. The Catholic Church, expanding not only

Re-imaging Socially Engaged Buddhism

173

against the Muslims of Spain and Portugal, expanded her power
into the “New World” with the brutal enslavement and murder of
untold millions of Native Americans as the Roman church once
more modeled the Roman Empire. The Protestants of the north,
while also conforming to a policy of cruelty to the natives,
nevertheless established a democratic state among the thirteen
colonies. The nature of Protestantism is to tend towards
independence rather than universality a la the Catholics and thus,
without a single denomination to dominate the new United States,
but rather the multiplicity of contending Protestant sects, a nation
without a king or a religion emerged, a first in history.
Having established the fact of protestant egalitarianism, I want
to turn our attention to the fact of the historically socially engaged
tradition of the Buddha. We know first of the rejection of the
authority of the Vedas and the description of the caste system as
mass hallucination or group delusion, and we know the Buddha
rejected his crown, and we know of the democratic structure of the
Sagha and of the Buddha’s preference for the classic Indian
democracies, notably the Vrji Republic. The relatively egalitarian
social structure for women allowed them to escape the abusive
husband or family and obtain an education in the Buddhist
community. The early Buddhist depiction of the Brahmin as
“greedy and deceitful” reminds one of the similar casting
Protestants have of the Pope and his hierarchy. “The closer you get
to Rome, the greater corruption you will find” goes an old
Protestant saying.
We have in the instance of the Emperor Aśoka, edicts of
toleration for all perspectives, the building of animal shelters, rest
areas for common travelers, and the dissemination of Buddhism in
all directions through his direction. As the Mahāyāna tradition
emerges especially in the northwest of India, one finds the
exaltation of the “defiled” merchant Vimalakīrti in relationship to
the Buddha’s most intellectual bhiku Śāriputra. The female
Śrīmālādevī is exalted as purely realizing her Buddha Nature in
what earlier would be deemed the “impure” female body. The
Lotus Sūtra exhorts all to treat those of all perspectives equally, as
they are all equally vehicles along the path to Awakening.
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As Buddhism enters China, we see the clear conflict with
hierarchical Confucianism, yet increasing merger with the
“horizontal” socially egalitarian structure of Daoism. The antifamily attitude of Buddhism, its tendency towards the individual
striving than the organization of “the masses” and the manner in
which the role of Sage is now open to all equally, not to mention
the attack on Confucian traditions five relationships, notably that
women are subordinate to their husband – all this elicited the
persecution of Buddhism from 842-845 after a heyday during
which China’s only female Emperor reigned, the Buddhist
Empress Wu.
After the Confucian crackdown, one finds Buddhism
principally alive among the peasants, some of who may simply
hold out for the devotional path to Amitābha and hope for rebirth
in Sukhāvatī or the “Happiness Realm” or simply wandered the
woods as a Daoist-style Chan master. The sophisticated
monasteries of Buddhism’s Golden Age in China were finished.
With the advent of China’s domination by Mongols following
hierarchical Tibetan religious advisors, we find the peasants
rebelling against this domination establishing the Ming Dynasty
through especially the actions of the White Lotus Society and its
great appeal to women and the poor. The vast demonstrations and
resistance culminated in ousting the hierarchically organized
Mongol religious traditions governed by the lamas of the Sakya
sect of Tibetan Buddhism.
We can note then again the appeal of this similar Buddhism,
the so-called Pure Land Sukhāvatī tradition of Japan in the ministry
of Shinran. He notes in a manner so eerily similar to that of Martin
Luther, that Infinite Light Buddha Amitābha is nearer to the sinner
than the pious. Luther’s proclamation was to “sin boldly” that god
could save the more. Both left the relatively elite monasteries,
married and modeled householder life, valuing the common life
over that of the monastic.
Each of these figures inspired extremist interpretations.
Thomas Muenzer concluded from Luther’s thought that the
peasants should also rebel and overthrow the feudal lords. An
estimated one hundred thousand peasants were massacred by the
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knights. Zenran, Shinran’s son, was disowned in the end, for
thinking that debauchery and lying were to be tolerated in
Amitābha’s grace. Clearly, to merge with Amitābha is to carry the
sincere conviction that Amitābha or “Infinite Light” is everywhere,
all the time and to be authentic and respectful of that. One should
live as if there already. Perhaps we can somehow even go so far as
to say that the social movements represented by Luther and
Shinran go back to the most massive slave rebellion the world has
ever known: Islam. The Turks had converted from Buddhism in its
West and the North Africans had converted in Europe’s East.
So, Buddhism has always been socially engaged. Engaged with
the individual no matter his or her social status. The monotheisms
of the West address the “mass-man” (and I mean “man”). Both
Israelite and Indian traditions permeate their West and East
respectively, through Judaism and Buddhism respectively. As each
“horizontal” system enters the “vertical” and hierarchical systems,
a mutual transformation occurs. New systems emerge. New
vortices of inter-relationship take place as Judaism becomes
Catholicism, and Buddhism becomes “Buddho-Daoism”. A fine
blend of coffee, don’t you think? In the social sense then, Chan
(Jpn., Zen; Kor., Seon) tradition has more in common with the
Protestants of north Europe than with the Dalai Lama. The system
in which he works is then, more akin to the Catholic / Orthodox
systems.
To then consciously develop future strategies for peacemaking,
we should all become cognizant of these patterns, these systems,
these “fractalizations” as the taiji or “Universal Absolute” in
Daoism. Thus to repeat and conclude: the insights of Daoism,
Buddhism, Judaism, Islam and Protestantism can be utilized to
restrain the hierarchical, vertical forces of Confucianism,
Hinduism and the Roman Catholic / Greek Orthodox amalgam.
Let’s mix them together now!

BUDDHIST PROTEST IN MYANMAR:
BASIC QUESTIONS
Ronald S. Green
Over the past year, many Americans have been puzzled and
excited by news of events in Myanmar (also called Burma). 1
Images of monks with megaphones and raised fists challenge
typical understandings of Asian Buddhists as portrayed in
classrooms and media. As a result, the pro-democracy
demonstrations by Buddhist monks in Myanmar have provided
rich grounds for university discussions on such issues as modern
Buddhist practices, socially engaged Buddhism and the application
of classical Buddhist ideas to the alleviation of social inequities of
the modern world. In hopes of contributing to the learning process
this paper makes a basic examination of some of these topics with
reference to the events in Myanmar and statements by those
involved. It identifies a number of details Americans are likely to
view as inconsistencies, such as the democracy leader’s tendency
to expound the virtues of Buddhist kingship.
In September 2007, Buddhist monks led the largest protest
against the military government of Myanmar that country had
experienced since the popular uprising of 1988 when 3,000 people
1

In 1989, the Burmese military government officially changed the English
version of the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar, and the capital city
from Rangoon to Yangon. These changes reflect the local names. Some groups
opposing the government refuse to recognize the name changes.
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were reportedly killed. Leading up to the events of September, a
month earlier the government doubled the price of gasoline,
triggering corresponding rises in the price of public transportation,
rice and cooking oil in the impoverished country. Deep social
economic suffering in Myanmar is well documented. In 2006, the
UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index sited a
high infant mortality rate, short life expectancy, the serious threat
posed by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, tuberculosis and malaria for
ranking Myanmar 130 out of 177 countries in terms of
development. In May 2007, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) issued a rare criticism by accusing the Myanmar
government of abusing the rights of the people. The new burden
imposed by the gasoline price hike was likely felt to be intolerable
by many. Within days of the price increase, a pro-democracy
demonstration of about 400 people took place in Yangon (also
called Rangoon), the former capital and largest city of Myanmar
with a population of six million. While the government quickly
suppressed the protest, arresting numerous activists, smaller
demonstrations continued around the country with the participation
of a modest number of monks. On September 5, the military
forcibly stopped a rally in the town of Pakokku, injuring at least
three monks. This provoked public and monastic outrage since a
large majority of the population in Myanmar is devoutly Buddhist
and the hundreds of thousands of clergy members hold high stature
in society.2 At some point in life, most males in Myanmar become
monks for at least a three-month period, usually as a child or just
before marriage in order to learn social morals. Thus, the public
has a very close connection to the 400,000 - 500,000 professional
monks in the country of around 50 million people.
The next day, monks in Pakokku made a drastic if not heretical
move by taking government officials hostage for a short time,
demanding that the government issue an apology by September 17.
After the deadline passed with no apology, monks began protesting
daily around the country, their numbers increasing to tens of
2

It is estimated that 89 percent of the Myanmar population is Buddhist,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html.
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thousands. Reading this, Americans are very likely to ask a number
of questions including the following: Were the protests, at least at
first, about an apology? If so, what is the dharmic significance or
importance of an apology? Why did the monks feel the need for an
apology? Were egos and humiliation factors? Is so, how does that
reflect on Buddhism? Were the protesters acting as individuals or
truly as representatives of the clergy?
At this time, monks also refused to accept alms or perform
religious services for members of the military and their families. In
Myanmar, non-monastic Buddhists participate in the religion
largely by earning merit for good fortune in this life and a better
future birth by contributing materially to the well-being of monks.3
The system of merit and demerit is believed by hundreds of
millions of Buddhists worldwide. It provides an explanation for
why a person is born in a particular situation. For example, the
justification for an individual maintaining the wealth of his or her
family in an overwhelmingly impoverished country, an
individual’s right to rule the country, or conversely, a baby being
born with cancer, are all routinely explained by past-life karma
accrued by earning merit or demerit. For this reason, it is of utmost
importance to earn merit in this life. Thus, the Myanmar monks’
refusal to accept alms from the military and their families
affectively denied access to the merit system and so, according to
the belief, to well-being. A question this raises among American
university students concerns Buddhists taking vows to save all
sentient beings or to provide spiritual aid to any person seeking it.
Are monks obligated to accept alms and by refusing, were they in
violation of a precept? Could the didactic purpose in the act
ultimately help believers even more than accepting their donations
would have? So far, no answers to these questions have been
forthcoming. As time went on and monks persevered in their
refusal to accept alms, donated food was left to rot in the streets.
Despite widespread hunger in Myanmar, the population would not
touch the food. This attests to both the popular support of the
3

This idea of buying good fortune compares roughly to the Christian notion
of giving tithe.
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political cause of the monks and the belief in their spiritual
efficacy. But in the eyes of the world, how does the failure to
distribute the food in some way reflect on the monks?
On September 21, a group calling itself Alliance of All
Burmese Buddhist Monks issued a statement saying the
government is “the enemy of the people” and calling to the citizens
of Myanmar to join the demonstrations. The group promised to
continue the protests until they “wiped the military dictatorship
from the land of Burma.”4 Regardless of the all-inclusive name of
the group, apparently conservative temple elders were not part of
the All Burmese Buddhist Monks. Almost certainly at the behest of
the junta leaders of “The Sagha,” the official governmentsupported Buddhist agency issued statements directing the
apparently “junior monks” to return to the temples and confine
themselves to “learning and propagating the faith.”5 It is possible
the activist monks believed their actions were proof they had
learned the faith and were propagating it to millions of media
watchers. The Sagha’s statement makes clear this is not the
orthodox interpretation. Its directive was, however, largely
ignored, again raising questions about violating monastic precepts.
Can a monk properly disobey a directive of a senior priest? Urging
the senior monks to control the protesters also attests to
government attempts to nonviolently avert the public relations
disaster, if not the expenditure of lives armed suppression would
involve. On the other hand, some viewed the senior monks’ silence
up until the point of probable government coercion as indication of
support.
In Yangon on September 24, monks gathered in mass to pray at
Shwedagon, the world renowned Golden Pagoda in Yangon,
before marching in protest. Afterwards, monks led a demonstration
by the house of Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition party,
the National League for Democracy (NLD), who has been detained
under house arrest for 12 of the last 18 years. Some monks chanted
4

BBC News, October 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asiapacific/7010202.stm.
5
New York Times, September 24, 2007.
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“Release Suu Kyi.” Suu Kyi has written numerous articles in
support of Burmese Buddhism and is a celebrated activist for
democracy. By coming to her house, Monks further linked the
protests to the desire for a change of political regimes and
particularly to democracy. Suu Kyi’s party won a landslide victory
in the country’s 1990 general election. Afterwards the military
leaders voided the election and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest.
When she spoke to demonstrators in September, it was the first
time she had appeared in public since 2003.
Initially, public response in Myanmar was meager, perhaps due
to fear of government reprisal. Within a few days, however, the
number of marchers grew as photos and film appeared spotlighting
the cause in the international media. Dramatic footage, apparently
taken on cell phones or sent out via the internet, showed the world
protesters from the general public lining both sides of a road,
shielding thousands of orchid-robed monks from possible military
violence. On September 25, the New York Times published a
picture likely surprising to its audience. It showed a monk holding
a megaphone in his left hand and his right fist raised above his
head. The caption told readers the young monk was shouting
slogans during a protest against the military government. Behind
him, non-cleric protesters carried a sign saying, “Sufficiency in
food, clothing and shelter, national reconciliation, freedom for all
political prisoners.” This sign does not mention democracy as the
way of achieving these demands.
During the first days, military leaders allowed the protests to
proceed without overt interference. As the number of protesters
grew for a week, the government issued a warning that they were
poised to “take action.” On September 25, police used pickup
trucks with loudspeakers in Yangon and Mandalay to order
protesters to disperse. A curfew was issued and troops were
stationed on the streets to suppress further demonstrations. The
government may have made efforts to stop cell phone and internet
pictures from leaving the country, as reported by Irrawaddy, the
pro-democracy and pro-Buddhist opposition news agency of
Myanmar, headquartered in Thailand. Irrawaddy maintained news
and pictures of the events and became a major source for
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information on the protests. Despite government efforts,
international television stations broadcasted pictures of the police
using batons and tear gas on monks.
Public violence reached a peak on September 27 as the military
opened fire with automatic weapons to disband the protesters.
Media sources published ominous photographs of recently emptied
streets littered with sandals discarded in haste. These were guarded
by uniformed military personal equipped with helmets and rifles.
Around this time, the Irrawaddy website went down, sparking
allegations of government tampering. By the government’s
account, a dozen people had been killed, including a Japanese
journalist. 6 Dozens more were wounded and over 2,000 people
were arrested. 7 Afterwards, news agencies reported monks were
conspicuously absent as police officers stood armed in the
hallways of otherwise deserted monasteries usually abuzz with
tourists and the faithful.
In response, the US imposed further sanctions on the military
leadership of Myanmar and President George W. Bush condemned
the violence. It should be noted that the United States has vested
interest in seeing the junta topped and a more market-friendly and
politically controllable regime established. China, considered
Myanmar’s closest ally, made public statements calling for
restraint of violence. Other than this, along with Russia and India,
China maintained its usual stance of noninterference. Americans
are likely to note that while China is willing to use force against
activist monks in Tibet and pro-democracy demonstrators in
Tiananmen Square, they are also concerned with appeasing the US
and maintaining a pleasant façade for trading partners and potential
6

Japanese Foreign Minister, Masahiko Komura claimed video footage
appeared to prove photo journalist Kenji Nagai was deliberately shot and the
perpetrators should be held accountable. “9 Killed in the 2nd Day of Myanmar
Crackdown,” Associated Press, September 27, 2007. The Myanmar The New
Light of Burma newspaper alleged the death was accidental.
7
Ibrahim Gambari’s report to the UN Security Council, available through
BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaselector/check/player/nol/
newsid_7030000 /newsid_7030400?redirect=7030407.stm&news=1&bbwm=
1&nbram=1&bbram=1&nbwm=1&asb=1.
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tourists. During the Myanmar incidents, the time of the 2008
Olympic games was approaching in China.
On September 30, the UN’s special envoy to Burma, Ibrahim
Gambari, met with military leaders and paid a rare visit to Aung
San Suu Kyi. In his report to the UN security council, Gambari
said, “Of great concern to the United Nations and the international
community are the continuing and disturbing reports of abuses
being committed by security and non-uniformed elements,
particularly at night during curfew including raids on private
homes, beatings, arbitrary arrests and disappearances.”8 As a part
of his official mission, Gambari urged government leaders to open
talks with Aung San Suu Kyi. As a result, Senior General Than
Shwe offered to meet with her, even though it is reported he did
not allow people to even mention her name in his presence.9 Later
Suu Kyi voiced disappointment in meetings with government
representatives.
Since the protests, the government of Myanmar has stepped up
its “Road to Democracy” plan including drafting a new
constitution, which was ratified in May 2008. However, prodemocracy opponents of the constitution argue it does little more
than solidify the military’s position as national leaders while
formally excluding Aung San Suu Kyi. The NLD mounted a
campaign to persuade the public to vote “no” to the constitution. In
addition, the government plans to hold a national election in 2010
but rejected the UN’s offer to monitor the process. Currently, Aung
San Suu Kyi is prohibited from holding government office. A law
forbids anyone having the ability to hold legal citizenship in
another country from so doing. Suu Kyi was married to a British
academic and is therefore disqualified.
Meanwhile, in December 2007, the US government sent
another political message of disagreement with the government of
Myanmar when the House of Representatives voted unanimously
to award Aung San Suu Kyi the Congressional Medal of Honor,
8

Ibid.
BBC News, October 9 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7033911.stm.
9
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America’s top civilian honor. Past recipients include George
Washington, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the fourteenth Dalai
Lama Tenzin Gyatso. Suu Kyi was also a recipient of the 1991
Nobel Peace Prize. In May 2008, a devastating cyclone hit
Myanmar. The government of that country refused to grant
humanitarian workers free access to those in need. The world
watched in anguish as the death toll rose. As the US publicly tried
to persuade the junta to open its doors to relief workers, it may
have only damaged such efforts by officially awarding the Medal
of Honor to Aung Sang Suu Kyi at the time.
Buddhism and Politics in the History of Myanmar
The Golden Pagoda (Shwedagon) is the most outstanding and
famous structure in Yangon. Although historians estimate it was
th
th
built between the 6 and 10 century, legend says it dates from
before the Buddha was born. This might reflect the possibility that
the area was considered sacred before it became associated with
Buddhism. Buddhist pagodas or stūpas of Asia generally contain
important relics. This may be the physical remains of a master, a
central sūtra, or in the case of the most revered stūpas, a relic of the
historical Buddha such as a small bone fragment. Shwedagon
allegedly contains six hairs of the Buddha and other relics.
Because of this, it has been considered by many over the centuries
the most sacred space of Myanmar.
Americans are often surprised to learn of the long association
of politics and Buddhism throughout Asia. For many centuries in
Myanmar, political figures have made use of the sacred
identification of Shwedagon as well as the mass support for
Buddhism generally. In 1057, King Anawrahta founded the first
unified Burmese state and is said to have introduced Theravāda
Buddhism to the country. He is also reputed to have fought Mons
in order to capture the Tripiaka, the collection of Buddhist
scriptures. After coming to power, he set about building or
restoring Shwedagon. Over time, “Stūpa Builder” became an
honorific title. Monarchs and the general public put much effort
into building temples and thereby were said to gain merit.
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Likewise, rulers and monastics benefited by mutual support.10 This
continued throughout the history of the country.
In 1852, the British came to occupy Myanmar, as they did
India and other areas of Asia around this time. Recognizing
Shwedagon as an important strategic point, the British captured the
temple grounds and held it under guard by military forces until
1930. This caused much anxiety among the population and has
been called “a form of psychological torture.” 11 Shortly after a
section of the temple was allowed to reopen, anti-colonial groups
formed nearby. At the outbreak of WWII in 1939, Buddhists asked
the British to not use Shwedagon as a fortress.
During British colonization of Asia, China, the giant power of
the region, was defeated and forced to accept unequal trading
agreements. As Asian countries fell to European powers, Japan
somehow managed to defeat Russia, considered perhaps the
strongest of those powers. As a result, it appeared to some that
Japan might hold the key to Asian liberation from imperialist
forces. For this reason, during the British occupation of Myanmar,
an anti-colonial militant group led by a man named Aung San left
the country to seek military help from Japan in defeating the
British. The group was trained by the Japanese and formed the
Independence Army, led by General Aung San. In 1942, Aung San
became a national hero when, alongside the Japanese Army, the
Independence Army defeated the British. His victory was to be
bittersweet however, as now the Japanese assumed the role of
occupiers. Undeterred, Aung San made an unimaginable move by
asking the British to help him defeat the Japanese. Stunned by the
devastation of WWII and withdrawing from their occupation of
Asia, the British softened its attitude towards the country. In 1945,
the British together with General Aung San’s Liberation Army
freed Myanmar from Japanese occupation. General Aung San
announced independence of the country at a huge gathering held at
Shwedagon. Two years later, he was assassinated by political
10

See Penny Edwards, “Grounds for Protest, Placing Shwedagon Pagoda in
Colonial and Postcolonial History,” Postcolonial Studies 9.2 (2006): 197-211.
11
Ibid, 205.
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opponents, but not before fathering Aung San Suu Kyi, who would
become the leader of the National League for Democracy by virtue
of her father’s fame.
After suffering through more than a decade of political
instability, a military coup took place in 1962. At that time, a
single-party government was established and a ban on independent
newspapers went into place. Though much turmoil and poverty has
persisted, the government has remained in power. In 1987, the
country’s currency was devalued and many people lost their
savings, triggering widespread anti-government sentiments. At
Shwedagon in 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi addressed a crowd of
500,000, demanding the instatement of democracy. Following this,
the 8888 movement occurred (August 8, 1988) and thousands were
killed in anti-government riots. As a result, The State Law and
Order Restoration Council (Slorc) was formed and thousands were
arrested. Shortly afterwards Burma was renamed Myanmar and
Rangoon renamed Yangon. In 1989, National League for
Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi was put under house arrest.
In numerous articles and statements, she has consistently voiced
her support for Buddhism and democracy, sometimes using the
notion of Buddhist kingship as the model for righteous and
democratic governing. From the point of view of “American
democracy,” these ideas are likely to appear widely incongruous.
A different type of question comes to mind from the opposite
direction. Is the very nature of Buddhist institutions, as they have
developed historically, more like a kingship than a democracy?
This question points to the hierarchal structure of the masterdisciple relationship prevalent on many levels of organization of
the sagha, which is anything but democratic. If so, coupled with
centuries of Asian history does this religious structure make it
more likely that Buddhists and Buddhist-oriented leaders such as
Aung San Suu Kyi will think about politics in terms of a kingship
rather than a democracy? More importantly, can Buddhist leaders’
courtship of democracy be viewed as General Aung San’s wooing
of first the Japanese and then the British, as expedient means to
throwing off the present evil but not meant for a long-term
commitment?
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Three explanations of Buddhists’ interest in democracy
Why are Buddhists interested in propagating democracy?
Typically, references to promoting democracy are found in the
context of broader treatments of socially engaged Buddhism. Most
writings on socially engaged Buddhism do not mention democracy
and it may or may not be a major objective of the larger movement
worldwide. To answer the question, it may be helpful to look at the
wider treatment of why Buddhists are sometimes social activists.
Socially engaged Buddhism literature, socially engaged
Buddhists and other writers offer three main explanations. 12
Perhaps the most common of the three explanations connects
social activism to a central goal in Buddhism, if not the central
goal of Buddhism: the alleviation and ultimate ending of suffering.
Second, Buddhist work for social change is sometimes explained
through the related but not identical idea of dāna, charity. A third
explanation comes from the Mahāyāna “Bodhisattva Ideal,” again
related to the first two but not identical. Some of the literature
appears to be unconcerned with or perhaps does not recognize
these three as separate and there could be ideological and practical
advantages in that. For example, describing the Mahāyāna
Bodhisattva Ideal as expressing the Four Noble Truths circumvents
the necessity of further ideological justification of that Ideal.
Practically, this would validate acting according to that Ideal.
However, there may also be internal contradictions and other
potential problems in combining the three explanations. Even if we
only take these as rough bases for explanation by these writers
alone, a number of issues need clarification for understanding their
position on the relationship of Buddhism and democracy.

12

Although these three can be found as the main explanations in the larger
body of literature on socially engaged Buddhism, for the sake of the present
study my sample will be the articles published in the last three years by Blue
Pine Books in their four serial books on socially engaged Buddhism. These
explanations are pervasive in writings on socially engaged Buddhism whether or
not they equally encompass the rationale of activists.

188

Ronald S. Green

We should begin by examining the first explanation to see if
striving for democracy is related to the central goal in Buddhism,
the alleviation and ultimate ending of suffering. The main theme of
the Buddha’s Four Noble Truths, perhaps the most basic doctrinal
statement in Buddhism, deals with suffering (dukkha). The end of
suffering is revealed in the Third Noble Truth, to end suffering one
must end desires. The Fourth Noble Truth says the way to end
suffering is by following the Eightfold Path. The Eightfold Path
begins with the necessity of Right Understanding. Right
Understanding is specifically the understanding of the Four Noble
Truths, suffering, the cause of suffering and the path to end
suffering. This understanding is necessarily based on individual
attainment. In contrast, socially engaged Buddhists’ goal of
alleviating suffering is not only self-directed but directed towards
others who may, according to Buddhist understanding, be at lower
levels of attainment, due primarily to merit and birth. On the other
hand, it is widely held among Buddhists that self-attainment may
be the best means of helping others. A model can be found in
Siddhārtha’s abandoning the obligations to his family for
meditative pursuits in the forest. Although this act appears to be
selfish, according to the story, Siddhārtha’s subsequent
achievement of Buddhahood brought the path of salvation from
suffering to the world, a greater good for his family and others.
The implication seems to be an individual’s self-attainment is the
best and perhaps the only way to end suffering of self and others.
After all, the Buddha did not return to the palace in order to
establish a Buddhist monarchy, much less a democracy. On the
other hand, by numerous canonical accounts, Buddhism appears to
oppose the Brahmanical caste system. Yet, belief in the equal
ability of all individuals to attain enlightenment, albeit, according
to some traditions this is true only after many rebirths, is not
democracy. There is no vote on who becomes a leader or a Buddha.
Even though not caste-dependent, this is still considered to be a
matter of birth combined with individual effort. While capitalism
theoretically holds to a hierarchy based on individual achievement,
democracy does not.

Buddhist Protest in Myanmar: Basic Questions

189

All three of these explanations of why Buddhists are interested
in propagating democracy are concerned with alleviating or ending
suffering. But, according to Buddhist doctrine, is all suffering
always bad? Alternatively, is at least preliminary suffering
necessary for later attainment and indeed inescapable for those of
lesser attainment? Is it not considered righteous punishment from
the perspective of merit? When considering what might be called
Buddhist theodicy, perhaps more so than suffering, ignorance
might be called evil. Yet labeling ignorance, which is at least the
cause of suffering if not suffering itself, evil, potentially misses the
point that ignorance and suffering are the human condition. A
notion shared by many Indian religions is that austerities and selfmortification are spiritually beneficial. While the Buddha
proclaimed the Middle Path between austerities and materialism,
there may remain a sense in which suffering is good in that it leads
to striving for overcoming it. 13 The Awakening of Faith, a
Mahāyāna text extremely influential in the development of a
number of traditions of East Asian Buddhism, says, “Ignorance
does not exist apart from enlightenment.”14 The basic problem for
humanity, according to this text, is not that we must overcome
suffering by political means, but that we must overcome its cause
by realizing ignorance is an illusion and enlightenment is our
intrinsic state. Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly as it developed in
China, appears to emphasize liberation, the Third Noble Truth,
more than suffering and ignorance found in the First and Second
Noble Truth.15
Similar questions arise in relation to the second explanation of
why Buddhists are engaged in the propagation of democracy. Is the
struggle for democracy dāna, charitable offering? If suffering
13

There is a circularity to this argument in that if there were no suffering
there would be no need to overcome it.
14
Yoshito S. Hakeda, trans., The Awakening of Faith (NY: Columbia
University Press, 1967), 41.
15
This is perhaps owing to the influence of Daoists and other Chinese
philosophers such as Mencius who are said to view the “human condition” in
“positive” terms in contrast to the view found in Indian religions that the basic
human condition is ignorance and suffering.
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helps people overcome ignorance, alleviating suffering cannot be
dāna. If suffering is not socio-political but a deep part of the
human psyche, then offering democracy as dāna cannot alleviate
human suffering. Then how can it be a merit-building gift? Meritbuilding gifts are typically those that support the clergy. Dāna
furthers individuals on the path to enlightenment. Is democracy
believed to further people on the path to enlightenment? If so, how
can it since political suffering is not the issue?
Whether suffering can be said to be bad or good, according to
the Four Noble Truths it is inevitable for humans who do not
understand its cause and follow the path to its destruction. It may
be objected that the articles on socially engaged Buddhism in
question do not claim that democracy will end suffering but will
alleviate some of its harshness. Based on the actions of socially
engaged Buddhists, such severe conditions apparently are not
considered necessary for bringing individuals to the truths of
Buddhism. In the context of Buddhism, we can think of at least
two explanations of why severe conditions would not help
individuals gain enlightenment. First, attainment is based on birth
and rebirth, largely dependent on merit and demerit in the present
and past. Two objections to this view being related to democracy
are offered here. An individual’s suffering and understanding of it
is decisive as motivation for building merit. And, in this view,
suffering is righteously applied for past life deeds.
A second explanation of why severe conditions would not help
individuals gain enlightenment is that dukkha is not suffering in the
political sense or not only in the political sense. Instead, Right
Understanding is a philosophical or loosely “religious”16 revelation
about the basic human condition beyond political concern.
According to this interpretation, if it were possible to build a
utopian political society wherein the basic needs of all people were
met, there would still be suffering in the Buddhist sense.
According to doctrine, Buddhist attainment, if not enlightenment,
16

I use the term guardedly in this particular context in deference to many
Buddhists who say Buddhism is not a religion. In other contexts, we find most
elements associated with Buddhism as practiced by the majority of people in
Myanmar and the world may be termed “religious” as commonly understood.
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is the only way to end this kind of suffering. This explanation is
somewhat ideologically satisfying. However, it is not pervasive in
the socially engaged Buddhism literature on democracy. For our
purpose, this fact necessitates further elucidation. Most importantly,
if dukkha is not political suffering, then the Four Noble Truths
cannot be given as a reason for socially engaged Buddhists’
struggles for democracy.
We will return to the third explanation of Buddhists
involvement in propagating democracy below.
Possible incompatibilities of Buddhism, Democracy, and
Capitalism
In considering the view that Buddhism engages in the struggle
for democracy as a way to alleviate suffering, in addition to
questioning the idea of suffering, we should ask if democracy
alleviates suffering and if it is the best means or even the most
expedient means of achieving this goal. If democracy can alleviate
suffering in one situation, can that be universalized? An argument
sometimes forwarded by those anti-democratic forces in power is
that democracy is not right for Asia. Aung Sang Suu Kyi
specifically rejects this argument out of hand, perhaps rightly but
without explanation. 17 That aside, for our purposes, a part of
reflecting on the “best means” for alleviating suffering must be
about whether democracy and what accompanies it can be suitable
morally or otherwise in terms of Buddhism.
In this vein, several comments might be made concerning
broader implications of the relation of Buddhism and democracy,
the role of religion and politics. In America, there is a widely held
belief in the notion that there should be a hard separation of church
and state as directed by the US Constitution. The First Amendment
to the constitution prohibits the establishment of a national religion.
In contrast, Aung Sang Suu Kyi holds up the Buddhist
Chakravartin king as the ideal model for the leader of Myanmar

17

Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear (NY: Penguin, 1995), 167.
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democracy. 18 While the US Constitution does not prohibit a
religious leader from assuming government power, it does prohibit
the formation of a national religion. The idea of the separation of
church and state might commonly be misinterpreting as implying
religion has no business in politics. However, according to the
Constitution and subsequent Supreme Court interpretation, the
principle only addresses the opposite: that state may not restrict
religion or the rejection of religion. Nor may it support one religion
more than another. In America, some feel the separation of church
and state is at times opposed by fundamentalist Christian
organizations seeking to establish a theocracy. Theocracy is
typically seen as the antithesis of democracy. Like the Christian
theocracy, the Buddhist version would not necessarily see the
government leader as a deity, but as one who is the most direct link
to divine beings or teachings. Suu Kyi describes the social contract
involved in the Buddhist kingship but the underlying assumption
remains the king’s position was accomplished by virtue of past
merits and favorable birth. While birthright is indeed the dominant
means by which the American capitalist class is renewed, and the
capitalist class is arguably the ruling class, that aspect of society is
anti-democratic.
If, on the other hand, Suu Kyi means to say the Buddhist
kingship is not a true model for a democratic country but some
features of it may be applicable, she fails to make this point.
Instead, she argues the Buddhist king is chosen by the people and
only remains in the royal position if he (there is no mention of the
possibility of ‘she’) fulfills the terms of the social contract,
specifically providing just rule. With much trepidation, the
question arises as to where in the history of any country of the
world this elected Buddhist king is found. Incredibly but
predictably, she points to King Aśoka (304-232 BCE) as her ideal
exemplar.19
18

Ibid, 172.
She also mentions King Vessantara in this regard, a mythical previous
incarnation of the historical Buddha from Jātaka tales and much celebrated in
Theravāda countries (ibid, 173).
19
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Aśoka is often referred to in Buddhism, particularly Theravāda
Buddhism, as the ideal ruler. Likewise, in the literature of socially
engaged Buddhism Aśoka is mentioned prominently in this regard.
However, far from being elected by the masses to rule justly,
Aśoka came to power by leading armies in the most brutal violence
ever perpetrated on the Indian subcontinent until his time. Aśoka is
attributed with uniting India as a large country. He achieved this by
military imperialism against the kingdoms of the region in
succession. Expediently, only after accomplishing this goal did he
proclaim Buddhism as the national religion, and the Buddhist
precept of non-killing to be the law of the land. This effectively
made it illegal for potential dissenters to raise armies against his
universal rule. Aśoka spread this and other advantageous Buddhist
precepts as edicts inscribes on pillars placed throughout the land
and beyond. He also built stūpas and temples to propagate his
version of Buddhism and held councils to remove “heretics” from
the fold. A heretic would have been anyone who professed a
Buddhist view contrary to his orthodoxy. Having shaped
orthodoxy in Buddhism and spread this hegemony beyond his
borders into Southeast Asia, it is little wonder that Aśoka is held
up in those countries as the ideal ruler. To outsiders, however,
there can be much consternation in presenting an imperialistic king
as a benevolent ruler because he became “Buddhist.” At a much
simpler level, one might assume that Americans would be opposed
to a religious leader on the grounds of fanaticism. However, the
American pop cultural appeal of the Dalai Lama and Buddhism in
general suggests openness to this.
Another relevant point in regards to the Buddhist notion of the
Chakravartin king can be made by reference to the life story of the
Buddha. Stories of the Buddha’s life are common among traditions
and are found in many scriptures and writings. In the second
century CE, the Sanskrit poet Aśvaghoa compiled a number of
these stories and produced the canonical Buddhacarita.
Accordingly, when Siddhārtha was born, a seer came to the palace
and predicted he would become either a Chakravartin king or a
Buddha. Upon hearing this, King Śuddhodana is delighted that his
son may extend his own worldly ambitions beyond his dreams.
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However, against his father’s wishes, Siddhārtha becomes a
Buddha, thus bringing salvation to the world. The story relates the
way to overcome suffering is the Eightfold Path and portrays the
Buddha as explicitly rejecting the way of the Chakravartin.
While the reverence for Aśoka is particularly widespread
among Theravāda Buddhists, in Mahāyāna literature the
Bodhisattva is endowed with supra-rational abilities and often acts
socially based on this special wisdom. For this reason, it is
assumed that an incarnation of a Bodhisattva, such as the
Fourteenth Dalai Lama, would be the ideal ruler. This returns us to
the third explanation of why Buddhists are interested in social
engagement and propagating democracy: the Mahāyāna
“Bodhisattva Ideal.” Perhaps embarrassed today by the notion that
a Bodhisattva has divine abilities or focusing on parts of scriptures
likely to appeal to modern listeners, in contrasts to canonical
descriptions, socially engaged Buddhist tends to emphasize the
relatively ordinary abilities of the Bodhisattva. Even so, the
extraordinary nature of such a being might be unavoidable. An
example of the abilities of a socially engaged Bodhisattva appears
in a story found in the Skill-in-means Sūtra (Upāyakauśalya),
important in Tibetan Buddhism. The story takes place on a ship
and tells of a Bodhisattva who has special insightful wisdom
received metaphorically from the dragon king. Because he knows
through supra-rational means that aboard the ship is a thief who
will kill five hundred people, the Bodhisattva acts quickly and kills
the thief. It is, of course, in violation of Buddhist precepts and
principles to take life. However, according to the story the
Bodhisattva accrued merit for this deed, in part because he was
willing to sacrifice his future favorable rebirth by killing and so
paradoxically secures a good rebirth.20 The implication of this is
that a Bodhisattva may act outside the guidelines of behavior
prescribed in Buddhist precepts when acting in accord with suprarational insight. Chinese Chan and Japanese Zen Buddhist texts
20

Mark Tatz, trans., The Skill in Means Sūtra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1994), 73-74. Variations are found in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and in
T.3.156.161b13-162a6.
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contain numerous examples of masters with high attainment
breaking precepts for unknown higher purposes.
As with the potential for harm in the Christian theocracy, this
Buddhist belief opens to the door to justifying such actions as the
“righteous war,” which would be similar to killing the thief. Indeed,
the Bodhisattva leader might have no boundaries whatsoever, since
the ordinary person’s understanding of the precepts or civil laws
can be overridden by “wisdom” and “skill-in-means.” Not only is
this contrary to democracy, but it potentially, if not inevitably,
leads to a tyranny of the Bodhisattva. In light of this, if there could
be a Bodhisattva leader or even a Chakravartin king, would that be
desirable? To state the point mildly, one problem with using the
Bodhisattva as an ideal model for governing is that based on
history, the existence of supra-rational insight applicable to
governing modern nations is highly unlikely. Although Aung Sang
Suu Kyi might not support the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva for president,
her idea of the Chakravartin king is no less radical. Maybe her
point is not that Buddhist kingship involves supra-rational insight
but that it is the “best means” for alleviating suffering. If so, why is
she the leader of the democracy movement and party?
In terms of the role of socially engaged Buddhism, it may also
be useful here to consider not only the dynamic between religion
and politics, but also among religion, politics and economic
systems. In many modern purported democracies such as the US,
there can be said to be a tension between capitalism and
democracy. To mention a few of the many aspects of this tension,
in US capitalism, for example, roughly ten percent of the
population control eighty percent of the wealth although
democracy holds that all people are equal in some ways. One of
the ways American democracy holds this is in the supposed
equality of individual political votes. Suu Kyi supports this view
by telling of the democratically chosen Chakravartin king. In
elections, it is in the economic interests of those who control
wealth to use some of that affluence to choose and financially back
politicians who will champion favorable causes for their group,
potentially to the economic detriment of the majority.
Theoretically the majority has the ability to reject such a candidate.
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However, due to such influences as wielded by capitalistcontrolled media and the overwhelming prevalence of the twoparty system, seemingly unbeknownst to the majority, politicians
may not be playing on a leveled political field. In addition, in the
US version of a representative democracy, the popular vote may
not count as much as the electoral vote in an election. Meanwhile,
electoral voters were likely chosen to represent the capitalist class,
coming into their positions by virtue of the system mentioned
above in connection with the financial backing of the wealthy.
Our basic human condition may be pervasive dissatisfaction
caused by perpetual desire as stated in the Noble Truths. However,
in late capitalism, our desires are not our own in form, but take the
shape of commodities sold to us through the media by business for
profit. The same is true of our supposed choices in democratically
elected leaders, who are in fact groomed and marketed to us by
capitalists who profit from and control their reigns. In the
marketing of both types of products, it is in the material interests of
those profiting from their sales to perpetuate desire and
manufacture ever increasing want. This is basic to the system and
antithetical to the goal Buddhism as expounded in the Four Noble
Truths.
Because of the widespread relationship between capitalism and
democracy, it becomes important in this discussion to
simultaneously ask what Buddhism’s role should be in dealing
with each. In our specific example of Myanmar, a major
consideration becomes whether the ostensive drive to adopt some
form of a Euro-American version of democracy also includes the
implementation of those countries’ version of capitalism. In
Myanmar’s drive for “democracy,” does accepting the praise and
support of Europe, America, Australia, Japan and perhaps even the
UN, imply a willingness to also accept the democracyaccompanying capitalism of those countries? Such a question was
likely behind the junta’s reluctance to accept humanitarian aid after
the cyclone in May 2008. If not in that case, there can be little
doubt that such actions as the US awarding the Medal of Honor to
Aung Sang Suu Kyi is no less than a strike at the economic system,
not just the political system in place in Myanmar, in hopes of
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establishing trade relations more favorable to the US economic
elite. Although Myanmar can see centuries of malevolent results of
alliances between impoverished Asian countries and rich capitalist
nations, ultimately, faced with the global economy, they may have
little choice in the matter. If so, what will be the role of Buddhism
in bringing it about, preventing it, or keeping it under control? This
consideration is as important today as it should have been for
General Aung Sang when asking Imperial Japan for help in ousting
the British and the British for help in ousting the Japanese.
A final explanation for Buddhist social engagement comes
from the canonical notion of dependent origination. This
explanation is given, for example, by Venerable Daewon Ki as a
reason for dedicating his temple to peace.21 The idea is found in
early scriptures, Abhidhamma literature and many later writings of
Zen and other traditions of Buddhism. In short, the theory states
that nothing exists in isolation and the existence of each constitute
of the world is dependent on something else. This assumption
leads to a belief that beneath the basic illusion that constitutes
ignorance, all people are fundamentally connected and joined as
the same. For this reason, the individual ego should be rejected as
ignorance. This idea is well known among students of World
Religions looking at the basics of Buddhism. It is seen as providing
a basis for moral actions by assuming if we harm another we are
harming ourselves. But, can it be connected with the Buddhist prodemocracy movement? Certainly, there is the implication of some
degree of equality among people since we are all connected to the
sufferings and exaltations of one another and in fact, the idea of
“another” is deemed invalid. However, perhaps this very fact also
invalidates the notion of individualism inherent in democracy as it
certainly does in regards to capitalism. Taken to this extreme, it
also challenges the assumptions of the individual merit / demerit
system.
In dealing with our topic, this paper has skirted the most likely
question to be raised by American students. We will conclude with
21

Chanju Mun, ed., The World is One Flower (Honolulu: Blue Pine, 2006),
xxxvii.
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it now, as it is a central consideration for socially engaged
Buddhism and is taken up by a number of contributors to this
volume. Is it antithetical to Buddhism to perpetuate factional
politics? By so doing, are the monks in Myanmar responsible for
continuing that aspect of their own suffering and that of others they
should be leading away from it?

VIRTUE, AND VIOLENCE IN THERAVĀDA AND
SRI LANKAN BUDDHISM
Eric Sean Nelson
1. Introduction1
The English word ethics stems from the Greek word “ethos”
that signifies a way of life or art of living. Ethics concerns human
actions, behaviors, and practices, in particular how we ought to
treat others and ourselves. In the western philosophical tradition, to
speak schematically, there are two major forms of approaching
ethics. On the one hand, one form of ethical theory consists of the
rule based on ethics found in the deontological ethics of intention
and duty, and the other the utilitarian ethics of evaluating actions in
terms of their consequences. Virtue ethics and other varieties of
context-based ethics, on the other hand, emphasize the individual
and communal cultivation of virtues through role models and
exemplars and their appropriate and flexible application to the
situation. The ethical is not assessed by the intentions and
consequences of actions but by how these and other elements fit
into a concrete way of life as a whole.
1

I would like to thank Ronald Green for his comments and suggestions for
improving the argument and style of this paper. I am also thankful to Namita
Goswami and Lori Witthaus for their thoughts on an earlier draft presented at
the Association for Asian Studies. This early short version appeared as “Virtue,
Violence, and Engagement in Theravāda and Sri Lankan Buddhism,” SACP
Forum for Asian and Comparative Philosophy 23.47 (Fall 2006): 192-216.
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Recent scholarship, in particular Damien Keown’s pioneering
works on Buddhist ethics, has seen the development of the claim
that Buddhist ethics is a variety of “virtue ethics.” 2 That is,
according to Keown, “Buddhist ethics is aretetic: it rests upon the
cultivation of personal virtue in the expectation that as spiritual
capacity expands towards the goal of enlightenment ethical choices
will become clear and unproblematic.” 3 Virtue ethics is a
contemporary approach to morality that resorts to the moral
paradigm developed by Aristotle. Aristotelian ethics emphasizes
the cultivation of individual virtues and the political community in
order to promote human flourishing or happiness in the broadest
sense. Keown argues for an interpretation of Buddhist ethics
“based on the Aristotelian model, or at least one understanding of
it.” Keown continues, “The parallel between Buddhist and
Aristotelian ethics is, I believe, quite close in many respects.
Aristotle’s ethical theory appears to be the closest Western
analogue to Buddhist ethics, and is an illuminating guide to an
understanding of the Buddhist moral system.”4
In this paper, I will examine the role of virtue ethics and
violence in traditional Theravāda and contemporary Sri Lankan
Buddhism. Despite the limits and problems of applying the virtue
ethics model – especially in its Aristotelian form advocated by
Keown – to Buddhist ethics, I contend that the virtue ethical
elements of Theravāda Buddhism help clarify issues of war and
violence as well as compassion and peace in a country such as Sri
Lanka (the former British colony of Ceylon). The Sri Lankan
people, both Sinhalese and Tamil, have suffered from
approximately three decades of civil war, ethnic strife, and
terrorism. An end to this conflict between the mostly Buddhist
Sinhalese and predominantly Hindu Tamils is still not in sight.
The issues revealed by the relation between Buddhism, politics,
and violence in South Asia should serve as a caution to and a
2

Damien Keown, Buddhist Ethics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 25; and The Nature of Buddhist Ethics
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 2.
3
Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, 2.
4
Ibid, 21.
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source of self-reflection for the contemporary project of socially
engaged Buddhism. Given (1) the everyday logic of being
absorbed in circumstances and making exceptions for one’s own
actions and inactions; (2) the possibility of acting from the
condition of exception and emergency (as being the norm and the
typical rather than the extraordinary and atypical); and (3) the
customary division between friend and enemy, native and foreign,
ethical and social norms and practices can be used to reproduce
and intensify rather than dismantle and resolve social conflicts.
This is true even of an ethics that is well-intentioned and altruistic,
such as perhaps the canonical Theravāda ethics of loving kindness
(mettā), generosity (dāna), and compassion (karuā), if it obeys
instead of confronting this logic of conflict.
Consequently, despite the many merits of the recent revival of
the ethical and religious in contemporary thought and culture, the
related privatization of social-political issues into private ones of
charity and compassion can result in an ideological blindness to
and a perilous one-sidedness in addressing issues of social justice.
That is, the ethical requires an understanding of and concern with
society beyond individual attitudes, intentions, and virtues if it is
not to become an unethical and abstract cult of virtue or misused in
the name of various particular religious, moral, national, and ethnic
identities. To this extent, ethics in general and in Buddhism needs
to be more than the virtue ethics of individuals and communities,
i.e., more than an ethics of individual and social virtues in order to
be both open and responsive to encountering others as well as
critical of its own self-distortion, if ethics is a response to rather
than an excuse for the underlying logic of conflict, violence, and
war that so often dominate human relations.
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2. Buddhism and Virtue Ethics
Morality, meditation, and wisdom constitute the three-fold
basis of Theravāda Buddhist practice. As the foundation and
prerequisite of the path, the moral life (sīla) is the first part of
Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa’s great commentary Visuddhimagga
and it is described by the Buddha as the foundation on which the
path is built.5 Theravāda Buddhist ethics is considered a variety of
virtue ethics, which considers the effects actions have on one’s
general condition or way of life as a whole, because it emphasizes:
(1) morality (sīla) as a way of life rather than a system of rules, (2)
the cultivation of morality through precepts and as perfections and
virtues, (3) moral psychology, which is richly developed in the Pāli
suttas and commentaries, and (4) the need for skillfulness,
fittingness, and appropriateness in applying morality to the
situation.6 Although Theravāda ethics differs from the Aristotelian
paradigm of virtue ethics, such as its focus on the actual and
concrete suffering of the other and of all sentient beings, it remains
comparable in some ways to Aristotelian and Confucian ethics in
stressing the need for the cultivation of an apt ethical discernment
that is responsive to the context through the appropriate enactment
of morality.
There are aspects of the Pāli canon that clearly evoke
Aristotelian virtue ethics, as when the Buddha described the moral
life constitutive of the Buddhist path as a “noble aggregation of

5

Bhadantācariya Buddhaghoa, The Path of Purification, tr. Bhikkhu
Ñāamoli (Seattle: Buddhist Publication Society Pariyatti Editions, 1999); and
Numerical Discourses of the Buddha, tr. and ed. Nyanaponika Thera and
Bhikkhu Bodhi (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2000) is a selective translation
of the Aguttara-nikāya (hereafter cited as AN), AN XI.1, AN XI.2.
6
The view that Mahāyāna involves a kind of virtue ethic has been more
extensively developed, especially given the claim that the Bodhisattva’s
compassion can override rules. Arguments for Zen and Mahāyāna virtue ethics
are found in Simon P. James, Zen Buddhism and Environmental Ethics
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) and David E. Cooper and Simon P. James,
Buddhism, Virtue and Environment (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
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virtues” involving a “faultless happiness.” 7 Here we see an
emphasis on the cultivation of virtues, their complementary unity
in producing a balanced way of life, and the happiness that this
entails. For the Buddha, the self-interested concern for one’s own
welfare leads one to develop a goodness that involves its own kind
of well-being. 8 Likewise, the Buddha’s emphasis on moral
appropriateness instead of ethical absolutes and skillfulness in
relation to the situation and context is a characteristic of virtue
ethics. Nevertheless, Keown’s argument for the parallel between
Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics is problematic given that
Aristotle’s phronesis (prudential judgment or sense of
appropriateness) is primarily an aristocratic mastery, an
accomplishment of the patriarchal householder and active citizen,
whereas Buddhist moral skillfulness (Pāli: kusala) transcends the
ekos and polis to a kind of freedom in relation to people and
things.9 This is not the freedom of indifference but of compassion
(karunā, the core virtue) as a spontaneous responsiveness
constituted by instead of transcending the ethical. Such freedom
evokes one aspect of a different variety of ancient Greco-Roman
virtue ethics – the cosmopolitanism of the Greco-Roman Cynics
and Stoics. Rather than restricting the ethical to the polis, the
political community, the Hellenistic and Roman Cynics and Stoics
argued for the moral community of humanity, advocating a
universal rather than particularistic “virtue ethics.”10 Likewise in
Buddhism, the ethical is not limited to the national community or
even the human, as ethical responsiveness extends to all sentient
beings and to the world itself. This suggests a kind of Buddhist
7

MN I. 269; translation in John J. Holder, ed. and tr., Early Buddhist
Discourses (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006), 70.
8
SN III.4. Most passages cited from SN can be found in the following
incomplete translation: The Sutta-Nipata, tr. H. Saddhatissa (Surrey: Curzon,
1994).
9
Keown, op. cit., ch.8.
10
Martha Nussbaum criticizes the reduction of virtue ethics to the
communitarian model of Aristotelian ethics, contending that Stoicism offers a
more humanistic and universalistic model in “Kant and Cosmopolitanism,” in
James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds., Perpetual Peace: Essays on
Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 46.
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world-community (cosmo-polis), which is further supported in the
ideal of the cakkavatti as a universal and inclusive wheel-turning
monarch. The wheel-turning monarch conquers through law rather
than violence (“stick or sword”), instituting peace and fairness for
all.11
Whereas appropriateness is secondary to principle in rulebased ethics and to command and law in the legalism of command
theory, virtue and context-oriented ethics is defined by the
recognition that appropriateness is not accidental but constitutive
of the ethical. Ethical life calls for the development of moral
sensibility or judgment, since the richness and complexity of life
cannot be adequately articulated and addressed through an abstract
system of mechanical rules or rigid commands. Some might object
that Buddhism has no ethics but only calls for a non-moral
meditative insight into the causality of karma. This view of karmic
determinism is clearly false, as I have argued in more detail
elsewhere. 12 For the Buddha, as he is said to state repeatedly
throughout the Sutta-nipāta, the path is intrinsically ethical
although morality alone is insufficient for liberation.13 Buddhism is
about deeds rather than rules and rites. 14 One should focus on
moral conduct, virtue and responsibility instead of the fate or
destiny of caste or birth;15 since there is no shelter except the actual
good we have done.16
Given that family resemblances and analogies do not entail
identity, it is important to resist conflating Buddhist with other
varieties of virtue ethics such as Aristotle’s. This context-sensitive
and flexible responsiveness articulated in Buddhism is not based in
political prudence, interpreted as discriminatory judgment, and the
11

DN I.89, DN III.59. Dīgha Nikāya, translation available in The Long
Discourses of the Buddha, tr. Maurice Walshe (Boston: Wisdom Publications,
1995).
12
E. S. Nelson, “Questioning Karma: Buddhism and the Phenomenology of
the Ethical,” in Charles Prebish, Damien Keown, and Dale S. Wright,
Revisioning Karma (Journal of Buddhist Ethics 14 (2007)): 353-373.
13
SN IV.898.
14
SN II. 249-250.
15
SN I. 136-140, III. 462, III. 648-650.
16
AN III. 51.
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hierarchy of social relations legitimated by Aristotelian ethics.
Buddhist social ethics is often interpreted as being more republican
and egalitarian, due to the Buddha’s historical origins and
message. 17 Ideally, Theravāda Buddhist virtues are oriented
towards a mindful loving-kindness that is developed and disclosed
in practices of morality, mediation, and wisdom. The primary
example of such mindfulness is the Buddha himself as the
embodiment of a purely skillful and spontaneous ethical
responsiveness towards all beings. This openness and situatedness
also opens up possibilities for misunderstanding and
misapplication when the person acts, speaks, and thinks without
mindfulness. The lack of mindfulness might generate the
conclusion that the first precept of non-harm (ahisā) can be
bracketed in the name of another good such as the protection of
Buddhism. Such a perspective is found in utilitarian interpretations
of Buddhist ethics, where the lives of the many might outweigh
one life, and in the phenomenon that has been described as
“Buddhist fundamentalism” by Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and
Chandra Richard de Silva.18 However, this phenomenon is more
aptly described as the nationalistic and communalistic use (or
cooption) of Buddhism, since it is not based in the authority of the
Pāli Canon, and insofar as the word fundamentalism usually entails
a return to and literal reading of a canonical or sacred text rather
than a radical departure from it.
The majority of the Buddhist suttas forbid violence and war,
with some interesting exceptions, calling for non-attachment even
ultimately to Buddhism itself. Such non-attachment is often
conflated with indifference. Critics of Buddhism often confuse
non-attachment and indifference, conflating a stereotypical view of
Stoicism (with its supposed repression of the emotions for the sake
17

David J. Kalupahana, Ethics in Early Buddhism (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1995), 100-101; and Etienne Lamotte, History of Indian
Buddhism: From the Origins to the Saka Era (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université
catholique de Louvain, Institut orientaliste, 1988), 10.
18
This expression is developed in Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R
de Silva, eds., Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).

206

Eric Sean Nelson

of virtue and the equanimity of ataraxia) and Buddhism (which
calls for recognizing, working with, and transforming emotions).19
Another critique would reduce Buddhism to the opposite of
indifference – egotistical self-satisfaction and joy in oneself.20 Yet
it is clear from the Pāli canon that the Buddha is never portrayed as
advocating moral indifference to the fate of others. On the contrary,
the noble person is: “One who is devoted to one’s own welfare and
cultivates the virtues, while at the same time [being] devoted to the
welfare of others by causing others to cultivate their virtues.” 21
From a perspective that is critical of the popular or political uses of
Buddhism, which seem to contradict Buddhist teachings, the
treatment of Buddhism as a reified cultural identity and exclusive
possession that excludes others and justifies hostility toward them
is at odds with its moral content. This politicized Buddhism seems
to contradict the explicit call for taking up others well-being, and
in particular, its universalism and cosmopolitanism that extends to
humanity and indeed the entirety of sentient life. The violent
promotion of Buddhism as a particular way of life conflicts with
the very practice and aim of that way of life. This problematic
nexus between Buddhism and the political is as much an issue for
contemporary Buddhism, including “engaged Buddhism,” as it is
for its traditional forms.22
19

For a more nuanced approach to the emotions in Stoicism, see Nussbaum,

44-45.
20

See Elizabeth Harris, who has an interesting analysis of such claims in
“Buddhism in the Media,” in Karma Lekshe Tsomo, ed., Innovative Buddhist
Women: Swimming against the Stream (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2000). The
implausible view that Buddhism aims at a stereotypical “Stoic indifference”
excluding possibilities for transformation is also found in other figures, such as
Gillian Rose’s critique of what she calls Levinas’ “Buddhist Judaism,” in
Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37-38.
21
Kalupahana, op. cit., 76.
22
For a survey of the relations between Buddhism and political institutions
and movements in recent Asian history, see the essays gathered in Ian Harris,
ed., Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia (London: Continuum,
1999). On the many problems of engaged Buddhist interpretations of Buddhist
ethics, see Christopher Ives, “Deploying the Dharma: Reflections on the

Virtue and Violence in Theravāda and Sri Lankan Buddhism

207

Utilitarian and contextualist readings imply that in some cases
moral agents are justified in sacrificing their own virtues and the
goods and lives of others for the sake of a greater good. For
instance, in common dilemmas from moral philosophy, agents
might be justified in killing one person who would otherwise kill
hundreds or thousands. The argument that it is legitimate for the
first precept demanding ahisā to be suspended under limited
exceptional circumstances, i.e., in order to assimilate some forms
of self-defense, is itself conditional, since it is clear from the suttas
that karmic responsibility is unavoidable for killing. One is always
culpable for killing, although one might be considered more or less
culpable. 23 Violence only creates more violence and, no matter
how necessary or legitimate it seems, always has its consequences
such that the end cannot cleanse or sanctify the means. But even
given this understanding, individuals and groups have felt
compelled for various reasons to engage in violence, and with
some justification in cases of compassion for the greater good, as
in the Jātaka narratives when the Bodhisatta (Skt., Bodhisattva)
saves the tiger by allowing it to eat him or the ship-captain kills
one in order to save many, or for the sake of self-defense.24 As
Peter Harvey notes, despite any moral dilemma: “Most lay
Buddhists have been prepared to break the precept against killing
in self-defense, and many have joined in the defense of the
community in times of need.”25
Reflection on the history of South and South-East Asia
illustrates that the Buddha’s commitment to non-harm and nonviolence has often been in tension with political institutions that
have never abandoned the right to use force and established social
Methodology of Constructive Buddhist Ethics,” in Journal of Buddhist Ethics 15
(2008): 23-44.
23
Hammalawa Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics (Boston: Wisdom Publications,
2003), 60.
24
On compassionate killing, see Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 135. H. Saddhatissa
introduces the self-defense of the community through a comparison with Plato’s
Republic (Ibid, 114), although violence is simultaneously seen as a condition of
decline (Ibid, 120, 124).
25
Peter Harvey, op. cit., 255.
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practices involving the mistreatment of other humans and animals.
The idea that ahisā is a primary virtue has coexisted with its
repeated violation. Since the canonical virtue of ahisā can be
overridden by the weight of circumstances in societies that have
claimed to promote the Dhamma, it is worthwhile to consider the
logic at work in the justification of internal coercion and external
war. This raises the question of whether violence is inherently
incompatible with the Dhamma, as the Buddha is generally
portrayed as advocating, or whether there is a “Buddhist just war
theory” based on other canonical sources and non-canonical
popular “lived” practices and ways of reasoning? Although
Ananda Abeysekara denies this apparent paradox by arguing that
Buddhism cannot be separated into an authentic philosophical
discourse stemming from the Buddha and popular violence, since
they are contingent and constructed categories, this paradox cannot
be evaded if Buddhism does not only consist of practices but
normative claims that can potentially problematize those very
practices.26
3. Virtue and Engagement
In many senses, Buddhism is inherently ethically engaged.
Buddhism is about practices and a way of life, and the Buddha
called for the appropriate practice of the virtues. 27 Compassion,
generosity, and loving-kindness are primary Theravāda virtues.
These are genuinely altruistic and other-oriented since they are
ultimately not done out of any “need” but out of freedom. 28
Although Richard Gombrich is correct when he asserts that the
Buddha’s primary goal was not social reform but spiritual
liberation, 29 the historical Buddha remains an ethical model and
exemplar who confronted social injustices, such as caste hierarchy
26

See his Colors of the Robe: Religion, Identity, and Difference (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 204.
27
SN I. 73.
28
SN I. 25.
29
Richard Gombrich, Theravāda Buddhism (London: Routledge, 1988), 30,
68.
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and the exclusion of “untouchables,” and the social pathologies of
violence and war. He did not do so because he was commanded to
do so to avoid punishment by a divine being, but because of an
insight into the moral nexus of kamma (karma), which as moral is
never simply a predetermined fate or destiny.30 He is described as
responding immanently from out of his own condition to the
concrete suffering of others. Although the Buddha’s initial
encounter with the suffering of others can be interpreted as
reflecting his concern about suffering the same afflictions, as being
self-interested, it is still his being affected by the other’s suffering
– the disquiet, sickness, old age, and death of others – that set him
on the path of awakening.31 This encounter with and uncalculated
response to suffering provided the basis for kamma becoming
ethical and the universe a basically moral arena in early
Buddhism.32
It is sometimes argued that “socially engaged Buddhism” is a
relatively new and western inspired phenomenon. First, this claim
presupposes that something else is meant by “engagement” than
traditional forms of Buddhist ethical engagement for sentient life.
Second, this claim is inaccurate insofar as engaged Buddhism is
not merely a contemporary western construct insofar as there are
qualities in traditional Buddhism allowing contemporary western
redeployments. Third, whereas “Western” interpretations often
focus on the individualism of Buddhism, and there are elements
emphasizing working for one’s own salvation, Asian Buddhists
have interpreted kamma as inherently social. Kamma inherently
binds one to others, forming a network of freedom and fate, and
responsibility extends beyond the immediacy of the moment into
the past and future of this and other lives.33 Further, a number of
30

I develop this argument concerning the moral character of karma in
“Questioning Karma,” 353-373.
31
On the general importance of feeling, affective response and moral
sentiment in Buddhist thought and practice, see Keown, The Nature of Buddhist
Ethics, 68-78.
32
Gombrich, 69.
33
On the social character of karma and responsibility, see Jonathan S.
Walters, “Communal Karma and Karmic Community in Theravāda Buddhist
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contemporary ethical issues such as the moral status of animals and
the environment are arguably more fully articulated in Buddhist
than in traditional western discourses. 34 The modern focus on
social activism and engagement is motivated by enlightenment
ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity and the social movements
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As varied responses of
historical agents, who can interpret and engage their contexts and
are not the mere passive product of colonial hegemony, anticolonial liberation struggles involve a multiplicity of traditions and
inspirations that are more than their Western and Christian sources.
Socially engaged Buddhism, inconceivable without its Asian
sources, brings traditions of Buddhist ethical reflection to bear on
contemporary moral and social issues. If ethical insights of the
Dhamma are needed in a world that all too readily resorts to
intolerance, persecution, and violence, then vigilance concerning
the possible dangers (whether to non-Buddhists or to Buddhists
themselves) of inappropriately and unskillfully engaging Buddhist
ethics remains vital to such engagement for peace, social justice,
and the common welfare. These dangers are apparent in the history
of Asian Buddhism and should serve to stimulate Western
History,” in J. C. Holt, J. N. Kinnard, and Jonathan S. Walters, Constituting
Communities (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), 9-39, see especially 10, 18, 28.
According to Walters, the notion of rebirth in Sri Lankan popular Buddhism
only deepens one’s sense of responsibility for others and the social character of
karma. My relations with others are unavoidable, given that I am bound to them
not only in this life but in others as well. The suffering that I ignore today,
because I believe the other person deserves that suffering because of past deeds,
will become part of my own suffering.
34
The notion of social engagement said to be lacking in traditional
Buddhism is not so much a traditional Christian idea, which is not necessarily
altruistic or purely ethical in the Kantian sense since charity is done for the
reward of salvation rather than purely for its own sake, as it is a modern one
emerging from the moral and political thought of the enlightenment. Compare
Rita Gross’s discussion of the claim that Christianity is the source of socially
engaged Buddhism in Soaring and Settling: Buddhist Perspectives on
Contemporary Social and Religious Issues (New York: Continuum, 1998), 1318. No doubt, the encounter between East and West has promoted contemporary
engaged Buddhism, yet this would have remained unlikely if it did not have a
basis within Buddhism itself.
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reflection on the character and potential consequences of moral
and political engagement.
The first danger is the possibility of the Dhamma being
appropriated by and limited to a political program such that it
becomes part of the ideological legitimation of problematic
political practices and institutions. One is unlikely to critically
engage a political order with which one is complicit. In engaging
politics, Buddhism – like any other philosophy, religion, or way of
life – risks becoming an instrument of the state or a party.
Providing an ethical basis for action, and morality is the basis of
practice35, entails establishing a foundation for the justification and
legitimation of action, although living morally is distinguished
from being attached to and anxious about right and wrong as
viewpoints. 36 On the one hand, this makes ethics and moral
judgment possible. On the other hand, it opens up the danger of
losing the ethical in its very institutionalization. There are
numerous historical examples that show how moral values and
ideals are used to excuse horror such that peace becomes war,
justice turns into injustice, humanitarian compassion justifies
violence, and freedom is turned into tyranny. Connections with the
state, the military, political parties and economic powers have at
times morally compromised Buddhism and can do so again in the
future. This is not without its rationale within Buddhism, which
often – analogously to the Christian two kingdom doctrine of the
earthly and divine kingdoms – either accommodated itself to the
state or left it to its own devices.37
Social engagement or activism, which counters tendencies
toward the privatization of moral questions, is by itself an
insufficient condition or criterion for addressing structural and
institutional social-political issues that concern issues of power,
justice, and equality that involve more than the intentions and good
will of individual agents. 38 Buddhism should not be reduced to
35

DN I. 206.
DN I. 26.
37
See Gombrich, 70 and 116.
38
Ives makes the important point that Buddhist ethics addresses individual
suffering and the individual’s response to suffering more than it does the social36
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engagement because it is “other-worldly” but insofar as
engagement blinds one to the need for mindfulness and
comprehension (sapajāno) in general and comprehension of
suitability (sappaya sapajāno) or the “art of practicality” in
particular. This art involves skillfulness and appropriateness in the
choice of the right means (Pāli, upaya-kusala; Skt., upāyakauśalya) for the right situation at the right moment, which Mark
Siderits translates as “pedagogical skill” and Jan Nattier more
broadly as “tactical skill.” 39 This virtue is one that the Buddha
preeminently exemplified.
Although the Dhamma is oriented towards peace, moral
responsibility and compassion, a second danger can be seen in
attempts to use Buddhism to justify violence and war. The various
forms of Japanese Buddhism, subordinated to the interests of the
Imperial state and state-Shinto after the persecutions of the Meiji
era, became part of a militaristic system of justifying expansion,
colonization, and war. 40 It was the reduction of the Dhamma to
socio-political interests that legitimated acting contrary to the
Dhamma. Distinguishing “reactionary” and “progressive”
engagement by itself does not resolve this issue. Imperial Japan’s
political and militaristic use of Buddhism and the support of
aggressive war by the majority of Japanese Buddhists are one
powerful example employed by critics of the social role of
Buddhism such as Brian Victoria.41 Yet this question can be raised
in contemporary contexts. There are Buddhists who actively work
for the non-violent resolution of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, for
example the Buddhists involved in Sarvodaya Shramadana, while
political diagnosis of suffering in Ives, “Deploying the Dharma: Reflections on
the Methodology of Constructive Buddhist Ethics,” 35.
39
Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 2007), 58; and Jan Nattier usefully explores the different
senses of “tactical skill,” involving more than teaching or pedagogy, in A Few
Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path according to The Inquiry of Ugra (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 154-156.
40
The extent of this complicity and active engagement has become apparent
from the work of Brian Daizen Victoria, Zen at War (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2005) and Zen War Stories (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
41
Ibid.
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other Buddhists have played a significant role in intensifying and
participating in the conflict. 42 We can thus find at least two
conflicting models of socially engaged Buddhism in contemporary
Sri Lanka, one “for peace” and the other “for war.”
What lessons should be drawn from uses of Buddhism that
seem morally problematic or unvirtuous by Buddhist ethical
criteria? Are there sources within Buddhist teaching, as Brian
Victoria has argued of Zen and Tessa Bartholomeusz of Sri Lankan
Theravāda, which potentially legitimate violence and war?43 The
first precept, or first moral rule, of Buddhism seems clear: I
undertake the precept to refrain from destroying living creatures
(Panatipata veramani sikkhapadam samadiyami). The first precept
of ahisā, a vow taken to dedicate oneself to non-harm and nonviolence, does not seem a promising start for justifying violence
and yet it is not the case that individuals and groups claiming to be
Buddhist have never engaged in violence. One can blame this on
the imperfection of human character, and accordingly people often
distinguish the pleasant ideal from the unpleasant reality. This
separation of norms and practices, besides being dualistic,
precludes critical discussion and leaves unanswered the question of
whether there are possible sources within Buddhist teaching for
departing from the moral demand of ahisā to not harm sentient
beings.
4. Virtue, Violence, and War
Through hatred, hatred is never overcome; through non-hatred, hatred is always
overcome – this is the eternal law.44

The obligation to cultivate compassion, loving-kindness,
respect, and reverence for all human and sentient life does not
42

For a brief account of the Sarvodaya Shramadana movement in relation
to Buddhist ethics, see Harvey, 225-234.
43
Brian Daizen Victoria, Zen War Stories and Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, In
Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
44
Dhammapada, verse 5.
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seem a hopeful beginning for the justification of war. The
argument that it is better to suffer harm than to do harm appears
less auspicious for legitimating violence of any kind. Buddhists
and non-Buddhists alike often take for granted that there is no
legitimate Buddhist justification of war much less a Buddhist
tradition of just-war theory. To use violence is to betray the
Buddha’s teachings: “There is a person who abstains from the
destruction of life; with the rod and the weapon laid aside, he is
conscientious and kindly and dwells compassionately towards all
living beings.”45
There are noticeable historical exceptions to the obvious
interpretation of the Buddha’s first precept demanding non-harm.
Traditional Buddhist kings have raised and used armies. Buddhist
monks have developed and used martial arts. In Medieval China
and Japan, monks have justified killing, carried weapons, formed
armies, and been involved in rebellions.46 Tibetan Buddhism tells
of a future king who will militarily liberate them from external
oppression in the stories associated with Shambhala and the
Kalachakra Tantra. Japanese Buddhists supported the expansion
of imperial Japan. There are questionable relations between
Buddhists and the military in countries such as Burma and
Thailand. Currently in Sri Lanka, Theravāda monks and laity have
been implicated in persecution and violence in the Sri Lankan
ethnic conflict and civil war.
Because of (1) the Buddha’s rejection of violence and war as a
legitimate means of achieving one’s ends and (2) the long history
and dedication to peace and non-violent social change in the
Buddhist tradition, it is important to reflect on these historical
exceptions. The powerful ethical character of Buddhism can be
seen from the Buddha’s critique of war, violence and social
injustice to more contemporary movements as diverse as the
Vietnamese peace movement of the 1960’s, the Tibetan struggle
45

AN, X, 206, also compare AN, IX, 7.
A classic article on such issues in East Asia is Paul Demiéville, “Le
bouddhisme et la guerre. Post-scriptum a l’«Histoire des moines guerriers du
Japon» de Gaston Renondeau,” Mélanges publiés par l’Institut des Hautes
Etudes chinoises, Tome I, Paris, 1957, 347-385.
46
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for religious freedom, the Burmese pro-democracy movement, and
in Sir Lanka the lay Sarvodaya Shramadana movement for peace,
communal self-help, and popular empowerment.
Counterexamples to what is often considered normative
Buddhism, which was a plural and contested Asian “construct”
before it was a western one, implicitly reveal the moral character
of Buddhism in limiting and countering the drive to hatred,
violence and war by the very fact that violence is deeply
problematic in Buddhism. Those claiming to be Buddhists who
engage in war are forced to appeal to the limited and contested (in
Buddhist thought) idea of self-defense or to a questionable
antinomian non-attachment to the ethical core of Buddhism itself –
loving-kindness and compassion. Although one cannot and should
not expect to exclude all possibilities for self-defense and
especially non-violent resistance, practices contradicting this
minimalist idea reveal that other motives and self-deception can be
at work. Rather than there being a general “antinomianism” or
“nihilism” inherently at work in Buddhism, as Brian Victoria
contends, the problem lies in the ambiguity about moral
appropriateness, including skillful means and skillfulness in
Buddhism. Buddhist ethics does not advocate the application of
one single rule or principle that is eternally and universally valid in
all cases but involves ethics understood as (1) appropriateness, (2)
a way of life, and (3) part of the way.47 Although it is not the end
or entirety of the Buddhist path, morality is its necessary
prerequisite.48
Because of the virtue-ethical and context-sensitive character of
Buddhism, a number of Buddhists and non-Buddhists suggest that
there is a condition that transcends ethics, even understood as
ethical virtues and appropriateness. One abandons morality, just as
one abandons the raft that gets one to the other side of the river.
Yet going beyond good and evil as unconditional absolutes and as
47

For a recent argument in favor of principles in Buddhist ethics, see Ives,
“Deploying the Dharma: Reflections on the Methodology of Constructive
Buddhist Ethics,” 30-34.
48
AN, XI, 1-2. This point is developed in Gombrich, 74, 89; and Keown, op.
cit., 50-53.

216

Eric Sean Nelson

discriminatory attachments does not entail transcending ethics as
one’s way of existing or dwelling. The art of suitability and
skillfulness is not unethical in being anti-essentialist, as it directs
the mind to considering the context and the level of understanding
of oneself and others. This prudential context-sensitivity has and
can be misunderstood as an excuse for unethical behavior among
some Buddhist individuals and groups. Buddhist ethics at its
simplest levels appeals to prudential self-interest, especially
through the popular logic of merit and merit transfer that is the
dominant form of popular Buddhist practice in Sri Lanka; 49 yet
continuing to act out of self-interested motives is canonically
considered only the lowest level of moral action.50 Egotistical selfinterest and attachment to one’s own individual or group
superiority undermines the basic equality of sentient beings that is
asserted in the Buddhist tradition as well as the fundamental
practices and virtues of loving kindness (mettā), generosity (dāna),
and compassion (karuā).
It is fair to say that Buddhism does not endorse the use of
violence. Still it is untrue that Buddhists – or at least individuals
and groups claiming to be Buddhists and engaging in at least some
of the practices associated with Buddhism – never engage in acts
of war, hatred, and conflict. This is no doubt caused by human
imperfection. Nevertheless, it should not just be accepted as human
imperfection, since such actions always involve accruing kamma
(karma) and Buddhism insists that beings strive for and realize
universal wisdom and compassion. The Buddhist emphasis on nonattachment, including to itself, and developing universal
compassion and self-criticism, especially of inadequate
understandings of Buddhism, demands a greater emphasis on and
means to critique one’s own behavior towards others. The
aggressive and brutal colonialism justified by Japanese Buddhists,
the right-wing rhetoric and practices of some Sri Lankan monks
and laity, and the connections between Buddhism and the military
49

Gombrich, 78; and H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: The New
Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 348.
50
Kalupahana, 76.
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in Burma, serve as important examples of the dangers of treating
Buddhism as a cultural possession or ideology of political
legitimation, of taking it as an end rather than a means and a way.51
5. Skilful Means and Moral Appropriateness
Nor to do any evil, but cultivate the good, to purify one’s mind, this the Buddhas
teach.52

Tessa Bartholomeusz, whose detailed critical account of just
war thinking in Sri Lanka I will partly rely on and partly critically
modify in section five, has located the issue of violence in the
pragmatic and prudential character of Buddhist ethics. 53 She is
correct to the extent that Buddhist ethics is not based in rigidly
following one principle or rule but is a way of life grounded in the
cultivation of multiple precepts or virtues. Even authors such as
David Kalupahana, for whom Buddhist ethics is principally an
ethics of principle, acknowledge that the principle can be modified
according to new circumstances. 54 When there are new
circumstances or a conflict between two different virtues or moral
rules, this question becomes pressing: one must decide the moral
dilemma through a sense of what is appropriate. When a principle
becomes uncertain, it can only be interpreted rather than
mechanically applied. A system of rules does not provide an
infinite number of further rules explaining how to apply them. That
is, there cannot be, on pain of infinite regress, another principle
stating how to apply the first principle. This means that there is no
further precept to explain the first precept of ahisā. In cases of
moral conflict, one has to adjudicate the sense of ahisā through
the context of Buddhist ethics as a whole and the pressing features
of the situation itself. This raises the question of whether the first
51
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precept can be outweighed at times by other considerations such as
utilitarian considerations of sacrificing one life in order to save
multiple lives. Can one then in exceptional circumstances destroy
or allow one life to be destroyed in order to save the lives of a
community or multitude of individuals?
This reasoning about exceptions and the force of necessity is
not only an abstract and speculative question. It has occurred
within Buddhist historical traditions and has given birth to a
Buddhist tradition that has been likened by some scholars to
western “just-war theory.” Just war theory seeks to explain the
circumstances under which it might be legitimate or at least
necessary to take life in armed conflict. Whereas scholars of
Theravāda such as Damien Keown have argued that killing can
sometimes be a legitimate response to suffering, other scholars
such as Rupert Gethin have rejected this argument since it does not
address dukkha as a reality that must be understood and worked
through rather than suppressed. 55 The issue is not that people
claiming to be Buddhists at times engage in violence and war in
the name of self-defense. It is difficult if not impossible to demand
the saintliness according to which it is illegitimate to defend one’s
parents, family, friends or community under any circumstances.
The problem is the “slippery slope,” i.e., when and how this
reasoning can go wrong and become an ideological excuse for
morally illegitimate violence and war.
The expression “skill in means” or “skillful means” (Skt.,
upāyakauśalya; Pāli, upayakusala) is a basic Mahāyāna concept,
developed in the context of the compassion and wisdom of the
Bodhisattva, and rarely found in the Pāli canon. The roots of this
expression, both upaya (“way, means, or resource”) and in
particular kusala (“skillful, profitable or expedient,” often used as
equivalent for “good, moral, or wholesome”), are present in the
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Living Being Ever Be an Act of Compassion? The Analysis of the Act of Killing
in the Abhidhamma and Pāli Commentaries,” in Journal of Buddhist Ethics 11
(2004): 168-202.

Virtue and Violence in Theravāda and Sri Lankan Buddhism

219

Pāli Canon.56 Upaya, the ability of the Buddha to teach at different
levels according to the understanding of the recipients, is restricted
to the Buddha. Kusala – skillfulness and wholesomeness as
opposed to unskillfulness and unwholesomeness – in action,
thought, and word is advocated for all following the path in
Theravāda Buddhism. 57 The use of a number of expressions
indicating different abilities and capacities requiring
appropriateness and skillfulness – such as kusala, sappaya, upaya,
and yoniso manasikārā (wise or appropriate attention),
ugghatitaññu (swiftness of understanding), patisambhida (the
knowledge to appropriately discriminate things) – can be seen in
the Pāli Canon.
For the Buddha, in the Sangiti Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, there
are “three kinds of skill: skill in progress, skill in regress, and skill
in means” (tini kosallani: aya kosallam, apaya kosallam, upaya
kosallam).58 The use of upaya kosallam in this context shows that
skillful means is not foreign to the sense of skillfulness in the Pāli
Canon and that it is not limited to the Buddha, at the same time as
the Buddha perfectly embodies such skillfulness. 59 Skill in the
Buddha’s discourses does not seem to mean casuistry, cleverness
or a merely calculative pragmatic prudence that is more political
than ethical. It is an art that cultivates a moral ability and insight
consisting of appropriately applying the Dhamma to the situation.
56
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This is confirmed by another reference to the aptness of
skillfulness in the Nava Sutta of the Sutta-nipāta, where it is said
that the one who knows Dhamma is like the skillful boatman who
is able to ferry others across a dangerous river. 60 Here again
appropriateness is explained as being like an art or craft such that it
is not simply the mechanical application of an abstract principle.
In another passage, understanding what is fitting and skillfully
attending is the basis of wisdom.61 In the Avijjā Sutta, skillfulness
is associated with knowing and ignorance, when the Buddha is said
to discuss how ignorance leads to unskillful qualities and knowing
to skillful ones. 62 In The Group of Ones, appropriateness and
skillfulness are interconnected such that both are essential to the
path: “A bhikkhu who attends appropriately abandons what is
unskillful and develops what is skillful.”63 This use of “skillful,”
which points to the cultivation of spontaneous activity as in
learning a craft to the point where it becomes second nature, is not
accidental to the Buddha’s discourses.
Not only morality but also meditation is often compared to a
skill that requires development. For example, in the Aguttara
Nikāya, the Buddha said: “Just as monks, an archer, or his
apprentice might practice on a straw man or a pile of clay, and
thereby later become a long-distance shot, an impeccable
marksman who can fell a large body, just so it is with a monk who
reaches the destruction of the taints in dependence on the first
jhana.”64 This sense of skill provides a partial basis for the later
Mahāyāna reinterpretation and extension of skillfulness (kusala) as
skillful means or skill in means (upāya-kauśalya). In early
Mahāyāna texts such as the Skill in Means Sūtra (Upāyakauśalya
Sūtra), and canonical texts such as the Lotus Sūtra, morality is
60
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fully absorbed into or subordinated to compassion such that the
compassion of the Bodhisattva transcends the cultivation of the
precepts considered as rules or virtues.65
Insofar as Theravāda ethics, like most Buddhist and many
forms of non-Buddhist ethics such as Aristotelian and Confucian,
is a form of virtue ethics, it faces the issue of appropriate action. If
this is the case, then acting from the precepts, and the Vinaya in
general, cannot be reduced to legalistic external conformity with
them. Codes, precepts, and rules demand the ability to distinguish
between the hypocrisy of breaking them for one’s own advantage
and the moral insight to adopt them to circumstances. For example,
a Sri Lankan bhikkhu should not possess money, yet it might not
be inappropriate for him to carry money for purposes that are
difficult to avoid such as for bus fare to get across town.66 Rules
cannot be mechanically applied but require the skillful application
of the Dhamma in acting in the proverbial right way at the right
time in the right place.67 A third source of the use of skillfulness in
contemporary Theravāda Buddhism would be from the growing
knowledge of Mahāyāna traditions of interpretation.
Is the Buddhist notion of skillfulness too open or ambiguous
such that it can possibly justify unethical behavior in the name of a
greater good? Can it potentially be used to justify behavior
contrary to the basic ethical principles of Buddhism such as the
Buddha’s critique of violence and war? This question of
skillfulness seems a more basic issue than that of ethical
antinomianism and nihilism developed in some western critiques
of Buddhism, since context-sensitive appropriateness would
provide the justification for going “beyond good and evil” and
other such expressions.68 This is not only a potential problem in
65
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Zen or Mahāyāna but in all Buddhism, given that the issue of
appropriateness is already significant in the Pāli Canon and in
contemporary Theravāda Buddhism.
6. Buddhism and Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka
To turn now to a “case study” of the relation between Buddhist
ethics and violence, I will consider the long-running civil war in
Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan conflict has its origins in the
development of Sinhalese nationalism in response to British
colonialism and during the post-war independence movement. The
British played off Sinhalese and Tamil interests and sentiments in
order to retain power during the colonial period, much as they did
in their other colonies. The postcolonial period saw the deepening
of various narratives of ethic self-identity among both the
Sinhalese and the Tamil populations. Successive democratically
elected Sri Lankan governments have reflected the interests and
aspirations of the Sinhalese, contributing to Tamil sentiments of
disentitlement. The resulting episodic civil war has killed over
65,000 people since the 1980’s.
The ethnic conflict has occurred between a series of elected
governments, led by various parities from the right to the left who
have been supported by the mostly Buddhist Sinhalese majority,
and the terrorist – insofar as suicide bombings, assassinations,
eliminating all Tamil rivals, etc., are terrorist – and or selfdescribed “liberation” organization Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) organization based in the mostly non-Buddhist
Tamil minority. 69 The best option for both sides would be a
69
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peaceful resolution and mutual cooperation, which seems presently
unlikely. On the one hand, there is much to criticize in the Sri
Lankan government and Sinhalese nationalists, from people who
claim to be conserving and defending Buddhism and its role in Sri
Lankan life to socialist populists, who have flamed the passions of
war. On the other hand, the legitimate grievances of the Tamil
population are used to support an authoritarian, nationalistic, and
violent organization.70
Representatives of “engaged Buddhism” and “critical
Buddhism” want to free Buddhism from what they describe as its
traditional complicity with unjust social and political institutions
and practices. They frequently point to Imperial Japan and the
current conflict in Sri Lanka as primary examples that prove
traditional Buddhism’s complicity with violence, exploitation, and
domination.71 This argument appeals, in the case of Sri Lanka, to
the fact that some Theravāda Buddhist monks and laity have been
implicated in violence and calls for violence against the LTTE and
/ or the Tamil population. Any adequate consideration of this
conflict begins to reveal the need for a more nuanced and
differentiating approach to the question of what role Buddhism
plays in the current conflict. This conflict raises two significant
questions: (1) What is the role of Buddhism in promoting the
conflict? (2) What are the arguments for and against the justice of
war in the Buddhist traditions of Sri Lanka? The second question
can be made more exact in the following terms: What possible
70
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justifications of violence are there in (i) the Pāli Canon, (ii) tales
about Aśoka – who has both righteous and violent traits72 – and the
universal wheel-turning monarch (cakkavatti), (iii) postcanonical
Sinhalese narratives of kingship and nation such as the
Mahāvamsa, 73 and, finally, (iv) contemporary postcolonial Sri
Lankan Buddhism?
In the remainder of this paper, I will sketch out a possible
answer addressing a few aspects of these questions. One strategy is
to analyze Buddhist ideas in the context of western just-war and
ethical theory and conclude that Buddhism as it informs the
“popular” actions and practices of living Buddhist communities is
more complex than its normative or “elite” ideal. Buddhist lands
do not only involve traditions of nonviolence and loving kindness.
They also have had a long history of thinking about and engaging
in internal and external physical conflict. That is, wars from which
reasoned as well as opportunistic assertions of the possible justice
or unfortunate necessity of war can emerge. Buddhism privileges
non-violence while at the same time self-described Buddhists have
justified and engaged in war under certain conditions.
Buddhism is a diverse set of norms and practices; and this
diversity is also true of Sri Lankan Buddhism where one can see
three approaches to the question of war. First, there is a position
that Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra Richard de Silva call
Buddhist fundamentalism.74 Yet fundamentalism suggests a return
to the fundamentals of Buddhism, which in this case would mean
to renounce violence as a means. As Mahinda Deegalle argues this
position is not so much Buddhist as it is Sinhalese nationalist,
which appropriates Buddhism as a symbol of Sinhalese heritage
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and identity.75 This raises the interesting question whether there is
actually such a thing as religious fundamentalism. Many
movements labeled as fundamentalist seem to be more about the
use of the religious for nationalistic economic and political
interests. The nationalist and “just war” positions can both appeal
to the Mahāvamsa, which describes the Buddha’s legendary visits
to Sri Lanka and the military victories of ancient Sinhalese
Buddhist kings against invading Hindu Tamils.76
The nationalists explicitly demands that the Sinhala-Tamil
conflict must conclude not only with the defeat of the LTTE but
also with the restoration of a unified and fully Sinhalese and
Buddhist Sri Lanka. Their argument for war generally follows a
three step legitimation of anti-Tamil sentiment: (1) Sinhala and
Buddhist identity constitute a unity that is radically distinct from
the Dravidian Hindu Tamil interlopers from South India; (2) Sri
Lanka is the island of Dhamma (dhammadvipa) ordained by the
Buddha himself (during his three apocryphal visits) for Buddhism
such that the whole island is a sacred relic of the Buddha’s and the
loss of its integrity would destroy this legacy; and (3) the justice of
a defensive war for the Dhamma justifies the preservation of Sri
Lanka in its unity as a majority Sinhalese Buddhist nation through
military action against the Tamils, identified with the invading
damila of the medieval epics, thus associating the present dispute
with past threats as well as the fear of tiny Sri Lanka being
submerged in the vastness of India. Bartholomeusz contends that it
is paradoxically Buddhist beliefs about pacifism – i.e., that
Buddhists are more fair, tolerant, and peaceful – that leads
Buddhists to differentiate themselves from others and turn to
75
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violence to protect that very ideal. The perceived need to preserve
endangered Buddhist peacefulness creates the conditions for
violence. 77 Yet Buddhism is not so much the cause of such
attitudes as it – or rather its surface historical facticity as uniquely
Sinhalese – is instrumentally incorporated into conservative
Sinhalese discourses and, more generally, the Sinhalese side of the
“ethnic outbidding” that Neil DeVotta characterizes as a cancer
eating away at Sri Lankan political life.78
The second range of views might be characterized as the
moderate justification of the use of force, and maintains the justice
of undertaking “defensive military action” against insurgencies
even if the insurgents draw on some legitimate grievances. The
war is interpreted as the defense of the territorial integrity and
peace of the nation, as a proper function of the modern secular
state, and/or the defense of the nation’s endangered Buddhist
identity. This model appeals to the conventional model of
international law and its account of the justice and limits of war as
well as to Buddhist principles such as maximizing well-being.
Assuming one is attacked, and if common well-being outweighs
the well-being of the attacker, it is then justifiable to defend
oneself, one’s parents and family, one’s fellow citizens, including
if it involves violence and killing. This argument is of course
reasonable, and self-defense is not without its pragmatic
justification and traditional authority. The problem is that such
arguments often move imperceptibly from the exceptional
justification of minimal violence under “conditions of necessity” to
the ideological normalization of the state of war. Violence, once it
is justified as an exception, becomes the norm from which there
seems no escape. The ethical loses its normative and critical force
and becomes part of the social reproduction and intensification of
conflict rather than a medium of its resolution.
There are multiple strategies used by Sri Lankans to answer the
question of how Buddhists can justify engaging in conflict and war.
77
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Some stress the unfortunate necessity of military action despite its
negative karmic consequences. Others, perhaps motivated by the
need for a more inspirational message, suggest that righteous war
(i.e., one with a morally legitimate goal and fought in an honorable
fashion with morally acceptable means) has meritorious karmic
consequences. Both strategies presuppose that the precept of
nonviolence is a prima facie rather than an absolute duty such that
nonviolence is a first duty that can be overridden under certain
circumstances as a last resort.79
Theravāda ethics, especially when it is interpreted textually
through the Pāli Canon, places absolute value on acting out of
compassion and avoiding harm. In practice, Sri Lankan Buddhists
reason with a plurality of context-sensitive prima facie duties. The
precept against violence is not absolute and can be overridden by
more pressing obligations such as defense of one’s parents, country,
or the Dhamma. The Buddha’s account of moral skillfulness
suggests, according to this reading, the use of practical judgment or
a sense of appropriateness to apply moral principles to the situation.
The Buddha’s precepts are primary and conflicts between precepts
require contextual reasoning that employs considerations that some
have compared with utilitarian (maximizing compassion and
minimizing suffering) and others to virtue ethical (the effects
actions have on one’s condition) reasoning. In this way, Buddhist
ethical reasoning is used to justify violence for the sake of
nonviolence and the Sri Lankan government’s claim to wage “war
for peace.” The justification of war requires the fulfillment of
certain conditions comparable to Christian and western just war
criteria. A number of Sri Lankan Buddhists, in line with traditional
justifications of war in the Buddhist kingdoms of South-East
Asia,80 appeal to the Hindu Bhagavad-Gītā and the Pan-Indic idea
that the ruler (rāja) and warriors (katriya) fulfilling their military
duties are exempt from ahisā.
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Historically numerous leaders and societies claiming to be
Buddhist have had armies, police forces, prisons, etc., with actual
weapons and the possibility of using them. This is based in PanIndian ideas about kingship and in several Buddhist traditions. In
the Pāli canon, the Buddha abandoned becoming a universal
wheel-turning monarch in order to become liberated. This
prioritized liberation, and the renunciation of violence and harm
that is essential to its realization, yet at the same time was
interpreted as giving a derivative or secondary legitimacy to
political leadership. Such monarchs are portrayed as universally
wise and generous but do not abandon the state’s monopoly on
force. This model of righteous kingship is the basis for the
Buddhist warrior-kings of the Mahāvamsa that continue to have
national appeal.
Popular Sri Lankan Buddhism incorporates a tacit “just war
theory” according to which war is justifiable when fought with the
appropriate intent and means. The Sinhalese supporters of war
appeal to such ideas of the legitimacy of defensive war, which is
defined by the compassionate intention to protect rather than the
negative motivations of anger, greed or hatred. It is interesting that
“militant Sinhalese nationalists,” insofar as they still claim to
operate within the framework of Buddhism, frequently appeal to a
widener or more extensive notion of defensive war (such as the
unity of “Buddhist Sri Lanka” as a whole) since canonical
Buddhism provides no basis for offensive or aggressive war. 81
Buddhism does not have the tradition of offensive “holy war” and,
since motivation and intention are more important than external
ritual and obedience, there is no basis for war to convert others by
force even for their own good – which leaves open the question of
the tacit violence or implicit coercive power of education,
socialization, and the socio-economic reproduction of society.
The first militant nationalistic and second moderate pro-war
Sinhalese positions described above are differentiated by the
portrayal of what is being defended and what means are justifiable.
This remains an active question given the fragility of peace, the
81
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continuation of death and destruction, the conflicting assertions
about the “righteousness” of each side, and the competing claims
about the justice and injustice of military action.
Finally, in a third type of position, there are Sri Lankan
Buddhists who reject all and any violence as an impediment to
nibbāna (nirvāa) and who have been prominently engaged in
promoting the peace process and reconciliation. Bartholomeusz
contends that this must be a consequence of giving the first precept
of ahisā a deontological status. That is, it is a universally valid
principle and duty that is applicable regardless of circumstances
and has no exceptions. The Buddha does not claim that violence is
only sometimes wrong but that violence, no matter how righteous,
always produces more violence; and warriors, no matter how
virtuous, always suffer the consequences of war. However, the
Buddhist precepts do not have to be interpreted according to the
model of rule based ethics, or applying a conceptual principle to all
cases, in order for Buddhists to unconditionally reject war. The
most appropriate skillfulness may well generally result in the
rejection of violence and war given its personal costs and karmic
consequences. This position is adopted by the majority of Sri
Lankan intellectuals, such as Walpola Rahula, who wrote in 1959
that “Violence in any form, under any pretext whatsoever, is
absolutely against the teaching of the Buddha.”82
According to the Buddha, “Conquest begets enmity; the
conquered live in misery; and the peaceful live happily having
renounced both conquest and defeat.”83 This position is in fact the
only consistent one with the Pāli Canon, if not later non-canonical
Sinhalese texts such as the Mahāvamsa that are also historically
significant in shaping Sinhalese self-interpretations of their own
identity and the possibility – albeit limited and tenuous – of a
Buddhist theory of “just war.” This difference shows the value of
not reducing the normative dimension of Buddhism to its popular
manifestations, and of not minimizing canonical texts and the
82
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“philosophical” dimension of Buddhism in the face of its “violent”
lived reality.84 Since norms and exemplars are richly embodied in
images and narratives, the distinction between normative claims
and actual practices does not entail the reduction of Buddhism’s
symbolic dimension to an impoverished rationalized shadow.
Exemplars and norms often serve a critical, regulative, and selfreforming function, providing a textured fabric and context to
which individuals can appeal so as to engage their circumstances
and practices differently. If it is illegitimate to isolate and reify
supposedly “elite” normative or canonical Buddhism on the
authority of “anti-essentialism,” it seems similarly problematic to
eliminate all normative and regulative claims in the name of
“popular practices.”
7. Conclusion: Virtue and Violence
The Sri Lankan conflict is not exclusively a question of one
individual’s insight and virtue in my estimation. If it was, it would
not be at such an impasse. It is a structural crisis that requires a
political solution that has to rely on a plurality of ethical, religious,
and social possibilities and voices. My claim here contradicts
current tendencies that (1) seek to privatize social problems into
issues of personal virtue or (2) reduce the plurality of public life to
one vision of the good life and/or religious redemption. To the
degree that Buddhism shares these features, which are appropriate
given its primary goal of spiritual liberation, it is insufficient by
itself to resolve structural social-political crises to the degree that
these require critical and empirically-oriented social research and
transformation. Like other ethical and religious ideals, Buddhism
can become a constituent part of social ills, if the Buddhist does
not recognize the independent and plural structural qualities of
social-political life. Nonetheless, despite these limits, it still offers
a valuable response to the question. Because of its responsiveness
to the suffering of others as well as its self-critical, non-coercive
and egalitarian character, Buddhism provides a powerful and
84
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cogent individual way of life. And, as such, it can contribute to the
resolution of conflict and suffering.
The conclusion that Buddhism is not the primary cause of the
Sri Lankan conflict and can be part of its peaceful resolution is not
a new thesis. P. D. Premasiri reasonably concludes that there is no
place for righteous war within Pāli Buddhism: “the idea of a just or
righteous war (dharma yuddha) involving the use of weapons of
war and violence is conspicuously absent in the Buddhist canon.
The Buddha countered the prevailing belief that soldiers of war
who fight for a cause could, as a consequence of their rightful
performance of duty, aspire to attain a heavenly rebirth if they
succumb to their injuries while in combat. The Buddha states in the
Pāli canon that one who fights a war does not generate wholesome
thoughts but thoughts of malice and hatred, which are absolutely
unwholesome. Therefore, their future destiny will be a woeful one,
which is in accordance with their unwholesome kamma.”85
According to my argument, Buddhism shares some of the
potential problems of other varieties of virtue ethics. In particular,
(1) moral appropriateness and skillfulness can become a potentially
dangerous doctrine legitimating unethical behavior and (2) the
ethics of individual self-cultivation of character can become
ideologically complicit with systems of exploitation and
domination. First, skillfulness can be reduced to an instrumental
manipulation of means without regard for the quality of the ends,
such that it is removed from its ethical context of loving-kindness,
generosity, compassion, and ahisā. Second, the privatization of
the ethical separates questions of character from the reproduction
of social-political systems, such that the moralist as well as the
ideologue appeals to the good intentions of individuals without
regard for underlying relations of power. Socially engaged
Buddhists ought to be mindful of both issues if they are to counter
the potential betrayal of the moral core of the Dhamma through
individual practices and social-political institutions. These
possibilities cannot be excluded a priori and indicate the need to
85

P. D. Premasiri, “The Place for a Righteous War in Buddhism,” in
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 10 (2003).
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be vigilant in cultivating and practicing the art of ethical
appropriateness and skillfulness.
Like other forms of context-sensitive ethics, Buddhist ethics
cannot be reduced to the mechanical application of one principle or
universal rule, such as John Stuart Mill’s principle of utility or
Kant’s categorical imperative. Whereas rule-based ethics requires
the appeal to and application of a general principle to particulars,
context-based ethics appeals to a concrete and existential way of
living as a whole. This whole involves the interdependence of self
and others as well as self and world.86 In this context, even the first
and most basic precepts of non-harm and non-violence (ahisā)
cannot be taken as unconditional or absolute if they cause more
harm than not. This is why the taking of life in conflict or war is
discouraged, especially because of their negative motivations and
consequences, yet not absolutely forbidden in Pāli and Sri Lankan
Buddhism. Likewise, vegetarianism is not taken as an absolute in
the Pāli canon or in Theravāda countries. The Buddha rejected
making it an unconditional duty or obligation, as one is more or
less culpable for eating meat or even killing an animal given (1)
the sentience/insentience of the being killed, (2) the motivation or
intention involved in killing the animal (e.g., hunting for food as
opposed to killing for employment or sport), (3) the amount of
suffering produced by the action, and (4) the directness and
indirectness of one’s involvement in the killing of the animal.87
Instead of being an absolute independently existing command
or obligation, morality is seen as a conditional and dependently
arisen ethical mode of comportment. It is a situational and
responsive disposition from which one can ethically respond to the
diversity of concrete circumstances. Without this ethical
orientation and context, a decontextualized notion of skillfulness –
and appropriate judgment in general – can and has been used to
justify violence and war in ways that run contrary to the Buddha’s
86

Note that interdependence by itself is not an ethical claim and Buddhist
ethics entails some forms of ethical independence, as argued in Ives, “Deploying
the Dharma: Reflections on the Methodology of Constructive Buddhist Ethics,”
24-25.
87
Compare Harvey, 159-162.
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teachings. If my argument is valid, then moral skillfulness and
appropriateness can legitimately be used to justify less morally
problematic and culpable forms of violence such as self-defense
and perhaps humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide. As a
consequence, it provides a limited and conditional Buddhist justwar-theory such that Theravāda countries can legitimately have
armies and police forces and still be considered Buddhist. Yet,
these uses are circumscribed, and such reasoning cannot
consistently be used to justify aggressive violence or war
motivated by anger, craving, hatred, or attachment. From this
perspective, there is much to criticize in these lands and their
history. Nonetheless, if the realization of Dhamma right here in
this life is not to be completely betrayed by worldly calculations,
then even such a pragmatically reasonable position goes too far or
risks too much. Despite actual and potential problems with
Buddhists, who would like but have not yet realized the Dhamma,
it remains a commendable virtue of Buddhism that it provides the
means to rigorously question violence and war as well as
demanding the proper cultivation of the skillfulness and insight to
do so. Such insight means that one is not only attentive to what
others do but more importantly to one’s own activities and
disposition, even more when one has the self-satisfaction of it
seeming most sensible and decent.

A DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
CONCEPTION OF “SELF INTEREST
MAXIMIZATION” AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM
Mathew Varghese
Through this paper, I am not trying to criticize the economic
development models of today or suggesting an alternative
methodology for managing wealth and resources. Here my effort is
to understand the conception of economic freedom that each and
every individual must be free economically to be a part of the
community and live in harmony with it. Economic freedom should
be viewed as an important aspect of life which could provide an
answer to one of the important Socratic questions, “how should
one live?” This query can be approached in many ways and one
way I wish to pursue in this paper is through economic freedom,
from the Buddhist context, as one aspect of human freedom that
one seeks to achieve as a purpose of life. In that perspective, to
reveal this conception clearly, I wish to use the Mādhyamika
dialectics to identify the implicit dangers in pursuing some
contextually constructed theoretical models vehemently without
evaluating the consequences for solving one of our perpetual
worries of life as an end in itself.
We live in a world where the idea of economic freedom has
taken the central place in our thinking and put all our efforts into
achieving greater economic power, presuming that it is the most
efficient way for bringing greater values and an ultimate meaning
to life. In fact, this idea, in the contemporary period, has shaken the
world with a big bang. The wealthy nations or people are trying
hard to control the power they have acquired from being wealthy,
whereas the poor nations and people try to catch up with the
wealthy nations by imbibing their ideologies and methods. In the
market-driven economy of today, economic thinking is based on
large scale production and maximum consumption. In this process
of finding economic freedom and perfect richness for everyone, we
consider that the procedure of creating more wealth is important in
pursuing our desires and dreams to the maximum, for being a part

236

Mathew Varghese

of the consumerist society, so that more wealth can be produced
and distributed. The negative side of this win-win situation may be
that we could be completely using up all our resources and the
world could be turning into a big waste basket. There is no simple
solution to this problem from our present way of thinking and
understanding as we base our thinking on knowledge and judgment
conditioned by our desires. Mādhyamika dialectics allows us to
reevaluate the validity of the epistemological sources and suggest
solutions from the problems itself.
The Aspect of Self Interest Maximization
As an example, today one of the most used concepts for
economic theories is “self interest maximization,” which presumes
that the foremost instinct motivating an individual to engage in any
economic activity is self interest. Accordingly, the effective
application of motivated self interest is the best factor for
promoting growth in the economy and society is greatly benefited
from the individualistic attitude toward desire fulfilling. For the
perfect deployment of this method, one needs to make decisions
using rational, technical, and innovative methods without giving
space for moral or ethical concerns. Those human concerns in fact
may act detrimental to the effective functioning of the modern
economic system. J. S. Mill explained the requirement of a person
engaging in economic activity with a quote from Dante, “Abandon
all friendliness, you who enter!” Everyone who sets to engage in
an economic activity should act like one who is committed to
accomplishing a mission: that of maximizing wealth.
Adam Smith, who introduced this concept, was a professor of
moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. The following,
from his book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, is one of the favorite quotes for economic
theorists: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regards to
their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but
to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but
of their advantages.” We can see here that the ‘self love’ or ‘self
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interest’ to earn money and to achieve economic freedom that
motivates a butcher to sell meat, and all other aspects connected
with his life is subservient to this self instinct. In fact, this idea,
according to noted economist Amartya Sen, is misinterpreted from
what Smith actually wanted to explain. He wanted to explain the
conception of self love from the context of stoic philosophy, that a
human being’s self interest involves discharging responsibility as
an honest member of the community lived in. The self interest of
the butcher, in this view, does not only involve earning money by
selling meat. The butcher wants to see that those who have bought
the meat have a good dinner. Here, the self love involves earning
money and helping others to carry on with their lives. In the
Buddhist context, one could carry out karma that would lead to
freedom from sufferings. There is a huge space here for ethical and
moral attitude (dharma) when engaging in the activity of finding
economic freedom.
The Buddhist thought in this regard comes from the advice of
the Buddha on right livelihood and the classical Indian
philosophical thought which considers wealth (artha) as an
important aspect that gives completeness to human life. 1 Indian
thought considers the human life in this world as a quest to find
liberation (moka) in artha, kāma and dharma. The meaning of
these terms relevant to this discussion is artha (wealth); kāma
(love, passion, desire, etc.); 2 dharma (moral direction, ethical

1

Theodore Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāa (1968;
reprint, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999), 62.
2
In Buddhist philosophy, the desire prompted by ignorance is condemned,
while the natural enthusiasm, passion, desire and love are accepted as esteemed
human values. See Aryadeva’s Cittaviśuddhiprakaraa edited from Tibetan and
Sanskrit sources with introduction and the full text in Sanskrit by Prabhubhai
Bhikhabhai Patel (Calcutta: Visva-Bharati, 1949), verse 42:
durvijñai sevita kāma kāmo bhavati bandhanam /
sa eva sevito vijñai kāmo mokaprasādhaka //
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duties, etc.) are the main motivating aspects of human life.3 In the
thoughts of contemporary economic thinkers, kāma represented by
self interest maximization is the major motivating factor for
achieving moka (perfect happiness by winning wealth) while
dharma is the most de-motivating factor and should be controlled.
Amartya Sen joins with the Buddhist thinkers when he explains
further about what Adam Smith wanted to say concerning moral
considerations: “The misinterpretation of Smith’s complex attitude
to motivation and markets, and the neglect of his ethical analysis of
sentiments and behavior, fits well into the distancing of economics
from ethics that has occurred with the development of modem
economics. Smith did, in fact, make pioneering contributions in
analyzing the nature of mutual advantage exchanges, and the value
of division of labor, and since these contributions are perfectly
consistent with human behavior sans bonhomie and ethics,
references to these parts of Smith’s work have been profuse and
exuberant.” It is very explicit that individuals should not make it
one whole life’s purpose just winning wealth as similar to the case
of contemporary economic thinkers.
Why are modern economists’ views not sustainable? In fact,
modern economists wanted to create a perfect economic system
where generating wealth was the main concern and also to create a
mathematical model to propitiate it. There is an accepted
presumption in the contemporary world that the scientific method
evolved in the modem period is valid eternally in explaining the
phenomenal world and it could show us practical ways to find
solutions to any problems. 4 The problem of scientific method is
The objects of desire and its enjoyment, for an unwise (ignorant) person,
could become a source of bondage (bandhanam); the same object of desire and
its enjoyment, for a wise person, becomes a source of liberation.
3
Theodore Stcherbatsky, 62.
4
Philosophers and thinkers in the last century wanted to introduce a kind of
universal scientific method. The presumption is that the scientific method
provides a certain amount of certainty and clarity and that certainty is applicable
to each and every aspect of human life. See Ledwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, 2nd edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959), 18. In the case of
economics in the 18th century, the leading thinkers wanted to introduce
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that it bases its judgments only from the humanly cognizable
knowledge sources where human wisdom on anything is
subservient to this perfectly alluded knowledge.
Here also the scientifically alluded ‘self interest maximization’
could solve all our problems of earning livelihood and beyond.
Since the focuses of all our activities are motivated for maximizing
as much wealth as possible, we consider everything in the world,
especially the sources from which we draw wealth, as income
rather than capital. The guiding logic might be that those sources
are huge bounties that never perish. We need only to find means to
exploit them as quickly and efficiently as possible. The butcher
would be killing as many animals as possible to show a huge profit
in his books without concern for the future of the resource. There
is a difference between considering something as a capital and as
income. 5 In practical wisdom (prajñā), capital should be
maintained and protected and only a part of it can be used as
income. In modern times, we are using the land, the natural
resources, the environment, and the human resources with the
presumption that the maintenance and upkeep of them are taken
care of by some invisible force. The classical wisdom on such
things gives way to human greed and huge desires. 6 We are
actually perfectly rational and cool headed in these matters, but we
expect an unseen force will take care of anything that might go
wrong. This is the modern conception of God. The idea of such a
God is relevant only if the scientific or analytical method we
depend on fails us.
Staying with the example of the butcher, the butcher
unconcerned about what happens with the meat sold kills as many
Newtonian methods to economics. See Todd Buchholz, New Ideas from the
Dead Economists (New York: New American Library, 1989), 121.
5
E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (New York: Harper & Row, 1973),
9.
6
With the progress of modern economics and lifestyle thereof, human greed
has taken the primary position of all human activities. The system otherwise is
trying to encourage human greed for more and fear if that is not achieved. See
Schumacher, 17.
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animals as possible and eventually sells the butcher shop to a
company and either becomes an employee of that company or gets
a lot of money to do whatever was dreamed of. But what might be
his biggest dream? The negative effect of this action is that the
butcher looses almost everything mostly his identity. He soon
understands that the money he earned has no special value for him.
The other negative effect he may confront, which happens in most
cases, is that butcher loses his job as the share value of the
company that brought his butcher shop might go down and
eventually go bankrupt. In both cases, the butcher would face a
debasement of ethical life. He may have lost his social life and
family as his children may not regard him highly and his wife may
run away in pursuit of the maximization of her own interest.
Mādhyamika dialectics sees this problem of the butcher as the
problem of knowledge and judgment.7
The Buddhist View on Knowledge and Judgment
The advice given by the Buddha to his Brahmin friend
Kūdadanda on the query on the right sacrifice is that the king
should make sure that the capital is distributed properly with
people who engage in different type of jobs, so that the money
would multiply through more production and people could have
comfortable lives without looting or creating political problems.8
7

The Buddhist conception of understanding the phenomenal realities is in
fact different from the conception of the modern theorists in this regard.
Buddhism confutes the conception that it is possible to understand the
phenomenal world with the help of a theory or a method. In the Brahmajāla
sūtra, the Buddha criticizes the views that promote theoretical viewpoints and
concludes that it is difficult to understand the world from the limitations set by a
theory. In other words, the theoretical understanding of the phenomenal world
basically originates from our expectations and preferences rather than what
actually happens. See sutta 1 in Maurice Walshe’s The Long Discourses of the
Buddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya (Boston: Wisdom Publications,
1995).
8
Brahmin, once upon a time there was a king called Mahāvijita. He was
rich, of great wealth and resources, with an abundance of gold and silver, of
possessions and requisites of money and money’s worth, with a full treasury and
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The Buddha advised that the king should use his prajñā (wisdom)
in making decisions in relation to human life. He should see that he
will not waste huge amount of resources as in the case of
traditional knowledge based Vedic sacrifices that may, according
to Buddha, not help bringing the expected harmony in the society.9
The knowledge we use to form our judgments is normally
inadequate and it is contextually determined. On the other hand,
prajñā invokes our understanding faculties more effectively so that
one is able to see reality properly. The meaning of prajñā is that it
brings forth reality as it is (prajñāyathābhūtam artha prajānāti).
It is considered that the functional prajñā puts an end to the normal
human ignorance.10
The aspect of human nature that we depend on expectations
and configure from what is available to us something that will
liberate us from all our problems is elaborately discussed in
granary. And when King Mahāvihita was musing in private, the thought came to
him: “I have acquired extensive wealth in human terms, I occupy a wide extent
of land which I have conquered. Suppose now I were to make a great sacrifice
which would be to my benefit and happiness for a long time?” And calling his
minister-chaplain, he told him his thought. “I want to make a big sacrifice.
Instruct me, Reverend Sir, how this may be to my lasting benefit and
happiness.” The Chaplain replied, “Your majesty’s country is beset by thieves, it
is ravaged, villages and town are being destroyed, the country side is infested
with brigands. If your Majesty were to tax the region, that would be the wrong,
that would be the wrong thing to do. Suppose Your Majesty were to think, “I
will get rid of this plague of robbers by execution and imprisonment, or by
confiscation, threats and banishment,” the plague would not be properly ended.
Those who survived would later harm Your Majesty’s realm. However, with this
plan, you can completely eliminate the plague. To those in the kingdom who are
engaged in cultivating crops and raising cattle, let Your Majesty distribute grain
and fodder; to those in trade, give capital; to those in government service, assign
proper living wages. Then those people, being intent on their own occupations,
will not harm the kingdom. Your Majesty’s revenues will be great, the land will
be tranquil and not beset by thieves, and the people, with joy in their hearts, will
play with their children, and will dwell in open houses. See sutta 1 in The Long
Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya.
9
The Vedic sacrifices were performed based on traditional knowledge
which had been handed over down to him by the king’s forefathers.
10
Stcherbatsky, 45.
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Mādhyamika philosophy and it can suitably be applied to our topic.
It is our wild desire that makes water visible in a mirage (when one
is going in a desert, mad thirst for water manifests as water in the
mirage).11
The economic theorists generally jump to gestalt water in the
mirage (in the theories) and take us to that illusory water.12 We
may feel satisfied and also could feel a sense of victory but in fact
like the one who chases the mirage those theories are not
redeeming us but are putting us in a state of total confusion and
misery. To explain this aspect more clearly, a person in the same
desert, travelling in air-conditioned comfort and looking at the
horizon, may see the mirage but may not necessarily expect water
there or see it as an oasis. Mirage may appear as an interesting
topic for him. Expecting water in the mirage is certainly a
motivating factor for a desert traveler to find a real oasis, but no
one can say that is the only motivating factor.
Nāgārjuna introduces the reason for confusion from these
words: (dūrādālokita rūpamāsannair dśyate spuam /
marīciryadi vāri syāddāsannai ki na dśyate //) Normally the
forms seen at far are clear when viewed from close proximity but
why water seen in the mirages are not identified clearly by those
nearby.13 When we go close to the mirage, it moves away from us.
The human mind has the tendency to infer ideas from such logical
11

mgatājala nocchedo na ca śāśvatatā matā /
vastuśūnya jagat sarva marīpratima matam//
Similar to the vision created of wild desire, where there is no annihilation or
no eternity (in this world), it is said of material objects in this world, all are like
a mirage.
12
The Buddhist notion of prajñā similar to the conception of śūnyatā
explains that external empirical realities are essentially śūnya. The so-called
realities of the phenomenal world are manifested because of our choices and
expectations (kalpana). In the case of economic theorists, the idea of “self
interest maximization” as the basic mode of human relationship, evolving from
the expectation that generating more wealth creates a comfortable life for
everyone, is an expectation and conceptual construction.
13
Objects seen at far distance are revealed clearly when we go near to them,
but things like the ocean of a mirage cannot be seen even when we go near to it.
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sources or premises, if we desire for things that may come in the
purview of such sources. We can see a dialectic situation arising
here that certain objects or things can be experienced with clarity
when we approach near to them; and while certain things like
mirage water cannot be experienced clearly, when we go near to
them. In fact, they move further away on nearness. In this case, the
desert traveler’s frustration increases and his actions become
absolutely illogical even though he is adamant in holding to certain
logical methods.
This dialectical situation is explained, using another example
by Nāgārjuna: na niruddhān nāniruddhād bījād akurasabhava
/ māyotpādavad utpāda sarva eva tvayocyate // 14
We cannot explain clearly the process of the origin of a sprout
or a tree in the pure rational sense. It is logically difficult to infer
that a sprout is originated from a destroyed seed, at the same time
one cannot declare that it is not originated from a destroyed seed,
or not originated from a seed. If we try to re-rationalize this
process of origin with the help of a theory, we must accept that the
originated sprout comes from an illusion.
Position of Mādhyamika Dialectics
From this discussion, it is clear that we are like the desert farer
who stands in the middle of the desert and hopes that water is there
in the mirage and when we go close to it, the mirage moves away
from us further, but still we expect the mirage to be real and move
further with it. It is important for us to understand the conception
14

vinatāt kāraāt tāvat kāryotpattir na yujyate/
na cāvinaāt svapnena tulyotpattir matā tava //
or
na niruddhān nāniruddhād bījād akurasabhava /
māyotpādavad utpāda sarva eva tvayocyate //

The origin of a sprout is not from a destroyed seed or from a nondestroyed
seed. You said that everything is originated from a manifested magical illusion.
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of a sprout and its intrinsic relationship with the seed, but our
vision is always mired by the illusion (vikalpa) with the perceptual
knowledge of what we see at the horizon or the seed as the original
cause of the sprout as real. There are schools of philosophy that
consider that the seeds are the ultimate cause of sprout and theorize
accordingly. Their theories may be partially true but they are not at
all in a position to make a pure theory for the existence of the
sprout because the sprout vanishes quickly into a seedling and then
to a tree, making theorizing more difficult. But again here we are
not confuting the existence either of the seed, sprout, nor the
seedling. Our effort here is to see that the process of change is
understood properly when we talk about a tree or the system as a
whole. On the other hand, if we fail to see the actual process of
changes, we fall into the trap of conceptual constructions
(vikalpas). In this context, Buddhist philosophy introduces the
conception of śūnyatā as an analytical tool. One of the most
impressive and inspiring explanation given by Nāgārjuna on the
conception śūnyatā is: sarvasakalpanāśāya śūnyatāmtadeśanā /
yasya tasyām api grāhas tvayāsāvavasādita // The direction given
by śūnyatā is like amta (the curative property of amta) that it
removes all the illusory imaginations. On the other hand, if one
were to get hold of this concept, he would sink himself into it.
Mādhyamika dialectics 15 would view the topic discussion in
such way that like a desert traveler who is thirty for water and
looking for a place to rest, the economic theorist with the support
of scientific thinking would configure that the economic freedom
they are looking at is there in the mirage (from the inferential
examples of ‘objects seen at far’ and ‘the origin of sprout from
seed.’ Such economists would have us believe that travelling in the
15

In Mādhyamika dialectics, the conception of śūnyatā is meant to help us
to view the actual as the way it exists without falling into the abysmal depth of
the confusions created by conceptual constructions. The śūnyatā functions as a
dialectical tool that could help us to understand the real situation as it is, such as
the question of seed or no-seed or the reality of mirage or its non existence. In
those cases, the śūnyatā never confutes with the idea of the causal value of the
seed but would not conclude that the seed causes a sprout necessarily. It takes a
lot of things into account when it has to announce this causal relation.
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desert with all our effort could get us to the goal of finding the
oasis of happiness and plentitude. In this process, we take the
examples of life with the analogy of the origination of a sprout
from the seed or the Smithian position on self interest (self love)
alone as the driving force for us to reach the goal for each
individual to contribute to the welfare of the social economy.
It is none of those theorists who propagated the idea of self
interest maximization as the basis of human transactions and
engagements was aware of the context in which Adam Smith
originally envisioned this idea that there are a lot of human
concerns and moral considerations backing the notion of self
interest. The real challenge before those theorists was to find a
scientifically functional theory that could be applicable everywhere.
In that sense, they used the knowledge from the quotation by Smith
as common knowledge that could be applicable and which could
give sound judgments. In this situation, normally people take the
example of the relationship between seed and sprout without
considering the other aspects relating to it. Knowledge of this kind
is necessary for making judgments that are in demand, as in the
case of water and a place to rest for the desert voyager. The
scientific mode of thinking requests us to look forward and move
forward since analytical knowledge considered a savior.
The problem of knowledge and judgment in dialectical
situations is actually the course of such confusions in the world.
For understanding this aspect better, we can find an impressive
observation by Nāgārjuna in which he concludes that: ya
pratityasamutpāda śūnyatā tā prakamahe/ sā prajñāptir
upādāyā pratipat saiva madhyamā // (Here everything that is
originated dependently is revealed as śūnyatā; and that which is
dependent on prajñā is seen in way of the middle – the way of the
middle path.)
The explanation to this verse in my opinion is that we can use
for understanding the real nature of phenomenal realities that
implicitly reveal the implicit dependent nature of each
phenomenon. In that sense, śūnyatā and prajñā serve the same
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function of revealing the actual situation without falling into the
problem of conceptual construction.
The butcher who sold his butcher business did the same thing.
He followed the knowledge made available to him by the
economic theorists and created a conceptual world (vikalpa). He
did not realize that the freedom he was seeking was available if he
were to satisfy all three adjuncts of life: artha, kāma, and dharma
for moka. Or as Adam Smith wanted to say, we enjoy when we
discharge our moral obligations as human beings. When we earn
enough wealth and when we have satisfied our urge by earning, we
want to be ethical. The butcher may now want a reversal of things
that may not happen for him, but the conception of śūnyatā or
prajñā helps one to view the problem and take corrective decisions.

PEACE THROUGH MORAL LIFE: AN ANALYSIS
BASED ON EARLY BUDDHIST DISCOURSES
Y. Karunadasa
Peace through moral life – to some this may appear pretty
obvious with no need for analysis; and to others, as an oldfashioned approach to the solution of a perennial problem.
However, we would like to submit that at the bottom of all social
problems, there looms a moral crisis as well – often masqueraded
under more trendy labels. The moral problem therefore calls for
our serious attention, for no sensible person can ignore the need for
a moral basis for all inter-personal relations as the surest guarantee
for ensuring peace. As an Indian classic observes, it is man’s
higher moral sense that marks him off from the lower species of
evolution.1 This could also be understood more as a prescription
than as a description, as exhortation as to how man should conduct
himself. For man has within him the potential and the wherewithal
either to elevate himself to the highest levels of moral perfection or
to descend down to the lowest depths of moral depravity. It is in
this context that we would like to submit for your consideration the
early Buddhist teaching on the moral life and its relevance to us
today in promoting peace at all levels.

1

Cf. Dharmo hi tesa adhiko viseso, dharmena hina pasubhi samaa
(Hitopadesa).
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We must begin by saying that early Buddhism is an out-andout ethical religion with an ethical idea as its final goal. It makes
no distinction, therefore, between the religious and the moral life.
What is morally reprehensible is not sought to be justified even on
religious grounds. Accordingly, all Buddhist observations on
politics and economics, on social institutions and inter-personal
relations, take into consideration the primacy of the moral life and
the need for a moral foundation of society. Buddhism also believes
that the efficacy of a moral view of life should depend on the
validity of the worldview, which serves as its raison d’etre. This
explains why the practice of the Buddhist moral life begins with
sammā dihi or right understanding. The reason behind this is that
a proper way of life should begin with a proper view of life. The
practice of the moral life must have as its rationale a worldview
involving a proper interpretation of our internal and external
experience.
The early Buddhist worldview could be described as a critical
response to two other worldviews that, according to the Buddha,
have a tendency to prevail throughout the history of the man’s
intellectual thought. Thus, addressing Kaccayana, the Buddha says,
“This world, O Kaccayana, generally proceeds on a duality of the
belief in existence and the belief in non-existence…. All exists,
Kaccayana, that is one extreme. Naught exists, Kaccayana, that is
the other extreme. Not approaching either extreme the Tathāgata
teaches you a doctrine by the middle way.”2
The reference is clearly to sassatavāda, the belief in
permanence or eternalism and ucchedavāda, the belief in
annihilation; in other words, to the belief in Being (bhūta-dihi)
and the belief in non-Being (vibhava-dihi).3 It is against these two
worldviews that the early Buddhist problems are continually
directed and it is by demolishing them that Buddhism seeks to
construct its own worldview. This explains why the early Buddhist
doctrines are presented in such a way as to unfold themselves or
2
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follow as a logical sequence from a sustained criticism of
sassatavāda and ucchedavāda. This particular context is
sometimes explicitly stated, sometimes, taken for granted. The
conclusion suggests itself, therefore, that it was as a critical
response to two mutually exclusive worldviews that Buddhism
emerged as a new faith amidst many other faiths.
What exactly does Buddhism mean by sassatavāda and
ucchedavāda and why does Buddhism consider itself as a critical
response to their mutual opposition? If we go by the early Buddhist
discourses, sassatavāda is the worldview which seeks to explain
the human personality by positing a soul entity which is distinct
from the body. 4 What seems to be emphasized here is the
distinction between a permanent metaphysical self and the
perishable physical body. By implication, this means that man’s
true essence is to be found, not in the perishable physical body, but
in the permanent metaphysical self. Since this soul-entity was also
conceived as something eternal, this particular worldview came to
be referred to in the early Buddhist discourses as sassatavāda or
eternalism.5 All the Indian religions current during the time of the
Buddha, whether they arose as a linear development of the Vedic
thought or as a reaction against it, seem to have subscribed to this
particular theory of the human personality. We may then introduce
this religious or spiritual view of life as the theory of metaphysical
self. From the Buddhist point of view, therefore, all religions, past
or present, which advocate the belief in an eternal / immoral selfsubsisting spiritual entity are but different versions of sassatavāda
and are therefore subsumable under this generic term.
On the other hand, ucchedavāda is the worldview which
considers itself as a reaction against sassatavāda. Therefore,
instead of positing a metaphysical soul-entity different from the
physical body, it identifies the physical body itself as man’s soul
entity.6 What is emphasized here is not the duality but the identity
of the soul and the body.7 By implication, this means that man’s
4
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true-essence is to be found, not in an elusive metaphysical self, but
in the empirically observable physical body. Since this physical
self is something that gets annihilated at death, with no prospect of
post-mortal existence, this particular worldview came to be
referred to in the early Buddhist discourses as ucchedavāda or
annihilationism. 8 The various schools of materialism current
during the time of the Buddha seem to have subscribed to this
theory of the human personality. We may, then, introduce this
materialist view of life as the theory of the physical self. From the
Buddhist point of view, therefore, all forms of materialism, past or
present, which advocate the theory of the physical self, are but
different versions of ucchedavāda and are therefore subsumable
under this generic term.
Thus, the Buddhist critique of sassatavāda and ucchedavāda is
the Buddhist critique of the spiritual and the materialist views of
existence which, according to Buddhism, persist throughout the
history of human thought. From the Buddhist point of view, both
views are but two different versions of ātmavāda, the belief in a
soul. The difference is to be seen between a soul that is spiritual
and eternal and therefore which survives death, on the one hand,
and a soul that is material and temporary and which therefore gets
annihilated at death, on the other.
If Buddhism dissociates itself from sassatavāda, this means
that it does not recognize a spiritual soul entity impervious to
change. This may also be understood as the denial of any kind of
spiritual substance in man which relates him to some kind of
transcendental reality serving as the ultimate ground of existence.
This is where Buddhism sets itself off from all spiritual ideologies
which postulate an Absolute, either in the form of a personal God
or an impersonal Godhead, as the raison d’etre of our world of
internal and external experience. This characteristically Buddhist
position has enabled Buddhism to focus its attention on man and
his present predicament rather than on an ineffable Absolute. This
explains why there are more psychological observations in
Buddhism than metaphysical speculations, anthropology instead of
8
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theology. It also explains why Buddhism considers that exalted
humanity is a better ideal than elusive divinity. On the other hand,
if Buddhism dissociates itself from ucchedavāda, this means that
the human personality is not a pure product of earth awaiting to be
annihilated at death, but an uninterrupted congery of
psycho-physical phenomena which does not terminate at death,
with the dissolution of the body. Although Buddhism does not
agree completely with sassatavāda, it does not deny survival
(punabbhava), moral responsibility and moral retribution
(kammavāda).
If Buddhism transcends the perennial conflict between
sassatavāda and ucchedavāda, it does so through its doctrine of
dependent origination (paiccasamuppāda) or the conditionality of
all phenomena (idap paccayatā). 9 This is the Buddhist doctrine
which serves as a foundation for all other Buddhist doctrines.
Hence, the Buddha says that one who has an insight into the fact of
dependent origination has an insight into the very heart of the
Dhamma. 10 The Buddha himself defines it as the Middle
Teaching, 11 because it transcends the eternalist and the
annihilationist ideologies (sassatavāda and ucchedavāda) whether
they manifest themselves as “sabbam ekattam” or “sabba
puthuttam”. 12 The first is the monistic view which reduces
existence to a common ultimate ground. The second is the opposite
pluralistic view which reduces existence to a concatenation of
discrete entities.
The Buddhist critique of ideologies, it may be noted here, takes
into consideration their psychological motivation as well. The
theory behind this is that our desires and expectations have an
impact on what we tend to believe in. According to the Buddhist
diagnosis of the psychology behind sassatavāda and ucchedavāda,

9
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the former is due to craving for being (bhava-tahā), 13 i.e., the
desire to perpetuate the individual self into eternity, the desire for
immortality; and the latter is due to the craving for non-being
(vibhava-tahā),14 the desire to get completely annihilated at death.
For by denying survival, ucchedavāda provides us with a
theoretical justification to lead a life without being burdened by
sense of moral responsibility and tormented by the fear of moral
retribution. Therefore, it abhors any prospect of after-death
existence and it is this psychological resistance, if our
interpretation is correct, that encourages the desire for complete
annihilation at death. Thus, according to Buddhism, the mutual
conflict between sassatavāda and ucchedavāda represents, not
only the perennial conflict between the spiritual and materialist
views of existence, but the human mind’s oscillation between two
deep-seated desires.
From what we have observed so far, two things should become
clear: The first is that sassatavāda is the Buddhist term for all
religions, past or present, which advocate the theory of the
metaphysical self. The second is that ucchedavāda is the Buddhist
term for all forms of materialism which, while advocating the
opposite theory of the physical self, reject all religions including
Buddhism. Thus, the Buddhist critique of these two worldviews
brings into focus Buddhism’s own worldview.
If the Buddhist worldview transcends the mutual opposition
between sassatavāda and ucchedavāda, it also transcends the
mutual opposition between their practical manifestations. For
sassatavāda, the physical frame in which the elusive soul is
encased is not an instrument but a veritable obstacle for the soul’s
deliverance. What prevents its upward journey is the gravitational
pull of the body (sense-pleasures). Hence, deliverance of the self,
its perpetuation in a state of eternal bliss, requires mortification of
the flesh. This is what came to be referred to in the early Buddhist
discourses as attakilamatha-anuyoga or self-mortification. 15 It
13
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must, however, be mentioned here, this can have different levels in
different religions depending on the way they define the relation
between metaphysical soul and the physical body. Nevertheless,
the subordination of the latter to the former implies where the
direction and the emphasis are. It logically leads to the theoretical
justification of ascetic practices as a means to self-perfection. On
the other hand, since ucchedavāda identifies the self with the
physical body, man’s aim in life, during his temporary sojourn here
on earth, cannot be the rejection of sensual gratification in the
pursuit of a higher spiritual ideal. If anything, it could be just the
opposite. This is what came to be referred to in the early Buddhist
discourses as kāmasukhallika-anuyoga.16
According to the Buddhist assessment, what is wrong in selfmortification is that it considers the physical body not as a useful
instrument but as an obstacle to mental culture. “Here the error lies
in taking the body to be the cause of the bondage when the real
source of the trouble lies in the mind – the mind obsessed by greed,
aversion and delusion.”17 The mortification of the body is not only
futile (anatthasahita) but fraught with suffering (dukkha) and is
therefore ignoble (anariya).18 It amounts to the impairment of an
instrument which is necessary for mental culture. This approach
may be due to a genuine aspiration for moral perfection. In point of
fact, the Buddha was less critical of self-mortification than sensual
indulgence. This explains why although the latter is criticized as
lowly (hīna), vulgar (gamma), and secular (pothujjanika), the same
criticism is not extended to the former.19 The implication seems to
be that sassatavāda which serves as the theoretical background of
self-mortification does not lead to the complete collapse of the
moral life. It is not subversive of the higher ideals of human
culture. For it recognizes a spiritual source in man and therefore
the moral foundation of society. In fact, according to Buddhism, all
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religions are but different forms of kammavāda, 20 for they all
advocate the practice of the moral life. However, Buddhism adds
this provision, kammavāda or the advocacy of the moral 1ife
becomes futile if it does not lead to kiriyavāda the advocacy of the
efficacy of moral acts, and this in turn, to viriyavāda, the advocacy
of the role of the human effort.21 These are the three main pillars
on which Buddhism builds its own edifice of the moral life. And it
was by taking these into consideration that the Buddha criticized
the other-versions of kammavāda prevalent during the day.
Sensual indulgence, which is the other extreme and which has
a materialist view of life as its theoretical background, is from the
Buddhist point of view, more unsatisfactory. It is based on the
mistaken view that the path to happiness lies in the continued
gratification of the desire for sensual pleasure, the titillation of the
senses as the only means to happiness. From a moral point of view,
what is undesirable about this approach is that it encourages the
satisfaction of self-centered desires and ego-centric impulses. That
this way of life gives pleasure is undeniable, but “the enjoyment is
gross, transitory and devoid of deep contentment.”22 The Buddhist
critique of gratification in sensuality as a means to happiness has
much relevance to us today when secularism has set up
consumerism as a goal in itself. Alcoholism, drug addiction,
juvenile delinquency, sexual violence, and the appeal of cults
which promise immediate relief from boredom, besides many
others, are the symptoms of a worldwide malaise which finds no
signs of abatement. At the bottom of all this is the mistaken quest
for the conquest of happiness through continued indulgence in
sensuality. It fails to take into consideration “the principle of
diminishing returns which operates in the mere gratificatory quest
for happiness.”23
It is in the context of this Buddhist critique of the two extremes
of self-mortification and sensual indulgence that the Buddhist
20
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teaching on the moral life assumes its significance. Its description
as the middle way (majjhimā paipadā) shows that it is aloof, or
sets itself off, from both extremes. This does not mean that what
Buddhism calls the Middle Path is a compromise between the two
extremes or their admixture. It is their avoidance in two, the
transcendence of their mutual opposition. The words used are
“ubho ante anupagamma,”24 meaning “without entering into either
of the two extremes.” The Middle Way is another expression for
the Noble Eightfold Path that, in the words of the Buddha, “gives
rise to vision, gives rise to knowledge, and leads to peace, to direct
knowledge, to enlightenment, and to Nibbāna.”25
If the Noble Eightfold Path begins with sammā dihi (right
view), this means that the practice of the moral life should be
based on a right view of actuality, our world of internal and
external experience. The first path-factor thus serves as a guide to
all other path-factors. The importance of right view lies in the fact
that our perspectives on the nature of actuality condition all our
actions and value-orientations. Therefore, the ideational framework
through which we perceive the world has a direct impact on the
way we make our choices and goals and on how we seek to
actualize them. Whether we express our views and beliefs in public
or whether we keep them to ourselves, they have a direct bearing
on the way we conduct ourselves in our individual and social life.
Hence, the Buddha says that he sees no single factor so responsible
for the arising of unwholesome states of mind as wrong view, and
no factor so helpful for the arising of wholesome states of mind as
right view. Again, there is no single factor so responsible for the
suffering of living beings as wrong view, and no factor so patent in
promoting the good of living beings as right view.26
Although Buddhism draws our attention to the importance of
right view as a necessary guide to the practice of the moral life, it
does not endorse dogmatic adherence to views, even if they are
right. Infatuation with one’s own view is sandihi-rāga and
24
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dogmatic adherence to ideologies is dihi-paramasa. Both
manifest themselves as “This alone is true, all else is false.”27 It is
this kind of mentality that provides a fertile ground for bigotry and
dogmatism whose practical manifestations are religious fanaticism
and persecution, not to speak of interpersonal conflicts, sometimes
leading to internecine warfare. When a religion becomes a
dogmatic ideology, it loses its spiritual dimension and paves the
way for ideological conflicts. In fact, it is not incorrect to say that
dogmatic attachment to ideologies is fraught with more danger
than excessive attachment to material things. The religious wars
during the medieval period, referred to by a misnomer as holy wars,
are cases in point. If we do not witness them today, it is perhaps
because the issues have changed and not that we have become
more tolerant. The Buddhist critique of dogmatism shows that a
critical approach, far from being detrimental, is salutary even to
spiritual life. From the Buddhist point of view, a truly religious life
should, therefore, be based on healthy criticism and continual
self-examination.
Another source of ideological dogmatism is the confusion
between the means and the end, the elevation of the means to the
status of the ideal. The Buddhist position on this matter is quite
clear: the Dhamma as a means has only relative value, relative to
the realization of the goal. In the “Parable of the Raft” (kullupama),
the Buddha tells us that his teaching should be understood not as a
goal in itself, but as a means to the realization of the goal.28 What
this seems to imply is that even the right view (sammā dihi) is a
conceptual model which serves as an instrument for obtaining a
true vision (dassana) to the nature of actuality. 29 Thus, the
emphasis is not on dihi (view) but on dassana (vision, insight).
The former is a means paving the way to the latter. Nor does
Buddhism associate itself with any kind of dogmatism and
absolutism as to how the right view should be presented. Hence,
the Buddha says that his doctrine should be understood not as an
27
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absolutist statement (nippariyāya) but as one presented in relative
terms (pariyāya).30 What this seems to suggest is that the nature of
actuality could be presented in different conceptual models among
which one is not held out as superior or interior to another. The
validity of each is to be seemed in its ability to realize the ideal, i.e.,
an insight into the nature of reality.
If right view provides the ideational basis of the moral life, the
second path-factor, right intentions (sammā sakappa), draws our
attention to the mind’s intentional function, the purposive aspect of
mental activity. It is through this factor that values in consonance
with the right view and oriented towards the right goal get properly
structured. Right intentions are of three kinds: (i) intentions of
renunciation, i.e., those free from self-centered desires and
ego-centric impulses; (ii) intentions free from aversion; and (iii)
harmfulness, i.e., those of benevolence and compassionate love.31
Such intentions form the psychological foundation for benevolent
moral actions. All actions which are socially harmful, all forms of
social conflict, violence and oppression can ultimately be traced to
our bad intentions. They are the manifestations or the outcroppings
of our thoughts motivated by greed, malice and delusion. Thus, our
mind’s intentional function has a tremendous impact on our social
environment. Therefore, the cultivation of right intentions is the
surest guarantee for interpersonal concord and peace. Today, when
we are living in a global village that cuts across natural barriers
and national frontiers, our right or wrong intentions have a wider
impact than at any period in the history of the human civilization.
The next three path-factors take into consideration our speech
(vācā), actions (kammanta) and livelihood (ājīva). Together they
represent the vocal and physical manifestations of our right or
wrong intentions, which in turn are guided by our right or wrong
views. It is at this level that our thoughts or intentions begin to
have a concrete impact on our social environment, for better or
worse. In the context of social ethics, therefore, these three factors
assume immense significance.
30
31
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The Buddhist teaching on right speech (sammā vācā) takes into
consideration four aspects. The first is that it should be dissociated
from all forms of falsehood. Positively this means devotion to truth
which makes one reliable and worthy of confidence. The second is
abstention from calumny or slanderous speech (pisuā vācā),
which is intended to make enmity and dissension among people.
Its opposite is the speech that heals divisions and promotes amity,
harmony and friendship. The third is abstention from harsh speech
(pharusā vācā). All forms of abuse, insult, and even sarcastic
remarks are its variations. Its opposite is the speech which is
“blameless, pleasant to the ear, lovely, reaching to the heart,
urbane, pleasing and appealing to the people.” Fourthly, right
speech consists of abstention from frivolous and vain talk, idle
chatter and pointless talk, all lacking in purpose and depth
(saphappalāpa). Its opposite is to be found in one who cultivates
meaningful, purposeful, useful and timely speech.32 The first and
the fourth aspects of right speech show that according to Buddhism,
even truth must not be stated if it leads to problems. In uttering
what is true, one should take into consideration not only its
potential effect but also the proper time for its utterance
(kālavādin).
These four aspects of right speech show how exhaustive and
thoroughgoing the Buddhist moral teaching is on how we should
exercise our capacity for verbal expression. The effects of speech
are as pervasive as those of physical action. Hence, we cannot
overlook its potential and consequences for good or harm. A
careless word or a sarcastic remark could break lives, make
enemies and even start wars. Hence, Buddhism advises us to be
ever watchful of our words (vācānurakkhi).33 This advice has more
relevance and importance today “when the positive and negative
potentials of speech have been vastly multiplied by the tremendous
increase in the means, speed and range of communications.” 34
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If right speech involves the proper cultivation of vocal acts,
right action (sammā kammanta) requires the cultivation of proper
modes of bodily acts. It enjoins first abstention from injury to life
and all forms of violence, the laying aside of all cudgels and
weapons and, positively the cultivation of love and compassion to
all creatures that have life. Secondly, it enjoins one to abstain from
“taking what is not given.” All kinds of thievery, robbery,
fraudulence through false claims, deceiving customers by using
false weights and measures, and even literary plagiarism axe some
of its many variations. Positively this means cultivation of honesty
and purity of heart at all levels of interpersonal relations. Thirdly,
right action requires abstention from wrongful gratification of
sensual desires through sexual misconduct or illicit sexual relations.
The fifth path-factor is on the necessity of following a morally
acceptable means of livelihood (sammā ājīva). The Buddha
mentions five specific modes of livelihood which are to be avoided:
trading in weapons, in human beings (slave trade, for example), in
living beings (butchery and meat production), in poison, and in
intoxicating drinks. 35 Practicing deceit, treachery, soothsaying,
trickery, and usury are among other wrongful means of livelihood.
In short, any occupation which entails harmful consequences to
others is to be considered as morally reprehensible, although it
could be materially rewarding.
The last three factors of the Noble Eightfold Path, namely right
effort (sammā vāyāma), right mindfulness (sammā sati) and right
concentration (sammā samādhi), form a closely inter-related group
involving direct mental training. They have as their basis the
purification of conduct brought about by the three prior factors.
The first requires putting forth energy to eliminate unwholesome
dispositions and to prevent them from arising anew and to cultivate
and stabilize wholesome dispositions. This particular path-factor
brings into focusing the indispensability of effort, diligence,
exertion and unflagging perseverance for the successful practice of
the Buddhist moral life. It is the vital factor “necessary for the
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triumph of the moral will over the baser emotions.”36 The second,
which is right mindfulness, is presence of mind, attentiveness,
alertness, or awareness that plays the role of an inward mentor
watching over all mental activity. For purposes of watching the
mind, it is necessary that it “should be trained to remain in the
present, open, quiet and alert,” 37 free from all judgments,
evaluations and interpretations. The ultimate aim of right
mindfulness is to give proper moral direction to all volitional acts
and their mental, vocal and physical manifestations. Sammā
samādhi or right concentration is the unification of the
differentiated mind, the calm, clear, unconfounded state of the
mind, “the centering of all mental activity right and evenly.”38 It is
this factor that serves as the proper basis for the dawning of
wisdom, a true vision to the nature of reality, resulting in the
elimination of all unwholesome dispositions and culminating in
moral perfection.
This brings us to an end of our general survey of the Noble
Eightfold Path, the Buddhist scheme for the practice of the moral
life. Here, we would like to make two observations. One is that the
eight factors of the path are not like the steps of a ladder, usually
followed in sequence and sometimes bypassing some for purposes
of expediency. As Bhikkhu Bodhi observes, “they can be more
aptly described as components rather than as steps, comparable to
the intertwining strands of a single cable that requires the
contributions of all for maximal strength.” 39 However, at the
beginning and until such time when they begin to support each
other some degree of sequence is inevitable. The other observation
that we would like to make here is that the Noble Eightfold Path
should not be understood as a path that we leave behind once we
have reached the destination. The path-factors are in fact eight
moral qualities to be absorbed and developed internally. Once
these eight factors are fully developed, it results in the emergence
36

P. D. Premasiri, Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Vol. V (Colombo:
Government of Ceylon, 1990), 150.
37
Bhikkhu Bodhi, op. cit., 84.
38
Ibid, 104.
39
Ibid, 12.

Peace Through Moral Life

261

of two other factors, namely right emancipation (sammā-vimutti)
and right knowledge and vision (sammā-ñānādassana). These are
ten kusala qualities which an arahant is said to be endowed with.40
Thus, the highest level of moral perfection based on the Noble
Eightfold Path is Nibbāna, to which the other two factors, namely
right emancipation and right knowledge and vision, are added. It
may not be incorrect to say, therefore, that to follow the Path is to
become the Path, for here, to a great extent, the means coincides
with the end as well.
One widespread misunderstanding of the Noble Eightfold Path
is only for those who have renounced the lay life and not for the
laity. This misunderstanding is part of the mistaken view that early
Buddhism is an entirely other-worldly religion, an ascetic
movement which has nothing to do with worldly life. We would
like to submit three specific reasons why this conclusion is not
acceptable. The first is that all the Buddhist moral teachings,
whether they concern the laity or the monks / nuns, are ultimately
traceable to the Noble Eightfold Path. It therefore follows that the
Buddhist teachings pertaining to happiness in this world,
well-being in the life after and the path leading to the realization of
Nibbāna are all based on it. It is the repository of Buddhist ethics
from which all other ethical teachings emanate. Secondly, the
definition given to right livelihood (sammā ājīva), for instance, as
abstention from five kinds of morally reprehensible trades, shows
clearly that the laymen, too, were taken into consideration in
defining the Noble Path. The third is the most important since it is
based on the words of the Buddha himself. In the Sayutta-nikāya,
the Buddha refers to two kinds of paths. One is the wrong path
(micchā paipadā) and the other is the right path (sammā paipadā).
After defining the wrong path as the direct opposite of the Noble
Eightfold Path, the Buddha says, “Monks, I do not uphold the
wrong path either for laymen or monks.41 Thus, the Middle Path
which is also the Noble Eightfold Path is the right path not only for
monks and nuns but also for laymen and laywomen. The clear
40
41

M. II, 115.
S. V, 18-9.

262

Y. Karunadasa

implication is that the Path could be followed on different levels or
in varying degrees of intensity. If it cannot be followed fully, it is
better to follow it as far as possible. If the best thing is to realize
the ideal, the next best thing is to be nearer the ideal. This situation
is in fact true of all present-day social, economic and political
ideals. Just because there are varying degrees of differences
between the ideal and the practice, we do not propose to give up
the ideal. The ideal is an invitation to do the right thing and to
resist from doing the wrong thing.
As a religious teacher who upholds the supremacy of the moral
life, the Buddha defines his position as follows: “You yourself
should do what ought to be done; the Tathāgatas are (only)
teachers.”42 Thus, the Buddha is not a savior who could redeem
mankind. On the contrary, he is a spiritual guide who shows the
way, the way to enlightenment and emancipation. Hence, he is also
called “a torch-bearer to mankind.” 43 As a moral teacher, he
explains to us what is morally wholesome and unwholesome and
the consequences that follow from our morally wholesome and
unwholesome acts. The Buddhist moral precepts should, therefore,
be understood as descriptive rather than prescriptive. There are no
moral commandments or injunctions as to what ought to be done
and what ought not to be done. This also means that morally good
and bad acts are neither rewarded nor punished, but that they have
their own consequences according to the principles of moral
causation, what the Buddhist commentators call kammaniyama or
the moral order.
However, saddhā or faith in the Buddha and his Doctrine
(Dhamma) is necessary if we are to embark on the course of
spiritual discipline that culminates in moral perfection. Reference
is made in the early Buddhist discourses to two kinds of saddhā.
One is called amūlika saddhā, i.e., baseless or blind faith. The
other is called akaravati saddhā or “rationa1 faith,”44 i.e., faith or
confidence arrived at by examining reasonable evidence for any
42
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claim made. It is this latter kind of faith that Buddhism emphasizes.
In fact, excessive faith or devotion to the Buddha could be an
obstacle to spiritual progress as is seen from the story of the
Buddhist monk called Vakkali.
It, therefore, follows that those who have faith in the efficacy
of the Dhamma to elevate a person from a morally lower position
to a morally higher position come to consider the Buddha as a
Moral Authority. Here by authority we do not mean a person who
has authoritative power, but one who has authoritative knowledge
on the subject. Hence, the followers of the Buddha, both laymen
and monks, consider him the highest authority on all problems
relating to the moral life. Therefore, they all have faith in the
Buddha and the Dhamma. There have been some attempts made to
minimize the importance of the role of faith in Buddhism. Textual
evidence does not support such a conclusion.
However, in presenting the Buddhist moral teachings, the
Buddha also took into consideration the necessity of keeping to a
minimum what may be called the faith-factor. A moral teaching, if
it is to be effective, should be persuasive rather than coercive. In
this connection, he also took into consideration that if not all, at
least the intelligent members in the society (viññū parisā) have the
ability to be rationally persuaded as to make a proper distinction
between what is morally good and bad. For this purpose, the
Buddha has laid down a set of guidelines that each individual
could follow in the practice of the moral life.
One such guideline is called attupama or self-comparison. This
is an invitation to the individual to put himself in another
individual’s position. If one does not like to be killed, it follows
that the other person also does not like to be killed. This is very
well illustrated in the well-known Dhammapada verse: “All
tremble at punishment; and all fear death. Comparing oneself to
another, let one refrain from killing another, and let one refrain
from killing and tormenting others.” 45 The same idea is more
poignantly expressed in the Sayutta-nikāya: “Here, a noble
disciple reflects thus: ‘I like to live. I do not like to die. I desire
45
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happiness and dislike unhappiness. Suppose someone should kill
me, since I like to live and do not like to die, it would not be
pleasing and delightful to me. Suppose I too should kill another
who likes to live and does not like to die, who desires happiness
and does not desire unhappiness, it would not be pleasing and
delightful to that other person as well. What is not pleasant and
delightful to me is not pleasant and delightful to the other person
either. How could I inflict upon another that which is not pleasant
and delightful to me?’ Having reflected in this manner, he (the
noble disciple) on his own refrains from killing, and encourages
others too to refrain from killing, and speaks in praise of refraining
from killing.”46 The basic idea behind this moral guideline is that
all living beings, whether they are human or otherwise, are led by
the pleasure-principle and therefore recoil from pain.47 If human
beings, as observed in the Vasettha Sutta, 48 differ biologically
(jātimaya) from all other species of living beings, what is common
to all is the fact that they like to be happy, they do not like to be
unhappy.
A second guideline for moral action is the one based on what
the Buddhist commentators call the threefold ādhipateya or the
three kinds of dominant influence.49 This requires our examining
the moral quality of an act from three different points of view. The
first, called attādhipateya, invites the individual to examine
whether the act he is going to commit results in self-blame or
repentance. This is a clear reference to what may be called
conscience, although a word corresponding to it does not seem to
occur in the early Buddhist discourses. This is a case of allowing
oneself to be controlled by oneself. The second, called
lokādhipateya, requires the individual to examine whether such
and such arts will be approved or disapproved by intelligent people.
This is a case of allowing oneself to be controlled by public
opinion. However, the Buddhist idea of public opinion does not
exactly correspond to how we understand it today, i.e., as the
46
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opinion of the majority. According to Buddhism, what matters is
neither the opinion of the majority nor that of the minority, but the
opinion of those who really know, the intelligent people in society;
the term used is viññū purisā. This is the yardstick that should be
adopted when we are confronted with what others say. Hence,
what is morally approvable is referred to as viññuppasaha and
conversely what is morally reprehensible as viñūgarahita. The
third point of view from which our acts are to be examined is
called dhammādhipateya, i.e., whether they conform to the Moral
Norm. This threefold examination is thus intended as a check for
refraining from doing what is morally unwholesome and also as an
incentive to do what is morally wholesome.
A third guideline is based on a rational appeal to a reasonably
intelligent person’s moral sense – if this term is permissible. In the
Kālāma Sutta, it is recorded that the people of Kālāma complained
to the Buddha that they were at a loss to discriminate between what
is morally good and bad, because they were confronted with a
variety of contradictory opinions on this matter. Then, the Buddha
put this question to them: “Now what think, you Kālāmas, when
greed (for example) arises within a man, does it arise to his profit
or to his loss? When the Kālāmas admitted that it conduces to
one’s own loss, the Buddha continued: “Now, Kālāma, does not
this man, thus become greedy, being overcome by greed and losing
control of his mind – does he not kill a living creature, take what is
not given, go after another’s wife, tell lies and induce others, too,
to commit deeds that would conduce to disadvantage and
unhappiness for a long time?”50 This same observation was made
in respect of malice (dosa) and delusion (confusion). A similar
argument, with the opposite effect, is repeated in respect of the
absence of greed, malice and delusion. It was through this rational
appeal to Kālāmas’ moral sense that the Buddha was able to
convince them of the undesirability of what is morally
reprehensible and of the desirability of what is morally rewarding.
As P. D. Premasiri observes, the Kālāma Sutta is “philosophically
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significant in that it draws attention to the possibility of
independent inquiry into moral questions.”51
The next question that we propose to take up is the relative
position which Buddhism assigns to our own good and the good of
others. How is the distinction between egoism and altruism
maintained?
The Buddhist answer to his question is very well illustrated in a
classification of individuals into four groups. The first individual is
he who does not strive either for his own well-being (attahita) or
for the well-being of others (parahita).52 The second individual is
he who pursues the well-being of others but fails to pursue his own
well-being. The third individual is he who strives for his own wellbeing and not for the well-being of others. The fourth individual is
he who strives for his own well-being as well as for the well-being
of others.53 The most important thing that must not be overlooked
here is that in this classification, the words “pursuit of well-being”
mean the pursuit of moral well-being, and not any other kind of
well-being. We should bear this in mind if we are to draw the
correct conclusion as to how Buddhism draws the line between
one’s own good and the good of others.
This classification of the four kinds of individuals is done in an
ascending order of excellence. Therefore, the fourth individual is
judged to be the best. An examination of the classification should
also show the great importance attached to one’s own moral wellbeing. This is very clear from the fact that the third individual who
pursues his own moral well-being is superior to the second person
who pursues the moral well-being of others, while neglecting his
own moral well-being. This same idea is also applied by the fact
that the fourth individual is judged to be the best. If the fourth
individual is held out as the best, this means that although he
pursues the moral well-being of others, he also pursues his own
moral well-being.
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Why does Buddhism attach more importance to one’s own
moral well-being? Does this mean that the early Buddhist morality
is individualistic, that it considers self-interest more important than
altruism? An affirmative conclusion is sometimes found in some
modern writings on Buddhism. The question we raised need not
lead to any kind of unwarranted speculation. For the answer to it is
provided in the Buddhist discourses themselves.
The Buddhist answer to this question is that one who is lacking
in morality cannot make others morally good. In illustrating this
situation, it is observed that a person who is stuck in mud cannot
pull out another who is also stuck in mud. The lesson to be drawn
is that a person who is stuck in the mud of moral depravity cannot
save another who is also in the same predicament. Before one
seeks to eliminate another’s moral depravity, one must first
eliminate it from oneself. This reminds us of the well-known
saying: Example is better than precept.
It is also maintained that the benefits of moral cultivation are
reciprocal. When a person eliminates from his mind such
unwholesome mental disposition as greed, malice and delusion,
they will not manifest themselves in practical form in relation to
others. Thus, moral cultivation has not only an individual
dimension but a social dimension as well. This is the significance
of the Buddha’s saying: “Monks, one who takes care of oneself,
takes care of others. And one who takes care of others takes care of
oneself. How, monks, is it that one who takes care of oneself takes
care of others. It is by moral training, moral culture and moral
development. And how, monks, does one who takes care of others
take care of oneself? It is by forbearance, by harmlessness, by
goodwill and compassion.”54
If Buddhism attaches more importance to an individual’s own
moral well-being, it should not be concluded from this that a
person who has attained moral perfection remains indifferent to
society. On the contrary, he addresses himself to the pursuit of
others’ moral well-being. This is clearly shown not only by the life
led by the Buddha, but also by the lives led by the arahants, as
54
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recorded in the Pāli texts. It is best illustrated by the Buddha’s
admonition to the first sixty arahants to go forth and preach the
doctrine of emancipation “for the benefit, well-being and
happiness of the man.”
Before we conclude this paper, we would like to refer here to
another important aspect of the Buddhist teaching on the moral life.
It is that according to Buddhism, moral perfection should be
accompanied by knowledge and must also be based on knowledge.
If they do not go together, moral perfection loses its very
foundation. To put it briefly, this means that a person who is
morally perfect but is not aware of his moral perfection is not
morally perfect. This may appear rather paradoxical, nevertheless
from the Buddhist point of view, it is the case.
This situation is very well illustrated in the Samaamandika
Sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya which records the theory of moral
perfection as advocated by a religious teacher of the Buddha’s day,
called Uggahamana. As recorded here, his definition of a morally
perfect person is as follows: “A person who does not do an evil act
with his body, speaks no evil speech, intends no evil intention,
leads no evil livelihood, is to that extent morally perfect.” 55
Apparently this seems to be how the Buddha himself teaches moral
perfection. However, the fact that it comes to be criticized by the
Buddha shows that this definition of moral perfection is not
acceptable to Buddhism. In criticizing it, the Buddha makes these
observations: “According to this view of moral perfection, even a
young baby-boy, lying on its back, would be morally perfect. A
young baby-boy, lying on its back, does not think of his own body.
How then could he do an evil deed with its body, except for a little
kicking about. He does not think of his own voice. How then could
he utter an evil speech except for a little crying? He does not think
about its own intention. How then could it intend an evil intention,
except for a little excitement? He does not think of its own mode
of livelihood. How then could he lead an evil mode of livelihood,
except for taking its mother’s milk?”56
55
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This criticism is based on the observation that the naive
innocence of a baby-body, lying on its back, is not based on
knowledge and is not accompanied by awareness. It is not
something that is deliberately and consciously cultivated. In the
same way, moral perfection devoid of the knowledge factor is not
moral perfection. This same idea is repeated in a different form
elsewhere as follows: “Just as a man whose hands and feet are cut
off knows that his hands and feet are cut off, even so one who is
morally perfect, whether he is walking or standing still or asleep or
awake, in him there is constant and perpetual presence of
knowledge to the effect that all mental defilements are destroyed
by him.”57
The Buddhist moral life is not based on a theory which states
that either the sense-organs or the corresponding sense-objects are
in themselves an obstacle to mental culture. If two oxen, one white
and the other black – so runs the argument – are tied by a yoke, it
is not correct to say that the black ox is a bond for the white ox or
vice versa. For it is the yoke that constitutes the bond, it is that
which unites them both. In the same way, what stands as an
obstacle to mental culture is neither the sense organs nor the sense
objects but craving or attachment. If it were otherwise, then one
would have to rule out the very possibility of the practice of the
moral life (Brahmacariya). 58 More or less, the same idea is
reflected in the Indriyabhāvanā Sutta where the Buddha questions
a disciple of Parasariya as to how his Master teaches moral culture.
In reply, the latter says that the senses are to be trained to the
extent when they fail to fulfill their respective functions: The eye
does not see form; the ear does not hear sounds. Then, the Buddha
rejoins that this kind of mental culture leads to the conclusion that
the blind and the deaf have their senses best cultivated.59 The clear
implication is that mental culture is not to be associated with the
suppression of the senses. They should be cultivated to see things
as they truly are (yathābhūta).
57
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A BUDDHIST ORIENTED RELATIONAL VIEW
OF TRANSFORMATION IN MEDIATION
Ran Kuttner1
Introduction
In the last few decades, there has been a growing interest in
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as a theoretical and
practical academic field that has been presenting new practices for
managing interpersonal conflicts. The ADR field is based on a
systematic understanding of negotiation and the nature of conflict.
In the burgeoning field of ADR, mediation has had a central
place as a process in which a third party helps disputants; there are
different views as to the nature of this help: What is the mediator’s
role? What are the goals of the mediation process? How should the
mediator intervene, if at all, throughout the process?
This paper offers an understanding of conflict escalation and of
conflict transformation based on Buddhist philosophy, while
addressing the abovementioned questions and by showing how the
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“Presence of Dialogue in Mediation: Understanding Relational Worldview as
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Buddhist worldview can shed light on some foundational concepts
in the field of conflict management and ADR.
I. Current tendencies in western thought and mediation
In their book The Promise of Mediation (1994), Baruch Bush
and Joseph Folger claim that in order for mediation to fulfill its
promise, its potential to fundamentally transform common
adversarial patterns, a different understanding with regard to
foundational philosophical questions such as what it means to be a
human being, our connection to our surroundings and our freedom,
is needed. Transformation is needed, they claim, from an
individualistic view of the self to a relational view of the self,
where “Individuals are seen as both separate and connected, both
individuated and similar. They are being to some degree
autonomous, self-aware, and self interested but also to some
degree connected, sensitive and responsive to others.”2
The narrative approach to mediation, as presented by John
Winslade and Gerald Monk in their book Narrative Mediation
(2000), offers a framework that also critically re-examines the
common modern western concept of the “self” as having a separate,
permanent inner core. The narrative approach emphasizes that a
shift is required from the parties’ firm, fixed and well-constructed
view of the self to a relational realization of its co-construction by
the parties. Winslade and Monk elaborate on the quest to reformulate the idea of the “self,” offering a critique of the category
of the “self” as a fixed entity, based on postmodern philosophy:
How mediators understand the nature of the self has a bearing
on how they manage a dispute between parties... problem2

Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation:
Responding to Conflict through Empowerment and Recognition (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1994), 242. (In 2005, a new and revised edition was released). The
individualistic worldview, they claim, is rooted in a vision of the individual as a
separate being, autonomous and unconnected, who will fulfill his potential and
actualize his freedom and independence by personally developing his values and
subjective life experiences.
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solving and interest-based approaches emphasize the individual
as independent, stable, unitary, self-motivating, and selfregulating identity…. Through the postmodern lens, a problem
is seen not as a personal deficit of the person but as constructed
within a pattern of relationships…. From this perspective,
identity is not fixed, nor is it carried around by the individual
largely unchanged from one context to another.3
The questioning of the “self” as a separate, independent, firm
entity is one tendency in current ADR literature, on which these
frameworks elaborate. It is a tendency found in late twentieth
century thought at large, which involves ontological questioning of
Aristotelian metaphysics and Cartesian philosophy with regard to
the human agent, the subject or the self.4 It also involves a call for
more focus on relational emphases. Prominent figures in the field
of ADR claim that not enough attention is given to relational
emphases – another important tendency in late twentieth century
thought – attention that if given and emphases that if explored, can
improve our understanding of the potential embedded in mediation
and even “integrative negotiation”, and both our practices and
teaching accordingly.5
3

John Winslade and Gerald Monk, Narrative Mediation: A New Approach
to Conflict Resolution (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2000), 44-45. While
elaborating on the loss of respect under the influence of the dispute, Winslade
and Monk refer to the formation of what they call “personality”, which can be
understood to mean the “self”: “A common description of conflict situations is
to call them personality crashes. Such a description privileges the essential
individual qualities that we call personality. The assumption of personality is
that individuals carry around with them some kind of stable personhood that is
context free. However, people are far more complex than any description….
What is implied in the type of respect we are advocating is a conscious effort not
to see people as essentially anything, to refuse to sum people up.” (Ibid, 132).
4
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault and Derrida are prominent
thinkers in creating this intellectual shift, each of them with his unique criticism
of the governing western underpinnings.
5
For example, Tricia Jones writes, “A review of theoretical approaches to
conflict and, more specifically, to mediation, reveals that relational context has
received little attention…. Although mediation theories may include reference to
or discussion of relational context, they rarely highlight its potential for
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I suggest that the discourse on the potential embedded in
mediation and the understanding the underlying premises of
“integrative negotiation” can benefit from analyzing the changes in
the view of the “self” as took place in twentieth century thought in
various disciplines, 6 as well as from the “relational” philosophy
and practices regarding what it is to be human.7 In addition, further
exploration of the philosophical underpinnings of the mediation
process at large and of proposed models in particular may
contribute to the field of ADR on both the theoretical and practical
levels, grounding it in a larger theoretical framework and allowing

influence. And, to date, they have failed to seriously unpack how that influence
may be exerted” (Tricia S. Jones, “A Dialectical Reframing of the Mediation
Process,” in New Directions in Mediation, eds. Joseph P. Folger and Tricia S.
Jones (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), 30). Her utterance, although written in
1994, is still relevant in 2007, and the challenge of shifting from the governing
discourse, in which “…disputants are constructed as expressive and utilitarian
individuals” (Jonathan Shailor, Empowerment in Dispute Mediation: A Critical
Analysis of Communication (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 28) is yet to be met.
Greenhalgh and Lewicki stress that even when negotiation manuals claim to
adopt relational emphases, the teaching of negotiation “was a convenient
simplification, because considering ‘the party’ as a single generic actor allowed
scholars to apply all of their individualistically oriented theory to the intragroup, inter-group, intra-organizational, and international levels.” (Leonard
Greehalgh and Roy Lewicki, “New Directions in Teaching Negotiations From
Walton and McKersei to the New Millennium,” in Negotiations and Change:
From the Workplace to Society, eds. Thomas A. Kochan and David B. Lipsky
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 27).
6
See for example Bowling and Hoffman, where the authors describe
manners in which new conceptions of the “self” effect various disciplines, and
also suggest relevance to the mediation room. (Daniel Bowling and David
Hoffman, “Bringing Peace into the Room: The Personal Qualities of the
Mediator and their Impact on the Mediation,” in Bringing Peace into the Room:
The Personal Qualities of the Mediator and their Impact on the Mediation, eds.
Daniel Bowling and David Hoffman (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2003), 13-49).
7
For example, developments in psychotherapy in the last few decades, as
framed under the “Relational Psychotherapy” stream (see Stephen Mitchell and
Lewis Aaron, eds., Relational Psychology: the Emergence of a Tradition
(Hillsdale: The Analytic Press, 1999), or relational postmodern philosophy (see
Sheila McNamee and Kenneth J. Gergen, Relational Responsibility: Resources
for Sustainable Dialogue (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1999).
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new insights to emerge regarding the practice of negotiation and
mediation.8
While elaborating on the philosophical underpinnings of the
relational worldview, the Buddhist philosophy – which in the
words of the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Izutsu “…is
ontologically a system based upon the category of relatio, in
contrast to, say, the Platonic-Aristotelian system which is based on
the category of substantia” 9 – should play an important role.
Buddhism offers a 25-centuries long worldview and method of
transformation which presents a significant alternative to the view
of the “self” as widely accepted in western philosophy. It presents
a philosophical, psychological and practical relational framework
for transformation, which at its basis includes a radical
transformation of the way the “self” is perceived. Prominent ADR
scholars have already begun introducing Buddhist concepts and
techniques to the discipline of Alternative Dispute Resolution;10
delving into the philosophical underpinnings of the Buddhist
8

Bush and Folger present the Relational Worldview as a philosophy that
sets an alternative to the governing philosophical underpinnings that lay at the
basis of the “individualistic worldview.” Mediation theory must examine and
shape, they claim, the basic philosophical tenets of mediation, as each
mediator’s philosophical worldview is the foundational layer that needs to be
clarified in order to understand his or her orientation to the practice. A
clarification of the foundational layers is essential, claim Bush and Folger, in
order to allow the mediator to make informed choices ingrained in a “big picture”
understanding of and an in-depth orientation to the mediation process. Winslade
and Monk go even further to claim that “Those who grasp the philosophical
position will relatively easily and quickly master the practices… [while] those
who undertake narrative mediation through a simplistic practical orientation of
them flounder after a short time and fail to embody the spirit of the approach”
(Winslade and Monk, 32).
9
Tohihiko Izutsu, Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism (Tehran: Imperial
Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977), 23
10
Riskin 2002/2004/2006, Peppet 2002/2004, Bowling 2003, Rock 2005,
Freshman 2006, if to name a few. The 2002 Spring issue (No. 7) of the Harvard
Negotiation Law Review was dedicated to that subject matter, under the title
“Mindfulness in Law and ADR,” following a symposium that took place in
March that year at Harvard Law School on that matter. For more information see:
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/news/2002/
riskin_mindfulness. php3.
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framework, I suggest, may help further draw the more practical
implications for mediation and negotiation. Buddhist philosophy
may also help shed light on the notion of “integration” altogether,
and help clarify some central concepts in “integrative negotiation”
literature, 11 thus helping to see the path from distributive
bargaining and adversity to integrative negotiation and dialogue.
II. Key concepts in Buddhist philosophy
The Relational Worldview as found in various disciplines in
current western thought, and the Buddhist Worldview, share
similar dissatisfactions and premises. However, there are
fundamental differences between the underpinnings of the
Buddhist philosophy and the common western philosophical
foundations that go back as far as Aristotelian philosophy.
According to Aristotelian premises, knowing an object demands
knowledge of its ‘essence,’ its inalterably fixed and determined
inner substance. According to the Buddhist worldview, on the
other hand, knowledge cannot be attained as long as an object’s
fixed and determined inner substance is sought. A key term in the
understanding of the Buddhist worldview is the term ‘dependent
co-arising’ (pratītya-samutpāda): any object – “self” included – is
a product of causality, dependently co-arising with other objects
that co-arise with it. According to the principle of dependent coarising, any given situation is a set of connections and relations in
which separate entities arise, entities that through a process of
abstraction, we grasp as having the characteristics of continuous
separate substances. 12 Seeing entities as continuous, separate
substances is an abstraction, resulting from observing the situation
11

As presented, for example, by Fisher and Ury, Lewicki and Saunders, Lax
and Sebenius, Mnookin, and others.
12
Izutsu explains, “We may do well to recall at this point that Buddhism in
general stands philosophically on the concept of pratītya-samutpāda, i.e., the
idea that everything comes into being and exists as what it is by virtue of the
infinite number of relations it bears to other things, each one of these ‘other
things’ owing again its seemingly self-subsistent existence to other things”
(Izutsu, 23).
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from outside and while ignoring the process of dependent coarising as it occurs at the moment. Doing so, we are creating
notions of entities that we later perceive to be separate from their
arising, having a substantial and permanent inner-nature with
which “they” then enter a process of interaction with “another” –
similarly substantial and permanent entity. Every “thing,” every
apparent object we seem to grasp as standing on its own, separate
from other objects, is not, according to the Buddhist view, such.
The idea that definite objects exist, having their own essence,
substance, and unique characteristics that will never change, is
perceived by the Buddhist philosophy as an abstraction derived
from the human need to arrange the world in such a way and create
what Buddhism sees as an illusion.
A key term in the understanding of dependent co-arising is the
idea of emptiness (śūnyatā). The claim that everything is empty
means that nothing exists independently, having an internal,
substantial, fixed and permanent nature of its own, a core or inner
nature (svabhāva) which is not a product of causality or
dependency in other things with which it stands in relation. The
wish to grasp to a separate, fixed and permanent substance –
according to the Buddha’s teachings – is an illusion that causes
human suffering and dissatisfaction or “dis-ease”. It involves
attachment to psychologically-formed entities, perceived as objects
with such characteristics. This constant processes of self-formation
(i.e., of forming entities with inner “selves”) needs to be
transformed, as such a mindset and mental activity, according to
the Buddhist worldview, is a partial and insufficient realization of
reality, and a form of what is described in the Buddhist framework
as ignorance (avidyā).
Buddhism aims to release the practitioner from the illusory
way in which the “self” is perceived through this constant
processes of self-formation in everyday life. Through mental
practice, the substantive self is transformed to a realization of the
impermanent, empty and dependent co-arising nature of all things,
according to which “things” exist only within the given context
and web of relations in which they take part. Transformation
within the Buddhist framework means letting go of the attachment
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to the firm, unchanging, independent self, and realizing its
“emptiness” of characteristics of substance.13 A transformation of
that attachment (which, as mentioned, is understood in Buddhist
philosophy as the cause for suffering and dis-ease) through
cultivation of awareness to the process of dependent co-arising –
sheds light, I suggest, on the shift sought in negotiation and
mediation from adversarial to integrative negotiation. In the latter,
viewed from a relational standpoint as understood within the
Buddhist framework, the separate, well defined ‘self’ or ‘agent’
can be seen in a new way.14 The either/or polarizing state of mind,
as well as the subject/object or mine/yours dichotomy which stems
from Aristotelian logic and stressed when in adversity, as will be
further discussed in the following section, may be transformed
through that process.15
Moreover, this illusion – according to the Buddhist worldview
– relates not only to the perception of human beings as having a
substantial and independent “self”, but to the perception of any
entity seen as a separate, self-substantive entity, i.e., the granting
13

Emptiness is a central term in Buddhism that needs much clarification in
order to prevent nihilistic interpretations.
14
This way of presenting the self helps clarify the philosophical tenets that
lay as foundational in some relational theories of human interaction. For
example, while quoting Mary Parker Follett and presenting her visionary
perception of integrative negotiation, Deborah Kolb and Judith Williams write:
“When bargainers put their cards on the table, face the real issue, and bring
everything into the open, they relate to each other differently. As Follett wisely
points out, ‘I never react to you but to you-plus-me; or to be more accurate, it is
I-plus-you reacting to you-plus-me…. In the very process of meeting, we both
become something different, more receptive to that unknown that the other party
knows. When we engage in dialogue instead of talking at each other, we learn
from the exchange, and the boundaries of set arguments become elastic.”
(Deborah Kolb and Judith William, Everyday Negotiation: Navigating the
Hidden Agendas in Bargaining (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2003), 235).
Cultivating awareness to the I-plus-you and the you-plus-me that is essential for
engaging in dialogue, as described by Follett, can be clarified and attained
through the process of transformation drawn in Buddhist philosophy.
15
“Eastern thought,” writes Rollo May, “never suffered the radical split
between subject and object that has characterized Western thought” (Rollo May,
The Discovery of Being: Writings in Existential Psychology (New York: Norton,
1983), 59).
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of characteristics of permanent, fixed and firm entity to objects,
ideas, feelings, etc.
Understanding the Buddhist framework and its governing
underpinnings, which include a re-examination and new
realizations regarding the self, may assist the practitioner in
emphasizing the centrality of the relational aspect and in fact to
advance the project that Bush and Folger claim is still in its
preliminary stages – to develop relational philosophy,
underpinnings for a relationally based approach to mediation.
Understanding this framework may also help further integrate
systematically the Buddhist philosophy and psychology with ADR
literature, and the Buddhist practice with the practice of mediation,
developing new techniques to help parties transform their
adversary into dialogue.
III. Conflict escalation as a process of self-formation
I suggest that during the escalation of a disagreement into
dispute, the disputants minimize the common dialogic space in
which dependent co-arising is taking place. The partners withdraw
from their common-space to singularity, shutting themselves
within their separate, distinct perceptions, which are no longer
balanced as dialogue is lost. Such withdrawal creates an illusionary
mindset of independent, separate “selfhood.” At the same time, it
also creates an illusion of “the other”: an “other” who is also
perceived as independent and separate, and acting outside the
common-space. This is where party-ness – the sense of being
separate parts that do not dependently co-arise – is created,
entrenching within the separate self and creating a private world, a
private language and internal grammar. 16 The freedom from the
construction of new understandings within the common dialogic
space, and moreover – from the relational process that is constantly
16

This illusion involves an instrumental attitude towards others that are
perceived in a one-dimensional manner, with no spatial perspective, as being
separate from the common-space. It is turning the other into an object, at the
same time objectifying their self-consciousness, a one-dimensional and illusive
consciousness, lacking space, lacking vividness.
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taking place – is part of that illusion. Constructing a commonspace with other players (such as one’s spouse or one’s lawyer), or
even dozens of other common spaces that the party moves between,
cannot substitute for reconstructing the understandings within the
dialogic space in which a dispute has developed.17
In the following pages, I wish to present a detailed model of
conflict escalation, which was developed by the German scholar
Friedrich Glasl, in which the changing mindset of the parties
involved throughout the process of escalation was analyzed stepby-step. An understanding of the dynamics of escalation as
presented in this model, I suggest, sheds light on the manner the
formation of the substantive self plays a central role in the
dynamics of conflict escalation. With regard to the process of
conflict escalation, my claim is, in general, that when in a conflict,
parties withdraw from their ‘common dialogic space’ as I name it,
and fortify or entrench in separate spaces, clinging to – or being
attached to, if to use two key concepts in Buddhist psychological
analysis – firm, fixed, independent positions.18
Friedrich Glasl developed a nine-step model of conflict
escalation, each stage accompanied by characteristic patterns of ingroup and out-group images, motives, moods, and forms of
interaction. 19 The first stage Glasl describes on the conflict
continuum is when the parties are aware of the conflict and
manifest tensions and antagonisms. As the cooperation slips into
tensions and frictions, interests and opinions crystallize into
17

This does not come to create dependency in a manner that would lead to
blurring the distinctions, but only by emphasizing the relational component as it
manifests itself each moment in the common space it would be possible to move
to the distinction and give room to the plurality of components that co-arise in
the common space. This does not come to suggest that the previous relationship
should be restored, but that the illusion and ignorance should be transformed,
thus creating a common – non sentimental – dialogic space, in which an
agreement to part, for example, may be reached.
18
“This is what I want” (and I do not intend to move), “I don’t care what
you think about it” (and I am ‘persistent’ about it, not open for reconsideration).
19
Friedrich Glasl, “The Process of Conflict Escalation and Roles of Third
Parties,” in Conflict Management and Industrial Relations, eds. G. B. J. Bomers
and R. B. Peterson (The Hague: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 119-140.
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standpoints, i.e., fixed positions on how a certain issue ought to be
handled, and tend to defend rigid positions. The transition from the
first to the second stage, which Glasl names “polarization and
debating style,”20 is a stage in which “these groups are increasingly
consolidated into more well delimited parties.” 21 The delimiting
process is described by Glasl as the main source of escalation,
where separation takes place, as boundaries defining who belongs
to the inside and the outside become more and more visible. In
order to gain strength, parties become increasingly locked into
inflexible standpoints. Glasl describes at that stage the formation
not only of firm positions, but the buds of bringing into the process
a firm “general position,” which is a shift from a discussion over
the merits to a more general – even if at this stage only vague –
sense of self behind the merits, who needs to be guarded and dealt
with.22 This stage includes growing mistrust among the parties, and
a sense of insecurity and loss of control, which the parties try to
compensate for with an increased emphasis on a self-image as
righteous and strength. 23 Aggressive actions serve at this stage
mostly to boost self-esteem.
The main characteristic of stage three is the loss of dependency
and the formation of what I see as independent self, independent
from the common dialogic space. In this stage, Glasl explains, the
antagonists seek to replace the mutual dependencies with unilateral
dependency, in order to be able to dominate the counterpart.24 With
that independency arises a wish for unilateral action, where each
20

Ibid, 125
Thomas Jordan, “Glasl’s Nine Stage Model of Conflict Escalation: A
Summary,” 2000, p. 1, in http://www.mediate.com/articles/jordan.cfm.
22
Separating the people from the problems, as advised by Fisher and Ury
(Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without
Giving In (New York: Penguin, 1981), 17), hence becomes difficult to attain.
23
In a later stage, the formation will wear a more global picture of “the
other,” while at this stage it is a patterning process, in which repeated
experiences of the counterpart lead to the formation of images of typical
behavior patterns, which help dealing with insecurity and loss of control.
24
Ibid, 4. Glasl writes, “The parties stop talking to each other for they
become convinced that they will get nowhere. They think positions are fixed and
will only be moved by deeds” (Glasl, 126).
21

282

Ran Kuttner

party’s top priority is to be perceived as not yielding, under any
circumstances, to the other’s wish to dominate. In order to assure it,
the pressure to conform to a common attitude and a common
interpretation increases the parties’ further entrenchment within the
picture of the formed self, which helps guard each of them from
the other party.
At stage four, the consolidating process of the self is entering a
new phase, as “the ‘typicals’ that evolved at stages two and three
are now consolidating and complemented into full-blown general
and consistent images of the counterpart. These images are
stereotypical, highly fixed and are very resilient to change through
new information.” 25 Such images, Glasl explains, serve an
important role in providing a sense of orientation: one has the
feeling of knowing what to expect from the environment. The
sense of insecurity involved is dealt with by also developing that
well-structured, known and familiar clear and distinct view of the
counterpart and of the situation.26
This is true not only for the manner by which “the other” is
seen, but also for the manner by which one sees oneself; the power
of the stereotypes, he explains, leads to a subtle pressure on each
party to conform to roles assigned to her behavioral expectations
that are – at this stage of the dynamic – difficult to escape. Stage
five is characterized by the parties’ sudden insight into the other’s
“true nature.” The formation of the self who is behind the actions
is at this stage completed, as one develops conviction as to the
other’s moral character and identity.
In stage six, a major escalation is taking place, according to
Glasl, as the parties make dedicated statements of self-commitment
from which they cannot retreat without losing credibility, in order
to enhance the seriousness of their threats. The attachment to the
25

Jordan, 4. “The parties’ self-image and the image of the enemy,” Glasl
writes, “become very much polarized” (Glasl, 127).
26
In a manner that according to the Buddhist worldview only strengthens
one’s ignorance and creates a barrier from seeing thing as they are, in their
suchness. Jordan writes, “The negative images are now screens that occupy the
field of vision whenever the parties meet each other. These screens prevent the
parties from seeing each other’s true complexity and individuality.” (Jordan, 5).
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self one formed in the dynamics, and the control and firm
perception of the situation that one craves for, blinds one from the
occurrences in the common space, and from seeing things as they
are, each party insisting that its own issues and standpoints must be
dealt with in exactly the exact form she has in mind.
At this point, one is most concerned with the protecting and
maintaining of one’s own formed self,27 and success is measured in
the credibility that this self has as a continuous, firm selfsubstantive entity, who for that reason clings to his standpoints and
threats without any withdrawal whatsoever.
In stage seven, the entrenchment onto the self increases, as
there is no longer any real communication. In this stage, each party
is only concerned with expressing his own message, and does not
care about how it is received, or what the response might be. The
further one increases one’s entrenchment and attachment to the self,
the more one draws away from dialogue. In stage eight, being
concerned only with one’s own survival, one moves to attacking
the “very core” of the other, aiming at destroying his existence as a
self and thus to eliminate the adversary. It is a last attempt to
preserve the formed self, through annihilating the other’s
equivalent entity. However, the attempt to preserve the formed self
is due to fail, bringing with it additional suffering and destruction.
That failure is the threshold to stage nine, when the selfpreservation drive is given up and there is no check at all on
further destructiveness.
This, according to the Buddhist worldview, is also the case
with ignorance, which generates non-dialogic behavior, reinforces
negative perceptions, attitudes and behavior, and thus generates
further suffering and dis-ease. Glasl’s model, I suggest, resonates
with the Buddha’s description of the cycle of suffering and disease, which presents an analysis of the manner ignorance is
generated: The Twelve Links model, a detailed 12-stage analysis of
the process of “withdrawing” from wisdom, its cessation
understood in the Buddhist framework as the transformation of
27

“Securing one’s own further survival becomes an essential concern.”
(Ibid, 9).
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suffering through realization of impermanence, emptiness and
dependent co-arising. The twelve-links model can thus be used to
understand both the processes of conflict escalation and of conflict
transformation, providing a thorough analysis of the described
withdrawal from the ‘common dialogic space.’ Both The twelvelinks model and Glasl’s model describe a process of escalation in
which the process of self-formation is emphasized as playing a
central role – in Glasl’s model in the context of conflict escalation
and in the Buddha’s description in the context of the development
of suffering and ignorance.
IV. Implications to mediation and negotiation
As mentioned, the process of withdrawing into the ‘private
space,’ or the state of mind as described by Glasl, can be equated
with the Buddhist scheme of withdrawal from wisdom and
relational awareness to what is viewed as ignorance – selfsubstantive independent and permanent entities. This has an effect
on the well-established view of “Interest Based Negotiation” as
laid out by Fisher and Ury in Getting to Yes and onwards: Interest
Based Negotiation sees the shift from adversarial bargaining to
integrative negotiation as a shift away from “positions.”28 In the
context of negotiation theory, the characteristics of self-substantive
independent and permanent entities can be ascribed to positions,
and ignorance can be understood as the inability to be aware of the
impermanent nature of every position, and its emptiness as a
substantial entity with an inner, independent core, independent
from the manner it co-arises in the ‘common dialogic space.’
This constant process of producing such entities or positions,
according to the Buddhist worldview, is the cause for human
suffering or dis-ease: “This is who I am” and “this is what I want,”
i.e., this is my identity and these are my positions, identical
28

Fisher and Ury define at the opening of Getting to Yes the common
pattern of bargaining over positions as “The problem,” as well as the vast
majority of literature, and deal throughout the book with that distinction and
with how to turn from “positions” to “interests” (see Fisher and Ury, table of
contents and first chapter).
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wherever I go, no matter of the “outer variables and changes”
(which are also granted similar delusive characteristics, seen as
self-substantive, independent and permanent), i.e., no matter what
the other’s fixed and firm positions are.
This way of looking at the world is challenged by the Buddhist
cultivation of wisdom, of developing awareness to the everchanging, empty nature of all such “things” or “entities,” or
“selves.” Transformation and de-escalation of conflicts, I therefore
suggest following the Buddhist worldview, is transformation from
this way of looking at “things” and of the process of withdrawing
to and entrenching in a separate, fixed and firm well-defined self,
to awareness of the ongoing process in which the “things” co-arise,
self included. It is a shift from the entrenched self-substantive, selfabsorbed and self-sustained self, fortified and captured in fixed,
firm independent view of one’s “self” and one’s perception of the
dispute at hand, manifested by fixed, firm and independent
positions, to realization of impermanence, emptiness and
dependent co-arising.
This, as aforesaid, has an effect on the well established view of
Interest Based Negotiation, which sees the shift from adversarial
bargaining to integrative negotiation as a shift from “positions” to
“interests”. Following the view suggested above, positions are
diagnosed as a manifestation of the fortified self. The positional
self can be viewed in terms of attachment as described above, as
clinging to firm, fixed, unchanging positions that are perceived to
be secured from the other party’s positions. A shift is required, I
suggest, not from “positions” to “interests,” but from the distinct,
bounded and firm self-substantial positions and arguments, to
relational awareness in which positions are recognized to be
dependently co-arising within each context. 29 Parties’
interdependence is thus realized 30 and new information may be
29

Thus meeting challenges as described in footnotes 4 & 14 above.
Lax and Sebenius stress the importance of interdependence, bringing it
forth in the opening pages of their book Managers as Negotiators, stressing its
centrality to integrative negotiation and value creation: “Mutual dependence
implies limits to how much one party can do alone, or at what cost, or how
desirably joint action may be preferable for everyone. This possibility makes
30
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gathered on their interests, needs, feelings and perspectives, in a
manner that I elsewhere define as “dialogic.” 31 Through such
transformation, one let go of the attachment to a generalized
perspective of one’s firm and un-effected, determined positions.32
Seen from a relational standpoint and with the understanding of
impermanence – “What was important to the parties last week – or
even 20 minutes ago – may not be important now. Interaction
between the parties can put some interests to rest, but it may raise
others. Thus, the parties must continually be attentive to changes in
their own interests and the interests of the other side.” 33
Attentiveness, I suggest, should be cultivated also to the manner by
which “their own,” as well as “the other side’s” interests,
dependently co-arise in the process. Mindfulness, according to
Buddhist philosophy, which one cultivates during the process of
transformation through various meditation practices, is the quality
of awareness described.

interdependence a key element that defines negotiating situations.” (See David
A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for
Cooperation and Competitive Gain (New York: Free Press, 1986), 7). Although
writing within a pragmatic philosophical framework, different from the one
suggested in this paper, I suggest that the awareness cultivated to
interdependence as described above can support the shift from “claiming value”
to “creating value.”
31
Following, I suggest, the foundational premises found in prominent
thinkers’ view of dialogue, e.g., Martin Buber, David Bohm, Mary Parker
Follett and others (see footnote 1 above, chapter 3).
32
This does not imply accommodating personality, giving up on one’s own
views (positions, interests, needs or feelings), but on “positionality,” i.e., the
characterization of each of them in a manner that grants them the characteristics
of “self”. Sara Cobb sees empowerment in mediation as a process that enhances
the destabilization of each party’s narrative coherence, reducing the rigidity and
the tendency to fixate in it, thus loosening the boundaries that self-perpetuation
narratives exhibit. She writes, “[i]n mediation, narrative closure or coherence is
problematic because it stabilizes the description of the problem in ways that
delimit its transformation.” See Sara Cobb, “Empowerment and Mediation: A
Narrative Perspective,” in Negotiation Journal 9.3 (1993): 251.
33
Lewicki and Saunders, 117.
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V. Conclusion
Buddhist psychology offers us a step-by-step micro-focus
model of the process in which humans withdraw to what I describe
as the illusory “private space.”34 I will not be able in this paper to
go into details and present that model, but wish to suggest the idea
of “positionality” as a mental attachment, clinging into firm, fixed
and independent “things” that serve as a manifestation of the self,
i.e., an entity situated behind the asserted positions which produces
the separate, independent and well defined or definite “things” – a
state of mind that needs to be transformed. We cannot suffice, if to
continue with this line of thought, with a shift from positions to
interests, but should aim – from a relational point of view – at
transforming the mindset to a realization of impermanence,
emptiness and dependent co-arising. The aim is to realize that
“things” not only “change all the time” but are empty of a core that
can be identified as the thing that changes. Put positively, “they”
are dependently co-arising in a relational manner in the common
dialogic space with whatever takes place and arises in that situation.
The challenge is to see that this realization represents neither a
state of repression of oneself (or ‘accommodation,’ as described by
Thomas and Kilmann in their Conflict Mode grid), 35 nor a
regressive psychological state. The “inner” me and “outer” world
cannot be really distinguished, and in order to learn about myself –
my needs, my interests, my positions, my fears and my sensations
– awareness is needed to the manner in which “my” needs,
interests and so on, relationally co-arise – right here, right now.
Walpola Rahula, in his book What the Buddha Taught, writes,
“Two ideas are psychologically deep-rooted in man: selfprotection and self-preservation…. For self-preservation, man has
conceived the idea of an immortal Soul or Atman (…) which will
live eternally. In his ignorance, weakness, fear, and desire, man
34

Or the illusory of private language, if to draw a parallel to Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy.
35
Kenneth W. Thomas and Ralph H. Kilmann, “Thomas-Kilmann Conflict
Mode Instrument” (New York: Xicom, 1974), in http://www.kilmann.com/
conflict.html.
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needs these two things to console himself. Hence, he clings to
them deeply and fanatically.”36
Positions, I suggest, are manifestations of these deep-rooted
conceived ideas. In the process of conflict escalation, with all the
weaknesses, fears, and desires that it brings, one seeks selfprotection and self-preservation, entrenching in firm, fixed and
independent self and positions. Buddhism offers a 25 centuries
long worldview and method of transformation of suffering and disease embedded in the craving for these mental frames. In order to
thoroughly examine its applicability to the mediation process and
to further develop the practice of mediation, the added value of the
Buddhist analysis to the understanding of conflict escalation and
its possible transformation is needed. Analyzed in the manner
described above, I suggest, conflict escalation can be seen as a
process which the Buddhist methods of transformation – if adapted
systematically to conflict settings – can help transform. Cultivating
mindfulness and other qualities of mind as emphasized and
practiced in the Buddhist tradition can help to develop integrative
mindset and dialogic interaction, and to “change the game” of
adversarial, competitive bargaining. 37 Stemming from the
philosophical underpinnings offered by the Buddhist framework,
that shift also incorporates a deep conviction that other models,
emphasizing a shift from positional to integrative bargaining, do
not necessarily include, as “the claim that opportunities for
integrative bargaining make good behavior a simple matter of
rational, pecuniary self-interest is not nearly as strong as is
sometimes claimed… the case for good behavior cannot
rest entirely on pecuniary self-interest”.38 In fact, delving into the
36

Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (England: Oneworld
Publication, 1959), 51.
37
As suggested by Fisher and Ury throughout Getting to Yes, or by Ury in
his succeeding book Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation
to Cooperation (New York: Bantam Books, 1993) where he writes, “Your
greatest power is the power to change the game – from face-to-face
confrontation to side-by-side joint problem-solving” (171).
38
Gerald Wetlaufer, “The Limits of Integrative Bargaining”, in Georgetown
Law Journal 85 (1996): 372.
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philosophical tenets of the Buddhist worldview may add
metaphysical rather than moral support: collaborating is not about
behaving well, but about being human.
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PARADIGMS OF BUDDHIST ETHICS:
JUDGMENT AND CHARACTER IN THE
MODERN WORLD
David Putney
Introduction
This paper will examine the following questions: (1) What
should be the role of Buddhist ethics in the modem world? A
discussion of this question will necessarily stimulate related
questions such as: (2) What is the role of ethics in the larger
Buddhist Path?; (3) Is a concern for ethics and karma, necessarily a
self-oriented or egoistic enterprise?; (4) Does the attainment of
Enlightenment or Realization transcend the concern for ethics?; (5)
What is the role of Buddhist ethics for the still unenlightened
practitioner?; (6) From the point of view of Western ethical
thought, how might we understand Buddhist ethics as a kind of
virtue ethics, a kind of utilitarian ethics, a deontological ethics,
some combination of these, or is some other framework more
appropriate?; (7) Is Buddhist ethics applicable only in regulated
Buddhist communities or does it have a role for individual
Buddhists in a larger urban society?; and (8) Does Buddhist ethics
have anything to say to ethical discussion in general, or is it
confined only to practicing Buddhists?
Although I will draw on Buddhist Nikāya and Mahāyāna
traditional theory and practice, the focus of this paper will be not
limited to the historical, but will also address the issue of how
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Buddhist ethics might or should be understood and applied in the
contemporary world.
The Role of Ethics and Karma in Buddhist Practice
In the most fundamental and traditional formulation of the path
of Buddhist is the Eightfold Path, where, traditionally, three major
categories are delineated: (1) Wisdom (paññā; prajñā), (2) Ethical
Practice (sīla), and (3) Concentration (samādhi). 1 The Eightfold
Path is mentioned so frequently in the Pāli Nikāya canon and
associated with the Four Noble Truths as the foundation of
Buddhist practice, and it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that
in Early Buddhism, 2 Buddhist Ethics must be understood in the
context of the Eightfold Path. In the context of Buddhist causality,
or depended arising (paicca-samuppāda), the three elements of
the path, Wisdom, Ethical Practice, and Concentration were
inter-dependent. The practitioner could not have one without the
others and could not develop one of the paths without developing
the others.
Although Buddhism abounds with seemingly legalistic rules
such as the extensive vinaya for monks and nuns, the “Five
Precepts,” the “Eight Precepts” and the “Ten Precepts,” etc. for
laypersons, the Eightfold Path stands out as fundamentally lacking
a legalistic structure. The sīlas in the Eightfold Path are spoken of
in terms of “Right” (sammā). They are not a list of “shall nots”.
The traditional “definitions” of Right sīla include examples of both
what should be aspired to and perfected and what should be
1

“Calavedalla Sutta,” in Majjhima Nikāya (1.301; see I. B. Horner, The
Middle Length Savings, vol. 1 (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1976), 363. It will be my practice throughout the remainder of this paper to use
Pāli spellings for text composed in the Pāli language and representing the oldest
texts of Early Buddhism and the Theravādin tradition and the Sanskrit forms for
texts in the non-Theravādin and Mahāyāna traditions.
2
I make no claims in this paper that what I call “Early Buddhism” is
identical to “Original Buddhism.” This topic is beyond the scope of this paper
and, I believe, beyond the ability of scholastic research to decisively
demonstrate. Early Buddhism in this paper refers to the Buddhism described in
the Pāli Nikāyas.
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avoided or eliminated, but are by no means exclusive lists of either
positive or negative behaviors. The sīlas, in the context of the
Eightfold Path, defy explicit injunctions or prescriptions about
specific activities.
Let us consider first, the traditional Five Precepts for laymen
include the vows to abstain from: (1) taking of life, (2) taking what
is not given, (3) misconduct in sensual actions, (4) false speech,
and (5) intoxication and indolence. 3 The Eight Precepts add
abstentions from (6) untimely meals, (7) entertainments, cosmetics
and personal ornaments, and (8) the use of high or exalted seats.
These three were reserved for special uposatha days of intense
practice, functioning as a form of short religious retreat. The 10
precepts were meant for especially dedicated laypersons on
extended retreats or even for lifelong personal practice. These
included an elaboration on the seventh precept, divided into two, a
further emphasis on abstaining from “high seats” and finally the
vow to abstain from accepting gold and silver. 4 These precepts,
however, were never meant to be ends in themselves, but rather as
a kind of guideline for self-realization. An analysis of the precepts
reveals their justification in terms of the effects of the actions
described on the practitioner and all other involved persons.5 It is
not the precepts which constitute the core of Buddhist ethics, but
rather the justification for the precepts in terms of the Four Noble
Truths and the Eightfold Path and later in the Bodhisattva Ideal
and the pāramitās (Perfections) stressed by Mahāyāna Buddhism.
Since all of the items in the Eightfold Path begin with the term
“Right” (sammā), and since three kinds of interrelated yet
distinctive forms of “right” have been identified, it is critical to
identify what is meant by “right” in each of the three groups.
Traditionally, the eight items have been arranged as follows:
Wisdom includes (1) Right View / Right Understanding
(sammā-dihi) and (2) Right Thought (Aims, Intention, Aspiration)
(sammā-sakappa). Ethical Practice has traditionally included (3)
3

H. Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics: Essence of Buddhism (New York:
George Braziller, 1970), 87.
4
Ibid, 87-113.
5
Ibid, 87ff and 113ff.
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Right Speech (sammā-vācā), (4) Right Action (sammā-kammanta),
and (5) Right Livelihood (sammā-jīva). Right Concentration has
included (6) Right Effort (sammā-vāyāma), (7) Right Mindfulness
(sammā-sati), and (8) Right Concentration / Meditation
(sammā-samādhi).6
I suggest that “Right” for Wisdom should be understood in
terms of the Buddhist conception of Truth, “Seeing things as they
are or have become” (yathābhūtam), without the distortions of
prejudice, mental habits, likes and dislikes, etc., and that Right
View is a synonym for Bodhi, literally meaning Enlightenment or
Realization.
I suggest that “Right” in the context of Ethical Practice should
be understood in terms of the Buddhist term kusala, which has
been translated as “good,” “skilled,” “wholesome,” and “healthy.”7
Kusala includes all of these English meanings, but is particularly
close to the term “healthy” and “wholesome,” in the context of the
Buddha’s common doctor and patient metaphors.
I would also include Right Thought (sammā-sakappa) in the
ethical category, contrary to much Buddhist tradition, because it is
described in the context of health rather than truth. The concept
includes right aims or intentions, including thoughts of detachment,
compassion and non-violence. Since the three traditional ethical
categories of speech, action, and livelihood include bodily “action,”
I argue that sakappa in this context refers to mental action. As
David Kalupahana has pointed out, the Amba1ahikā-

6

M 1.301.
See T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, Pāli-English Dictionary (PED)
(Rpt., New Delhi: Munshirain Manoharlal Publishers, 1975) (It was first
published in London by the Pāli Text Society), 223-224, where kusala is defined
as “skillful”, expert”, “good”, “right”, and “meritorious”. Kalupahana
understands kusala as “wholesome” or “healthy”. [See David J. Kalupahana,
Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), 61f].
Taniguchi translates kusala as “skillful” in the context of that which leads to a
healthy mind. [See Shoyo Taniguchi, “A Study of Biomedical Ethics from a
Buddhist Perspective” (Masters Thesis, UC-Berkeley, CA, 1987), 60].
7
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rāhu1ovāda-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya defines “good” and “bad”
in the following fashion, always referring to bodily, mental and
verbal actions. He summarizes this sutta as follows:
Whatever action, bodily, verbal, or mental, leads to
suffering (by bādha, literally, illness) 8 for oneself, for
others, or for both, that action is bad (a-kusalam). Whatever
action, bodily, verbal or mental, does not lead to suffering
for oneself, for others or for both, that action is good
(kusalam).9
“Actions” of the mind may also be thought profitably of as
“states of mind.” Thus, H. Saddhatissa defines “Right Thought,”
saying:
This means that our mind should be pure, free from lust
(rāga), ill will (vyāpāda), cruelty (vihisā) and the like. At
the same time, we should be willing to relinquish anything
that obstructs our onward march and unselfishly transfer
merit obtained to all sentient beings.10
Thus, Right Thought should not be limited simply to intention,
but also the states of the mind as manifested in its activities.
Ethical practice would then include the four elements of Right
Thought, Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood. All of
these can be thought of in terms of health, and health can best be
understood both as things to avoid, and things which need to be
actively promoted, learned and developed.
In the Third Category, Concentration, the sixth path, Right
Effort, is often described in reference to efforts to control mental
action and unwholesome mental states. The traditional “examples”
of Right Effort include efforts to (1) prevent evil and unwholesome
(unhealthy) (akusala) states of mind from arising. (2) Get rid of
8

PED: “evil, wrong, hurt”, 492.
M 1.414-418. See Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, 62. See I. B. Horner,
Middle Length Savings, vol. 2, 88-90 for full English translation.
10
Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics, 70-71.
9

298

David Putney

such evil and unwholesome states that have already arisen. (3)
Produce to cause to arise good and wholesome states of mind not
yet arisen. (4) Develop and bring to perfection the good and
wholesome (kusala) states of mind already present.11 The first two
are negative and the last two are positive. Saddhatissa, however,
generalizes these to apply to all of the ethical paths,12 which could
be summarized as: (1) prevent habits of unwholesome thought,
speech, actions, and livelihood from arising; (2) get rid of such
habits of unwholesome thought speech, actions, and livelihood that
have already arisen; (3) produce or cause to arise good and
wholesome habits of thought, speech, action and livelihood that
have not yet arisen; and (4) develop and bring to perfection the
good and wholesome habits of thought, speech and action that are
already present.
The Third Category also includes two other important forms of
concentration: Right Mindfulness and Right Meditation. These are
the particularly Buddhist way in which to develop both Ethical
Conduct and Wisdom. Right Mindfulness is the practice of
carefully watching and observing (1) the nature and activities of
the body (one’s own and others’), (2) sensations or feelings, (3)
states (or activities) of the mind, and (4) ideas, thoughts,
conceptions and phenomena (dhamma).13 Right Concentration or
Meditation includes a large variety of ways to focus the mind,
including the Four Jhānas, the Formless Jhānas, various
visualizations, and so on.
Buddhism inherits the older Indian word, karma, but
understands it in terms of the Buddhist theory of causality or
Dependent Arising. Karma is often spoken of in the context of
rebirth, but is not limited to rebirth. I argue that the major
significance of karma to the practitioner at the present moment of
practice is better understood in terms of the Buddhist causal
understanding of the psychological processes of delusion and the
mutual interrelationships of one person’s actions with other
11

See, for example, “Mahā-satipanna Suttanta,” Dīgha-nikāya 2.312.
Saddhatissa, 72.
13
See the “Mahā-satipahana-Sutta” of the Majjhima-nikāya 1.70 ff.
12
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individuals in his or her society and environment, past, present,
and future.
It is true that karma can and has often been understood in terms
of personal reward, especially in terms of a higher, or even a
heavenly rebirth. It has been rightly argued that such a view is
essentially egoistic. If one practices “right” ethical practices with a
view to ensuring one’s own personal reward or salvation, this is,
according to the most basic of Buddhist teachings, a form of
attachment, a clinging to the “self” and would tend to hinder the
way to Realization. Also, understanding karma primarily in terms
of rebirth can function as a form of bad faith in that people can tell
themselves that such and such need not be done today, it can be
done later, or that they do not have the strength to do such and
such now, but will later, although this may be in a future life. Also,
present and past ills and inequalities can be attributed to the karmic
results of previous lives and these are to be patiently born as one’s
just fate.14 Such a view can lead to an excuse for non-action, in a
situation where action should be taken.
The goal of accumulating personal good karma conveniently
ignores the fundamental Buddhist teachings of “No-Self” (Pāli,
anattan; Skt., anātman) and Impermanence (Pāli, anicca; Skt.,
anatya), where it is meaningless to say that the person who
commits an action is either identical or different to the person who
“enjoys” its fruits.15 An overemphasis on “self” in past or future
lives leads to the very substantialization of self opposed by the
Buddha.
Winston King has argued that, in the Theravāda tradition, a set
of definite goals are “inherently tainted with samsaric impurities”
because it is still “ineradicably poisoned with attachment to this

14

Winston L. King, “Is There a Buddhist Ethic for the Modern World,” in
Eastern Buddhist 25.2 (Autumn 1992): 2-3.
15
See, for example, the “Kassapa Sutta” (S. 2.18-22), where the Buddha
tells Kassapa that it is meaningless to say that suffering is wrought by oneself,
by others, by both, or neither.
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present world, with desire for limited time-space ‘goods’.” 16 He
has also argued that in both the Theravādin and Mahāyāna
traditions:
The portrayal of the individual self and its world as
fundamentally transient and unreal has consistently led to a
down grading of concrete efforts to “better” the present
world order in the daunting knowledge that samsaric
entities (self, world) can never be essentially or
permanently improved. Thus, Buddhism has on the whole
been socially passive.17
However, to conclude that there is no point in working for the
betterment of self, community and society because any and all
results are impermanent is to fall into the trap of using
impermanence as an excuse for failing to apply all of the ethical
paths, as well as Right Effort. If effort is to be applied only to those
results which are necessarily permanent, we need make no effort in
any direction. Every concrete situation faced in life is impermanent,
and yet in the Buddhist worldview, this is merely an aspect of
causality, or Dependent Arising (paicca-samuppāda). The whole
point of the Buddha’s teaching of Dependent Arising, as found in
the Four Noble Truths, is to help the individual understand why
situations have developed, what results are likely to arise from
certain actions, and how to go about correcting problems that have
arisen.
The function of Ethical Practice in the Eightfold path was
never meant to support such an egocentric viewpoint. Although the
ultimate goal of the Buddhist path cannot be formulated
specifically in terms of personal and social goals, on the other hand,
it cannot be realized without acting on provisional personal and
16

Winston L. King, “Motivated Goodness and Unmotivated Perfection in
Buddhist Ethics” (Anglican Theological Review, LXXI.2 (1989)) and quoted in
his “Is There a Buddhist Ethic,” 1.
17
Winston L. King, “Buddhist Self-World Theory and Buddhist Ethics”
(Eastern Buddhist 22.2 (Autumn 1989), paraphrased in King, “Is there a
Buddhist Ethic,” 1.
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community goals, depending on the circumstances of place and
time. Also, although it is true that realization of the Path of
Buddhism cannot be accomplished without Concentration
(samādhi) and Wisdom, it is also true that Concentration and
Wisdom cannot be realized outside of moral action. Indeed, moral
action is the manifestation of the realization of Wisdom.
Does Realization transcend the concern for ethics?
Some have argued that Enlightenment or Realization
transcends concerns for dualistic thinking: making distinctions
such as good or bad. They do not mean, of course, that the
enlightened person, whether arahat, bodhisattva or Buddha, is free
to commit evil. They mean rather that the enlightened one
“naturally” does good, almost by definition. James Whitehill has
labeled this the “transcendence trap.” In his discussion of Robert
Aitken’s The Mind of Clover: Essays in Zen Buddhist Ethics,18 he
quotes Aitken’s conclusion, [incorporating a Mahāyāna view of
Emptiness (śūnyatā)]: “Thus, in the world, too, there is nothing to
be called virtue.”19 According to Whitehill:
The trap misleads them and us into portraying the perfected
moral life as a non-rational expressiveness, something
natural, spontaneous, non-linguistic, and uncalculating.
This is a ‘Taoist-like’ view of virtue as ‘natural, intuitive,
skill / power’ (Chn., te; Jpn., toku) .... This ethical
conception results in the kind of ontological dismissal of
morality and ethics....20
The “Transcendence Trap” ignores the basic reality that the
vast majority of sentient beings are not enlightened. Buddhist
ethics must speak to the practitioner. The Eightfold Path and the
18

Robert Aitken, The Mind of Clover: Essays in Zen Buddhist Ethics (San
Francisco: North Point Press, 1984).
19
Aitken, 159.
20
James Whitehill, “Buddhist Ethics in Western Context: the ‘Virtues’
Approach,” in Journal of Buddhist Ethics 1 (1994): 2.
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Six pāramitās, after all, are not for the Buddha, but for the
individual lost in ignorance, selfishness, attachment, and craving.21
Even in the context of the Buddha Nature and Original
Enlightenment doctrines, the vast majority of sentient beings,
although essentially Buddhas (depending on how we interpret this
doctrine) perceive themselves as being unenlightened. It is clear,
that in nearly all forms of Buddhism, the remedy to this problem is
seen in the reliance of the “unenlightened” person on a good
teacher. And yet, no one can make progress on the Buddha path by
“leaning” on the teacher. In the terms of Early Buddhism, each
person must be their own guide and lamp, looking to the three
treasures of the Buddha, Dharma and Sagha for assistance. The
situation is not fundamentally different in the Mahāyāna where
direct assistance from Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is possible. The
importance of effort, in some sense, on the part of the practitioner
is indispensable, even in the context of “other help” in the Pure
Land systems. It is impossible to discuss the full range of Buddhist
doctrine on effort and faith in this paper, yet, I believe, the generic
conclusion remains true for nearly all, if not all Buddhist schools:
the individual practitioner must think, speak, act, and make his or
her livelihood in the most wholesome manner possible, given the
limits of the individuals personal attainment or understanding.
True enlightenment, King argues, is sometimes thought to
bring the realization that, ultimately, the world does not need
improvement, or that the real improvement must be wrought
instead in one’s own view of the world. He quotes the
eighteenth-century Zen master Hakuin:
The Buddha Amitāyus is brilliantly manifest here and
now.... All kinds of hell-suffering ... are nothing but

21

Whitehill, “The role of Emptiness in Buddhist practice] is true and
helpful only within the ‘deconstructive’ mood and context of ‘anyata’ dialectics
and metaphysics. When the net of ‘no-self’ is thrown to catch truth in an ethical
context, villains laugh and demons thrive.” (p. 6).
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Amitāyus Buddha’s whole body that shines with the color
of burnished gold.22
Such an interpretation is a variation on the Buddha Nature
Doctrine, which was so pervasive in Japanese Shingon, Tendai and
Zen. But even here, the Japanese Zen tradition is not univocal.
Dōgen (1200-1253), for example, in his later years, seeing the
confusion caused by these doctrines emphasized the traditional
understanding of Buddhist ethics in at least four of his last group of
writings included in his 12 Fascicle Shōbōgenzō: “Jinshin Inga”
(Deep Belief in Causality), “Sanji-ga” (Karmic Retribution in the
Three Stages of Time), “Ippyaku-hachi Homyo-mon” (One
Hundred and Eight Ways to Enlightenment), and “Hachi
Dainin-gaku” (The Eight Aspects of Enlightenment).23
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Hakuin, or the Zen
movement in general in Japan, concluded from the Buddha Nature
and Original Enlightenment doctrines that effort in all aspects of
the Path was unnecessary, a point which Dōgen stressed
relentlessly throughout his career. An examination of the strict
regimens in Zen training monasteries in Japan, either Sōtō or
Rinzai, makes this point be self-evident.
Western Paradigms for Understanding Buddhist Ethics
In the context of a dialogue with Western ethical thought, how
might Buddhist ethics be best explained as a kind of virtue ethics, a
kind of utilitarian ethics, and a combination of these, or are none of
these appropriate?

22

“Sokkaroku-kaien-fusetsu,” Sect. 30, in Hakuin Osha Zensha, vol. 2, pp.
403-404, trans. by Tokiwa Gishin. Quoted from King, “Is There a Buddhist
Ethics,” 5.
23
For a “preliminary” translation, see Yaha Yokoi and Daizen Victoria, Zen
Master Dōgen: An Introduction with Selected Writings (New York & Tokyo:
Weatherhill, 1976).
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Some, such as Whitehill, following Damien Keown, 24 have
argued that Buddhist ethics is best understood as an “ethics of
Virtue.”25 Whitehill defines this type of virtue ethics as an ethics of
“wakened virtue,” or more completely as “awakened,
compassionate virtue-cultivation.” 26 Ken Jones also argues for a
form of virtue ethics.27 According to Whitehill, Jones “affirms ...
that Buddhist morality is a matter of character and cultivation, and
that it focuses on cultivating character rather than evaluating
particular acts.”28 Jones argues that:
The emphasis in Buddhist morality is therefore on the
cultivation of a personality which cannot but be moral
rather than focusing upon the morality of particular
choices and acts. But, to repeat, it is not the will that can
create such a personality, no more than I can pick myself
up from the ground by my collar. It is to the training the
will must be applied, from which virtue will naturally
flow.29
Whitehill constructs his version of a Buddhist ethics of virtue
on the Six pāramitās: “generosity or gift giving (dāna), morality or
the five precepts (śīla)30, patience and forgiveness (kānti), courage
and vigor (vīrya), concentration [or meditation] (dhyāna), and
wisdom (prajñā).31 The importance of reason, for Whitehill, was
emphasized in the Mahāyāna by the addition of four more

24

Damien Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1992).
25
Whitehill, 4.
26
Whitehill, 5.
27
Ken Jones, The Social Face of Buddhism (London: Wisdom Publications,
1989).
28
Whitehill, 7 (my italics).
29
Jones, 157 (my italics).
30
H. Wolfgang Schumann translates sila as “self discipline”. [H. Wolfgang
Schumann, Buddhism: An Outline of its Teachings and Schools, translated by
Georg Feuerstein (London: Rider and Company, 1973), 130.
31
Whitehill, 9.
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pāramitās: resolution, determination, strength, and skillful
means.32
The notion of the Perfections, of course, is not unique to the
Mahāyāna. As Saddhatissa notes, the Ten Perfections in the
Theravādin Tradition include: (1) generosity (dāna), (2) morality
(sīla), (3) renunciation (kekkhamma), (4) wisdom (paññā), (5)
energy (viriya), (6) patience (khanti), (7) honesty and truthfulness
(sacca), (8) determination (adihāna), (9) loving kindness (mettā),
and (10) equanimity (upekkhā).33
For Whitehill, the fuzziness of the Jones’ phrase, “from which
virtue will naturally flow,” places Jones on the lip of the
“transcendence trap” by arguing the Buddhist ethical behavior
emerges from the “forms of moral discipline and repetition, yet
different from them, somehow transcendent, natural and free.” For
Whitehill, the “schooling in the forms of virtue is a social,
emotional, and cognitive process.”34 The role of the pāramitās is
primarily positive: “to foster a character that increasingly
encounters each moment, each space, each being, as a ‘mother’
enjoys and protects her only child.”35
Whitehill further argues that:
A focus on character tends to obscure or override the role
of general principles and rules as guides to decision-making
and mutual regulation. ... I acknowledge that
act-evaluations and rule-adjudications must be secondary
instruments in Buddhist ethics, necessary as they may be in
particular moments of particular communities.36
That the Buddhist ethical path includes a form of virtue ethics
cannot be discounted. The considerable attention paid to
32

Schumann lists these last four as “right method” (upāya), [the
Bodhisattva] “vow” (praidhāna), “strength” (bāla), and “knowledge” (jñāna).
(p. 132).
33
Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics, 72. See DhA 1.84.
34
Whitehill, 7 (my italics).
35
Whitehill, 9.
36
Whitehill, 15-16.

306

David Putney

psychology in the Nikāyas, Abhidhamma / Abhidharma and
Yogācāra systems attests to this. The Buddhist tradition is certainly
in agreement with Aristotle’s assertion that:
Those who have just begun to learn can string together
words, but do not yet know; for it has to become part of
themselves, and that takes time; so that we must suppose
that the use of language by men in an unrestrained state
[akta] means no more than its utterance by actors on the
stage.37
In the Buddhist tradition, a person does evil both out of
ignorance and because of deeply ingrained karmic habits
(sakhārās / saskāras), defilements (k1eśa / k1eta) and cancer
like “outflows” or “cankers” (āśravas / āsravas). And through the
purification of these character habits, meditative techniques and
the realization of Wisdom, the moral becomes possible.38 Whether
or not this realization is attained through “self help” or through the
help of Amida Buddha, enlightenment is linked to moral character.
I argue, however, that “act-evaluation” is just as much an
integral component of Buddhist ethics as is the development of
character. The two go hand in hand, and Buddhist ethics are
impoverished when either of them is undervalued. It is clear that
Buddhist ethics can also be understood as, at least, including a
special form of utilitarian ethics, where the welfare of oneself and
others, in terms of health and happiness, forms the basis of ethical
judgments.
In the “Ambalahikā-Rāhulovāda-sutta” of the Majjhimanikāya, we read:
37

Nicomachaen Ethics, 7.3: 1147a20-24; Translated from Ross and
Urmson, Collected Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1811.
38
For a detailed discussion of the psychology of habit in Buddhism, see my
dissertation, “The Nature and Practice of Freedom: A Dialogue on Freedom and
Determinism in Buddhist and Western Philosophy,” Ch. 2, and for a
comparative discussion of Plato and Aristotle and Buddhism on the relationship
between knowledge or wisdom, habit and freedom, see Ch. 3.
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Even so, Rāhula, a deed is to be done with the body (only)
after repeated reflection; a deed is to be done with speech ...
with the mind (only) after repeated reflection.39
I have already noted that Kalupahana has formulated such a
general utilitarian principle:
Whatever action, bodily, verbal, or mental, leads to
suffering for oneself, for others, or for both, that action is
bad (a-kusalam). Whatever action, bodily, verbal or mental,
does not lead to suffering for oneself, for others or for both,
that action is good (kusalam).40
Shoyo Taniguchi has stated:
Mental, physical, or verbal actions that are harmful to
oneself, to others, or to both are strongly discouraged in
Buddhism. The Buddha says it is because all beings fear
pain, harm, suffering, and hurt and seek comfort and
fearlessness.41
She quotes the Sayutta-nikāya:
‘A state that is not pleasant or delightful to me, it must be
so to him too. Then how could I inflict that upon him?’ As
a result of such reflection, he himself abstains from taking
the life of creatures and he encourages others so to abstain,
and speaks in praise of so abstaining. [Repeat for stealing,
adultery, lying, etc.]42

39

[M 1.415]. I. B. Horner, trans., Middle Length Savings, vol. 2, 88-89.
M 1.414-418. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, 62.
41
Taniguchi, 52.
42
[S.5.353-354]. Trans. from F.L. Woodward, vol. 5, The Book of the
Kindred Sayings (1930; Rpt., London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1979), 308f.
40
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Gunapala Dharmasiri stated:
In Buddhist ethics, the reasoning of morality is deduced to
“oneself”.... [The Buddha’s] appeal to us is to realize that
all other beings too think exactly in the way one thinks
about oneself.43
Dharmasiri goes so far as to identify Buddhist ethics with “act
utilitarianism,” but is careful to point out that:
It was an ideal utilitarianism rather than a hedonistic
because the ultimate end of ethical endeavor went beyond
the pleasure-pain principle.44
This is because the ultimate goal is Nibbāna in Early Buddhism
and Buddhahood in the Mahāyāna. In the Dīgha-nikāya, we read
about Nibbāna that:
There will be pleasure (pāmujjam), joy (pati), composure
(passaddhi),
mindfulness
(sati),
self-possession
(sapajānam), and happy living (sukho ca vihāro).45
Although this is an Early Buddhist description of Nibbāna as
attained in life, this description is also applicable to the Pure Land.
And, since the goal of all Buddhas is to free all beings from

43

Gunapala Dharmasiri, Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics (Antioch, Calif.:
Golden Leaves Publishing Company, 1989), 27.
44
Gunapala Dharmasiri, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of
God (Colombo: Lake House Investments, 1974). Quoted by Pahalawattage Don
Premasiri, “Moral Evaluation in Early Buddhism: From the Perspective of
Western Analysis” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1980), 172-173.
In his dissertation, Premasiri gives an extended discussion of the relationship
between Buddhist Ethics and the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. Especially
see Chapter 6, “Early Buddhism and Utilitarian Ethics.”
45
D. 1.196, translated by Premasiri, Ibid, 179. Also see T. W. Rhys Davids,
Dialogues of the Buddha, pt. 1 (Pāli Text Society), 261.
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suffering, the utilitarian aspect of Buddhist ethics is basic to the
Buddhist tradition.
Buddhist ethics is realized through empathy 46 and through
judgment. To say, however, that these judgments or incomplete
since they are based more or less on ignorance, as opposed to
Wisdom, is another aspect of the “transcendence trap,” since we
cannot avoid making ethical decisions in our daily lives, regardless
of our level of attainment. I argue that one of the main functions of
the Buddhist teaching of causality is to form a framework for such
decisions. What will happen if I think this way, speak this way, act
this way, or make my living in this way? Our limited wisdom and
perspective will necessarily result in numerous errors. However, it
is precisely these errors that lead to an understanding of
consequences, the result of experience.
Taniguchi points out:
Since each human nature, character, habit or behaviour is
different according to each one’s given surroundings,
abilities, education and maturity, sīla or good conduct
differs accordingly to one’s development of character and
nature.47
It is through mindfulness of our experience48 that we come to
see the dependently arisen nature of the fruits of action, leading, as
Dharmasiri argues, to judgments based on facts (yathābhūtam).49
This is Right View. It is precisely through a combination of the
development of healthy (kusala) habits of mind and body
(sakhārās), along with the Perfections (pāramitās) and the
application of the Buddhist utilitarian principle to concrete
situations that the true path of ethics is realized.

46

Dharmasiri, 27.
Taniguchi, 53.
48
See, for example, I. B. Horner, The Basic Position of Sīla (Colombo: The
Bauddha Sahitya Sabha, 1950), 18.
49
Dharmasiri, 33.
47
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Buddhist Communities and Mass Society
Is Buddhist ethics applicable only in regulated Buddhist
communities, or does it have a role for individual Buddhists in a
larger urban society? As a starting point for this discussion, it is
important to remember that the Buddha taught “for the good of the
many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the
world.”50
Some have advocated that Buddhist ethics is best developed in
relatively small Buddhist societies, where a teacher and other
members help to reinforce all aspects of Buddhist practice, and that
“tend to lack a viable social ethic in modem terms, that is a
policy-generating set of principles that can be institutionalized on a
mass scale, while protecting individual right-claims with coercive
means.”51 This is because “the self is fundamentally incomplete,
evolving, and inter-penetratingly co-dependent with others.” This
training must be carried on in the context of a community of a
teacher and practitioners. “The Buddhist believes her moral efforts
flow necessarily into the community on many levels, materially,
verbally, and mentally, in a subtle, looping reciprocity.”52
That such communities are vital to Buddhism is clear, but
where does this leave such communities in the larger social
community of diverse beliefs? What do the Buddhist practitioners
or small group of practitioners do?53 Do initiates or more advanced
students live in such communities for a variety of reasons? Does
Buddhism have nothing to say to the lone individual or the small
group of practitioners, since “ethical strategies focusing on rational
rules and judgments of particular outward acts are the essential
50

Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, 2nd ed. (New York: Grove
Press, 1974), 46.
51
Whitehill, 12.
52
Whitehill, 11.
53
Whitehill argues that communities of four to six “can hardly challenge
and support the full range of self-cultivating practices necessary to awakened
virtue.” He also says that communities of more than 200 active members are too
large, since such organizations are “too complex and too absorbed in the
entropic tasks of organization maintenance of buildings, mortgages, and so on.”
[Whitehill, 16].
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feature of groups so large that they constitute a society of
strangers?” 54 Are act-evaluations and rule-adjudications limited
only to the status of “secondary instruments in Buddhist ethics,
necessary as they may be in particular moments of particular
communities.”55 I think not.
It is only a combination of virtue ethics and situational ethical
judgments in the context of efforts in all aspects of the Eightfold
Path, or the Mahāyāna Pāramitās can be practiced, with at least
some success, ideally with periodic contact with a teacher and/or
Buddhist community. If the lay practitioner is not in the best of
possible worlds, the ideal sized and led Buddhist community, this
is no excuse for not doing his or her best to cultivate both character
and judgment. I am not attempting, in any sense, to devalue the
role of the teacher and Buddhist communities, but am stressing that
a discussion of Buddhist practice and especially moral practice
cannot be limited to these communities.
Buddhist Ethics and Societal Ethics
Does Buddhist ethics have anything to say to ethical discussion
in general, or need it be confined only to practicing Buddhists?
I argue that Buddhism can engage in a dialogue with Western
Ethicists by concentrating on commonalities between Buddhism
and the Western tradition in the areas of (1) virtue ethics, (2)
situational ethics, and (3) ethical judgments according to the
maxim. “Act such that your thoughts, speech, actions and
livelihood are of benefit and bring happiness to oneself as well as
others and do not act such that your thoughts, speech, actions and
livelihood cause harm and suffering to yourself as well as others.”
A dialogue on virtue ethics is possible because many, though not
all, of the Buddhist virtues are held in common with other world
religious and ethical traditions. A general interest in developing
virtue in the process of educating children, for example, is a good
starting point. Buddhism, I believe, has a great deal to say about
54
55

Whitehill, 16 (my italics).
Ibid. (my italics).
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ethical judgments and can engage in dialogue with Western
ethicists in utilitarian ethical discourse, virtue ethical discourse,
and even in a form of Kantian deontological ethics of maxims.
Such an engagement can help the Buddhist community to integrate
itself into the larger, impersonal society of diversity and help the
individual Buddhist develop a working relationship with that
society.

THE TEACHINGS OF THE BUDDHA AND JESUS
AS RESOURCES FOR A DOCTRINE OF PEACE
J. Bruce Long
Not by hatred is hatred quelled
but only by acts of love.
This is the eternal law.
(Dhp. 5)
But I say to you, Love your enemies and
pray for those who persecute you, so that you
may become children of your Father in heaven….
(Matt. 5.44)

In his introduction to the excellent collection of essays on
Comparative Philosophy, Interpreting Across Boundaries,1 Gerald
Larson discusses a number of pitfalls in the use of the comparative
method, per se, each of which, if committed, will ineluctably skew,
in some way of another, one’s view of the topic under
consideration. Two of the four perspectival biases appear more
frequently than the other two. First is the temptation to elevate
one’s own perspective or set of beliefs over that of the ‘other,’
such that the truth-value of one’s own perspective is inflated and
1

See Eliot Deutsche and Gerald Larson, eds., Interpreting Across
Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1988), 3-18.
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that of the ‘other’ is undervalued. Second is the exact antithesis of
this fault, namely, the tendency to diminish or denigrate one’s own
personal or cultural ethos and idealize that of the ‘other,’ as being
more special or superior to one’s own cultural system.
In this essay, we will attempt to avoid both of these pitfalls, in
hopes of being in a position to travel, not a neutral track (for that is
humanly impossible) but a kind of middle-of-the-road pathway,
cutting between ‘pure objectivity’ and ‘pure subjectivity.’ The aim
of this approach is to maximize the chance of giving the ethics of
the Buddha and the ethics of Jesus as fair and balanced a hearing,
as possible, in an attempt to delineate each of them as potential
resources for an Ethics of Peace.
In order to make even this relatively circumscribed subject
manageable, we have chosen to consult two sacred texts, one from
each of the two traditions, as exemplary statements of the central
core of the respective body of teachings on the Ethics of Peace.
The relative brevity and conciseness of each of the two texts,
combined with the wealth of details concerning core ethical
principles contained in each, makes these texts a reasonable basis
for this exploration.
First to be considered is the Buddha’s Ethics of Peace as
embodied principally in one of the most eloquent and highly
revered scriptures in the whole of Buddhism, namely, the Mettā
Sutta, also, thought to be one of the earliest compendia of the
Buddha’s discourses.2
Subsequently, we will explore Jesus’ Ethics of Peace as
articulated in the earliest known record of what are believed to
have been Jesus’ exact words (or as close to those exact words as
we are ever likely to come), a document known simply as “Q” or
more poetically, “The Sayings of Q.” For now, it suffices to say
2

Sutta Nipāta (I. 8), English translation, K.R. Norman, Groups of
Discourses, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Pāli Text Society, 2001). See also, The Rhinoceros
Horn and Other Early Buddhist Poems, trans. K.R. Norman (Oxford: Pāli Text
Society, 1996). There is also a large body of material on this sutta composed by
various contemporary Pāli scholar-monks, notably, Thanissaro Bhikkhu,
Piyadassi Thera and Ñāamoli Thera accessible at the online site,
http://www.accesstoinsight.org.
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that “Q” was composed entirely of selected “sayings of Jesus,” no
stories, no didactic material, no biographical information – just
sayings. More will be said about this document, subsequently.3
In this comparative exploration of the teachings of the Buddha
and Jesus as models of and resources for the development of an
Ethics of Peace, it will be assumed that an Ethics of Peace does not
have an existence independently of a general system of ethics in
either case but that it is, in every case, inextricably intertwined
with the constitutive strands of their more general ethics.
The Buddha’s Ethics of Peace
The Buddha’s social ethics is based on a set of principles
meant to develop and support a society pervaded by peace and
amity. In the area of interpersonal relations (or etiquette and ethics),
the Buddha promoted a morality of great gentility, gentleness and
humaneness, based more on comity and fellowship than on strict
moral obligation. The four cardinal virtues – friendliness (mettā),
compassion (karuā), joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā) form
the basic quaternity of his comprehensive ethical system. Unlike
the ethical systems of all of the other Great Religions (except for
the contemporaneous Jainism), the Buddha’s concern for the
protection of life forms extended well beyond the bounds of the
human community, to include “all sentient beings,” both great and
small, visible and invisible.
The Jātakas, stories concerning the previous lives of the
Buddha, urge the adoption of friendly and even compassionate
relations between human beings and all the other sentient beings in
3

A very small core body of scholarly literature in English on the subject of
“Q” might include the following: Burton Mack, The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q
and Christian Origins (San Francisco: Harper, 1993); James M. Robinson, Paul
Hoffmann, and John S. Kloppenborg, eds., The Critical Edition of Q: Synopsis
including the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, Mark and Thomas with English,
German and French Translations of Q and Thomas (Minneapolis: Fortress,
2000) and of greatest value as a recreation of Jesus’ ‘theology’ from this same
text, James M. Robinson’s Jesus: According to the Earliest Witness
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007).
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the universe, based on such cardinal virtues as living for others,
devotion to family, brotherhood, honesty, non-injury, and the like.
And while the primary focus of the Buddha’s ethical instructions
was on the monastic community, he provided a broad and varied
array of ethics principles, by means of the adherence to which the
lay person might hope to achieve a better rebirth in the future, in a
celestial realm or Pure Land and ultimately, achieve complete
liberation.
Like Jesus (Matt. 6. 19-21), the Buddha counseled his
followers to avoid burying a treasure in a deep pit, in hopes that it
might come in handy in the eventuality of some personal
misfortune. He wisely observes that such a buried treasure may not
be of any benefit at all to its owner, “for he may forget where he
has hidden it, or goblins may steal it, or his enemies or even his
kinsmen may take it when he is careless.” (Dhp., 119-120) The
Buddha continues that by means of “charity, goodness, restraint,
and self-control,” a person can store-up a treasure that will be
beneficial regardless of the physical circumstance, “a treasure
which cannot be given to another person or group and which
robbers cannot steal.” If such a wise man follows this course, “this
treasure will never forsake him.”4
The key word that synthesizes the diversity of terms used at
various points in the Nikāyas is the word, “non-attachment.” The
relevance of this word to the creation of an Ethics of Peace is
patently obvious: if a person, a family, a community, or an entire
people were to live by this principle of mental, moral and spiritual
release, surely it would follow that open warfare would never be a
viable option, and every conscientious effort would be made to
resort, at most, to a nonviolent form of self-defense or even less
than that, a calm and undisturbed silence. For under this ethical
rubric, neither the collection, the preservation nor the transmission
4

Khuddaka Patha 8. Note that in this passage the statement that “the
treasure cannot be given to others” stands in distinction from the belief in later
Mahāyāna that merits accruing from good deeds may be transferred to others as
a gift, the most exemplary model of which is the compassionate actions of the
bodhisattva, whose sole raison d’etre is the assistance to all sentient beings in
finding their way to emancipation or full Buddhahood.
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of any sort of material values or commodities should serve as a
motivating force for any kind of bucolic action, of either mind or
body. Positively stated, each individual, family, society or nation
state would seek under all circumstances to maximize the benefits
of ‘the other,’ regardless of how the ‘other’ is defined. There
would be no self-aggrandizing action in any form; only altruistic
and benevolent action on behalf of the welfare of ‘the other’ and in
promotion of the general commonweal.
The Mettā Sutta as the Basis for the Buddha’s Ethics of Peace
The Mettā Sutta, located in the Sutta Nipāta (I. 8), is a seminal
text in the presentation of the Buddha’s Ethics of Peace.
The genius of this text is, in part, its marriage of poetic
conciseness and comprehensive inclusion of the prominent ethical
principles of the Buddha’s teachings. For this reason, this Sutta
stands as a paradigmatic representation of many of the key
principles of the Buddha’s ethics.
The first two verses are an extremely concise presentation of
the Buddha’s concept of the perfected person or a person who is
skilled in accomplishing his goals or objectives. In addition, these
verses provide a pre-scription for a dedicated Buddhist practitioner
to achieve the ultimate goal, namely, “that state of peace” (ta
santa padam) or Nibbāna. In a word, they clearly establish the
fact that a combination of single-minded dedication and persistent
commitment are indispensable to the effective practice of the
Dharma.
The first ten lines of the poem enumerate a total of fifteen
virtues possessed by the ideal person: skilled in aims, desirous of
attaining the state of peace, capable, upright and straightforward,
easy to instruct, gentle, of humble nature, contented and easy to
support, with few duties, living lightly, with peaceful faculties,
modest and not greedy for supporters, not attached to views (of any
kind), virtuous and consummate in vision, having subdued the
desire for sensual pleasures. All virtues could be viewed as marks
of the Way of Peace.
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This list is, in effect, a working menu of the virtues that
constitute the Buddha’s overall ethics (sīla), as well as his Ethics
of Peace. The first quality in the list is a term meaning, capable or
skillful in achieving one’s aims (sakko). This strong goal
orientation should give rise to honesty and forthrightness (ujū ca
sūjū ca) in one’s practice. Then come obedience, gentleness, and
humility (anatimāni), the last term emphasizing the Buddha’s
exhortation to pursue a life that is not excessively proud or
arrogant.
Following this, there is a list of attributes that seem more
intended for monastics than for laity, a fact that would seem to
confirm that this sutta, as it now stands, is the result of the comingling of at least three pieces of material that were once distinct
and independence sources. The list includes contentment, easy to
support, of few duties and simple lifestyle; restrained senses,
masterful, modest and unattached to family. Specifically the text
described such people as subhara and sallahuka-vutti, literally
easy to support and simple in livelihood, or characterized by a
simplicity of dress, food and shelter, the bulwark of the monk’s life
and kulesu ananu-giddha, meaning separation from lay-life and
exercising self-restraint among lay people.
Then follows a succinct summary of the ethical profile of the
ideal human being from the Buddhist perspective: “May he not
perform the slightest wrong for which the liberated being (arahant)
might rebuke him.” Here the text serves up another succinct
summation of the nature of ideal ethical judgment: pare
upavadeyyum (an action for which a person would rebuke another),
indicating that a less than ideal person will be more likely to detect
the shortcomings of others than of his own. This point, of course,
coincides precisely with the comparable words of Jesus, urging his
followers to refrain from judging others, in recognition of the fact
that sooner or later, that person will be judged by others by the
same ethical criteria by which he has judged others. The
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judgmental person is one who sees “the speck in the neighbor’s
eye,” but fails to see “the log in their own eye.”5
In a most dramatic and highly poetical manner, the sutta
presents a wish for the well-being of all creatures, great and small:
“May all beings be happy and well and may they have joyous
minds,” a thought that will be foremost in the mind of the ideal
person at all times. Thus, without verbal elaboration, the text
evokes a person of universal goodwill and loving kindness, whose
every thought is pervaded by feelings of friendship, not only for
his closest acquaintances but for all creatures in the universe,
known and unknown.
The next two stanzas provide a brief inventory of the various
genre of creatures to which one should always relate and interact
with an attitude of friendliness and loving kindness: (1) feeble or
strong, (2) of long, short and medium stature, (3) small and large,
(4) visible and invisible, and (5) those who are born and those who
are yet to be born. This classification of different types of creatures
to whom perpetual good will should be extended, is the most allencompassing and, indeed, universalistic of any ethical profile
known to this writer. Furthermore, the list should be understood to
be much more than a frozen taxonomy or a creaturely typology,
that is formulated as an intellectual exercise. Rather, it should be
seen as a working program in ethical self-development.
The practice of mettā must be developed in stages, beginning
with the bestowal of mettā upon oneself. For the Buddha
recognized (as Jesus did in his injunction “you should love your
neighbors as you love yourself”), that without first loving oneself, a
person will be mentally and emotionally incapable of loving others.
From the securing of love of oneself, one should, then, practice the
bestowal of mettā upon people who are closest to the giver and the
most well-liked and only then should they extend mettā to friendly
strangers and finally, to people who have done the person wrong in
some way or another and, hence, people that that person may
5

Matthew 7.1-5. In modern psychotherapeutic terminology, the first stance
is the product of maximizing when judging the faults of others, and minimizing
when reflecting on one’s own faults. This tendency is both an “imbalanced” and
an “inaccurate” picture of both one’s own and others, virtues and vices.
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distrust or dislike. From this sequence of steps, it becomes clear
that the practice of mettā should be carried out within an enormous
geographical stage (i.e., the universe) and with a largesse of
emotional empathy for every conscious being.
The next four verses delineate the model for developing and
maturing these thoughts of loving kindness. The text is composed
of a series of what might be described as “prayerful injunctions”:
may you avoid deceiving or hating anyone, anywhere, showing
neither anger nor ill-will nor wishing harm in any form to anyone.
Like a mother who is prepared to risk her own life in order to
protect her only child from harm, one should “cultivate boundless
love toward all beings.”
And then, picking up on the intentionality of the first principle
in the Eightfold Path, the text states that one should maintain a
state of increasingly purified and alert mindfulness at all times and
thereby, develop increasingly pure and clear awareness of one’s
life-situation, and in the course of things develop Right Views. In
addition, one should be always virtuous and possessed of insight
into the nature and moral and spiritual directionality of each
moment of experience. By this means, “that person will never
again be subject to rebirth,” declares the sutta triumphantly.
To deceive or betray someone else in order to enhance one’s
own position vis-à-vis a desired outcome, is, obviously, to act out
of a self-centered attitude of greed and blind self-aggrandizement
and to cast an insult on another is to see oneself in a superior light.
It is obvious from this context that this injunction covers both
external actions of deprecation and debasement of others and
internal attitudes of arrogance and superiority toward others. Such
attitudes of exaggerated self-regard are likely to give rise to actual
desires that other persons against whom one has ill-feelings,
actually experience some kind of misfortune.
The final couplet decisively summarizes the viewpoint of the
entire sutta, as well as, a major portion of the Buddha’s teachings
contained in the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path. While
the Buddha clearly regarded the extension of mettā throughout the
length and breadth of the universe and to all of its creatures, as
crucial to the creation and maintenance of a Culture of Peace, he,
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also, made it clear that this practice was not sufficient to gain the
ultimate goal, Nibbāna. He posits four additional preconditions to
the achievement of that goal which, in this context, he states but
does not elaborate: namely, (1) to put away all false views and
thereby, master the first step in the Eightfold Path, the achievement
of “Right Views” (sammā dihi); (2) to become virtuous (sīlavā),
which includes Right Speech (sammā vācā), Right Action (sammā
kammanta) and Right Livelihood (sammā ājīva); (3) to acquire
insight (dassanena sapanna), Right Knowledge or Right Thought
(sammā sakappa); and (4) to discard all forms of sensual desire
(kāmesu gedham), which leads to the eradication of suffering by
means of the suppression of desire (tahā, tā).
It is evident from the foregoing that the Buddha’s teachings,
as well as, his life and actions, are not only instructions about an
Ethics of Peace, expressive of a mutual loving regard of human
beings for each other, but an existential embodiment of those
ethical principles. At no point does he allow the resorting to
aggressive or violent behavior against another human being (or any
other creature), either to acquire some desired commodity or value
or to protect something already owned. This entire ethics might be
epitomized in the paradigmatic declaration: “Not by hatred is
hatred quelled but only by acts of love. This is the eternal law.”6
Jesus’ Ethics as Represented in the Pre-biblical “Sayings of Q”
It has long since been proven, by use of the analytical tools of
modern biblical criticism, initially developed in Germany in the
1880’s, that “the Bible did not fall from heaven like a stone,” that
is, all at once and in one piece. Both the Old and New Testaments
developed over centuries and through the agency of numerous
writers and editors /redactors. Like the Pāli Sūttas, the four gospels
(Matthew, Mark, Luke and John) were initially transmitted orally
and only later committed to writing. It is further known, beyond
any reasonable doubt, that the four apostles, to whom each of the
four gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke and John) has been attributed,
6
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were not the actual authors of the four texts. It is not known who
authored these texts and those facts may never be conclusively
determined.
In 1838, a biblical scholar in Leipzig, Germany, Christian
Hermann Weisse sensed the presence of a collection of the
“sayings of Jesus” embedded, almost incognito, in the gospels of
Matthew and Luke, as we now have them. After its discovery and
reconstruction as a “ghost text,” it came commonly to be referred
to simply as “the source,” or in German, Quelle, abbreviated as
“Q.”7
Since the existence of Q precedes the actual composition of
Matthew and Luke, and is the source from which the writers of the
two gospels drew the “sayings of Jesus” around which they wove
their own narratives of Jesus’ life and teachings, this text, in all
probability, is our most reliable source for the actual words of
Jesus in the entire New Testament canon.
“Q” is not a currently existent text. It is a scholarly
reconstruction of a text composed entirely of the “sayings of Jesus,”
a collection of precious aphorisms that is believed to have been
collected around 50 CE, a mere seventeen years after Jesus’ death.
Two of the four Gospel writers (Matthew and Luke) drew directly
from Q in composing their own accounts of the life and teachings
of Jesus. Once the gospels came into existence and became
authoritatively established within the Christian community, the
document “Q” was apparently superseded and ultimately
disappeared.
What, then, are the basic principles and requirements of Jesus’
Ethics of Peace according to this pre-biblical document, the
“Sayings of Q?”
Jesus’ first recorded action during his adult years was his
leaving his family home in Nazareth to join the apocalyptic
movement of John the Baptist, and undergoing John’s initiation of
the rite of baptism in the Jordan River. This water-rite must have
7

Consult James M. Robinson, Jesus: According to the Earliest Witness
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007) for extensive information concerning the
personage of Jesus in the “Sayings of Q.”
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symbolized the discarding one’s old worldly identity and the
emergence of a new, godly person, prepared to meet the coming of
the Kingdom of God within the near future. To interpret, properly,
Jesus’ ethical teachings, it is necessary to see them within the
context of his apocalyptic vision, namely, that the Day of
Redemption, the Final Judgment and the End of the World, were
all believed to be near-at-hand.
After his baptism by John, Jesus broke away from John’s
apocalyptic movement and began to preach a message of his own,
based on a similar understanding that his mission in the world was
to usher in a new era of the Kingdom of Righteousness (basileia
dikaiosuna) or the Kingdom of God (basileia tou theou) to be
established, not on power and might but on love and forgiveness.
According to a leading biblical scholar, “Jesus did not call for any
demonstration of repentance or baptism. For him, God’s grace was
certain without rites. . . . At the centre of Jesus’ message stood the
Jewish belief in God: for Jesus, God was a tremendous ethical
energy which could soon change the world to bring deliverance to
the poor, the weak and the sick.”8
The core ingredients of Jesus’ ethics as found in Q are as
follows: (1) A love (Grk., agape) not only for one’s family, friends
and neighbors but for one’s enemies as well, contrary to the Old
Testament, where “unbelievers” are defined as God’s enemies, and
hence, to be avoided except, perhaps, to bring them into the
company of the faithful, and the corollary to that, (2) the Golden
Rule, “do unto others as you would have them do unto you,”9 (3) a
lack of critical judgment towards other people, regardless of who
they might be or the circumstances under which one may find
oneself dealing with them, (4) a life, devoid of material
possessions, and without toil for daily bread, but rather a life
dedicated to the service of the Kingdom of God and a looking to
God for all of one’s daily needs, (5) a life committed to denying
self and serving others, regardless of who they might be, and (6) a
8

Gerd Theissen & Annette Merz, The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive
Guide (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 570.
9
Cf. Luke 6. 31.
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life lived in the awareness that the ‘appointed time’ (kairos), the
day of salvation, the end of the world order and the final judgment
is near-at-hand.
Using the metaphor of the tree, Jesus compared good trees that
produce healthy fruit and bad trees that produce inedible fruit, with
good and evil human beings. His intention in telling this story was
to say, “Let me tell you what being a good person really means – I
call on you to be just that.”10 As this small story illustrates, Jesus
sought to identify the basic intentions, attitudes and motivations of
people, rather than focus on their attention to social proprieties,
ritualistic practices or publicly-sanctioned ethical norms. He spoke
to people personally to address the kind of person he wanted them
to be. He challenged them to adopt a certain way of life as a result
of their moment-to-moment decisions and choices. He summoned
them to a certain way of life, articulated in his teachings, for he
spoke to them as a teacher (Rabbi) or better, a preacher or evangel,
rather than a theologian who would, customarily, deal with ideas
rather than moral and spiritual injunctions 11 and life changing
commitments.
In Jesus’ view, “looking out for number one,” or striving for
“self-preservation,” either for individuals or institutions, is not an
acceptable life pathway to follow. Rather, one should not be
concerned about one’s own life, at all. Just think of the ravens (Q
12. 22-31), he counseled – they do not work in fields or store their
harvest in barns, as do human beings. Yet God provides for their
nourishment. Like the lilies of the field, they have no need to
produce their own clothing and yet the beauty of their adornment is
superior even to the royal garments of a king like Solomon. The
moral of the story: God always knows what each person needs
before they ask for it and he stands ready to provide it, provided
they ask for it with uncompromised confidence or faith in His
power to provide whatever is needed.
All of these teachings, taken separately and together, present a
life-model that cuts across the grain of most natural human
10
11

Robinson, op. cit., 69.
Ibid, 69.
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inclinations toward self-preservation, self-aggrandizement, selfadvancement, and the acquisition of desired objects or goals (often
at the moral and psychological expense of others) or the protection
of something already owned but under threat of loss. Jesus
counsels a life governed by the ethics of self-abnegation, selfdenial, equitable treatment of others regardless of the
circumstances and an uncompromised love of and compassion for
others, especially the poor, the socially-despised and the
dispossessed. Under such an ethics, there is no accommodation
given to self-serving, defensive or offensive moral stances, or any
other similar positions that, under extreme circumstances, may
serve as a motivation to interpersonal or intra-communal conflict
or outright warfare.
One discovers more fully the basic ethics of Jesus and its
implications for life, in those passages of Q in which Jesus is either
addressing or speaking about his closest disciples, who, in modern
parlance, might be referred to as “wandering rebels.” They have no
money and no need for any. They have no purse or clothes bag,
since they take neither money nor supplies with them. (Q 10. 4)
They live like the wild birds and animals or like the sparrows that
cannot even fall to earth without God knowing it. (Q 12. 7) They
must trust implicitly in the power of God to take care of them.
They do not even wear sandals on their feet, perhaps a sign of
penance (Q 10. 4). Nor do they even carry a stick to protect
themselves from wild animals and robbers; rather they go about
after the fashion of lambs among ravenous wolves, innocent and
vulnerable. (Q 10. 3)12
Thus, the archetypal representation of the loyal follower of
Jesus is not the powerful potentate or the militaristic defender of
the realm, nor the self-serving rich and famous, but rather the
lowly, self-sacrificing and self-effacing underlings in society, who
live, altruistically, in service to and for the benefit of other people,
the poor, the disenfranchised and the powerless.
12

This passage from Q manifests an ethic that could only be described as
ascetical, commensurate, in many ways, with the spiritual paths depicted in both
the Hindu and Buddhist traditions as the path taken by “wandering homeless
yogis,” (sāmañña-s/śramaa-s and sannyasin-s.)
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Jesus initiates, what has become his most compelling and
archetypal body of teachings, his “Sermon on the Mount,” with the
famous “Beatitudes” (lit., “blessings”), that illuminate vividly the
place of love and peace in his overall message. He extends these
blessings, not to the rich and powerful, not to kings and wealthy
merchants but to the poor in spirit, mourners, the meek and
submissive, those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, the
merciful, the pure in heart, the peacemakers, etc. He states
specifically in the eighth beatitude that those who are persecuted
for righteousness’ sake will inherit the kingdom of heaven. He
promises his followers that many of them will be persecuted on his
account but that they can rejoice in the assurance that their reward
for their faithfulness on earth will be great in heaven.
But Jesus goes one step further toward the establishment of an
Ethics of Peace, by declaring that one should not even offer
resistance to anyone who harms one or threatens one’s person with
harm. (Q 6. 29-30) If someone strikes you on one cheek, offer him
the other, as well. If a robber snatches your (outer) coat, you
should give him the shirt off your back as a gift. If anyone asks
you for something, give it to him willingly and if someone seeks a
loan, do not ask him later for repayment (i.e., treat the loan as a
gift). And, he concludes, as we ask God to forgive us our
sins/moral debts, so should we forgive others their indebtedness to
us. These, too, are unquestionably, hallmarks of an Ethics of Peace.
Perhaps, one of the most difficult of all principles in Jesus’
Ethics of Peace to embrace is this: love your enemies and pray for
those who persecute you. You should do more than love your
friends or social equals because even the sinners and tax collectors
do as much. Rather, you should follow the lead of God, who sends
both rain and sunshine alike, on both the good and the evil. Only
by this means can you become a child of God.13
A key piece of evidence that points to the very core of Jesus’
Ethics of Peace is to be found in a section of “Q” (10. 5-6)
13

As Robinson notes, “Jesus was first called a Son of God, not because he
was like a Roman emperor, or like Hercules, or like other sons of God in that
society, but because he was like God in loving /and forgiving/ his enemies.”
Ibid. 71.
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regarding the customary greeting offered to a fellow member of
“the faithful,” i.e., the greeting, “Shalom.” This was not an empty
and casual greeting, as our “good morning, how’re you doing?”
often is. The greeting was extended with profound sincerity and
warmth of spirit, more especially to a fellow members of the
“Jesus’ people.” Whenever a “wandering rebel” knocked at a door
and was admitted with a “Shalom,” the head of that household
came to be known a “son of peace,” and the household itself, a
“place of peace,” when, in point of fact, such a place often existed
under great risk of persecution and even, death for its residents, at
the hands of the opponents of Jesus, both Jewish and gentile.14
The “wandering rebels “who followed Jesus wherever he went
on his mission of teaching, healing and exorcisms (the three forms
of ministry for which he was largely known) were sent out to go
from house to house, seeking minimal hospitality for themselves
(simple food – often a small loaf of bread and a single small fish –
and a simple homespun robe for clothing) and offering only
gestures of “peace” in return. These disciples often healed the sick
and extended a reassuring word to the world-weary and the
bereaved that “God’s power has touched you.” (Q 10. 9)
This, then, is the way of life that Jesus and his followers urged
people to embrace – unburdened and uncluttered like the life of the
ravens and the lilies of the field. For as Jesus promises, one needs
only to ask God for something and it will be given: seek and you
will find; knock and the door will be opened to you. (Q 11. 9)
Hence, the taking of aggressive, self-serving measures to grab
something that another person has in their possession or to prevent
such a persona from acquiring something one is determined to
possess, is never condoned.
In sum, because God’s bounty is so abundantly available and
only for the asking, no person should be concerned or anxious
about their life, what they would eat, what they would put on.
Only consider the ravens: they neither sow nor reap nor gather into
barns, and yet God feeds them. Are we humans not much better
than the birds? For this is what the Gentiles (unbelievers) do; but
14
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your heavenly Father knows what you need even before you ask
for it. Therefore, seek only the kingdom (Mt 6. 25-34) and all other
things will be granted to you. (Q 12. 22b. 24. 29-31)
A Short Hermeneutical Interlude
There is a paradox at the heart of the teaching, concerning the
superiority of human beings over the birth of the air (and by
extension, all other ‘lower animals’) a teaching that sets Jesus’
ethics apart from that of the Buddha in a dramatic fashion. On the
one hand, Jesus seems to be expressing unconditional love for the
birds of the air and in a sense, idealizes them as models of the free
and unburdened life. But, then, he quite surprisingly suggests that
the ravens are, by definition, an inferior species of creature, which
is less valuable in God’s eyes than are human beings. This
statement re-enforces the long-held belief in the Hebraic tradition
that humans are the crown of God’s creation, the most illustrious
of all his creative acts and should, therefore, be held in higher
regard and treated with special concern, over and above the animal
kingdom, over which God gave man dominion at the time of the
creation of the world. (Genesis 1. 26)
This axiological and ethical distinction between human beings
and the, so-called, lower animals, stands in stark contrast to the
Buddha’s conviction that the uncompromised avoidance of causing
injury or harm (ahisā) to all sentient beings is a fundamental
precondition for achieving a purified heart and mind. The
reasoning here seems to be that if one exercises avoids bringing
harm to any sentient being, one will, thereby, be in personal touch
with the deepest of all ethico-spiritual principles, namely, “the
reverence for life,” within the life-world (sasāra).
The doctrine of “ahisā” has stood as the hallmark of the
Buddhist tradition for over 2500 years. That same ethics of nonviolence continues to be the elemental guiding principle in
contemporary Buddhism. Two recent examples: first, a huge series
of protests staged by monks in Myanmar (formerly, Burma)
against the repressive policies of the current government, which
the government-controlled military put down with unrestrained
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force, causing the disappearance and even the death of numerous
monastic demonstrators and second, large groups of Tibetan
monks protesting, also through non-violent means, the plethora of
violations of common civil rights by the iron rule of the Chinese
government in Beijing. The Dalai Lama, the political and spiritual
leader of the people of Tibet, made a public declaration that unless
his fellow-countrymen halted the violent protests immediately, he
would resign as the Dalai Lama. Many other such contemporary
public demonstrations on behalf of peace and justice are dramatic
exemplifications of the Buddhist-Gandhian conviction that “nonviolent resistance” is the most effective and least injurious of all
forms of “righteous indignation.”
A Brief Counterpoint in Jesus’ Ethics of Peace
There is one element in Jesus’ ethics that calls for brief but
close scrutiny. That is the charge by Jesus (contained in simple
form in Q, but provided in a more elaborate and demanding form
in the gospel of Matthew) that declares that he came to earth “to
bring, not peace but a sword.”
The passage in Matthew is as follows: “Don’t get the idea that I
came to bring peace on earth. I did not come to bring peace but a
sword. After all, I have come to pit a son against his father, a
daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her
mother-in-law. A person’s enemies are members of the same
household. Those who love father and mother more than me are
not worthy of me, and those who love son or daughter more than
me are not worthy of me. And those who do not take their cross
and follow after me are not worthy of me. Those who find their life
will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it.”
(Matthew 10. 34-37) The piece about family conflicts is based on
an identical passage from the Old Testament prophet, Micah (7. 56). This is another instance in which a gospel “writer/redactor”
reaches back to the Hebrew scriptures for a piece of material that
he felt would assist him in accomplishing his “theological goal” in
recounting the story of Jesus.
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The core statement in this passage comes from Q and hence, is
in all probability, either the exact words of Jesus or an accurate
paraphrase. Like the other three gospel writers, Matthew drew on
the simple sayings of Jesus contained in Q and then added his own
narrative and theological elaborations to achieve his theological
task. It is likely, based on close textual analysis, that only the first
sentence of the declaration came from Jesus himself, by way of Q.
Thus, Matthew expanded on Jesus’ point about peace and the
sword, by supplying specifics about family divisions that might
occur as a result of following him.
Taking the sentence about bringing not peace but a sword at
face value, it seems to be in direct conflict with Jesus’
recommendation of unqualified love. (See Matt. 5. 43-48) But,
given the love-centered nature of Jesus’ overall message and
mission, this sentence should be read “metaphorically.” The
hermeneutical result of such a reading would go something like
this: “While I preach peace to everyone, my followers should
understand that following me may (and in all likelihood will) put
them at odds with certain opponents of the faith. And they should
understand that such conflicts may be one of the attendant costs of
discipleship.”
Another consideration: since, in this saying, Jesus refers to
himself in the first person, (it is doubtful that he, customarily, did
this) and also, that it harkens back to a verse from Micah, it is,
again, likely that much of this passage originated, not with Jesus
himself, but with the later Church. In any case, the first sentence in
the passage should not be interpreted literally to mean that Jesus’
followers should, literally, take up arms to fight for his cause, but
only to be prepared to remains faithful to Jesus’ teachings and to
meet attacks on the community of the faithful with love and
forgiveness.
However, one caveat remains: Elsewhere in Q and the gospels,
Jesus is teaching in the temple and his parents reportedly think he
is mad and urge him to come home with them. Jesus responds with
a startling statement: “Who is my family? Only those who do the
will of my father in heaven are my family and not necessarily my
blood kin, only.” This, combined with the passage about hating
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your family members and cutting family ties, cuts to the very root
of the, then current, Mediterranean social and religious practice of
supporting one’s blood relatives, at all costs, perhaps, even to the
point of death. According to some scholars, “The saying probably
originated as a retort to people who used family ties as an excuse
not to become a follower.”15
Hence, despite the seemingly contradictory intention of this
passage and other gospel passages that will go unmentioned here,
Jesus’ message remains a message of peace. What needs to be
factored into the overall picture is that Jesus obviously realized that
his message, though based to some extent on the Hebraic tradition
in which he was raised, was at odds with the mainline and
conservative branches of that tradition and that, in all likelihood,
an adherence to his message would place the believer at odds with
the social and religious communities of which they were a part.
The Buddha’s and Jesus’ Ethics of Peace Compared and
Contrasted
The core teaching of both the Buddha and Jesus is this: Before
taking action a person should put him/herself in the place of the
other person and treat them exactly as they themselves would like
to be treated by them – that is with friendship, not animosity; with
love, not hatred; with forgiveness, not condemnation; and with
compassion and understanding, not abuse.
In hopes of providing the basis for a quick and easy
comparison of these two Ethics of Peace, there follows below a
listing of some of the most important core commonalities and
differences within the respective ethical systems. The Buddha’s
teaching comes first in each instance, followed by Jesus’ teaching
regarding the same, or similar topic.
1. B: Extend not only to human beings throughout the world,
but to all sentient creatures, the gift of friendliness, loving kindness,
15
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compassion, joy and equanimity, without any degree of
discrimination of any sort, regardless of the nature of the condition
or set of conditions in any instance.
J: Love, not only your family, friends and neighbors but also
your enemies and those who persecute you, in order, thereby, to
become “sons of your Heavenly Father,” i.e., to become God-like.
2. B: Like a mother risking everything to protect her only
child, one should cultivate boundless love that pervades the whole
world, beginning with those one already knows and loves,
followed by those one doesn’t know, concluding with those one
knows but toward whom that one may harbor ill-feelings of dislike
or resentment.
J: You should love everyone with equal regard, just as Jesus
has loved you for, to lay down your life for your friends, is the
greatest love of all.
3. B: To believe one’s family and wealth to be enduring
personal possessions is self-delusionary, for one does not even own
oneself. Even though one may accumulate limitless worldly goods,
one succumbs to death in the end. Therefore, cultivate
righteousness – a treasure does not pass away and that thieves
cannot break in and steal.
J: Do not struggle to acquire wealth and power in this world
where time destroys all human accomplishments and where
robbers break in and steal; rather build up treasures in heaven
which can neither be destroyed nor stolen.
4. B: One should abstain from killing, from stealing, from
lying and from illicit sexual acts, in order to maintain a life of
moral purity.
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J: In keeping with the ancient commandment, one should not
murder, steal, lie, commit murder, commit adultery or dishonor
one’s parents.
5. B: The Buddha began his search for Truth by becoming a
“homeless wanderer” (śramaa), traveling about with no place to
lay his head; even after Enlightenment, he continued to wander
from place to place, intent on instructing all those who were
willing to listen and believe.
J: Jesus was a Palestinian peasant and a homeless itinerant
preacher and a charismatic healer and declared that he “has
nowhere to lay his head.”
6. B: The Buddha renounced the world of power and wealth
and abandoned his family (parents, wife and newborn son) to go
out, he knew not where, to search for, he knew not what – perhaps
the answer to his many questions and liberation from the angst that
overwhelmed him after witnessing the “Four Signs.”
J: You should “hate father and mother …. son and daughter,”
in order to become his disciple – meaning, love Jesus more than
your family and realize that, following Jesus often entails
abandoning family and your domestic responsibilities.
Despite the existence of a remarkable number of correspondent
ethical principles in these two Ethics of Peace, there remain,
perhaps, an equal number of dissimilarities. This is not an occasion
for puzzlement or amazement, for given the dramatic points of
disparity between the ancient Indian and the Palestinian religious
and cultural historical contexts, the wonder is not the plethora of
cultural contrasts, but the remarkable number of correspondences.
Here, then, are a few of the defining differences between the
Buddha’s and Jesus’ ethics:
1. B: A knowledge of the Truth about the nature of the world
does not come through divine revelation from God but through the
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practice of the principles of the Dharma, which the Buddha himself
discovered under the Bo tree and has delivered to mankind through
his ministry.
J: A knowledge of the Truth comes through divine revelation
from the Heavenly Father, that brings with it a requirement of a
life of obedience to the divine will as communicated through the
ministry of Jesus.
2. B: Salvation or liberation is acquired not through the grace
of a divine being but by each individual working out their own
salvation with diligence, in recognition that everything, including
the universe as a whole, is subject to change and decay.
J: Salvation comes through faith in Jesus’ message of love and
hope. Hence, no need to be anxious about daily needs; rather invest
complete trust in the reign of God’s power throughout the universe,
His readiness to provide all basic needs and, ultimately, his power
to grant deliverance from a self-centered, strife-ridden and selfdefeating life, to all those who believe.
3. B: No apocalyptic vision of the coming “end of the world,”
nor an appeal to any sort of kingdom, whether worldly or celestial
but rather complete renunciation of any notion of a “kingdom,” in
order to escape from all forms of suffering and the realization of a
life of peace and joy.
J.: An “apocalyptic” vision of his mission to usher in a new
historical era, characterized by the advent of the “Kingdom of God”
which is, paradoxically, both “at hand” and also “not of this world.”
4. B: No invocation of a divine or celestial “deliverer” and no
human teacher; only an unswerving conviction in the power of the
Dharma to provide the way to enlightenment and deliverance from
suffering to all those who embrace it and practice its principles.
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J: Teachings established on a single-minded faith in Yahweh,
the solitary God of the Jews and in his power to provide, not only
ordinary needs but, ultimately, salvation and, thereby, deliverance
to a state of righteousness, love and peace.
4. B: Belief, not in a divinely created and sanctioned Universal
Law but a cosmological law (Dhamma/Dharma) operative on the
basis of the principle of Dependent Co-arising and the
impermanence of all entities in the phenomenal world.
J: Belief in a divinely established and sanctioned universal Law,
revealed, initially, in and through the Law of Moses (notably, the
Ten Commandments) and all of the attendant ritual practices, to his
Chosen People (the Children of Israel), but consummated and
fulfilled in Jesus’ life and teachings (and according to the later
Church in Jesus’ death and resurrection on behalf of a sinful
humanity).
Conclusion
In summation, it is abundantly clear that the central doctrine of
both the Buddha’s and Jesus’ ethics is in the case of the Buddha
the injunction to practice universal loving kindness and equanimity
toward all creatures and in the case of Jesus, the love of all human
beings. Viewed historically, the Buddhist tradition has created a far
better record in living up to this universal love-ethics, than has the
Christian Church.16
Second, it is both self-destructive and self-delusionary,
according to both traditions, to invest one’s full attention and
energies to the amassing of wealth, power and prestige during a
given lifetime, to the exclusion of other, more personally and
socially beneficial values (such as the cultivation of moral and
spiritual principles, the amelioration of social ills arising from
social inequality, and the development of one’s own human
16
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potential for “the good”). The ultimate self-delusion is the
ignorance of the inevitability of death that will, in a moment’s time,
wipe away all that has been garnered during a lifetime.
Third, both Founders agree that all human beings should
subscribe to such basic and irreplaceable human values as not
killing, not stealing, not lying, and not honoring the fundamental
worth of each individual human being, simply, by virtue of their
birth in the world as a human being.
Fourth, and finally, one should anchor one’s life in
commitment to know and do the Good, understood minimally, as
“doing no harm to others,” and more than that, living to the best of
one’s ability, given one’s intellectual, moral, spiritual and material
resources, for the good of others.
This essay will close with a few brief remarks on a few of the
major differences between the ethics of the Buddha and Jesus and
the social and political manifestations of those differences in
historical perspective.
First, it can be said that Buddhism has managed, to a large
extent, to honor and live by its ethics of non-violence and peaceful
coexistence with a wide variety of other religions and cultures.
The historical facts confirm, with little or no room for doubt or
qualification on this point, that, unlike the history of Christianity,
the history of Buddhism, by and large, has spread through many
different cultures throughout the world, unscarred by outbreaks of
religious warfare, i.e., wars launched by or joined in defense of the
faith. Christianity, on the other hand, has been marked by attacks
on Christianity itself by members of others faiths (principally,
Islam), the Church’s launching of eight Crusades against the
Muslim world, the Spanish Inquisition of the 14th - 15th centuries
contain the outbreak of heresies against orthodox belief and, in the
case of the Thirty Year’s War in the 17th century, the warfare
between European Catholics and Protestants.
Second, the lack of a belief in a creator / ruler God in
Buddhism, in addition, to a shift by the Buddha of the focus of his
teachings away from himself and toward the teachings themselves
away, juxtaposed with the uncompromised Christian belief in a
single God, believed to be the lord of the entire universe (and
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consequently, of all peoples inhabiting that universe), and in his
Son, Jesus Christ (according to the later Church), believed to be
the only “Way, the Truth and the Life,” for all peoples, has given
rise to very different histories: (1) In the case of Buddhism, more
openness to and tolerance of other faiths, less doctrinal and
ritualistic exclusivism, and less compelled to defend, forcefully
and militaristically, its own understanding of the Truth, (2) in the
case of Christianity, ostensibly committed to the ethics of “turn the
other cheek,” love both neighbor and enemy and forgive wrongs
committed by others, but in reality, compromising or outright
transgressing that ethics repeatedly, throughout its two-thousand
plus year history of “wars and rumors of wars.”
And, finally, the Buddhist ethics is, theoretically, more
comprehensively environmentally friendly, by virtue of its
commitment to the ethics of non-injury and non-violence and its
adherence to a “reverence for life,” in all of its myriad forms, than
is the Judeo-Christian ethics, which is committed to the love of
human beings, only. For its parts, the Judeo-Christian ethics, as
articulated in the biblical account of the creation of the world,
included Gods investiture in human beings of the dominion over
all the lower, non-human creatures. It has been argued that one of
the fundamental reasons that modern science and technology
developed in the western world rather than in Asia is the twin
Judeo-Christian notions that the world is real and therefore, worthy
of concerted attention and physical development, and the
superiority of mankind over the whole of nature. It goes without
saying, the outcome of this “naturalistic drama” remains to be seen
in future times.
And, as the French saying goes, “plus ca change, plus c’est la
meme chose” (“the more things change, the more they remain the
same”).

APPENDIX
CHRISTIANITY AND WAR
Kenneth A. Locke
At first glance, it may seem odd to find a paper on Christianity
and war in a volume dedicated to exploring religions’ contributions
to peace. Why speak of war when the goal should always by peace
and loving-kindness? Is not war something that should be
eradicated? The answer to both these questions is, of course, “yes,”
but we must be careful not to fall into a simplistic naiveté. To say
that war is bad is not the same as saying that war is always the
worst possible course of action. At times, war may be the lesser of
two evils. While it would be nice if all peoples and nations could
resolve their differences through non-military means, reality
presents us with a far more complicated, ambiguous and disturbing
picture. Imperialist policies, violent ideologies, selfish desires and
megalomania continue to shape human interaction, giving rise to
violence, oppression, invasion and occupation. To insist on the
complete rejection of military action in the face of such destructive
forces is not only naive, it is foolhardy. It can lead to torture,
enslavement and extermination. Indeed, few today would argue
that it would have been better if the world had dealt with Adolf
Hitler through non-military means. In our ambiguous and deeply
flawed world, wars are sometimes necessary.1 The problem is not
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war, but unnecessary war. How are we to distinguish between the
two? This paper explores a Christian response to this question.
Christians must explore and talk about this question because
politicians rarely hesitate to invoke religion to justify military
action. In the run-up to the Iraq War, George W. Bush repeatedly
insisted that “our cause is just” and that President Saddam Hussein
was an “evil” dictator who had to be removed from power, thereby
combining the concept of justice with metaphysical / religious
ideas of good and evil. More blatantly, on March 17, 2003, when
President Bush announced military action against Iraq, he ended
his address with the words “may God continue to bless America,”
implying that God, at least up until then, was on America’s side.
However, probably most astounding was Bush’s statement at a
ceremony honoring soldiers killed in the Iraqi conflict: He
announced that these soldiers were now closer to God. Christians
cannot sit idly by while politicians use such religious language to
further their geo-political and military goals. They must speak out
and show what it truly means to be a Christian in our, at times,
violent world.
An almost immediate, but unfortunately not very helpful,
response to Bush’s language is to argue that Christianity rejects
completely all acts of violence. A number of scriptural passages
seem to support this view. Probably the most famous is Matthew
5:38-41:
You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and
a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, ‘Do not resist an
evil doer.’ But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek,
turn the other also; and if anyone wants to sue you and
take your coat, give your cloak as well; and if anyone
forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile.2
In the Beatitudes, Jesus states, “Blessed are the peacemakers
for they will be called children of God” (Matthew 5:9), and on the

2

All biblical quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version.

Appendix: Christianity and Peace

341

night of his arrest, he appears to condemn using violence for selfdefense:
Then they came and laid hands on Jesus and arrested him.
Suddenly, one of those with Jesus put his hand on his
sword, drew it, and struck the slave of the high priest,
cutting off his ear. Then Jesus said to him, “Put your sword
back into its place; for all who takes the sword will perish
by the sword.” (Matt. 26:50-52)
These scriptural passages illustrate Christianity commitment to
non-violence, even in the face of violent aggression.
Nevertheless, one must be careful not to overstate the case. In
spite of this non-violent message and preference for peace, from
the beginning, Christianity did allow for the possibility that
violence may sometimes be necessary. Jesus himself appears to
have engaged in violent action when he cleansed the Jerusalem
Temple:
In the temple he found people selling cattle, sheep, and
doves, and the money changers seated at their tables.
Making a whip of cords, he drove all of them out of the
temple, both the sheep and the cattle. He also poured out
the coins of the money changers and overturned their
tables. (John 2:14-15)
What is significant, however, is the reason Jesus engaged in
such action: In Luke 19:46, Jesus’ outburst at the Temple is
followed by the proclamation, “It is written, ‘My house shall be a
house of prayer, but you have made it a den of robbers.’” Jesus
was upset because money, rather than prayer and focus on God,
had become the center of Temple life. At issue, here was the
problem of idolatry, the worship of something other than God as
though it were God. The sellers and money changers in the Temple
were more interested in profit than in a relationship with God; they
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had chosen to worship money rather than the true God. As a result,
they had lost their connection with God and had degenerated into
“robbers.” In order to put an end to this idolatry in the House of
God, Jesus drove them from the temple. It would seem that
violence is justified when it is in service to the true God.
Connected to preventing idolatry is the fight for justice.
Repeatedly in the biblical literature, the idea of justified violence is
closely connected to the prevention of innocent suffering: “Wash
yourselves; make yourselves clean; remove the evil of your doings
from before my eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do good; seek
justice, rescue the oppressed, defend the orphan, plead for the
widow.” (Isaiah 1:16-17) God demands justice from his people and
holds them accountable for their actions. Those who fail to do
good will face violent consequences: “But if you refuse and rebel,
you shall be devoured by the sword….” (Isaiah 1:20) Simply
worshipping God is not enough: “What to me is the multitude of
your sacrifices? Says the LORD; I have had enough of burnt
offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts; I do not delight in the
blood of bulls, or of lambs, or of goats.” (Isaiah 1:11) What is
noticeable is that idolatry and injustice often overlap. Worship of
the one true God and the ability to maintain and defend justice are
two sides of the same coin:
“Teacher, which commandment in the law is the greatest?”
[Jesus] said to him, “‘You shall love the Lord your God
with all your heart, and will all your soul, and with all your
mind.’ This is the greatest and first commandment. And a
second is like it: ‘You shall love your neighbour as
yourself.’ On these two commandments hang all the laws
and the prophets.” (Matt. 22: 36-40)
There is a never-ending dialectic between loving God and
loving one’s neighbor. Failure to love God is to fall into idolatry, it
is to consider something else (e.g., money, power, ego) as more
important than God, and it invariably leads to injustice and the
mistreatment of others. At the same time, failure to love others,
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and the invariable suffering it causes, leads to idolatry, the worship
of a false God.
This uncompromising call to be both loving and just, however,
is at the same time a reminder of human weakness and failing:
How are imperfect humans to perfectly combine love and justice?
The two often appear incompatible. The acceptance, flexibility,
empathy and forgiveness cultivated by love seem at odds with the
rigidity, sternness, exactness and judgment demanded by justice.
Humans find it difficult to reconcile the two, and often end up
choosing between emphasizing love at the cost of justice, or
celebrating justice to the detriment of compassion. For Christians,
this human shortcoming is summed up in the word “sin.” Few
words are more misunderstood. In the Bible, a sin is not so much
the violation of a taboo or the transgression of an external
ordinance, as it is an action and/or thought which touches upon and
distorts a human’s personal standing with God. To commit a sin is
to alienate oneself from the divine.3 It is the failure to love God,
and thus it is the failure to love one’s neighbor and to maintain
justice.4 This is the profound negative implication the term “sin” is
meant to convey: a sin damages and distorts a person’s loving
relationship with God. Since it is God who perfectly combines the
practice of love with the practice of justice, sin separates humans
from the divine source which would enable them to do the same.
Nor can this separation be completely overcome. For
Christians, the problem is not just sin, but “original sin.” The
modern world tends to dismiss the idea of original sin too quickly.
Although in its classic formulation by Augustine (354-430) it is no
longer acceptable today, the fundamental message it was meant to
express remains relevant. Augustine formulated his description of
original sin in response to Pelagius (late 4th to early 5th century),
who taught that every human being could learn to avoid sin.
Augustine rejected Pelagius’ teaching because he believed it failed
to appreciate the tragic element in human life. Augustine argued
3
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instead that when Adam sinned against God, he ruined the entire
race.
Since then, Adam’s sin has been passed down from generation
to generation through the act of procreation. Every child is, from
moment of birth, infected with this sin.5 While it is probably best
to discard Augustine’s negative attitude toward sex and unfair
portrait of the newborn child, one must be careful not to lose sight
of the deeper truth he was trying to convey. Human behavior is
almost always morally and psychologically ambivalent. Humans’
best intentions go wrong and their hidden motivations remain
unclear even to themselves. The doctrine of original sin expresses
the deep tragedy that affects all human action. It reveals human
flaws and reminds people that their best efforts are often not good
enough. From the moment of birth, people are divided against
themselves, others and God. Humans are self-destructive, even
when they do not want to be.6 Nowhere is this better expressed
than in the words of Paul: “I do not understand my own actions.
For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate…. For I
do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do.”
(Romans 7:15, 19)
War is inevitable because sin (failure to love God and neighbor)
is inevitable. Thus, from a Christian perspective, it is the reality of
idolatry and injustice that fuels war. Consequently, Christians are
faced with an insoluble dilemma: as sinful humans, they contribute
to the cause of war, yet at the same time they are called by God to
struggle against those who cause war. Furthermore, this struggle
may itself involve military action. From its inception, Christianity
has acknowledged that the practice of war is not necessarily
incompatible with the Christian message. In the Gospel of Luke, a
soldier is praised for his deep faith:

5
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As Jesus had finished all his sayings in the hearing of the
people, he entered Capernaum. A centurion there had a
slave whom he valued highly, and who was ill and close to
death. When he heard about Jesus, he sent some Jewish
elders to him, asking him to come and heal his slave.
When they came to Jesus, they appealed to him
earnestly…. And Jesus went with them, but when he was
not far from the house, the centurion sent friends to say to
him, “Lord, do not trouble yourself, for I am not worthy to
have you come under my roof; therefore I did not presume
to come to you. But only speak the word, and let me
servant healed. For I also am a man set under authority,
with soldiers under me; and I say to one, ‘Go,’ and he goes,
and to another, ‘Come,’ and he comes, and to my slave,
‘Do this,’ and the slave does it.” When Jesus heard this, he
was amazed at him, and turning to the crowd that followed
him, he said, “I tell you, not even in Israel have I found
such faith.” When those who had been sent returned to the
house, they found the slave in good health. (Luke 7:1-10)
And no time in this exchange is the centurion’s military
profession held against him, nor is he required to abandon it for his
slave to be healed. The Book of Acts contains a long passage on
the centurion Cornelius, who finds favor with God and is baptized
into the Christian faith. Described as a devout man who gave alms
and prayed constantly, he experiences a vision of God which leads
him to contact the apostle Peter. Peter comes to his household and
tells him the story of Jesus Christ. The story culminates with the
Holy Spirit descending upon all who are listening, upon which
they are baptized in the name of Jesus Christ (Acts 10:1-48). As in
Luke, Cornelius’ military service is neither held against him nor
considered a stumbling block to becoming a Christian.
In the post-New Testament period, as Christians began to
contemplate military service at a deeper level, there arose the
recognition that being both a soldier and a Christian could be
problematic. A number of Christian writers began to urge their
fellows to avoid military service. What is noteworthy, however, is
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that they did so not so much out of a desire to practice nonviolence, but to avoid the danger of idolatry, the worshipping of
false gods. Tertullian (c. 160 – c. 225), for instance, while decrying
the pain and destruction caused by war, argued that the Roman
emperor, state and army were part of God’s plan on earth:
They know from whom they have obtained their power;
they know, as they are men, from whom they have received
life itself…. Without ceasing, for all our emperors we offer
prayers. We pray for life prolonged; for security to the
empire; for protection to the imperial house; for brave
armies, a faithful senate, a virtuous people, the world at
rest, whatever, as man or Caesar, an emperor would wish.7
The military might of the Roman empire was necessary to
assure stability, security and peace. Nevertheless, Tertullian’s
support for the army did not extend to an endorsement of Christian
military service. For him Christian life and military life stood in
total opposition:
But now inquiry is made … whether a believer may turn
himself unto military service, and whether the military way
be admitted unto the faith, even the rank and file, or each
inferior grade, to whom there is no necessity for taking part
in sacrifices or capital punishments. There is no agreement
between the divine and the human sacrament [the Latin
word sacramentum could also mean “a military oath”], the
standard of Christ and the standard of the devil, the camp of
light and the camp of darkness. One cannot be due to two
masters – God and Caesar.8

7
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Tertullian’s reference to “sacrifices” is important, for it
highlights what disturbed him most about the Roman army: It was
first and foremost a religious system with rituals that honored not
only Roman gods, but pledged obedience to the emperor, who was
considered a god. This was the key issue for Tertullian: Christian
participation in such a system was tantamount to worshipping
something other than God.9 This is why he chose to discuss the
problem of military service in his Treatise on Idolatry. Tertullian
even felt that wearing military dress was incompatible with
Christianity,10 and lauded a Christian soldier for refusing to wear a
laurel crown because it conflicted with his faith. 11 Hippolytus
(c.170 – 236), a contemporary of Tertullian’s, took a similar view.
In his Apostolic Tradition, he placed the occupation of the army
under the same footing as idolatry.12 While he argued that soldiers
who converted to Christianity “must be taught not to kill men,” he
particularly considered the soldier’s swearing of oaths and wearing
of “the purple” inconsistent with Christian practice. Indeed, he
insisted that “If a catechumen or a believer seeks to become a
soldier, they must be rejected, for they have despised God.” 13
Hippolytus was aware of the religious nature of military service:
the very practices of swearing oaths and wearing military garments
expressed a commitment to Roman religious beliefs. Like
Tertullian, he feared that the religious rituals and symbols that
permeated the Roman army would lead Christians away from the
worship of the one true God of Jesus Christ.
Origin (c. 184 – 254) represents a slightly different perspective.
He clearly linked being Christian with an inability to serve in the
military, but, unlike Tertullian and Hippolytus, he did not focus on
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idolatry. Instead, he insisted that living the Christian life was
completely incompatible with the practice of any form of violence:
And yet, if a revolt had led to the formation of the Christian
commonwealth, so that it derived its existence in this way
from that of the Jews, who were permitted to take up arms
in defence of the members of their families, and to slay
their enemies, the Christian Lawgiver would not have
altogether forbidden the putting of men to death; and yet
He nowhere teaches that it is right for His own disciples to
offer violence to any one, however wicked.14
Origin agreed that the ancient Israelites were justified in
resorting to war to ensure their survival, but he argued that such an
approach had never been meant to last in perpetuity. The Jewish
law, which permitted the making of war and the putting to death of
criminals, had been replaced by the Gospel of Jesus Christ, which
did not. 15 Nevertheless, Origin’s position did not lead to a total
blanket condemnation of war. While he rejected Christians serving
in the army, he did allow them to pray for the success of those
engaged in military action. For him all Christians were “priests,”
and, like their pagan counterparts serving in the Roman temples,
could not be required to enlist in the army, even in times of war.16
However, since Christians were “priests” in service of the one true
God, their prayers could help guarantee military success:
And to those enemies of our faith who require us to bear
arms for the commonwealth, and to slay men, we can reply:
“Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, and those
who attend on certain gods, as you account them, keep their
14

Origin, Against Celsus, III, 7, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations
of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, vol. 4 (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1972).
15
Ibid, VII, 26.
16
Ibid, VIII, 73.

Appendix: Christianity and Peace

349

hands free from blood, that they may with hands unstained
and free from human blood offer the appointed sacrifices to
your gods; and even when war is upon you, you never
enlist the priests in the army. If that then is a laudable
custom, how much more so, that while others are engaged
in battle, these too should engage as the priests and
ministers of God, keeping their hands pure, and wrestling
in prayers to God on behalf of those who are fighting in a
righteous cause, and for the king who reigns righteously,
that whatever is opposed to those who act righteously may
be destroyed.” And as we by our prayers vanquish all
demons who stir up war, and lead to the violation of oaths,
and disturb the peace, we in this way are much more
helpful to the kings than those who go into the field to fight
for them.17
Origin thought that war was caused by sin, and that sin was
caused by demons. It was these demonic forces that threatened
civil order and sometimes made war necessary. For him, a
righteous war was one undertaken to uphold social peace and
stability, and Christians had a God-given duty to support such wars.
Through their prayers, they could weaken the demons and ensure
victory. Ironically, although Origin forbade Christians to fight, his
concession that war could be righteous laid the groundwork for
what would later become the Christian theory of just war.18
Origin’s trust in the power of Christian prayer led him to argue
that the spread of Christianity throughout the Roman empire would
lead to the decline and eventual end of war:
But if all Romans … embrace the Christian faith, they will,
when they pray, overcome their enemies; or rather, they
will not war at all, being guarded by that divine power
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which promised to save five entire cities for the sake of
fifty just persons.19
Needless to say, this hope proved naive, and as Christianity
spread, no such decline took place. Furthermore, as the Roman
world became more Christian, it became more difficult to justify
Christian avoidance of military service. This proved especially the
case once the emperor himself converted to Christianity. In 312,
during a civil war over the imperial succession, Constantine I (c.
280 – 337) openly declared his commitment to Christianity before
battling his opponent Maxentius (c. 278 – 312) at the Milvian
Bridge near Rome. Constantine’s victory in the battle not only
made him emperor of the Roman west, but also guaranteed
Christianity state support. Twelve years later, he defeated the
emperor of the Roman east, Licinius (c. 250 – 325), and become
the undisputed ruler of the entire empire. With the head of the
Roman military state now a Christian, it was no longer politically
correct to insist that commitment to Christianity required the
unconditional avoidance of war and army service.
Consequently, Christians began to explore in more detail the
extent to which military service and the waging of war could be
compatible with service to God. For Eusebius (c. 260 – c. 340) the
answer was straightforward: Constantine’s military battles for the
imperial throne had actually been battles between the Christian
God and the pagan gods of Rome. Good had fought evil, and good
had triumphed. Commenting on Constantine’s final military
confrontation with Licinius, Eusebius argued that war was justified
when it was the only way to overcome evil:
[Constantine], perceiving the evils of which he had heard
[i.e., the persecution of the Christian Church] to be no
longer tolerable, took wise counsel, and tempering the
natural clemency of his character with a certain measure of
severity, hastened to succour those who were thus
grievously oppressed. For he judged that it would rightly be
19
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deemed a pious and holy task to secure, by the removal of
an individual [i.e., Licinius], the safety of the greater part of
the human race. He judged too, that if he listened to the
dictates of clemency only, and bestowed his pity on one
utterly unworthy of it, this would, on the one hand, confer
no real benefit on a man whom nothing would induce to
abandon his evil practices, and whose fury against his
subjects would only be likely to increase; while, on the
other hand, those who suffered from his oppression would
thus be forever deprived of all hope of deliverance.20
Eusebius appears to have had two criteria for justifying
Christian engagement in military conflict: (1) It had to be the only
remaining viable option for overcoming evil and oppression, and
(2) not going to war would cause greater suffering than going to
war. Since Constantine and his Christian soldiers had fulfilled
these criteria, their military actions were justified and righteous in
the eyes of God. 21 Christian reflection on war had shifted from
debating whether Christians could fight, to when they should fight.
It was Augustine (354 – 430) who probably made the most
significant and lasting contribution to this debate, laying the
foundations for what eventually became Christian just war theory.
Augustine’s ruminations on war were deeply affected by his
thoughts on good and evil. He concluded that supreme good was
achieved when “the flesh should cease to lust against the spirit, and
that there be no vice in us against which the spirit may lust.”22
Since all humans were tainted by sin, it was not possible in this life
to attain this supreme good; the best humans could hope for was,
through God’s help, “to preserve the soul from succumbing and
yielding to the flesh that lusts against it, and to refuse our consent
20
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to the perpetuation of sin.” 23 By “lust” Augustine did not only
mean sex, but such desires as ambition and greed that led people to
pursue their own selfish goals for power, recognition and wealth.
These selfish desires were evil, for they left humans feeling
dissatisfied, disappointed and distraught, and eventually turned
them against their fellows. This understanding of good and evil
deeply shaped Augustine’s thoughts on war, for it led him to judge
the rightness of military action not so much by its outer
manifestations, than by the inner disposition of its combatants.
Augustine believed that serving in the army and serving God
were perfectly compatible. Writing to the Christian military officer
Boniface in 421, Augustine advised him not to think “that it is
impossible for any one to please God while engaged in active
military service.”24 The Bible itself contained numerous examples
of warriors and soldiers who found favor with God. What was vital
for Augustine was that soldiers engage in combat with the proper
goals and inner disposition:
Think, then, of this first of all, when you are arming for the
battle, that even your bodily strength is a gift of God; for,
considering this, you will not employ the gift of God
against God. For, when faith is pledged, it is to be kept
even with the enemy against whom the war is waged, how
much more with the friend for whom the battle is fought!
Peace should be the object of your desire; war should be
waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may
by it deliver men from the necessity and preserve them in
peace. For peace is not sought in order to the kindling of
war, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained.
Therefore, even in waging war, cherish the spirit of a
peacemaker…. Let necessity, therefore, and not your will,
slay the enemy who fights against you. As violence is used
23

Ibid.
Augustine, Letters, CLXXXIX, 4, in A Select Library of the Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. 1 (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1974).
24

Appendix: Christianity and Peace

353

towards him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the
vanquished or the captive….25
For Augustine, the key to a just war was service to the causes
of peace and mercy and the avoidance of one’s own selfish desires.
Quoting Matthew 22: 37-40, he insisted that the Christian soldier’s
guiding principle must be the selfless love of God and neighbor.26
War itself was not evil, its evil lay in negative passions it could
invoke: lust for domination, ferocity of rebellion, and savagery and
cruelty. As long as soldiers served God and avoided these evil
passions, their engagement in combat was just, even if their rulers
instigated the war for unjust reasons.27
Augustine’s ideas proved paradigmatic, and laid the foundation
for what would eventually become a Christian systematic theory
for just war. This theory received one of its first distinct
formulations in the work of Thomas Aquinas (1224/5 – 1274), who
drew heavily on Augustine. Like Augustine, he did not consider
war in itself sinful; as long as three specific criteria were fulfilled,
Christians could engage in warfare:
First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command
the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a
private individual to declare war, because he can seek
redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior.
Moreover, it is not the business of a private individual to
summon together the people, which have to be done in
wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed
to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch
over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province
subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have
recourse to the sword in defending that common weal
25
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against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers
…; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword
of war in defending the common weal against external
enemies….
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those
who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve
it on account of some fault….
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have
a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of
good, or the avoidance of evil…. For it may happen that
war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just
cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked
intention.28
Like a number of his predecessors, Aquinas considered war
just if it was undertaken with the intention to safeguard social
peace and stability. Rulers not only had the right, but the duty, to
engage in warfare if evil forces of invasion and chaos threatened
society. In short, war was allowed if no other recourse was
possible, a legitimate authority declared war, those being attacked
deserved it because of their evil actions, and the guiding intent was
the quest for peace and order, not the fulfillment of selfish desires.
Although Aquinas’ thoughts on war have undergone
considerable elaboration and modification over the centuries, they
remain influential today. In a recent contribution to the topic, the
Roman Catholic Church’s Magisterium urged “everyone to prayer
and to action so that the divine Goodness may free us from the
ancient bondage of war,” but also acknowledged the right to selfdefense once all peace efforts had failed. 29 The use of military
force was allowed only under the following conditions:
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the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or
community of nations must be lasting, grave, and
certain;
all other means of putting an end to it must have been
shown to be impractical or ineffective;
there must be serious prospect of success;
the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders
graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of
modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in
evaluating this condition.30

The Magisterium emphasized that the ruling authorities had a
grave moral responsibility to ensure that these conditions were
fulfilled. Furthermore, once hostilities began, just war theory
demanded that equitable provision was made “for those who for
reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms,” that “non-combatants,
wounded soldiers, and prisoners … be respected and treated
humanely,” that “the extermination of a people, nation, or ethnic
minority” was a mortal sin, that people “were morally bound to
resist orders that command genocide,” and that “the indiscriminate
destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants” was
“a crime against God and man….”31
The debates over Christian just war theory are far from
resolved, but the above outlined developments over the last two
millennia have, at least, brought into focus the main issues of
concern: (1) The cause must be just: military force should only be
used to correct evils that threaten the massive violation of a
population’s basic human rights. (2) There must be right intention:
the just cause must be the actual reason for going to war, not a
pretext to hide less acceptable and selfish motivations.32 (3) There
must be comparative justice: the injustice suffered by the one side
must significantly outweigh that suffered by the other. (4) Only a
30
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legitimate authority may declare war. (5) There must be a
probability of success: arms, soldier and civilian lives must not be
wasted on lost causes, nor may disproportionate measures by used
to achieve minimal successes. (6) War must always be a last resort:
all peaceful and viable alternatives must have been seriously tried
and exhausted. (7) The benefits must outweigh the costs: not going
to war must result in greater evil than going to war. Only when
these criteria are fulfilled may a war be considered just.
Furthermore, once combat is initiated, there is the constant danger
that a just war may deteriorate into an unjust one. In order to
prevent this, combatants must abide by the following rules: (1)
War must only be directed at enemy combatants, never noncombatants; deliberate destruction of civilian residential areas that
lack military targets and acts of terrorism or reprisals against
ordinary civilians are prohibited. (2) The amount of force used
must be proportional to the evil suffered: the more disproportional
collateral civilian injuries and deaths, the more likely the war is
unjust. (3) The principle of minimum force must apply: only the
strength necessary to defeat the enemy should be employed.33
As helpful as these guidelines may be, they also highlight the
very painful reality of human weakness, frailty and failure. These
criteria for just war are open to massive interpretation, and it is
unlikely that any person or nation could satisfy them completely.
The difficulties are manifold. Determining just cause and right
intentions requires a level of self-honesty and self-reflection by
rulers and nations that is seldom achieved. Humans have great
difficulties being honest to themselves and others, and are masters
of self-deception. Truth is also often the first casualty of war,
greatly increasing the possibility that what was initially just
becomes unjust. How does one weigh the levels of suffering of one
side over against the other? Suffering is to some extent a subjective
experience, and one person’s great pain and sense of injustice may
be another’s minor irritation. What is a legitimate authority? Must
33
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it be a democracy and, if so, what kind of democracy? What
qualifies as a military success, how may innocent casualties be
acceptable? Other issues are also difficult to resolve. How does
one determine whether all peaceful alternatives have been
exhausted? Since the believed benefits of going to war lie in future
expectations, how reliable are they for judging whether not going
to war would be the greater evil? The future rarely turns out as
expected.
These difficulties illustrate the great tragedy of human
existence. It is simply impossible for human to be certain that they
have fulfilled and maintained all the criteria for a just war. Anyone
who claims such certainty is either lying in a dangerous state of
denial, or in the grip of demonic forces. In the end, human sin
permeates all, a fact Christians must keep in mind when they
contemplate military action. In our sinful world, driven by selfserving passions, war may at times be necessary to prevent even
greater evil. But even when war is justified, Christians must
constantly ask themselves how they failed: How did their own sin
contribute to the disaster, and how could their sin make the disaster
worse. We fear and rebel against such brutal self-honesty, yet it is
commanded by Jesus:
Why do you see the speck in your neighbour’s eye, but do
not notice the log in your own eye? Or how can you say to
your neighbour, ‘Friend, let me take out the speck in your
eye,’ when you yourself do not see the log in your own
eye? You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye,
and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your
neighbour’s eye. (Luke 6:42).
Under no circumstances should Christians engage in ware out
of a sense of self-righteousness, for this will invariably lead to a
dehumanizing of the enemy and greater tragedy. 34 Finally,
34
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Christians would do well to remember that victory could never be
an automatic retroactive justification for war.
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